This paper examines the relationship between Arthur Fine’s “Natural Ontological Attitude” and the work of neo-pragmatists, particularly Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty. I argue that many of the problems that face Fine’s account can be seen as a direct result of his failure to employ certain key pragmatist insights concerning the nature and status of the realism-antirealism issue. Consequently, I suggest that we should cease to think of Fine as representative of mainstream attempts to dispense with the realism-antirealism issue and (...) instead view NOA as an unfortunate mixture of opposed philosophical traditions. (shrink)

Defining the common good -- Assessing the impact of proposed actions on human happiness and well-being -- Protecting and enhancing public goods -- Identifying today's major social problems -- Activists, reformers and social movements -- Key tools for advancing the common good -- What can businesses do to advance the common good? -- What can government do to advance the common good? -- What can nonprofit organizations do to advance the common good?

The late antique and early medieval Mediterranean was characterized by wide-ranging cultural and linguistic diversity. Yet, under the influence of Christianity, communities in the Mediterranean world were bound together by common concepts of good rulership, which were also shaped by Greco-Roman, Persian, Caucasian, and other traditions. This collection of essays examines ideas of good Christian rulership and the debates surrounding them in diverse cultures and linguistic communities. It grants special attention to communities on the periphery, such as the (...) Caucasus and Nubia, and some essays examine non-Christian concepts of good rulership to offer a comparative perspective. As a whole, the studies in this volume reveal not only the entanglement and affinity of communities around the Mediterranean but also areas of conflict among Christians and between Christians and other cultural traditions. By gathering various specialized studies on the overarching question of good rulership, this volume highlights the possibilities of placing research on classical antiquity and early medieval Europe into conversation with the study of eastern Christianity. (shrink)

Philip Quinn, John A. O’Brien Professor at the University of Notre Dame from 1985 until his death in 2004, was well known for his work in the philosophy of religion, political philosophy, and core areas of analytic philosophy. Although the breadth of his interests was so great that it would be virtually impossible to identify any subset of them as representative, the contributors to this volume provide an excellent introduction to, and advance the discussion of, some of the questions (...) of central importance to Quinn in the last years of his working life. Paul J. Weithman argues in his introduction that Quinn’s interest and analyses in many areas grew out of a distinctive and underlying sensibility that we might call “liberal faith.” It included belief in the value of a liberal education and in rigorous intellectual inquiry, the acceptance of enduring religious, cultural, and political pluralism, along with a keen awareness of problems posed by pluralism, and a deeply held but non-utopian faith in liberal democratic politics. These provocative essays, at the cutting edge of epistemology, the philosophy of religion, philosophical theology, and political philosophy, explore the tenets of liberal faith and invite continuing engagement with the philosophical issues. “Philip Quinn was admired enormously throughout the world of professional philosophy.... His reputation for rigor, his tireless service to the profession, and his essentially ‘non-dogmatic,’ but philosophically sophisticated faith is widely admired... The essays in this volume are first-rate contemporary philosophy along with an excellent introduction to Quinn’s work.” —_Charles Taliaferro, St. Olaf College_ "The papers that form _Liberal Faith_ give insightful treatments of three types of questions: first, how can we conscientiously believe something when there are many people we admire who do not believe it, and what is the underlying relation here between justification and rationality; second, what does it mean to desire union with God, and can Christians properly believe in the possibility of eternal self-annihilation; third, how should liberal democracy accommodate the religious convictions of its members, whether some comprehensive doctrine such as a religion is required to justify a commitment to human equality, and whether there is an absolute moral prohibition on the state use of torture. The volume has an unusually good introduction putting the papers into dialog with each other and with the work of Philip Quinn. The papers are cohesive because the central themes of Philip Quinn's work hold together into a picture of how Christianity and Liberal Democracy fit together." —_John Hare, Noah Porter Professor of Philosophical Theology, Yale Divinity School _ “This is a collection of high quality essays dealing with various topics related to Philip Quinn’s work. The book makes an original contribution by virtue of its individual papers, each of which is new. These essays will be of interest to scholars and students who followed Quinn’s work, especially in philosophy of religion and political philosophy.“ —_John Greco, The Leonard and Elizabeth Eslick Chair in Philosophy, Saint Louis University _. (shrink)

This paper discusses the neo-logicist approach to the foundations of mathematics by highlighting an issue that arises from looking at the Bad Company objection from an epistemological perspective. For the most part, our issue is independent of the details of any resolution of the Bad Company objection and, as we will show, it concerns other foundational approaches in the philosophy of mathematics. In the first two sections, we give a brief overview of the "Scottish" neo-logicist school, present a generic form (...) of the Bad Company objection and introduce an epistemic issue connected to this general problem that will be the focus of the rest of the paper. In the third section, we present an alternative approach within philosophy of mathematics, a view that emerges from Hilbert's Grundlagen der Geometrie (1899, Leipzig: Teubner; Foundations of geometry (trans.: Townsend, E.). La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1959.). We will argue that Bad Company-style worries, and our concomitant epistemic issue, also affects this conception and other foundationalist approaches. In the following sections, we then offer various ways to address our epistemic concern, arguing, in the end, that none resolves the issue. The final section offers our own resolution which, however, runs against the foundationalist spirit of the Scottish neo-logicist program. (shrink)

Moore held that to call something good is to ascribe a property to it. But he denied that the property could be expressed in non-evaluative terms. Can one accept this view of the meaning of good without falling into skepticism about whether anything can be, or be known to be, good? I suggest a way of doing this. The strategy combines the idea that good is semantically entangled, as opposed to semantically isolated, with the idea that (...) rational agents have a generic disposition to follow reasons. (shrink)

It is often held that moral considerations take precedence over considerations of other kinds in determining what we ought to do. I contend that this claim is ambiguous and argue that objections to each interpretation of it can be met only by rejecting the other. One surprising consequence of my argument is that no deontic moral theory can effectively guide action unless it is conjoined with a theory of the good. Another interesting consequence is that the deontologists' favorite objection (...) to teleological theories — the objection from injustice — does not go through. (shrink)

Modern technology has changed the way we live, work, play, communicate, fight, love, and die. Yet few works have systematically explored these changes in light of their implications for individual and social welfare. How can we conceptualize and evaluate the influence of technology on human well-being? Bringing together scholars from a cross-section of disciplines, this volume combines an empirical investigation of technology and its social, psychological, and political effects, and a philosophical analysis and evaluation of the implications of such effects.

In response to the five essays commenting on The Ethical Commonwealth in History, I provide an exploration of three themes—the character of the highest good, the possibility of attainment of the highest good, and the agency for its attainment—as a basis for dealing with the concerns these essays raise about my interpretation of Kant’s critical project. On my interpretation, Kant’s project of “critique” is primarily an anthropological one, with its central focus on the moral vocation to which finite (...) reason calls humanity as a species: To bring about a world of enduring peace as an essential element in the enactment of the highest good. These concerns bear upon: my characterization of the social and religious dimensions both of the highest good and of the finite human reason for which it serves as the final end; the historical dimensions that I claim for the community that is the locus for the attainment of the highest good; and the roles for human and for divine agency in such attainment. (shrink)

Philip Pettit offers a new insight into moral psychology. He shows that attachments such as love, and certain virtues such as honesty, require their characteristic behaviours not only as things actually are, but also in cases where things are different from how they actually are. He explores the implications of this idea for key moral issues.

This paper examines how we are to understand the goodness of neighbourly love, using the example of the parable of the Good Samaritan. Engaging with the philosophical discussion concerning the parable's moral significance that ensued in the wake of Peter Winch's 1987 paper ‘Who is my Neighbour?’, the paper argues that framing the goodness of the Samaritan in terms of a perceived necessity—as Winch and others do—runs the risk of simplifying and thus distorting it. The proposed alternative claims that (...) goodness is better understood when framed in terms of what Kierkegaard describes as purity of heart. Developing this claim, it is shown that while the one who is pure of heart does good deeds without perceiving them as necessary, the notion of necessity may nonetheless be of moral significance for the one who witnesses such purity. (shrink)

With modern rationalisation we subject life to quantification, generating evidence and models, and the more we subject life to codification, generating systems, regulations and procedures, the less we understand who we are and what we do. We plunge headlong into illusion, blinded by the clarity of our own newly-found rationality and the solidity of the evidence. We experience an eclipse of reason, no longer understanding what it is to formulate concepts and ideals, nor understanding what it is to offer our (...) lives, time and attention in an appropriate ratio or distribution. (shrink)

The Right and the Good, a classic of twentieth-century philosophy by the great scholar Sir David Ross, is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton-Lake, a leading expert on Ross. Ross's book is the pinnacle of ethical intuitionism, which was the dominant moral theory in British philosophy for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Intuitionism is now enjoying a considerable revival, and Stratton-Lake provides the context for a proper understanding of (...) Ross's great work today. (shrink)

I aim to illuminate foundational epistemological issues by reflecting on 'epistemic consequentialism'—the epistemic analogue of ethical consequentialism. Epistemic consequentialism employs a concept of cognitive value playing a role in epistemic norms governing belief-like states that is analogous to the role goodness plays in act-governing moral norms. A distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' versions of epistemic consequentialism is held to be as important as the familiar ethical distinction on which it is based. These versions are illustrated, respectively, by cognitive decision-theory and (...) reliabilism. Cognitive decision-theory is defended, and various conceptual issues concerning it explored. A simple dilemma suggests that epistemic consequentialism has radical consequences. (shrink)

Drawing on his extensive experience as both a medical practitioner and a patient, acclaimed author, award-winning physician, and ethicist Philip Hébert creates a brave and intimate portrait of the complex ethical questions raised by revolutionary advances in medical diagnosis and treatment. Philip Hébert addresses the complex ethical questions raised by revolutionary advances in medical treatment. This work expands upon Hébert's previous book, "Doing Right," and extends his knowledge of the field beyond medical professionals to reach the patients they (...) treat. (shrink)

In my contribution to this volume, I (BHS) comment on on the stultifying rhetoric of contemporary analytic moral theory as illustrated in Judith Jarvis Thomson's Tanner Lectures, with particular reference to Thomson's anxieties about the moral relativism exhibited by college freshman and to her efforts--quite strained, in my view, and inevitably unsuccessful--to demonstrate the existence of objective judgments in matters of morality and taste .

Argues i) that part of what it is to understand what is being asked, when we ask whether something is good, is being able to distinguish stopping points in a series of "Why?" questions, and ii) that this ability explains how we can reason from observable facts to conclusions about value.

Since the turn of the century there has been a strong trend to break through the wall which has separated philosophy from the “special sciences” and to investigate the problems which require a good judgment in both philosophy and science. The evolution of science itself and the increasing relevance of science in human life have given immense momentum to this trend. But this momentum could not be appreciated in its actual strength because scientists who wanted to raise their voices (...) had trouble in finding a Journal where they could communicate with the people who were interested, for almost all the scientific journals were devoted exclusively to technical papers. In founding Philosophy of Science Dr. Malisoff started the construction of a channel by which this important flow of scientific investigation could reach its public. This line of thought found in the journal a possibility of self-expression and it became a real force in the life of the community of scientists and scholars, and even of educated men in general. From the first volume, papers were published which have later been quoted in every discussion about the philosophy of science. I mention, as an example only, R. Carnap's paper on Testability and Meaning. Nobody who has wanted information and stimulation in this modern field of investigation could get it without looking into Malisoff's Philosophy of Science. (shrink)

How to Win an Election is an ancient Roman guide for campaigning that is as up-to-date as tomorrow's headlines. In 64 BC when idealist Marcus Cicero, Rome's greatest orator, ran for consul, his practical brother Quintus decided he needed some no-nonsense advice on running a successful campaign. What follows in his short letter are timeless bits of political wisdom, from the importance of promising everything to everybody and reminding voters about the sexual scandals of your opponents to being a chameleon, (...) putting on a good show for the masses, and constantly surrounding yourself with rabid supporters. Presented here in a lively and colorful new translation, with the Latin text on facing pages, this unashamedly pragmatic primer on the humble art of personal politicking is dead-on --and as relevant today as when it was written.A little-known classic in the spirit of Machiavelli's Prince, How to Win an Election is required reading for politicians and everyone who enjoys watching them try to manipulate their way into office. (shrink)

Social life across the African continent is largely threatened by intolerance, injustice, lack of equal opportunity, inequity in resource distribution, lack of compassion, unfair treatment and disrespect for others’ rights, as well as compromising intrusion of ethnicity, corruption, terrorism and religion into affairs of the state. So, Africans largely struggle with the political problem of building and sustaining societies and institutions that can be civil and compliant to the rule of law. There exists an African problem of political justice and (...) social justice. Disorder and parochialism in a sociopolitical system are mainly instigated by inefficiency and over-politicization of major developmental institutions. We recommend some human values of Ubuntu such as mutual respect, cooperation for the common good and the pursuit of reconciliation as pillars for stable and viable political and social order across most parts of Africa. (shrink)

We are very grateful to Mona Gupta and Peter Zachar for their commentaries on our paper. In our view, the main challenge for both commentators is this: do they have empirical evidence to refute our rejection (on evidence-based grounds) of the primacy of the current technological paradigm in psychiatry? Although opinions may differ about our choice of the philosophical tools we use to interpret the facts, unless there is good evidence to contradict our basic premise, their arguments will fail (...) to reach the evidence-based medicine (EBM) gold standard that they support. We do not believe their commentaries present any empirical evidence that contradicts our critique. Before we respond, we wish to stress two .. (shrink)

The malign figure of the Antichrist endures in modern culture, whether religious or secular; and the spectral shadow he has cast over the ages continues to exert a strong and powerful fascination. Philip C. Almond tells the story of the son of Satan from his early beginnings to the present day, and explores this false Messiah in theology, literature and the history of ideas. Discussing the origins of the malevolent being who at different times was cursed as Belial, Nero (...) or Damien, the author reveals how Christianity in both East and West has imagined this incarnation of absolute evil destined to appear at the end of time. For the better part of the last two thousand years, Almond suggests, the human battle between right and wrong has been envisaged as a mighty cosmic duel between good and its opposite, culminating in an epic final showdown between Christ and his deadly arch-nemesis. (shrink)

A person sometimes forms moral beliefs by relying on another person''s moral testimony. In this paper I advance a cognitivist normative account of this phenomenon. I argue that for a person''s actions to be morally good, they must be based on a recognition of the moral reasons bearing on action. Morality requires people to act from an understanding of moral claims, and consequently to have an understanding of moral claims relevant to action. A person sometimes fails to meet this (...) requirement when she relies on another person''s moral testimony, and so there are moral limits on such reliance. (shrink)

Horrendous evils may be considered in a religious context (as in the paper by m mcc adams to which this is a reply). An example from tolstoy of a nonreligious case is discussed. Professor adams's arguments for the refusal of the christian to be overwhelmed by horrendous evils are evaluated in the light of this. They are found inadequate on two grounds: (i) inadequate treatment of the mattering of others; (ii) they undermine the unqualified moral judgment presupposed in the characterization (...) of suffering as 'horrendous evils'. (shrink)

I discuss three tiers of technological innovation: mild innovation, or the acceleration by technology of a human activity aimed at a good; moderate innovation, or the obviation by technology of an activity aimed at a good; and radical innovation, or the altering by technology of the human condition so as to change what counts as a good. I argue that it is impossible to morally assess proposed innovations within any of these three tiers unless we rehabilitate a (...) natural-law ethical framework. And I offer some moral starting points within such a framework, in connection with innovations of each of the three types. (shrink)

This trenchant study analyzes the rise and decline in the quality and format of science in America since World War II. Science-Mart attributes this decline to a powerful neoliberal ideology in the 1980s which saw the fruits of scientific investigation as commodities that could be monetized, rather than as a public good.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.4 (2001) 335-342 [Access article in PDF] "Dispersing the Cogito: A Response to Vivian's Rhetorical Self" Philip Lewin Bradford Vivian ("The Threshold of the Self," Philosophy and Rhetoric 33. 4: 303-18), in seeking to disrupt the cogito, claims that acts of creative self-constitution by a "rhetorical self" become possible as subjectivity is dispersed across subject positions. However, the apparent ability of the rhetorical self to (...) freely choose which positions it will inhabit, as well as its apparent capacity to undergo subjectification without being marked by its habitation of those positions, seem to reintroduce several of the cogito's essential features.Vivian argues that "there is a historicity to our being and its expression, to our subjectivity and its elaboration" (303). His essay provides a clear and cogent account of how subjectivity might arise as the result of a series of rhetorical acts whose audience is the self. One's self, then, is a local and ongoing aesthetic formation, continually becoming and coming into being; to the extent that the aesthetic nature of this process is produced by persuading one's self to adopt some styles of life over others, then this process is a thoroughly persuasive phenomenon. The aesthetic composition molded by this continually renewed persuasion might best be described as the rhetorical self. (312; emphasis in original) Vivian clears away a good deal of the underbrush that often prevents us from getting a hold on the problematics of selfhood and subjectivity. I find much that is praiseworthy in the essay, particulary its explication of the contingent and shifting nature of the processes through which the self is formed and reformed. But there is a key theoretical elision in Vivian's argument that does much to restore the legitimacy of the Cartesian cogito that he is at pains to disrupt. The result is a model of self that revises Cartesianism by dispersing subjectivity among various subject positions, [End Page 335] but that, in a number of other important ways, preserves essential features of the cogito, as though each fragment of the dispersed cogito were itself a complete mini-cogito.Vivian's account elides the rhetorical process of self-formation. In a typical passage at the end of the essay, he comments, "In order to compose and cultivate one's being in the world, one must persuade one's self to choose and orchestrate certain styles of life from among those available into an entire aesthetics of being" (316-17). The questions this claim provokes are: How does this process of self-persuasion actually take place? What aspect or agency of psyche is doing the persuading? To conceive of the self as Vivian does--a self "conceived as a form--a rhetorical form--that exists only in its continual aesthetic creation, in its indefinite becoming" (304)--suggests a kind of autonomy and self-transparency in self-formation that has discouragingly Cartesian overtones.The terms with which Vivian has chosen to work, namely, subjectivity and the rhetorical self, do not address these issues of self-persuasion. Instead, they serve to mask them. Subjectivity, for Vivian, refers to the positions the self finds itself assuming within discursive regimes, positions whose formation entails moments both of self-persuasion and of subjection to existing social exigency. Subjectivity (so conceived) has the property of being an effect of multiple acts of subjectification, of voluntary acquiescence to preexisting subject positions. "Discourse creates subjects by first creating subject positions from which to speak" (313). The subject is not original, but rather follows from "an entire 'assemblage' of subject positions that are the willful creation of no one, but are instead formed by the complex operations of discourse" (313). The theoretical difficulty with this way of accounting for subjectivity lies in its elision of agency; how shall we make sense of the rhetorical self? More specifically, how does a necessary immersion into discursive practices couple with rhetorical acts of self-persuasion? What motivates self-persuasion? Are all the factors involved in self-persuasion fully conscious and under voluntary control? If not, how are we... (shrink)

In this provocative and insightful work, Philip Leon examines the nature of power and its ethical implications, delving into topics such as social justice, democracy, and civil disobedience. Drawing on a wide variety of sources from philosophy, politics, and history, Leon offers a nuanced and thought-provoking exploration of one of the most fundamental issues of our time. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know (...) it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This chapter, which deals with the psychological origins of goodness in childhood, and the developmental origins of human morality, argues that the socialization model and cognitive maturation model give short shrift to the role of emotions as one of the multiple natural prerequisites for nurturing morality. The primary models of moral development in the field of developmental psychology considered moral acquisition as a derived and “nurtured” consequence of inborn tendencies to either seek knowledge or gain social connection. Morality could not (...) possibly emerge out of hierarchical socialization. Socially constructed moral codes and feelings were derivative of natural emotional appraisal tendencies built on struggles for survival. Morality and convention were psychologically bound together, unified by the syntax of moral importance. The emotional transformation of socialized conventions into underlying moral competence can be likened to the transformation of everyday language performance into the innate syntactic structures indexing linguistic competence. (shrink)

Ce texte propose une lecture de l'oeuvre de Montesquieu à partir de débats récents sur le relativisme politique. La méthode d'ensemble qui se dégage de quelques grands thèmes des Lettres persanes et de L'Esprit des lois permet d'apercevoir le double enseignement de cette pensée: qu'elle est structurée à la fois par un horizon normatif d'universalité et par une conception plurielle du bien politique.This paper proposes a reading of Montesquieu's work on the basis of recent debates concerning political relativism. The overall (...) method which is present in some of the major themes of the Lettres persanes and De l'Esprit des lois suggests that this thought is structured at once by a normative horizon of universality and by a plural conception of the political good. (shrink)

Plato’s Symposium contains two accounts of eros which explicitly aim to reach a telos. The first is the technocratic account of the doctor Eryximachus, who seeks an exhaustive account of eros, common to all things with a physical nature. For him medical techne can create an orderly erotic harmony; while religion is defined as the curing of disorderly eros. Against this Socrates recounts the priestess Diotima finding a telos, not in technical exhaustiveness, but in a dialectical definition of eros in (...) the light of the good. What is common to all human beings is the desire to be in eternal relation to the good. All technai are forms of poiesis, by which things pass from being to not being. The erotic harmony recommended by Eryximachus, no less than the Aristophanes” recommendation of eros as “of a half, or of a whole’, is subject to the question whether “it happens to be good’. A self-harmonisation produced by techne can no more evade the sovereignty of good, than can projects of self-completion with a beloved in our likeness. (shrink)

According to republican theory, we are free persons to the extent that we are protected and secured in the same fundamental choices, on the same public basis, as one another. But there is no public protection or security without a coercive state. Does this mean that any freedom we enjoy is a superficial good that presupposes a deeper, political form of subjection? Philip Pettit addresses this crucial question in On the People's Terms. He argues that state coercion will (...) not involve individual subjection or domination insofar as we enjoy an equally shared form of control over those in power. This claim may seem utopian but it is supported by a realistic model of the institutions that might establish such democratic control. Beginning with a fresh articulation of republican ideas, Pettit develops a highly original account of the rationale of democracy, breathing new life into democratic theory. (shrink)

Sharon Street has argued that we should reject theism because we can accept it only at the cost of having good reason to doubt the reliability of our judgments as to what moral reasons there are. The success of her argument depends on the assumption that no realist account of normative reasons that validates commonsense morality has a tenable secular epistemology. I argue that even given this assumption Street’s argument does not succeed.

L'A. mesure l'influence de la consommation economique sur l'amelioration de la qualite de vie, dans la perspective d'une ethique de la vertu environnementaliste. Defendant la superiorite de l'ethique ancienne sur la science economique moderne, l'A. privilegie l'ideal eudemoniste d'une societe bonne sur les valeurs de neutralite, croissance et developpement propres a l'economie moderne.

PhD thesis published with Amsterdam University Press. -/- ***Back cover: -/- In this time of mass communication, rich people like us know very well the horrible conditions in which many poor people must live. Therefore, the question of what should we do about poverty, which is the central question of this study, readily arises. This book also asks more specific questions such as: How much money should wealthy individuals like us spend on fighting poverty? and, What restrictions should we place (...) on the extent and orientation of our expenditure in the light of poverty? The question of what rich individuals like us should do morally about poverty, first of all requires clarity about some relatively general issues: Must we always do whatever does the most good, or should we only do the most good possible while avoiding great cost to ourselves? Or, do we only need to do our fair share in a cooperative scheme which would eradicate poverty if everyone else also does their share? A large part of this study focuses on such issues. The book argues that if we can do great good at little cost to ourselves, we ought to do so – and perhaps we ought to do great good even if the cost to ourselves of doing so, is not small. Also, it is argued that rich individuals like us can often, at little cost to ourselves, undertake a number of concrete actions which help to fight poverty, and that we are morally obligated to undertake acs such as giving tithes, living within our ecological footprint, and frequently buying fair trade products. (shrink)

For a very long time now, philosophers have been inclined to distinguish two kinds of reasoning. There is theoretical reasoning, in which one aims to figure out what is true, and there is practical reasoning, in which one aims to figure out what to do. Figuring out what to do is something we do all the time, but it’s not so easy to say just what this activity is. On its face, it seems to have something to do with selecting (...) a course of action. But sometimes we select a course of action without figuring out what to do, simply because as far as we can see there is nothing to figure out. Faced with eleven indistinguishable 12oz cans of crushed tomatoes, I may see nothing to choose among them. Perhaps I did figure out that I wanted the crushed tomatoes, as opposed to the diced tomatoes, the whole stewed tomatoes, the tomato paste, or the tomato sauce. Only crushed tomatoes are suitable for the dish I have in mind. But now it’s down to which can of crushed tomatoes, and. (shrink)

How do we know right from wrong, good from bad, help from hindrance, and how can we judge the behaviour of others? Ethics are the rules and guidelines that we use to make such judgements. Often there are no clear answers, which make this subject both interesting and potentially frustrating. In this book, the authors offer readers the opportunity to develop and express their own opinions in relation to ethics in psychology. There are many psychological studies that appear to (...) have been harmful or cruel to the people or animals that took part in them. For example, memory researchers carried out studies on a man who had no memory for over forty years, but because he had no memory he was never able to agree to the studies. Is this a reasonable thing to do to someone? Comparative psychologist Harry Harlow found that he could create severe and lasting distress in monkeys by keeping them in social isolation. Is this a reasonable thing to do even if we find out useful things about human distress? If you were able to use psychological techniques to break someone down so that they revealed information that was useful to your government, would you do it? If so, why? If not, why not? These ethical issues are not easy to resolve and the debates continue as we encounter new dilemmas. This book uses examples from psychological research to look at: key ethical issues ethical guidelines of psychologists socially sensitive research ethics in applied psychology the use of animals in research This book is essential reading for undergraduate and pre-undergraduate students of psychology and related subjects such as philosophy and social policy. (shrink)

Contemporary expositions of God's goodness commonly err either (1) by subjecting God to moral laws, which is to question His sovereignty, or (2) by failing to establish that God will always act in accordance with moral principles, which removes the theist's ability to appeal to God's goodness in response to problems of evil. Current attempts at intermediate positions which avoid these two problems fall short. In this paper, I aim to construct a better intermediate position and account of God's goodness. (...) I do this by claiming that God's ability to create is best explained in terms of God's self‐love. Since God, as the greatest possible being, must be able to create, He must love Himself. I argue that this in turn entails that God loves all things, since by loving Himself, God loves the pre‐existent ideas of everything that will come to exist, and by extension the things themselves. This, I argue, allows us to have confidence that God will act in accordance with moral principles, but without subjecting Him to moral laws. (shrink)

This paper starts from the assumption that panpsychism is counterintuitive and metaphysically demanding. A number of philosophers, whilst not denying these negative aspects of the view, think that panpsychism has in its favour that it offers a good explanation of consciousness. In opposition to this, the paper argues that panpsychism cannot help us to explain consciousness, at least not the kind of consciousness we have pre-theoretical reason to believe in.

Immanuel Kant’s critical philosophy pays little explicit attention to the concept of ‘wisdom’ in its taxonomy of the functions of human reason in its work of rendering intelligible the world and the human place in the world. On the basis of some crucial texts in Kant’s writings, this essay argues that wisdom has a role to play in the task Kant assigns to practical reason; this task is to make the world in which humans dwell intelligible morally, i.e., to make (...) sense of the world as locus in which good and evil take form in function of the exercise of human freedom. In such a world, the function of wisdom is ‘cosmopolitan’ in that it provides a horizon of a social hope that recognizes human solidarity, vulnerability, and otherness, as signal instances of the inclusive moral relationality necessary for sustaining both an ‘outer’ world order for peace and the ‘inner’ dynamic of full moral relationality that Kant terms ‘the ethical commonwealth’. (shrink)