Cet ouvrage se propose de degager un champ de recherche aux confins de la psychomecanique du langage et de la psychologie genetique, de mettre a jour les desseins croises de ces deux theories. De la reussite de l'entreprise ou de son echec depend en partie une meilleure comprehension de l'acquisition des connaissances linguistiques par l'enfant et celle du rapport langage-pensee et donc du fonctionnement du langage pris en charge par un sujet parlant ou ecrivant, celles des mecanismes structuraux porteurs de (...) la realisation de l'acte de langage avec ses variations idiolectales ou sociolectales. Pour acceder a la psycholinguistique et plus generalement a une anthropologie du langage, le chercheur doit disposer d'une theorisation precise de l'objet qu'est le langage, condition de toute amplification interdisciplinaire. (shrink)

Innovating new experiences is an innovation strategy that increases product differentiation and the perceived value of offers for future autonomous cars. Young Chinese customers are a relevant target group of lead users to co-create those experiences. We address the co-creation of memorable and engaging experiences with targeted potential users and the building of the meaning of experiential imaginary that results from innovations (based on digital media) echoing the need for sensory atmospherics while strolling in the city. We aim at understanding (...) how customers can co-create meaningful experiences. We analyze the narrative structures of the experiential imaginaries, considering the narratives as a major component of ambiance experiences and imaginary. With an empirical approach that associates projective techniques to semiotic analysis of the corresponding narratives, we describe the structural system of the experiential imaginary of young Chinese customers when imagining driving in the city in tomorrow’s cars. Semiotics offers a novel contribution to innovation marketing and idea generation of experiential innovations. This theoretical stance valorizes the outside-in paradigm of future lead-users as co-creators of innovative experiences, whose imaginary narratives are raw materials for creativity. This approach is an alternative to brainstorming and its limits for creating disruptive innovations. (shrink)

This article examines the points of similarity and the differences between the Patočkian concept of interpellation and Merleau-Ponty’s concept of chiasmus. These two modes of relating-to-being through language and body, perception and space share the same character of reversibility and openness to the other. However, the “co-respondance” between the subject and the world is not approached by the two phenomenological philosophers from the same perspective. Being-questioned is the inter-psychical event specific to one’s experience of others and of the world; the (...) chiasmatic structure is the bedrock of the ontological relationship and the intercorporeity of beings. Close, but distinct one from the other, interpellation and chiasm partially reveal the common preoccupations of two philosophers whose dialogue History never allowed to occur. (shrink)

We give a simplified version of the system introduced in ‘Non-Redundancy’, presented here as a Modal Logic whose primitive elements are finite sequences. It includes a treatment of Condition C, Condition B, Condition A, and the Locality of Variable Binding, but disregards quantification and Weak and Strong Crossover effects, which are treated in the longer paper.

The objective of this article is to propose a precise characterization of the collective practice behind at least an important part of the phenomena named “decision by consensus”. First, I provide descriptions of the use of this rule, and give a definition of the non-opposition rule, both as a specific sequence of acts and as a stopping rule. Second, I challenge the usual way of understanding the non-opposition rule by contrast with voting, stating that the contrast between logic of approval (...) and logic of consent also has to be taken into account. Third, I examine the conditions of its use. The non-opposition rule satisfies groups whose concern is to decide without dividing. Finally, from the analytic benefit of opening up decision by consensus as the use of the non-opposition rule, I will examine, in a fourth part, whether consensus in decision-making is as democratic a procedure as is sometimes thought. (shrink)

In this article, I underline the profound link existing between Ricœur’s practical philosophy and language. Indeed, the latter bestows unity upon the former, because it constitutes its main axis, for methodological reasons. First of all, I recall Ricœur’s definition of discourse and explain its various transphrastic dimensions. I then show how this philosophy of language is carefully used to build a very coherent logic of judgment, which underlies all Ricœur’s epistemological reflections about normative disciplines. I particularly insist on the logic (...) of legal judgment. (shrink)

Based on the analysis of narrations in Free Indirect Discourse and the Historical Present, we argue that the grammatical notion of context of speech should be ramified into a Context of Thought and a Context of Utterance. Tense and person depend on the Context of Utterance, while all other indexicals are evaluated with respect to the Context of Thought. Free Indirect Discourse and the Historical Present are analyzed as special combinatorial possibilities that arise when the two contexts are distinct, and (...) exactly one of them is presented as identical to the physical point at which the sentence is articulated. (shrink)

When do children become aware of themselves as differentiated and unique entity in the world? When and how do they become self-aware? Based on some recent empirical evidence, 5 levels of self-awareness are presented and discussed as they chronologically unfold from the moment of birth to approximately 4-5 years of age. A natural history of children's developing self-awareness is proposed as well as a model of adult self-awareness that is informed by the dynamic of early development. Adult self-awareness is viewed (...) as the dynamic flux between basic levels of consciousness that develop chronologically early in life. (shrink)

Dans la relation éducative coexistent transfert et relation. Dans la relation familiale vont exister une dépendance et une relation réelles évoluant progressivement vers la construction d’imagos parentales. Les parents peuvent transmettre à leurs enfants un certain nombre de codes et de règles à condition de s’en sentir les dépositaires et les garants. À travers l’éducation de leurs enfants les parents doivent pouvoir assumer une façon de faire sous-tendus par une façon d’être. Ceci ne peut se comprendre qu’à la faveur d’un (...) véritable processus de filiation. (shrink)

On dit communément qu'il faut voir pour croire. Mais faut-il voir pour connaître? Et quelle sorte de connaissance obtenons-nous sur le monde lorsque nous ouvrons les yeux? Si le sens commun et avec lui la plupart des philosophes antiques et médiévaux conçoivent la vision comme une forme de saisie immédiate qui nous livre en toute transparence les objets du monde extérieur, l'âge classique s'est arraché à la séduction du sensible. Confrontés à de nouvelles manières de structurer la visibilité - la (...) perspective des peintres et les instruments d'optique des savants - les philosophes du XVIIe siècle méditent sur le jeu d'échange subtil que ces nouvelles expériences de vision révèlent entre la surface et la profondeur, le proche et le lointain, le senti et le représenté. De Kepler et Descartes à Malebranche, Locke ou Berkeley, s'instaurent de nouvelles normes pour penser les partages de l'œil et de l'esprit : les sens ne nous sont pas donnés pour connaître, la vision est une sorte de langage naturel et providentiel, appuyée sur les signes arbitraires de la sensation et soumise à notre insu à l'exercice interprétatif d'un "jugement naturel".C'est l'âme qui voit et non le corps, mais c'est une âme en situation, projetée dans le monde des corps, et tentant - sans toujours y parvenir - de surseoir à la relativité et la contingence de son point de vue. (shrink)

Following a long-standing philosophical tradition, impartiality is a distinctive and determining feature of moral judgments, especially in matters of distributive justice. This broad ethical tradition was revived in welfare economics by Vickrey, and above all, Harsanyi, under the form of the so-called Impartial Observer Theorem. The paper offers an analytical reconstruction of this argument and a step-wise philosophical critique of its premisses. It eventually provides a new formal version of the theorem based on subjective probability.

« À chaque lecture, chaque livre est mentalement “réécrit” par son lecteur comme Ménard réécrivit le Quichotte. Ainsi, l’infatigable fable borgésienne est peut-être moins une parabole sophistiquée de la littérature, qu’une description fidèle et somme toute évidente de l’acte de lire ». Lire au sens propre et courant, c’est déchiffrer une écriture, un signe ou une suite de signes renvoyant conventionnellement à des objets (lire un pictogramme), à des sons musicaux (lire une partition), à des m...

The paper analyses economic evaluations by distinguishing evaluative statements from actual value judgments. From this basis, it compares four solutions to the value neutrality problem in economics. After rebutting the strong theses about neutrality (normative economics is illegitimate) and non-neutrality (the social sciences are value-impregnated), the paper settles the case between the weak neutrality thesis (common in welfare economics) and a novel, weak non-neutrality thesis that extends the realm of normative economics more widely than the other weak thesis does.

We introduce a ranking of multidimensional alternatives, including uncertain prospects as a particular case, when these objects can be given a matrix form. This ranking is separable in terms of rows and columns, and continuous and monotonic in the basic quantities. Owing to the theory of additive separability developed here, we derive very precise numerical representations over a large class of domains (i.e., typically notof the Cartesian product form). We apply these representationsto (1)streams of commodity baskets through time, (2)uncertain social (...) prospects, (3)uncertain individual prospects. Concerning(1), we propose a finite horizon variant of Koopmans’s (1960) axiomatization of infinite discounted utility sums. The main results concern(2). We push the classic comparison between the exanteand expostsocial welfare criteria one step further by avoiding any expected utility assumptions, and as a consequence obtain what appears to be the strongest existing form of Harsanyi’s (1955) Aggregation Theorem. Concerning(3), we derive a subjective probability for Anscombe and Aumann’s (1963) finite case by merely assuming that there are two epistemically independent sources of uncertainty. (shrink)

Biological individuals are usually defined by evolutionists through a reference to natural selection. This article looks for a concept of individuality that would hold at the same time for organisms and for communities or ecosystems, the latter being unaffected by natural selection. In the wake of Simon’s notion of “quasi-independence,” I elaborate a concept of “weak individuality” defined by probabilistic connections between sub-entities, read off our knowledge of their interactions. This formal scheme of connections allows one to infer what are (...) the individuals in the domain addressed by the theory of the interactions. The article argues that if ecosystems do not have strong individuality, they still possess a weak individuality, ecological theories providing the values of the variables in the formula for individuality. (shrink)

Conceptualist accounts of the representational content of perceptual experiences have it that a subject _S_ can experience no object, property, relation, etc., unless _S_ "i# possesses and "ii# exercises concepts for such object, property, or relation. Perceptual experiences, on such a view, represent the world in a way that is conceptual.

Kant’s analysis of the concept of natural purpose in the Critique of judgment captured several features of organisms that he argued warranted making them the objects of a special field of study, in need of a special regulative teleological principle. By showing that organisms have to be conceived as self-organizing wholes, epigenetically built according to the idea of a whole that we must presuppose, Kant accounted for three features of organisms conflated in the biological sciences of the period: adaptation, functionality (...) and conservation of forms..Kant’s unitary concept of natural purpose was subsequently split in two directions: first by Cuvier’s comparative anatomy, that would draw on the idea of adaptative functions as a regulative principle for understanding in reconstituting and classifying organisms; and then by Goethe’s and Geoffroy’s morphology, a science of the general transformations of living forms. However, such general transformations in nature, objects of an alleged ‘archaeology of nature’, were thought impossible by Kant in the §80 of the Critique of judgment. Goethe made this ‘adventure of reason’ possible by changing the sense of ‘explanation’: scientific explanation was shifted from the investigation of the mechanical processes of generation of individual organisms to the unveiling of some ideal transformations of types instantiated by those organisms. (shrink)

Indexicals are context-dependent expressions such as I, you, here and now, whose semantic value depends on the context in which they are uttered. They raise two kinds of questions. First, they are often thought to be scopeless – e.g. with I rigidly referring to the speaker – and to give rise to non-trivial patterns of inference – e.g. I exist seems to be a priori true despite the fact that I necessarily exist isn’t. Second, indexicals may play a crucial role (...) in the expression of irreducibly De Se thoughts, and both the existence of such thoughts and the ways in which they can be reported in indirect discourse must be elucidated. The Kaplanian picture posits that indexicals take their value from a distinguished context parameter, whose very nature is responsible for some entailments, and which remains fixed – hence the apparent scopelessness of indexicals. It further posits that while indexicals may serve to express irreducibly De Se thoughts, these may not be reported as such in indirect discourse. Both tenets have been criticized in recent research: there are a variety of constructions across languages in which the context parameter appears to be shifted; and several types of indirect discourse do give rise to De Se readings. (shrink)

We develop a formal semantic analysis of the alarm calls used by Campbell’s monkeys in the Tai forest and on Tiwai island —two sites that differ in the main predators that the monkeys are exposed to. Building on data discussed in Ouattara et al. :e7808, 2009a; PNAS 106: 22026–22031, 2009b and Arnold et al., we argue that on both sites alarm calls include the roots krak and hok, which can optionally be affixed with -oo, a kind of attenuating suffix; in (...) addition, sentences can start with boom boom, which indicates that the context is not one of predation. In line with Arnold et al., we show that the meaning of the roots is not quite the same in Tai and on Tiwai: krak often functions as a leopard alarm call in Tai, but as a general alarm call on Tiwai. We develop models based on a compositional semantics in which concatenation is interpreted as conjunction, roots have lexical meanings, -oo is an attenuating suffix, and an all-purpose alarm parameter is raised with each individual call. The first model accounts for the difference between Tai and Tiwai by way of different lexical entries for krak. The second model gives the same underspecified entry to krak in both locations, but it makes use of a competition mechanism akin to scalar implicatures. In Tai, strengthening yields a meaning equivalent to non-aerial dangerous predator and turns out to single out leopards. On Tiwai, strengthening yields a nearly contradictory meaning due to the absence of ground predators, and only the unstrengthened meaning is used. (shrink)

We propose two alternatives to Xu’s axiomatization of Chellas’s STIT. The first one simplifies its presentation, and also provides an alternative axiomatization of the deliberative STIT. The second one starts from the idea that the historic necessity operator can be defined as an abbreviation of operators of agency, and can thus be eliminated from the logic of Chellas’s STIT. The second axiomatization also allows us to establish that the problem of deciding the satisfiability of a STIT formula without temporal operators (...) is NP-complete in the single-agent case, and is NEXPTIME-complete in the multiagent case, both for the deliberative and Chellas’s STIT. (shrink)

Institute for Biomedical Ethics, Geneva University Medical School * Corresponding author: Médecins Sans Frontières (OCG), rue de Lausanne 78, CH-1211 Geneva 21, Switzerland. Tel.: +41 (0)22 849 89 29; Fax: +41 (0)22 849 84 88; Email: philippe_calain{at}hotmail.com ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> Abstract Outbreaks of filovirus (Ebola and Marburg) hemorrhagic fevers in Africa are typically the theater of rescue activities involving international experts and agencies tasked with reinforcing national authorities in clinical management, biological diagnosis, sanitation, (...) public health surveillance and coordination. These outbreaks can be seen as a paradigm for ethical issues posed by epidemic emergencies, through the convergence of such themes as: isolation and quarantine, privacy and confidentiality and the interpretation of ethical norms across different ethnocultural settings. With an emphasis on the boundaries between public health investigations and research, this article reviews specific challenges, past practices and current normative documents relevant to the application of ethical standards in the course of outbreaks of filovirus hemorrhagic fevers. Aside from commonly identified issues of informed consent and institutional review processes, we argue for more clarity over the specification of which communities are expected to share benefits, and we advocate for the use of collective definitions of duty to care and standard of care. We propose new elaborations around existing normative instruments, and we suggest some pathways toward more comprehensive approaches to the ethics of research in outbreak situations. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

A deductive argument is a pair where the first item is a set of premises, the second item is a claim, and the premises entail the claim. This can be formalised by assuming a logical language for the premises and the claim, and logical entailment (or consequence relation) for showing that the claim follows from the premises. Examples of logics that can be used include classical logic, modal logic, description logic, temporal logic, and conditional logic. A counterargument for an argument (...) A is an argument B where the claim of B contradicts the premises of A. Different choices of logic, and different choices for the precise definitions of argument and counterargument, give us a range of possibilities for formalising deductive argumentation. Further options are available to us for choosing the arguments and counterarguments we put into an argument graph. If we are to construct an argument graph based on the arguments that can be constructed from a knowledgebase, then we can be exhaustive in including all arguments and counterarguments that can be constructed from the knowledgebase. But there are other options available to us. We consider some of the possibilities in this review. (shrink)

What Frege’s paradox on concept and object (FP) consists in and the manner in which Frege coped with it (the ladder strategy) are briefly reviewed (§ 1). An idea for solving FP inspired by Husserl’s semantics is presented; it results in failure, for it leads to a version of Russell’s paradox, the usual solution of which implies something like a resurgence of FP (§ 2). A generalized version of Frege’s paradox (GFP) and an idea for solving it inspired by Davidson’s (...) semantics are presented; three theorems about recursive definability of truth are put forward and used to determine whether this idea can be successfully applied to certain putative forms of the Language of Science (§ 3). Proofs of these three theorems, in particular of the third, which answers a question that does not seem to have drawn logicians’ attention, are then given (§ 4). Finally, it turns out that there is a tension between the proposed solution of GFP and the idea of Language of Science assumed so far in this paper, and a way of solving it is proposed (§ 5). (shrink)

Latour’s actor-network ‘theory’ (ANT), and more generally Latour’s constructivist and relativistic work, has since long been debunked. (1) It does not make any sense, mixing all conceptual categories together (humans and non-humans, facts and moral prescriptions, science and politics); (2) nevertheless, it pretends to explain important issues such as our current environmental crisis and what to do to overcome it; (3) consequently, it can have extremely damaging political consequences. Latour’s ANT may perhaps be considered as a work of art but (...) certainly not as a work of science. Unfortunately, I find that Anders Blok and Casper Bruun Jensen’s attempt to salvage it is unconvincing and inherits the same problems. (shrink)

Le libertinage n'est pas circonscrit à un groupe social uniforme, classe d'âge, catégorie socioprofessionnelle, famille philosophique. Il ne forme pas davantage un isolat culturel. Dans la diversité même de ses manifestations, il illustre la variété des situations et des rôles que l'individu peut souhaiter expérimenter dans une vision dynamique, vitaliste, de sa sexualité. Les présents fragments visent moins à établir un catalogue exhaustif des possibles de la performance libertine qu'à apporter quelques éléments de réflexion sur ce qui s'y joue sur (...) les plans relationnel et émotionnel. Ils interrogent une réalité formalisable en de nombreux de ses aspects et tentent d'approcher ce qui se dit à travers elle de l'humaine capacité à acter le désir sexuel comme forme créative."--From publisher's website. (shrink)

Cet essai est une tentative pour penser autrement I liberté en ses actes. Une de ses originalités est de procéder par changements d'échelle, c'est un microscope philosophique. Sous la grande idée de liberté, il cerne d'imperceptibles appuis qui la font tenir debout. L'enjeu est donc de taille. Son développement prend la forme d'un parcours progressif par étapes, traversant des conceptions très différentes de la liberté et des domaines d'application divers. Il épouse ainsi les contours d'une mise en variation du concept (...) d'appui, au point que celui-ci pourra être identifié chez certains philosophes alors qu'il y passait auparavant inaperçu. Il s'agit aussi de montrer de quels problèmes ce concept tire sa nécessité. Ces problèmes sont tout autant théoriques que pratiques, spirituels que corporels, tout autant moraux que politiques. Bien plus, en justifiant pourquoi un appui, n'est pas un soutien, cet essai donne une certaine allure à la liberté : celle de la spirale, de l'hélice. Il montre que, sous de nouvelles manières d'agir ou de penser, peuvent pousser des spirales de la liberté"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)