Given the obvious differences between telling a story and setting out a philosophical theory or a carefully reasoned argument, the philosophical narrative is, on the face of it, an unlikely genre. It is rendered even more problematic when we come to the philosophical narrative for children, with philosophy and children being, in the eyes of tradition, an equally dubious combination. The philosophical novels of Matthew Lipman and others constitute an existence proof that such a (...) genre is possible, of course, but the mere fact that the attempt has been made does not nullify the claim that the form is disfigured or misbegotten. Indeed, without further examination, who is to say that the philosophical narrative for children is not a mongrel as both philosophy and literature, or that it can be called philosophical only by courtesy? In what follows I remark briefly on what makes writing philosophical and then apply those remarks to the philosophical narrative for children in order to explore both the difficulties and allure of the genre. (shrink)

The subject of the article is the philosophical narratives of secularization and their importance for the study of religion in modern society. I am focusing in particular on Charles Taylor’s narrative presented in his monumental A Secular Age. Contrary to some of Taylor’s critics, especially Ian Hunter, I argue that the philosophical approach to secularity presented by the Canadian thinker cannot be equated with ideologically marked “combat concepts” that characterize the emergence of modernity as a result of (...) either the overcoming of religion by autonomous reason or as the “self-alienation of Christianity”. The “conditions of belief” analyzed by Taylor indicate the mutual mediation of religion and secularity and provide a hermeneutical framework thanks to which we can criticize both the Enlightenment narratives about the triumph of religion over reason and religious visions, which perceive modernity as a theological phenomenon in its essence (John Milbank). Referring to David Martin’s considerations, I also draw attention to the heuristic dimension of Taylor’s narrative and its relevance to the research on religion. (shrink)

This paper discusses the relevance and the conceptual role, within Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, of a fleeting impression of shame that reverts the threat of solipsism looming over any project of transcendental philosophy. In reading Sartre’s masterpiece, I underscore two methodological points that tend to be bypassed in standard interpretations and lengthy discussions of the book. On the one hand, I safeguard the strictly descriptive core of Sartre’s presentation of the impression of shame and what it reveals about the formal (...) structures of the (pre-reflective) cogito, as Sartre understands it. On the other hand, my analysis explores the different phases of the (conceptual) narrative of the For-Itself, which Sartre inherits from the Idealist tradition in modern philosophy and applies to the concreteness of a phenomenological description of the main stages of one’s experience of the outside world. (shrink)

Introducing key ideas of narrative inquiry, this is the first book to explore in depth the theoretical underpinnings of the methodology. The authors open up ways of thinking about people's experiences and their lives, which are situated and shaped by cultural, social, familial, institutional, and linguistic narratives. The authors draw on a range of theorists, creative nonfiction writers, poets, and essayists. The book is arranged into five parts covering a range of topics including: embodiment, memory, knowledge, wonder, imagination, community, (...) responsibility, and place. Each section ends with a methodological discussion of their work involving refugee families with young children from Syria. (shrink)

Recently fiction has been given a central role in the engagement in philosophical thinking, especially within an educational setting. We find many configurations of this intersection of the narrative and the philosophical and the variances among them need noting if we are to critically examine how each form works. But there remains a troubling question: can fiction really offer up philosophical ideas without failing as literature and missing the mark as philosophy? While allegories and analogies have (...) a long and fruitful history of elucidating complex philosophical ideas, philosophers have taken pains to differentiate themselves from the crafter of tales. Philosophers have tended to prefer clear and sustained thinking through rational arguments over imaginative suggestion. Fiction is not philosophy. This paper will explore the different forms that narrative-as-philosophy can take and offer an assessment of the relative merits of these stories as invitations to philosophical thinking. (shrink)

Deep brain stimulation (DBS) has in some cases been associated with significant psychological effects and/or personality change. These effects occur sometimes as acute changes experienced intraoperatively or during the initial setting of the stimulator and sometimes as longer term progressive changes in the months following surgery. Sometimes they are the intended outcome of treatment, and in other cases they are an unintended side-effect. In all of these circumstances some patients and caregivers have described the psychological effects of DBS as frightening (...) or disconcerting. I trace the source of these negative reactions to the fear that stimulation-related psychological and personality changes represent a threat to personal identity and agency. This issue has implications both for philosophical theories of personal identity and agency and for clinical concerns. A narrative account of personal identity is developed to illuminate the nature of the threat to identity and agency DBS potentially poses, and to suggest steps that might be taken to mitigate and avoid these threats. (shrink)

The new Mizrahi narrative, presented by Israeli Mizrahi groups such as The Mizrahi Democratic Rainbow, presents a challenge to multi-cultural education. In particular, it repudiates the hegemonic meta-narrative of Ashkenazi-Zionist-Jewish-Israeli history that identifies the (White) Ashkenazi as the Zionist. The article summarizes a narrative-oriented academic research of the evolution of the new Mizrahi narrative in Israel, since the 1990s.It presents findings from historical, philosophical, and narrative analyses of texts from different periods of older and (...) newer Mizrahi struggles in Israel. The article presents a three-stage model of the development of resistance narratives that evolved, in this case, in opposition to the hegemonic Ashkenazi mega-narrative, and that employed different practices that facilitated their expression in social narrative networks. These stages are: (1) accounting for the past (placing historic, colonialist Zionism on trial); (2) writing a new (purely Mizrahi) historiography; and (3) creating an Arab-Mizrahi identity separate from the Ashkenazi hegemony (identified as occupational Zionism that has been violent against both Jews and Arabs, and which is an invasive, foreign growth in a non-European space). The article offers critical perspectives on the main philosophical and educational challenges of the new narrative which reveals that, historically, these three processes also involve use of stereotypes and assumed an elitist point of view that governed development of the resistance discourse. Such actions contradict the movement’s claim that the new Mizrahi narrative exists on purely moral grounds and seeks to liberate itself from these very same oppressive elements found in the dominant meta-narrative. In contrast, the analytical approach presented in this article allows for an analysis of the resistance narrative that changes the stage of liberation to one of unification. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophy of technology, in particular mediation theory, has largely neglected language and has paid little attention to the social-linguistic environment in which technologies are used. In order to reintroduce and strengthen these two missing aspects we turn towards Ricoeur’s narrative theory. We argue that technologies have a narrative capacity: not only do humans make sense of technologies by means of narratives but technologies themselves co-constitute narratives and our understanding of these narratives by configuring characters and events in (...) a meaningful temporal whole. We propose a hermeneutic framework that enables us to categorise and interpret technologies according to two hermeneutic distinctions. Firstly, we consider the extent to which technologies close in on the paradigm of the written text by assessing their capacity to actively configure characters and events into a meaningful whole; thereby introducing a linguistic aspect in the theory of technological mediation. Secondly, we consider the extent to which technologieshave the capacity to abstract from the public narrative time of actual characters and events by constructing quasi-characters and quasi-events, thereby introducing the social in our conception of technological mediation. This leads us to the outlines of a theory of narrative technologies that revolves around four hermeneutic categories. In order to show the merits of this theory, we discuss the categories by analysing paradigmatic examples of narrative technologies: the bridge, the hydroelectric power plant, video games, and electronic money. (shrink)

This inquiry examines various philosophical conceptions of identity and the clash between different identity narratives in the history of philosophy. The main goal of this paper is to show how the European philosophical idea of identity was developed. This paper explores the emergence of European philosophical identity narratives, which have shaped the ideas of justice, truth and community in Europe. It studies the foundational identity narratives that underlie the contested idea of a shared European heritage in law (...) and culture, such as the ideas of equality, tolerance, rule of law, pluralism and the rejection of totalitarianism, and their relevance for current debates on philosophical ideas of self and identity. Identity is an open process. It is a dynamic hermeneutic category, which is constantly reinterpreted and reinvented. There are various philosophical traditions of Cogito – some of them perceive it as foundation of all knowledge and some of them perceive it as a mere illusion. In all these philosophical perspectives, the self is understood only through interpretation. The self is constituted as a narrative, as a text. Understanding oneself means understanding oneself in front of a text. The self is reinterpreted all over again only in light of narratives provided by culture. The task of hermeneutics is not only understanding of a subject, but also rethinking the subject. (shrink)

The Psychology of Personhood: Philosophical, Historical, Social-Developmental, and Narrative Perspectives. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2014.881615.

This research focuses on the complex relationship between the musical narrative and emotional expression in piano works from a philosophical point of view. It aims at identifying how emotions are enacted within music and how they can influence and mold the listener’s experience. Building on the premises of important philosophical theories, the study explores the idea of musical narrative, its origins, and its impact on forming emotions within music. Emotional communication in piano works is also discussed (...) in the study, with an emphasis on how composers incorporate various musical features to portray certain emotions. Furthermore, this research elaborates on the philosophical perspective of musical narrative and emotional expression and contributes to the understanding of the aspects within the framework of piano music. The findings of this research are intended to add to the debates in the philosophy of music, with regard to performance and listener’s reception. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.4 (2003) 295 [Access article in PDF] Agency, Narrative, and Self:A Philosophical Case Conference John Z. Sadler and K. W. M. Fulford This issue of PPP features our second "philosophical case conference," which addresses three important and interrelated concepts in the philosophy of psychiatry. Our first philosophical case conference (Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology Volume 5, Number 2, 1998) featured detailed case (...) material concerning the manifold issues involved in psychiatric euthanasia. For this issue, guest edited by J. Melvin Woody, the rich cases supplied by Lloyd Wells provide the foundation for a discussion of narrative accounts of the self and what it means to be an agent.Philosophical case conferences are an occasional feature of PPP, and develop topics to satisfy one or more criteria: to provide discussions that are important to clinical practice or research, to embed current or perennial philosophical debates in the nitty gritty of clinical practice and personal experience, and/or to provide a clinical testing ground for new conceptual developments relevant to the philosophy of psychiatry.The format for this issue involves four feature articles, the first by Wells, presenting detailed case material of several patients, followed by discussions (by Kennett & Matthews, Phillips, and Woody) inspired by, or addressing explicitly, the philosophical questions implied in such cases. Following these four feature articles, a panel of commentators (Glas, Hardcastle, Radden, Thornton, Weiner, Woodbridge) respond to the four feature articles as they wish, providing the variations on the agency, narrative, and self themes. We think you will find this issue of PPP to be a fine example of what the philosophy of psychiatry can do, and we give our abundant thanks to Mel Woody for putting this issue together.... (shrink)

Both the itihāsa-s of the Mahābhārata and the Platonic philosophical ‘epode’ are often used to persuade in conditions where emotion threatens to incapacitate the person for argumentative discourse. Narrative reason has its own conditions of success and failure, opening up a discursive arena in which all kinds of utterances are welcome. Emphasizing the psychagogic function of the ‘once-upon-a-time’ reason, it is worth asking who the real protagonist of the story is and whether the story has a duty or (...) a dharma of its own to fulfill. Dharma and all the dilemmas it brings along with it constitute one of the fundamental problems that make up the whole Mahābhārata. In this essay I wonder about the dharma of the Mahābhārata itself—a literary work which gives itself the name ‘triumph’ (jaya)—and the cultural mission it fulfills in the lives of those who hear it, read it, study it, and share it with others. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers of science argue that models are a major vehicle of scientific knowledge. This applies to highly theoretical inquiry as well as to experimental or otherwise observational research, in both the natural and the social sciences. Making this claim is not yet very illuminating, given that there is a large variety of different kinds of model, and a number of ways in which they function in the service of science. The ambiguity of the term ‘model’ and the multiplicity of (...) kinds of model are illustrated by Pierre Duhem’s famous comparison of the mind of a continental physicist to that of an Englishman: the former strives for ‘theories’ that are formulated in ‘the clear and precise language of geometry and algebra’ and consist of abstract and idealized notions and formulae, while the latter insists on having mechanical ‘models’ that satisfy ‘his need to imagine concrete, material, visible, and tangible things’ that are familiar to ordinary experience. While the French or German physicist deals with a formalized theory in his account of electrostasis, the English account is in terms of ‘strings which move around pulleys, which roll around drums, which go through pearl beads, which carry weights; and tubes which pump water while others swell and contract; toothed wheels which are geared to one another and engage hooks. We thought we were entering the tranquil and neatly ordered abode of reason, but we find ourselves in a factory’ (Duhem 1954, pp. 70–1). Models in this sense—iconic models —employ analogies to visualize the mechanisms depicted, while formalized theories supposedly lack this property. On the other hand, it is nowadays customary to use the term ‘model’ also for such formal systems of equations, conspicuously so in the social sciences—and, much of the time, such formal systems are used for representing causal mechanisms. In relation to such a formal system, ‘model’ is also used for its various interpretations, or just for the interpretation that makes it true. The model muddle needs to be sorted out. (shrink)

Why do we tell our life stories? What is the point of studying narratives? What is the truth of narratives? How are narratives collected and studied by researchers? In this book the voices of teachers, education researchers, student teachers and philosophers join to form a polyphonic voice that attempts to answer these questions. They shed light on the obscure world of narrative research. This book contains both theoretical articles and empirical examples of narrative research. The theoretical articles introduce (...) and develop the basic concepts of narrative research and focus attention on its philosophical foundations. The empirical articles apply the narrative approach in a multi-dimensional way and provide a clear illustration of narrative research in action. The narrative data consists of teachers' stories about teacher education and school practice. (shrink)

The profound changes in personality, mood, and other features of the self that neural interventions can induce can be disconcerting to patients, their families, and caregivers. In the neuroethical debate, these concerns are often addressed in the context of possible threats to the narrative self. In this paper, I argue that it is necessary to consider a dimension of impacts on the narrative self which has so far been neglected: neural interventions can lead to a loss of meaning (...) of actions, feelings, beliefs, and other intentional elements of our self-narratives. To uphold the coherence of the self-narrative, the changes induced by neural interventions need to be accounted for through explanations in intentional or biochemical terms. However, only an explanation including intentional states delivers the content to directly ascribe personal meaning, i.e., subjective value to events. Neural interventions can deprive events of meaning because they may favor a predominantly biochemical account. A loss of meaning is not inherently negative but it can be problematic, particularly if events are affected one was not prepared or willing to have stripped of meaning. The paper further examines what it is about neural interventions that impacts meaning by analyzing different methods. To which degree the pull towards a biochemical view occurs depends on the characteristics of the neural intervention. By comparing Deep Brain Stimulation, Prozac, Ritalin, psychedelics, and psychotherapy, the paper identifies some main factors: the rate of change, the transparency of the causal chain, the involvement of the patient, and the presence of an acute phenomenological experience. (shrink)

This article aims to reveal the semantic dynamics of narratives on Rousseau in Kyiv academic philosophy of the 19th and early 20th centuries. through the separation of the informational layer from the rhetorical one in their content and the identification of hidden (unarticulated) elements that determined both the general nature of the narrative and the evaluative judgments of the narrators. Based on archival primary sources and printed editions (mostly bibliographic rarities), a historical and philosophic study of the narratives on (...) Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his philosophy of education performed, which were created and broadcast by professors of Kyiv Theological Academy and St.Volodymyr University Pamfil Yurkevych, Sylvester Gogotskyi, Markellin Olesnitskyi, Mykola Makkaveiskyi, Oleksandr Selikhanovych, and Vasyl Zenkovskyi. Keeping almost the same informational core, the narratives of Kyiv academicians on Rousseau differ significantly in terms of rhetoric. While the “older generation” goes into philosophical criticism of the pedagogical ideas of the Swiss thinker as the Stranger, the “younger ones”, limiting themselves to remarks about their controversial nature, represent him as the Self. This difference is due to both personal factors and institutional conditions for the development of Kyiv academic philosophy, as well as changes in the general political situation in the period of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. (shrink)

This is an exploration of how the narratives people construct during everyday living are shaped by certain limitations and regular patterns in individual memory. The book draws on themes in Walter Ong's analysis of memory and oracy. It also explores the relations between memory aids/supports and memory itself. The recognition of records as playing a role in memory adds a collective dimension and raises questions about the nature of historical truth. The ethical theme is based on the thesis that the (...) past can be redeemed or changed not just on the level of narrative, but also on the level of additional actions that can be related to prior actions in such a way as to justify a new narration of the events taken together. This means that the past can be changed, and this notion of redeeming the past is inspired by Christian thought. (shrink)

_Purpose._ The article aims to define the philosophical narratives about the "beautiful human" of Greek antiquity in the coordinates of the triad of "natural", "social" and "cultural" body. _Theoretical basis._ When achieving this purpose, the author based on the conceptual provisions of the philosophical anthropology of Н. Plessner, in particular, concerning the attitude of a limited body to its limit as an empirical comprehension of a human him/herself and the world. Developing the position of the body as a (...) socio-cultural phenomenon and proceeding from the definition of corporeality as a "transformed human body under the influence of social and cultural factors, which has socio-cultural meanings and performs certain socio-cultural functions" (I. Bykhovskaya) (transl. by O. G.), the triad of "natural", "social" and "cultural" body was used as a methodological basis to analyse the research object. _Originality_ lies in the explication of the peculiarities of aesthetic and anthropological discourse in Ancient Greek philosophy, not only through the prism of the dichotomy of "soul" and "body", but also through the prism of the triad "natural", "social" and "cultural" body, allowing rethinking of the narratives concerning the "beautiful human" of the formation period of the European anthropological aesthetics in Antiquity. _Conclusions._ The anthropological aesthetics of Greek Antiquity is masculine aesthetics, the aesthetics of the male "cultural body". If a man is an epistemological subject, he is able, despite the ugliness and abomination of his natural body, to reach the level of the cultural body, the level of "personal existence of corporeality". As for the female corporeality, since the Ancient Greek philosophy does not provide the status of an epistemological subject for a woman, she remains at the level of "social body". (shrink)

This study delves into the philosophical dimensions of the art market in the digital age, examining how historical identity intertwines with contemporary value. Using qualitative methods, including semi-structured interviews and case study analysis, the research investigates the strategic invocation of historical identity by artists to enhance the cultural and monetary worth of their digital creations. Findings reveal that established reputations in the traditional art world and the recontextualization of cultural artifacts—such as iconic historical events or artistic movements—significantly influence the (...) perceived value of digital artworks. For instance, algorithmic art and daily creation processes evoke deeper narratives that resonate with historical art traditions. The study also highlights the role of blockchain technology and NFTs in ensuring authenticity, fostering trust, and redefining ownership models. Scarcity, through limited editions or unique variations, further amplifies the perceived value of digital art. Artists like Beeple leverage their pre-digital careers and innovative techniques to command substantial market attention, while works such as Grimes’s "The Persistence of Chaos" illustrate the influence of celebrity on value creation. The research underscores the philosophical and cultural significance of digital art, exploring how historical identity and technological innovation converge to shape contemporary artistic value systems within a globalized digital marketplace. (shrink)

In this new book, Fr. Damian Ference proposes a more precise lens for decoding Flannery O'Connor's narrative art, one that originates in O'Connor's own words about herself: Hillbilly Thomism. The author examines the various ways in which St. Thomas Aquinas and the philosophical tradition of Thomism shaped not only O'Connor's view of reality but also the stories she told to help us see and know it."--from inside front flap.

This paper explores one of Unamuno's most challeng-ing short stories: Artemio, heuatontimoroumenos (1918). In this text, Unamuno deals with an experience for which he coins the expression ›self-envy‹. Is ›self-envy‹ conceptually sound? Or is it an unsuitable phrase for an emotional state that has nothing to do with envy? The paper proceeds in three steps in order to answer these questions. After presenting Unamuno’s Artemio, heuatontimoroumenos (section 1), the following section considers the notion of self-envy, which I interpret as a (...) singular but instructive case of envy (section 2). My attention then turns to a more general emotional state, which I interpret using the concept of akratic emotion (section 3). The paper concludes with some considerations as to the use of literature as a form of thought experiment for philosophical purposes. In sum, I show that Artemio can be efectively read as a thought experiment in relation to envy and akrasia, i.e., the state of acting against one’s better judgement. (shrink)

Morally unequal treatment of different nonhuman species, like pigs and dogs, can seem troublingly inconsistent. A position Todd May calls moral individualism and relationalism appears to justify the moral discomfit attending such species-differentiated treatment. Yet some of its basic assumptions are challenged by a philosophical style Roger Scruton called narrative philosophy. Expanding upon Christopher Cordner’s discussion of narrative philosophy, this paper develops a narrative-style philosophical critique of Todd May’s moral individualism and relationalism, especially its reductionist (...) understanding of moral reasons, consistency, and relevance. Such criticism opens up the possibility that the unequal treatment of nonhuman species like pigs and dogs is perfectly consistent and even justified. However, the paper then presents a narrative-style argument that such species-differentiated treatment may be morally inconsistent and unjustified after all. (shrink)

The concept of narrative matters to hermeneutics for two reasons. First, whatever else hermeneutics is, it is the practice and theory of the interpretation of texts. But narrative also matters to hermeneutics for a deeper reason. Hermeneutics is not just the interpretation of texts; it is also a philosophical outlook, one that sees the topics of meaning and interpretive understanding as central to the business of philosophy. Hence, the study of narrative presents specialized versions of many (...) of the questions that have been raised about hermeneutics as a philosophical outlook. Its different meanings all orbit around a core meaning connected with the symbolic representation of action. Even White, who calls narratives verbal fictions, thinks these fictions can say something true. Finally, the relationship between narratives and reality is difficult to clarify, because narratives describe an order that inheres in things themselves but that is transformed in being brought to language. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: 1. Introducing persons and the psychology of personhood Jack Martin and Mark H. Bickhard; Part I. Philosophical, Conceptual Perspectives: 2. The person concept and the ontology of persons Michael A. Tissaw; 3. Achieving personhood: the perspective of hermeneutic phenomenology Charles Guignon; Part II. Historical Perspectives: 4. Historical psychology of persons: categories and practice Kurt Danziger; 5. Persons and historical ontology Jeff Sugarman; 6. Critical personalism: on its tenets, its historical obscurity, and its future prospects James (...) T. Lamiell; Part III. Social-Developmental Perspectives: 7. Conceiving of self and others as persons: evolution and development John Barresi, Chris Moore and Raymond Martin; 8. Position exchange theory and personhood: moving between positions and perspectives within physical, sociocultural and psychological space and time Jack Martin and Alex Gillespie; 9. The emergent ontology of persons Mark H. Bickhard; 10. Theorising personhood for the world in transition and change: reflections from a transformative activist stance on human development Anna Stetsenko; Part IV. Narrative Perspectives: 11. Identity and narrative as root metaphors of personhood Amia Lieblich and Ruthellen Josselson; 12. Storied persons: the double triad of narrative identity Mark Freeman. (shrink)

The Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH) is a recently conceived, late entrant into the contest of trying to understand the basis of our mature folk psychological abilities, those involving our capacity to explain ourselves and comprehend others in terms of reasons. This paper aims to clarify its content, importance and scientific plausibility by: distinguishing its conceptual features from those of its rivals, articulating its philosophical significance, and commenting on its empirical prospects. I begin by clarifying the NPH's target explanandum (...) and the challenge it presents to theory theory (TT), simulation theory (ST) and hybrid combinations of these theories. The NPH competes with them directly for the same explanatory space insofar as these theories purport to explain the core structural basis of our folk psychological (FP)-competence (those of the sort famously but not exclusively deployed in acts of third-personal mindreading). (shrink)

One of Kant’s famous questions about being human asks, “What may I hope?” This question places individual life within an encompassing horizon of human history and speculates on the possibility of perspectives beyond death. In our time mortality is generally repressed, though the development of personal consciousness is closely linked to realization of one’s finitude. This raises especially urgent questions for children, and they are left to deal with them alone. From the time awareness begins, knowledge that death can occur (...) at any moment is one of the a priori determinants of being alive; that is, life is structured in advance by its future pastness. . According to Max Scheler, death reveals itself as a necessary and manifest constituent of all possible inner experiences in the life process. The cultural and individual interpretations of death’s meaning and consequences derived from this insight opened up an ample space for imagined possibilities of “continued existence,” which affected approaches to life. In our research project “Inochi – The Concept of Life after Death in Children’s Construction of the World. A German-Japanese Comparison,” carried out with German and Japanese research support, we examine concepts developed within the community of inquiry concerning “the individual’s afterlife” as soul, angel, animal, star, etc. In this we want to examine whether a globalized media environment leads to a cultural convergence in children’s ideas, and whether there are differences between views of girls and boys. Relevance of ideas about death is seen in the example of Japanese children who, believing in reincarnation chose “killing oneself” with relative frequency as a problem-solving strategy. Our contribution will present children’s imaginings using the drawings they created within this framework, since these can be interpreted as expressions of “narrative philosophizing,” especially for the Japanese children. Here we follow Mark Johnson who says” Human beings are imaginative synthesizing animals” . These imaginations make up a large part of our understanding, not just our beliefs, but rather our socially constructed way of being in and inhabiting a world. (shrink)

Are philosophical arguments as effective as narratives in influencing charitable giving and attitudes toward it? In four experiments, we exposed online research participants to either philosophical arguments in favor of charitable giving, a narrative about a child whose life was improved by charitable donations, both the narrative and the argument, or a control text (a passage from a middle school physics text or a description of charitable organizations). Participants then expressed their attitudes toward charitable giving and (...) were either asked how much they would hypothetically donate if given $10 (Experiment 1) or told they had a 10% chance of winning $10 and given the opportunity to donate from their potential winnings (Experiments 2–4). Across the four experiments, participants in all of the narrative conditions and in some of the argument conditions tended to express more positive attitudes toward charitable giving and donated about $1 more on average than did participants in the control conditions. These effects appear to have been mediated by the “narrative transportation” scale, which suggests that appeals to donate can be effective if they engage participants’ emotions, imagery, and interest. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 127 seems to imply. Of course, this critique can easily be dismissed as asking for a book that Krieger did not wish to write. His method has produced important results, for Krieger has discerned developmental trends overlooked by others. Otherwise, the only area that I think needs further discussion is Ranke's conception of the nature and function of science. Krieger seems to imply that science automatically means (...) a nomological approach modeled upon the mechanical physical sciences. But Ranke was nourished in an atmosphere where science was often equated with Naturphilosophie. Certainly, Ranke's language is filled with images and terms popularized by Naturphilosophen. Ranke's quest for a science of history may fit very nicely with the ideal dimension of his thought if the science that he is talking about is analogous to Naturphilosophie. It may turn out that the basic polarity in Ranke's idea of history is an analytic construct that has little meaning for Ranke's own intentions. Krieger ends his study with a chapter devoted to the meaning of Ranke's work for modem historiography. It is the dialectical synthesis of the whole study. After recapitulating Ranke's achievements, Krieger then emphasizes the breach that separates Ranke from our conceptual world. We no longer share Ranke's beliefs or values. In fact, for most of us "he must seem simply archaic, and the more he is himself historically restored the more archaic he must seem" (p. 355). For the reader who had to struggle through this difficult book and to contend with Professor Krieger's passion for complex dependent clauses, this announcement appears as a grand denouement. But the shock is only temporary. Krieger's assertion of the differences that separate Ranke from us serves as a warning to those who still take Ranke's approach as an objective model for historical reconstruction. The deeper meaning of Ranke's view of history is the affirmation of history as an autonomous and independent form of knowledge. "History is an inimitable way of rendering comprehensible modes of humanity which must otherwise be incomprehensible" (p. 356). This form of knowledge, which is devoted "to the actual but equipped with a language of common sense organized around the categorical," proceedes by arranging things along a time line (p. 357). Here Krieger launches a spirited counterattack against those modem theorists who have questioned the viability of history as an independent form of knowledge or who have minimized the importance of developmental analysis, preferring instead to concentrate upon relatively static deep structures. Krieger's study affirms Ranke's project in its most general sense; that history is a cumulative logic of the actual, "the meeting ground of philosophy, science, and cataclysmic experience" (p. 356). And it serves, at the same time, as a positive demonstration that a developmental analysis does impart knowledge that other approaches cannot achieve. In this sense, Krieger's masterful study of Ranke reaffirms Ranke's central position as a founding father of modem historical thought. PETER HANNS REILL University of California, Los Angeles Arthur Quinn. The Confidence of British Philosophers:An Essay in Historical Narrative. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977. Pp. xii + 289. Gld. 80. This is a remarkable book. Almost all of it is a study, very well researched and presented, of four major English philosophical movements: Newtonians, the Utilitarians, the Oxford Hegelians, and the Russell, G. E. Moore, and Whitehead group. The study shows the initial enthusiasm, optimism, and confidence of each of the groups. Each believed that it had found a way to solve the intellectual and perhaps moral and social problems of mankind. As each movement developed, the confidence slowly eroded when philosophical problems and difficulties failed to disappear. The picture Quinn presents of these movements is very interesting. He has grouped together 128 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY much detail that makes us see the original intentions of the leaders of each of these movements. He also deftly shows how as stumbling blocks arose each movement lowered its goals and began to fade. Employing a very wide range of printed sources, Quinn presents a series of convincing vignettes, and in so doing be often reveals features of these movements that have been... (shrink)

The advent of digital technology has revolutionized the way we interact with and interpret cultural heritage. This paper explores the profound philosophical implications of these technological advancements on the reinterpretation of ancient Dunhuang murals, a UNESCO World Heritage site known for its rich Buddhist iconography and historical narratives. By employing digital reconstruction and analysis techniques, scholars and practitioners are able to delve deeper into the textual and visual narratives, revealing previously obscured details and contexts. This study critically examines how (...) digital tools not only enhance visual accessibility but also challenge traditional interpretative paradigms, potentially reshaping our understanding of these murals' religious and philosophical significances. Through a synthesis of empirical research and philosophical inquiry, this paper discusses the transformative potential of digital technology in bridging the past with the present, thereby contributing to a renewed dialogue between ancient wisdom and contemporary philosophical thought. (shrink)

Sky Marsen proposes a new way of reading philosophy, through the lens of narrative semiotics she highlights the similarities between creative and philosophical writing and shows how theoretical texts, such as philosophy, rely to a large extent on strategies of communication present also in fictional narratives.

Relating Narratives is a major new work by the philosopher and feminist thinker Adriana Cavarero. First published in Italian to widespread acclaim, Relating Narratives is a fascinating and challenging new account of the relationship between selfhood and narration. Drawing a diverse array of thinkers from both the philosophical and the literary tradition, from Sophocles and Homer to Hannah Arendt, Karen Blixen, Walter Benjamin and Borges, Adriana Cadarero's theory of the `narratable self' shows how narrative models in philosophy and (...) literature can open new ways of thinking about formation of human identities. By showing how each human being has a unique story that can be told about them, Adriana Cavarero inaugurates an important shift in thinking about subjectivity and identity which relies not upon categorical or discursive norms, but rather seeks to account for `who' each one of us uniquely is. (shrink)

Using the bench trial of Colorado’s Amendment 2 as an example, this article focuses on the more general question of expert testimony in moral philosophy. It argues that there is indeed expertise in moral philosophy but argues against admitting such expert testimony in cases dealing with what John Rawls terms “constitutional essentials” and ‘matters of basic justice.” Developing the idea of public reason inherent in the Rawlsian concept of political liberalism, the article argues that philosophers can and should speak out (...) on public issues, if they do so with due respect for certain restrictions, but that they should not serve as expert witnesses on core constitutional questions, since doing so suggests that they claim a type of authority that would require fellow citizens to defer to their views. Such claims to authority in basic ethical matters threaten the mutual respect for divergent comprehensive doctrines that lies at the core of political liberalism. Philosophers have a duty to serve the public good, and they perform this service in fruitful ways. But they should refuse a public role that appears incompatible with equal respect for the committed ethical searching of their fellow citizens. (shrink)

The author draws attention to the fact that the new millennium has not lived up to the high expectations that the ideological project of «tolerant universalism» and «multicultural liberalism», with its focus on consensus, solidarity, respect for the Other, and emphasis on universal liberal values, could become the ideology of global progress in the 21st century. Instead, misunderstandings, wars, conflicts, and violence have not disappeared from the world stage. On the contrary, there is an observable «budding» of new and new (...) conflicts and wars. Conflict, like evil in general, has deep roots in both historical and psychological experience, as well as in the very ontology of humanity. Therefore, the issue is not about eliminating conflict but about qualitatively changing the direction of conscious human efforts – whether individual, collective, or socially organized. The author argues that, if restraint and tolerance are not cultivated, mutual destruction remains the alternative. We enter the modern world (which is not unified, but globalized) through the intersubjective space, through dialogical truths, and so on. This requires the establishment of new forms of worldview, new approaches to examining phenomena in nature, society, and the human being. Clearly, today there is a preference for research ideas and principles related to the synergistic approach, self-organization, self-creation, and self-reproduction, both at the level of the macrocosm and the microcosm. Philosophically, these ideas resonate with existentialist and phenomenological narratives and philosophies. The author currently points to the presence of such approaches in the thought of domestic philosophers. (shrink)

PROLOGUE Philosophers in pursuit of first principles often appear, even to fellow philosophers, to be off on a quixotic quest. Bertrand Russell, perhaps the ...

In this article, “Narrative Closure,” a theory of the nature of narrative closure is developed. Narrative closure is identified as the phenomenological feeling of finality that is generated when all the questions saliently posed by the narrative are answered. The article also includes a discussion of the intelligibility of attributing questions to narratives as well as a discussion of the mechanisms that achieve this. The article concludes by addressing certain recent criticisms of the view of (...) class='Hi'>narrative expounded by this article. (shrink)

Narrative is now a commonly used term in medical education, ethics, and practice. Yet the concept of narrative defies singular definition, and definitional and functional pluralism about narrative in health care remains underappreciated. Diverse conceptualizations of narrative are generically grouped under umbrella terms like “medical humanities” or “narrative medicine.” Such broad grouping risks undermining attention to relevant differences in use, meaning, or theory of narrative, overestimating the scope of certain criticisms of narrative practice (...) or use, while overlooking more insidious concerns. This essay moves toward a conceptual clarification of narrative in medicine through a process of naming and sorting. Narrative conceptualizations are grouped into narrative premises which include descriptive and normative claims about narrative, and narrative practices, which put narrative into action as process, method, or tool. A philosophical pragmatist approach to narrative in medicine reworks narrative anxieties about fact and fiction, truth or falsehood, in terms of the justifiability of belief, the inclusion or exclusion of experience, and the rationality of practices that are never perfect and always up for revision. (shrink)

The notion that narratives play an important cognitive role in our ability to make sense of the world has become an intellectual commonplace. Peter Lamarque notes that “narratives are prominent in human lives, not only in the obvious places like literature, history and biography, but in virtually all forms of reflective cognition.”1 The argument that I present in this paper draws on a particular understanding of the significance of narrative for the constitution of selfhood. This understanding was first articulated (...) by Alasdair MacIntyre in After Virtue. In the 1950s the German philosopher Wilhelm Schapp had already noted the ubiquity of narrative in our lives. As Schapp writes in In Geschichten verstrickt... (shrink)

Narratives relate salient connected events across some time and many particular details of the agents involved in those events. Whether fictional or true, historical or current, personal or cultural, they seem to pervade human experience and, according to theorists across different philosophical traditions, can be of some help to elucidate concerns in the moral life. Thomas Aquinas himself acknowledges the existence of such things, or at least their near analogues, in various places in his corpus. But he does not (...) offer a sustained explanation of how narratives are understood in terms of his psychology. In this paper, I claim that such an account lies in his thought on the functioning of two interior senses in particular – the cogitative power (vis cogitativa) and the memorative power (vis memorativa) – which have been the subject of more sustained study only more recently. With this account of how humans generate and process such narratives, Thomistic scholars will be positioned to explain how narratives may function in human experience, especially the moral life, on Thomistic terms. (shrink)

While environmental philosophers have been striving to extend ethics to deal with future generations and nonhuman life forms, very little work has been undertaken to address what is perhaps a more profound deficiency in received ethical doctrines, that they have very little impact on how people live. I explore Alasdair MacIntyre’s work on narratives and traditions and defend a radicalization of his arguments as a direction for making environmental ethics efficacious.

This paper is about visual narratives. Most of the examples used in the philosophical literature on narratives are literary ones. But a general account of narrative needs to be able to cover both pictorial and literary cases. In the first part of the paper, I will argue that none of the most influential accounts of narrative are capable of this. In the second part, I outline an account of visual narratives, or, rather, of our engagement with visual (...) narratives. (shrink)

In “Mad Narratives: Self-Constitutions Through the Diagnostic Looking Glass,” by using narrative approaches to the self, I explore how the diagnosis of mental disorder shapes personal identities and influences flourishing. My particular focus is the diagnosis grounded on the criteria provided by the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). I develop two connected accounts pertaining to the self and mental disorder. I use the memoirs and personal stories written by the subjects with a DSM diagnosis as illustrations to (...) bolster my claims. First, expanding on the narrative approaches to the self, I explain how narratives about a subject shape her self-constitution. I elucidate how this process is generated by drawing on research in developmental psychology, cognitive science, and social psychology. Next, using this account as a springboard, I argue that the DSM diagnosis of mental disorder serves as a source of narrative, entering into the patients’ autobiographical and social narratives. This plays an important role in the diagnosed subjects’ self-understanding, self-constitution and flourishing. In this vein, how mental disorders are classified is not only a theoretical question about accurately taxonomizing the various experiences related to mental distress but also an ethical question about which ways of talking about mental disorders will allow subjects to respond effectively to their psychological distress, to flourish and to live autonomous and fulfilling lives. Finally, I suggest that the DSM-based narratives wield a double-edged sword when it comes to the subject’s flourishing: On the one hand, there are problems with some DSM-based narratives that stem from the DSM diagnostic schema and the culture of DSM diagnoses. These problems render these DSM-based narratives unbeneficial for flourishing as they constrain the range of adoptive social, cognitive and emotional responses the subjects can give to their mental disorders. On the other hand, there are grounds to believe that some DSM-based narratives help subjects to flourish. For instance, they provide certainty to subjects' otherwise puzzling symptoms and help them reach out to others with similar experiences. Understanding how the DSM-based narratives can both benefit and harm will help us address problems with psychiatric diagnoses and the dissemination of knowledge about mental disorders in popular culture. The project aims to convince both philosophers and psychiatrists that no plausible theory of the self can be developed without attending to the topic of mental disorder and that no theory of mental disorder can be complete without devising the tools provided by the philosophical approaches to the self as well as developmental and social psychology. It also calls for methodological alterations in mental health ethics research, arguing that a careful scrutiny of mental disorder memoirs can advance the ethical underpinnings to the practice of psychiatry. (shrink)