Wisdom is peculiarly abstract, ineffable, and yet perennial. It is also temporal, stretching forwards as well is backwards in time. Wisdom is often treated as the outcome of life experience, reflection, discipline, and equanimity. Capturing the Ineffable aims to establish wisdom as an area if inquiry within anthropology and an analytic account of wisdom and its role and focus in anthropology. In addition to developing theories for an anthropology (and excavation) of wisdom, this volume argues collectively that anthropology is especially (...) well suited to engage in questioning what it is that is called wisdom, and how wisdom, as a concept, and an enacted activity, functions in metaphysical and interpersonal experiences, values, and judgements. The contributors include many key US and UK thinkers. (shrink)

In this work, the prominent political philosopher Philip Pettit embarks on a massive undertaking to offers major new accounts of the foundations of the state and the nature of justice. In doing so Pettit builds a new theory of what the state is and what it ought to be, addresses the normative question of how justice serves as a measure of the success of a state, and the way it should operate in relation to its citizens and other people.

This paper sets out an account of trust in AI as a relationship between clinicians, AI applications, and AI practitioners in which AI is given discretionary authority over medical questions by clinicians. Compared to other accounts in recent literature, this account more adequately explains the normative commitments created by practitioners when inviting clinicians’ trust in AI. To avoid committing to an account of trust in AI applications themselves, I sketch a reductive view on which discretionary authority is exercised by AI (...) practitioners through the vehicle of an AI application. I conclude with four critical questions based on the discretionary account to determine if trust in particular AI applications is sound, and a brief discussion of the possibility that the main roles of the physician could be replaced by AI. (shrink)

This paper explores the role of moral uncertainty in explaining the morally disruptive character of new technologies. We argue that existing accounts of technomoral change do not fully explain its disruptiveness. This explanatory gap can be bridged by examining the epistemic dimensions of technomoral change, focusing on moral uncertainty and inquiry. To develop this account, we examine three historical cases: the introduction of the early pregnancy test, the contraception pill, and brain death. The resulting account highlights what we call “differential (...) disruption” and provides a resource for fields such as technology assessment, ethics of technology, and responsible innovation. (shrink)

"Philip Rieff has become out most learned and provocative critic of psychoanalytic thinking and of the compelling mind and character of its first proponent.

In his monograph On Numbers and Games, J. H. Conway introduced a real-closed field containing the reals and the ordinals as well as a great many less familiar numbers including $-\omega, \,\omega/2, \,1/\omega, \sqrt{\omega}$ and $\omega-\pi$ to name only a few. Indeed, this particular real-closed field, which Conway calls No, is so remarkably inclusive that, subject to the proviso that numbers—construed here as members of ordered fields—be individually definable in terms of sets of NBG, it may be said to contain (...) “All Numbers Great and Small.” In this respect, No bears much the same relation to ordered fields that the system ℝ of real numbers bears to Archimedean ordered fields. In Part I of the present paper, we suggest that whereas $\mathbb{R}$should merely be regarded as constituting an arithmetic continuum, No may be regarded as a sort of absolute arithmetic continuum, and in Part II we draw attention to the unifying framework No provides not only for the reals and the ordinals but also for an array of non-Archimedean ordered number systems that have arisen in connection with the theories of non-Archimedean ordered algebraic and geometric systems, the theory of the rate of growth of real functions and nonstandard analysis. In addition to its inclusive structure as an ordered field, the system No of surreal numbers has a rich algebraico-tree-theoretic structure—a simplicity hierarchical structure—that emerges from the recursive clauses in terms of which it is defined. In the development of No outlined in the present paper, in which the surreals emerge vis-à-vis a generalization of the von Neumann ordinal construction, the simplicity hierarchical features of No are brought to the fore and play central roles in the aforementioned unification of systems of numbers great and small and in some of the more revealing characterizations of No as an absolute continuum. (shrink)

We examine the notions of negative, infinite and hotter than infinite temperatures and show how these unusual concepts gain legitimacy in quantum statistical mechanics. We ask if the existence of an infinite temperature implies the existence of an actual infinity and argue that it does not. Since one can sensibly talk about hotter than infinite temperatures, we ask if one could legitimately speak of other physical quantities, such as length and duration, in analogous terms. That is, could there be longer (...) than infinite lengths or temporal durations? We argue that the answer is surprisingly yes, and we outline the properties of a number system that could be employed to characterize such magnitudes. (shrink)

Many have offered accounts of the procreative asymmetry, the claim that one has no moral reason to create a life just because it would be happy, but one has moral reason not to create a life just because it would be miserable. I suggest a new approach. Instead of looking at the procreative asymmetry on its own, we can situate it within a broader landscape of asymmetries. Specifically, there are two other analogous asymmetries in the prudential and epistemic domains. The (...) prudential asymmetry says that one has no prudential reason to acquire a desire just because it would be satisfied, but one has prudential reason not to acquire a desire just because it would be frustrated. The epistemic asymmetry says that one has no epistemic reason to acquire a belief just because it is true, but one has epistemic reason not to acquire a belief just because it is false. The existence of these analogous asymmetries in these normative domains suggests the possibility of a unified account of all three asymmetries as instances of a more fundamental asymmetry of value-based reasons. This paper develops a working model of what such a unified account might look like. Such an account can give us a unified explanation of a variety of phenomena, reinforce the plausibility of each of these asymmetries, and give us a novel picture of how value gives us reasons that might extend beyond these three applications. (shrink)

This paper presents an account of empathy as the form of experience directed at embodied unities of expressive movement. After outlining the key differences between simulation theory and the phenomenological approach to empathy, the paper argues that while the phenomenological approach is closer to respecting a necessary constitutional asymmetry between first-personal and second-personal senses of embodiment, it still presupposes a general concept of embodiment that ends up being problematic. A different account is proposed that is neutral on the explanatory role (...) of the first-person sense of embodiment, which leads to an emphasis on the transformative nature of empathy and a broadening of the scope of possible targets of empathic awareness. (shrink)

The article presents a pluralistic model of value change, emphasizing the interplay between technology and societal values. It critiques the Simple Change Model, which suggests a uniform transition from one dominant value scheme to another, arguing instead for emergent and differential value change. Emergent value change occurs when new values arise within specific contexts without displacing existing ones, often influenced by generational experiences with technology and niches where new technologies are introduced. Differential value change highlights how distinct groups may adopt (...) different value schemes based on their unique contexts and experiences, sometimes leading to societal polarization and the need to reconcile incompatible value schemes. The article stresses the importance of individual experiences of ethical uncertainty and disruption in understanding these changes. By integrating these complexities, the model offers a rich, non-deterministic framework for analyzing how values evolve in response to technological advancements. (shrink)

Whether institutions and not just individual doctors have a right to not participate in medical assistance in dying (MAID) is controversial, but there is a tendency to frame the issue of institutional non‐participation in a particular way. Conscience is central to this framing. Non‐participating health centres are assumed to be religious and full participation is expected unless a centre objects on conscience grounds. In this paper we seek to reframe the issue. Institutional non‐participation is plausibly not primarily, let alone exclusively, (...) about conscience. We seek to reframe the issue by making two main points. First, institutional non‐participation is primarily a matter of institutional self‐governance. We suggest that institutions have a natural right of self‐governance which, in the case of health centres such as hospitals or hospices, includes the right to choose whether or not to offer MAID. Second, there are various legitimate reasons unrelated to conscience for which a health centre might not offer MAID. These range from considerations such as institutional capacity and expertise to a potential contradiction with palliative care and a concern to not conflate palliative care and MAID in public consciousness. It is a mistake to frame the conversation simply in terms of conscience‐based opposition to MAID or full participation. Our goal is to open up new space in the conversation, for reasons unrelated to conscience as well as for non‐religious health centres who might nonetheless have legitimate grounds for not participating in MAID. (shrink)

Against the apparent casting away of poetry from contemporary philosophy of language and aesthetics which has left poetry forceless, I argue that poetry has a linguistic, philosophical, and even political force. Against the idea that literature (as novel) can teach us facts about the world, I argue that the force of literature (as poetry) resides in its capacity to change our ways of seeing. First, I contest views which consider poetry forceless by discussing Austin’s and Sartre’s views. Second, I explore (...) the concept of force in the realm of art—focusing on Nietzsche’s philosophy and Menke’s Kraft der Kunst—and the relations between linguistic, artistic, and political forces. Third, I consider how the transformative force of poetry can be considered political by turning to Kristeva’s Revolution in Poetic Language and Meschonnic’s conception of poetry according to which the poem does something to language and the subject. To illustrate this transformative force of poetry, I analyse Caroline Zekri’s poem ‘Un pur rapport grammatical’. I therefore think of poetry not only as doing something with language, but also as doing something to language. To rephrase Austin’s famous title, and thus reverse his evaluation of poetry, poetry might reveal to us not only How to Do Things with Words, but how to do things to words and, through this doing, how to transform and affect the world. (shrink)

"The essays, both philosophical and historical, demonstrate the continuing significance of a neglected aspect of Kant’s thought."—Religious Studies Review Challenging the traditional view that Kant's account of religion was peripheral to his thinking, these essays demonstrate the centrality of religion to Kant's critical philosophy. Contributors are Sharon Anderson-Gold, Leslie A. Mulholland, Anthony N. Perovich, Jr., Philip J. Rossi, Joseph Runzo, Denis Savage, Walter Sparn, Burkhard Tuschling, Nicholas P. Wolterstorff, and Allen W. Wood.

John Dewey wished to place development of the ability to think at the core of school education. The kind of thinking that Dewey had in mind was based on his conception of scientific inquiry. Matthew Lipman was likewise committed to an education centred on thinking, but he claimed that we should turn to philosophy rather than to science in order to secure this end. In his view, philosophy has a stronger claim to this mantle than does science, or any other (...) subject, when it is appropriately reconstructed and taught. He developed various arguments to that effect, but the one considered here is that philosophical thinking has a generic character that especially suits it for the role. I examine this argument to see how compelling a case it makes for the inclusion of philosophy in the school curriculum. (shrink)

Some philosophers claim that there are certain laws that restrict what kinds of things we can perceptually represent. Those laws do not apply, however, to beliefs. To be a representationalist is to hold that there is a similarity between perception and belief. If this is the case, why do the laws apply to one kind of mental state, but not the other? I argue that the puzzle is not a puzzle for representationalists in general, but only for some forms of (...) representationalism that hold excessive analogies between perception and belief. I will consider three kinds of views: a view that identifies perception with belief; a view that claims that perception and belief share the same kind of content, viz. propositions; and the view that belief and perception are both intentional states, but do not share the same type of content. I will argue that the laws of appearance rule out views that identify perception with belief, and that consider propositions to be the contents of perception. (shrink)

Doing philosophy encourages us to explore beneath the surface of things. It challenges us to ask questions and go beyond easy, obvious answers. Doing philosophy with children is exciting. It is surprising, challenging, awe-inspiring and fun.

This paper presents the treatment of anaphora in generative grammar. After a broad review of of the different theories covered under the term, it provides an overview of the history of the treatment of anaphora in generative grammar. It then discusses Ariel’s theory of accessibility and shows how it can account for the choice of some of the anaphoric expressions provided in the text. In a final section, the paper presents the author’s recent work on the choice between verbal anaphors. (...) It is shown that accessibility can account for some aspects of the choice but is not sufficient. Further constraints on the choice are proposed in terms of the notion of Question Under Discussion, for which experimental evidence is adduced. (shrink)

In “Epistemology in Philosophy of Religion,” Philip Quinn focuses on the central problem of religious epistemology for monotheistic religions: the epistemic status of belief in the existence of God. He explores what epistemic conditions arguments for God's existence would have to satisfy to be successful and whether any arguments satisfy those conditions. Turning to the claims of reformed epistemology about belief in God, Quinn assesses Alvin Plantinga's claim that belief in God is for many theists properly basic, that is, (...) has positive epistemic status even when it is not based on arguments or any other kind of propositional evidence. Quinn distinguishes two versions of this claim. According to the first, emphasized in Plantinga's earlier work, theistic belief is properly basic with respect to justification or rationality, while according to the second version, prominent in Plantinga's more recent work, theistic belief is properly basic with respect to warrant. (shrink)

In 2001, the algebraico-tree-theoretic simplicity hierarchical structure of J. H. Conway’s ordered field${\mathbf {No}}$of surreal numbers was brought to the fore by the first author and employed to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for an ordered field (ordered$K$-vector space) to be isomorphic to an initial subfield ($K$-subspace) of${\mathbf {No}}$, i.e. a subfield ($K$-subspace) of${\mathbf {No}}$that is an initial subtree of${\mathbf {No}}$. In this sequel, analogous results are established forordered exponential fields, making use of a slight generalization of Schmeling’s conception of (...) atransseries field. It is further shown that a wide range of ordered exponential fields are isomorphic to initial exponential subfields of$({\mathbf {No}}, \exp )$. These include all models of$T({\mathbb R}_W, e^x)$, where${\mathbb R}_W$is the reals expanded by aconvergent Weierstrass system W. Of these, those we calltrigonometric-exponential fieldsare given particular attention. It is shown that the exponential functions on the initial trigonometric-exponential subfields of${\mathbf {No}}$, which includes${\mathbf {No}}$itself, extend tocanonicalexponential functions on theirsurcomplexcounterparts. The image of the canonical map of the ordered exponential field${\mathbb T}^{LE}$oflogarithmic-exponentialtransseries into${\mathbf {No}}$is shown to be initial, as are the ordered exponential fields${\mathbb R}((\omega ))^{EL}$and${\mathbb R}\langle \langle \omega \rangle \rangle $. (shrink)

The author, a specialist in philosophy for children who is recognized worldwide, presents the conceptual and philosophical framework within which the idea of early education in philosophical discussion is situated. A theory of education and its place in social and cultural development is the precondition to any practice aimed at doing philosophy with children.

Our best current science seems to suggest the laws of physics and the initial conditions of our universe are fine-tuned for the possibility of life. A significant number of scientists and philosophers believe that the fine-tuning is evidence for the multiverse hypothesis. This paper will focus on a much-discussed objection to the inference from the fine-tuning to the multiverse: the charge that this line of reasoning commits the inverse gambler’s fallacy. Despite the existence of a literature going back decades, this (...) philosophical debate has made little contact with scientific discussion of fine-tuning and the multiverse, which mainly revolves around a specific form of the multiverse hypothesis rooted in eternal inflation combined with string theory. Because of this, potentially important implications from science to philosophy, and vice versa, have been left underexplored. In this paper, I will take a first step at joining up these two discussions, by arguing that attention to the eternal inflation + string theory conception of the multiverse supports the inverse gambler’s fallacy charge. It does this by supporting the idea that our universe is contingently fine-tuned, thus addressing the concern that proponents of the inverse gambler’s fallacy charge have assumed this without argument. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIt is often held that disagreement over non-normative facts is less significant to the project of public justification than disagreement over relevant moral norms. But this dismissal of non-normative factual disagreement is unjustified—an ad hoc attempt to save the ideal of public justification from the endemic actual disagreement that threatens it. Disagreement over norms is relevant to political legitimacy; so, too, is disagreement over facts. I draw two implications from this point. First, inasmuch as accounts of public justification typically involve (...) a unanimity condition, public justification should not be thought a desideratum of political legitimacy. Second, virtuous political praxis will often involve enforcing legislation in spite of unresolved non-normative factual disagreement. That is, with respect to legitimacy, there is nothing morally amiss about such legislation. Clearly these last claims presuppose some basis for legitimacy other than agreement; I will only gesture at what this might be. Assuming that much actual legislation is indeed legitimate, though—in spite of extant normative and non-normative disagreement—I go so far as concluding that such a basis, whatever it is, must exist. (shrink)

How can materialists begin to do justice to the experiencing subject? Some materialists, whom I call ?structuralists?, believe that the brain sciences offer at least the distant prospect of a materialist psychology with an experiencing subject. Others, and notably those materialists who are functionalists, believe that this faith is misplaced, and offer us instead a functional psychology. I argue, briefly, that functionalism cannot deliver the goods, and go on to elaborate and defend the structuralist claim that consciousness or experience is (...) the formation of content conceived as that laying down of traces commonly assumed to be involved in perception and cognition. (shrink)

Defining the features of ubuntu in the context of African philosophy, is basically about the quest for a definitive means of culturally expressing what seems primal, unique, useful, and common to the Africans in relation to the world. Put simply, the quest to clarify the key features of ubuntu is to some extent a search for the African self-concept or identity for effective global interconnectedness of the races. This is to be done in a way that defines and sustains the (...) ontology and essence of the Africans, as a people who know who or what they are, and what they are capable of contributing to the world. A search for the values of ubuntu is the pursuit of a new way of doing things: a quest for a new definition of social justice in which all people, particularly the Africans and their beliefs will be given due recognition and respect in the global order. Legitimizing of ubuntu is in a way the repudiation of the colonial history of the African continent; the aggressive and relentless pursuit of the decolonization of all African spaces-economic, cultural, political, moral, intellectual, and so on. So, in summary, ubuntu is framed philosophically as a platform for liberating the Africans from all manners of peonage, domination, oppression, and exploitation both from within or outside the continent and establishing a basis for interrelations with the world. (shrink)

Anyone who raises questions about a well-entrenched practice can expect at least some of the practitioners to offer rebuttals. I am grateful to those who view my critique of current analytic philosophy as flawed for taking time to endeavor to correct me. They will surely not be surprised to find me recalcitrant. But I hope they will conclude, as I do, that the present airing of disagreements is profitable.

How have sociologists responded to the emergence of environmentalism? What has sociology to offer the study of environmental problems? This uniquely comprehensive guide traces the origins and development of environmental movements and environmental issues, providing a critical review of the most significant debates in the new field of environmental sociology. It covers environmental ideas, environmental movements, social constructionism, critical realism, "ecocentric" theory, environmental identities, risk society theory, sustainable development, Green consumerism, ecological modernization and debates around modernity and post- modernity. (...) class='Hi'>Philip Sutton adopts a long-term view, which focuses on the relationship between ideas of nature and environment, ecological identities and social change, providing a framework for future research. Bringing environmental issues into contact with sociological theories, Nature, Environment and Society provides an up-to-date introduction to this important new field. It will be essential reading for all students of sociology, environmental studies and anyone interested in understanding environmental problems. (shrink)

There has been a resurgence of interest in panpsychism in contemporary philosophy of mind. According to its supporters, panpsychism offers an attractive solution to the mind–body problem, avoiding the deep difficulties associated with the more conventional options of dualism and materialism. There has been little focus, however, on whether panpsychism can help with philosophical problems pertaining to free will. In this paper I will argue (a) that it is coherent and consistent with observation to postulate a kind of libertarian agent (...) causation at the micro-level, and (b) that if one if believes in libertarian agent causation at the macro-level, there are significant advantages in also postulating its existence at the micro-level. (shrink)

In seeking an answer to the question, How can the church speak from Christian warrants on any of the fateful choices we face in our common life, Paul Ramsey argued that, when it speaks, the voice of the church ought to be instructional rather than advocatory. An investigation of what the Episcopal Church has said over the past 20 years about abortion provides strong support for Ramsey's argument. This history suggests also that additional questions need to be asked if that (...) church and others are to address adequately the issues raised by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. The most important of these questions are: (a) on what sorts of issues are the churches obliged to speak, (b) are these issues ones that call for agreement, (c) to whom are the churches obliged to speak, (d) in what vocabulary ought they to speak, (e) who ought to speak, and (f ) under what circumstances is anyone obliged to listen. At a minimum, an adequate ethic for ecclesiastical pronouncements requires that these questions be asked and answered. (shrink)

_The Elements of Arguments_ introduces such central critical thinking topics as informal fallacies, the difference between validity and truth, basic formal propositional logic, and how to extract arguments from texts. Turetzky aims to prevent common confusions by clearly explaining a number of important distinctions, including: propositions vs. propositional attitudes, propositions vs. states of affairs, and logic vs. rhetoric vs. psychology. Exercises are provided throughout, including numerous informal arguments that can be assessed using the skills and strategies presented within the text.