Innovating new experiences is an innovation strategy that increases product differentiation and the perceived value of offers for future autonomous cars. Young Chinese customers are a relevant target group of lead users to co-create those experiences. We address the co-creation of memorable and engaging experiences with targeted potential users and the building of the meaning of experiential imaginary that results from innovations (based on digital media) echoing the need for sensory atmospherics while strolling in the city. We aim at understanding (...) how customers can co-create meaningful experiences. We analyze the narrative structures of the experiential imaginaries, considering the narratives as a major component of ambiance experiences and imaginary. With an empirical approach that associates projective techniques to semiotic analysis of the corresponding narratives, we describe the structural system of the experiential imaginary of young Chinese customers when imagining driving in the city in tomorrow’s cars. Semiotics offers a novel contribution to innovation marketing and idea generation of experiential innovations. This theoretical stance valorizes the outside-in paradigm of future lead-users as co-creators of innovative experiences, whose imaginary narratives are raw materials for creativity. This approach is an alternative to brainstorming and its limits for creating disruptive innovations. (shrink)

This paper argues that besides mechanistic explanations, there is a kind of explanation that relies upon “topological” properties of systems in order to derive the explanandum as a consequence, and which does not consider mechanisms or causal processes. I first investigate topological explanations in the case of ecological research on the stability of ecosystems. Then I contrast them with mechanistic explanations, thereby distinguishing the kind of realization they involve from the realization relations entailed by mechanistic explanations, and explain how both (...) kinds of explanations may be articulated in practice. The second section, expanding on the case of ecological stability, considers the phenomenon of robustness at all levels of the biological hierarchy in order to show that topological explanations are indeed pervasive there. Reasons are suggested for this, in which “neutral network” explanations are singled out as a form of topological explanation that spans across many levels. Finally, I appeal to the distinction of explanatory regimes to cast light on a controversy in philosophy of biology, the issue of contingence in evolution, which is shown to essentially involve issues about realization. (shrink)

The paper presents a new logic for reasoning about the formation of beliefs through perception or through inference in non-omniscient resource-bounded agents. The logic distinguishes the concept of explicit belief from the concept of background knowledge. This distinction is reflected in its formal semantics and axiomatics: we use a non-standard semantics putting together a neighborhood semantics for explicit beliefs and relational semantics for background knowledge, and we have specific axioms in the logic highlighting the relationship between the two concepts. Mental (...) operations of perceptive type and inferential type, having effects on epistemic states of agents, are primitives in the object language of the logic. At the semantic level, they are modelled as special kinds of model-update operations, in the style of dynamic epistemic logic. Results about axiomatization, decidability and complexity for the logic are given in the paper. (shrink)

This paper is based on the archives of Michel Foucault collected (since 2013) at the Manuscripts Department of the Bibliothèque nationale de France in Paris. Our investigation focuses in particular on a complete manuscript, until now totally unknown and entitled ‘ Phénoménologie et psychologie’ (‘Phenomenology and Psychology’). This manuscript could be the first project for a thesis devoted to ‘The Notion of the “World” in Phenomenology’, written around 1953–4, at the same time as a manuscript on Binswanger and existential psychiatry (...) and as a manuscript on philosophical anthropology. We aim to show the importance that phenomenology seems to have held for Foucault at the beginning of the 1950s and in particular the role that it could have played in Foucault’s distancing himself from a naturalist psychology and a philosophy of consciousness to which he opposes a philosophy of the world, of being and of language. Foucault thus discovers a truth of the phenomenology which rests on the radicality of the transcendental gesture and on the access to an ontology gathering the being, the meaning and the language. (shrink)

According to one productive and influential approach to cognition, categorization, object recognition, and higher level cognitive processes operate on a set of fixed features, which are the output of lower level perceptual processes. In many situations, however, it is the higher level cognitive process being executed that influences the lower level features that are created. Rather than viewing the repertoire of features as being fixed by low-level processes, we present a theory in which people create features to subserve the representation (...) and categorization of objects. Two types of category learning should be distinguished. Fixed space category learning occurs when new categorizations are representable with the available feature set. Flexible space category learning occurs when new categorizations cannot be represented with the features available. Whether fixed or flexible, learning depends on the featural contrasts and similarities between the new category to be represented and the individual's existing concepts. Fixed feature approaches face one of two problems with tasks that call for new features: If the fixed features are fairly high level and directly useful for categorization, then they will not be flexible enough to represent all objects that might be relevant for a new task. If the fixed features are small, subsymbolic fragments (such as pixels), then regularities at the level of the functional features required to accomplish categorizations will not be captured by these primitives. We present evidence of flexible perceptual changes arising from category learning and theoretical arguments for the importance of this flexibility. We describe conditions that promote feature creation and argue against interpreting them in terms of fixed features. Finally, we discuss the implications of functional features for object categorization, conceptual development, chunking, constructive induction, and formal models of dimensionality reduction. Key Words: concept learning; conceptual development; features; perceptual learning; stimulus encoding. (shrink)

Philosophers of science have recently focused on the scientific activity of modeling phenomena, and explicated several of its properties, as well as the activities embedded into it. A first approach to modeling has been elaborated in terms of representing a target system: yet other epistemic functions, such as producing data or detecting phenomena, are at least as relevant. Additional useful distinctions have emerged, such as the one between phenomenological and mechanistic models. In biological sciences, besides mathematical models, models now come (...) in three forms: in vivo, in vitro and in silico. Each has been investigated separately, and many specific problems they raised have been laid out. Another relevant distinction is disciplinary: do models differ in significant ways according to the discipline involved—medicine or biology, evolutionary biology or earth science? Focusing on either this threefold distinction or the disciplinary boundaries reveals that they might not be sufficient from a philosophical perspective. On the contrary, focusing on the interaction between these various kinds of models, some interesting forms of explanation come to the fore, as is exemplified by the papers included in this issue. On the other hand, a focus on the use of models, rather than on their content, shows that the distinction between biological and medical models is theoretically sound. (shrink)

It is already known that unifiable formulas in normal modal logic |$\textbf {K}+\square ^{2}\bot $| are either finitary or unitary and unifiable formulas in normal modal logic |$\textbf {Alt}_{1}+\square ^{2}\bot $| are unitary. In this paper, we prove that for all |$d{\geq }3$|⁠, unifiable formulas in normal modal logic |$\textbf {K}+\square ^{d}\bot $| are either finitary or unitary and unifiable formulas in normal modal logic |$\textbf {Alt}_{1}+\square ^{d}\bot $| are unitary.

ABSTRACT We consider the question of the complete axiomatization of a relative modal logic with composition and intersection.

Following a previous elaboration of the concept of weak individuality and some examples of its instances in ecology and biology, the article focuses on general features of the concept, arguing that in any ontological field individuals are understood on the basis of our knowledge of interactions, through the application of these general formulas for extracting individuals from interactions. Then, the specificities of the individuality in the sense of this weak concept are examined in ecology; I conclude by addressing the differences (...) between ecosystems and organisms as they appear in the viewpoint of such concept. (shrink)

Whereas many others have scrutinized the Allais paradox from a theoretical angle, we study the paradox from an historical perspective and link our findings to a suggestion as to how decision theory could make use of it today. We emphasize that Allais proposed the paradox asa normative argument, concerned with ‘the rational man’ and not the ‘real man’, to use his words. Moreover, and more subtly, we argue that Allais had an unusual sense of the normative, being concerned not so (...) much with therationality of choicesas with therationality of the agent as a person. These two claims are buttressed by a detailed investigation – the first of its kind – of the 1952 Paris conference on risk, which set the context for the invention of the paradox, and a detailed reconstruction – also the first of its kind – of Allais’s specific normative argument from his numerous but allusive writings. The paper contrasts these interpretations of what the paradox historically represented, with how it generally came to function within decision theory from the late 1970s onwards: that is, as an empirical refutation of the expected utility hypothesis, and more specifically of the condition of von Neumann–Morgenstern independence that underlies that hypothesis. While not denying that this use of the paradox was fruitful in many ways, we propose another use that turns out also to be compatible with an experimental perspective. Following Allais’s hints on ‘the experimental definition of rationality’, this new use consists inletting the experiment itself speak of the rationality or otherwise of the subjects. In the 1970s, a short sequence of papers inspired by Allais implemented original ways of eliciting the reasons guiding the subjects’ choices, and claimed to be able to draw relevant normative consequences from this information. We end by reviewing this forgotten experimental avenue not simply historically, but with a view to recommending it for possible use by decision theorists today. (shrink)

In this review of Christian Marazzi’s book Et vogue l’argent , the discussion concentrates on three questions which are central to the analysis of post fordist capitalism: 1. Is there really a dissociation between financial investment and productive investment, and should one not rather recognize a new capitalist stratum constituted by the association between the managers of investment funds and the top-level administrators of the great productive firms? 2. Does the notion of the mass worker, as used by Marazzi, not (...) tend to both to underestimate the productivity of the Taylorist worker and to overestimate his political activism ? And finally, 3. Should the focal point of emergent productivity not be grasped as much in terms of the event as in terms of linguistic communication ? (shrink)

The product of two $\textbf {Alt}$ logics possesses the polynomial product finite model property and its membership problem is $\textbf {coNP}$-complete. Using a reduction from an undecidable domino-tiling problem, we prove that its admissibility problem is undecidable.

We define and study the notion of an indexed frame. This is a bi-dimensional structure consisting of a Cartesian product equipped with relations which only relate pairs if they coincide in one of their components. We show that these structures are quite ubiquitous in modal logic, showing up in the literature as products of Kripke frames, subset spaces, or temporal frames for STIT logics. We show that indexed frames are completely characterised by their ‘orthogonal’ relations, and we provide their sound (...) and complete logic. Using these ‘orthogonality’ results, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for an arbitrary Kripke frame to be isomorphic to certain well-known bi-dimensional structures. (shrink)

Based on the analysis of narrations in Free Indirect Discourse and the Historical Present, we argue that the grammatical notion of context of speech should be ramified into a Context of Thought and a Context of Utterance. Tense and person depend on the Context of Utterance, while all other indexicals are evaluated with respect to the Context of Thought. Free Indirect Discourse and the Historical Present are analyzed as special combinatorial possibilities that arise when the two contexts are distinct, and (...) exactly one of them is presented as identical to the physical point at which the sentence is articulated. (shrink)

The problem of unification in a normal modal logic $L$ can be defined as follows: given a formula $\varphi$, determine whether there exists a substitution $\sigma$ such that $\sigma $ is in $L$. In this paper, we prove that for several non-symmetric non-transitive modal logics, there exists unifiable formulas that possess no minimal complete set of unifiers.

Nous nous proposons de revenir dans cet article sur le partage explicité par Michel Foucault en 1978 entre une « philosophie de l’expérience, du sens et du sujet » et une «philosophie du savoir, de la rationalité et du concept » dans la tradition de laquelle s’inscrirait plutôt son propre travail archéologique. Nous montrons qu’appliqué aux premiers écrits de Foucault, un tel partage se trouve singulièrement brouillé, en particulier du fait des usages variables que ces écrits font de la notion (...) d’expérience, d’abord ramenée du côté de l’expérience vécue, avant d’être dédoublée en expérience historique et expérience-limite. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to give new kinds of modal logics suitable for reasoning about regions in discrete spaces. We call them dynamic logics of the region-based theory of discrete spaces. These modal logics are linguistic restrictions of propositional dynamic logic with the global diamond E. Their formulas are equivalent to Boolean combinations of modal formulas like E(A ∧ ⟨α⟩ B) where A and B are Boolean terms and α is a relational term. Examining what we can say (...) about dynamic models when we use formulas to describe them, we successively address the axiomatization/completeness issue and the decidability/complexity issue of our dynamic logics of the region-based theory of discrete spaces. (shrink)

This article examines the points of similarity and the differences between the Patočkian concept of interpellation and Merleau-Ponty’s concept of chiasmus. These two modes of relating-to-being through language and body, perception and space share the same character of reversibility and openness to the other. However, the “co-respondance” between the subject and the world is not approached by the two phenomenological philosophers from the same perspective. Being-questioned is the inter-psychical event specific to one’s experience of others and of the world; the (...) chiasmatic structure is the bedrock of the ontological relationship and the intercorporeity of beings. Close, but distinct one from the other, interpellation and chiasm partially reveal the common preoccupations of two philosophers whose dialogue History never allowed to occur. (shrink)

Si le racisme consiste à exclure une personne ou un groupe de personnes sur la base d’un critère arbitraire (quel qu’il soit), alors la fraternité républicaine, qui se veut universelle, est l’exact contraire du racisme. L’objet du présent texte est de montrer que la construction de cette notion suppose un long chemin. Considérer tout être humain comme un frère ne va nullement de soi ; c’est le résultat d’une évolution lente et complexe, tant historique qu’individuelle. Il s’agit de comprendre en (...) particulier le secret de l’altruisme sincère : c’est l’exclusion, l’injustice et l’illusion qui permettent seules la naissance de l’altruisme. (shrink)

Réponse à la critique de mon article sur l’antispécisme (« La critique du « spécisme » comme illusion métaphysique », L’Enseignement philosophique, 69 e année, n° 3, mars-mai 2019) par Malo Morvan.

The West African Ebola epidemic has set in motion a collective endeavour to conduct accelerated clinical trials, testing unproven but potentially lifesaving interventions in the course of a major public health crisis. This unprecedented effort was supported by the recommendations of an ad hoc ethics panel convened in August 2014 by the WHO. By considering why and on what conditions the exceptional circumstances of the Ebola epidemic justified the use of unproven interventions, the panel's recommendations have challenged conventional thinking about (...) therapeutic development and clinical research ethics. At the same time, unanswered ethical questions have emerged, in particular: the specification of exceptional circumstances, the specification of unproven interventions, the goals of interventional research in terms of individual versus collective interests, the place of adaptive trial designs and the exact meaning of compassionate use with unapproved interventions. Examination of these questions, in parallel with empirical data from research sites, will help build pragmatic foundations for disaster research ethics. Furthermore, the Ebola clinical trials signal an evolution in the current paradigms of therapeutic research, beyond the case of epidemic emergencies. (shrink)

Le rapport de Spinoza à l’histoire est ici envisagé comme rapport à l’histoire de la philosophie. Il s’agit non d’une recherche de sources ou d’influences de la doctrine, mais d’examiner le geste propre qu’aurait Spinoza-philosophe de rappeler le passé de la philosophie. Peut-on légitimement qualifier d’« historique » l’usage qu’il fait de ce passé? L’évocation, la correction ou la réfutation font-elles apparaître, sous la plume de Spinoza, une forme d’historicité de la philosophie? L’idée ici proposée est la suivante : la (...) considération successive des philosophes, des mots et des motifs de rédaction des Principia ne révèle, en dépit des apparences, nulle histoire authentique, mais autant de stratégies discursives (tracer, narrer, constituer) propres à établir les éléments d’une « vraie » philosophie et, par là même, à se situer soi-même par démarcation et promotion d’une pensée propre. (shrink)

‘Statisticalists’ argue that the individual interactions of organisms taken together constitute natural selection. On this view, natural selection is an aggregated effect of interactions rather than some added cause acting on populations. The statisticalists’ view entails that natural selection and drift are indistinguishable aggregated effects of interactions, so that it becomes impossible to make a difference between them. The present paper attempts to make sense of the difference between selection and drift, given the main insights of statisticalism; basically, it will (...) disentangle the various kinds of indistinguishability between selection and drift that happen within biology, by examining the epistemological and metaphysical nature of the distinction between selection and drift. It will be based on a ‘difference-making account’ of selection. The first section will explicate the inscrutability of selection and drift, its various types in the statisticalist writings, and its implications. The second section specifies concepts of natural selection and drift in the difference making account of selection I am using, and shows that one can derive from this the statistical signatures of selection and drift. On this basis I focus on one sort of indistinguishability issue about selection and drift, which I call epistemic opacity, and explain why it mostly affects small populations. The last section explains why epistemic opacity does not raise an genuine epistemic problem for evolutionary biology. (shrink)

La bonne nouvelle (l'évangile), c'est que tous les hommes, sans distinction de culture ou de religion, sont en tant qu'êtres de la Nature dotés de raison et d'intuition et sont, de ce fait, capables d'acquérir une connaissance vraie de cette Nature dont ils font partie et donc de leur propre nature. Ils sont déterminés par cette Nature à être heureux. Cet ouvrage démontre comment Spinoza a conçu et la métaphysique de la Substance et l'éthique, en vue de nous introduire à (...) cette connaissance du bonheur qui en découle. (shrink)