Traumatic experiences and post-traumatic stress are highly prevalent in people with psychosis, increasing symptom burden, decreasing quality of life and moderating treatment response. A range of post-traumatic sequelae have been found to mediate the relationship between trauma and psychotic experiences, including the “traditional” symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The International Classification of Diseases-11th Edition recognizes a more complex post-traumatic presentation, complex PTSD (cPTSD), which captures both the characteristic symptoms of PTSD alongside more pervasive post-traumatic sequelae known as ‘disturbances in (...) self-organization’ (DSOs). The prevalence and impact of cPTSD and DSOs in psychosis remains to be explored. In the first study of this kind, 144 participants with psychosis recruited from North West United Kingdom mental health services completed measures assessing trauma, PTSD and cPTSD symptoms and symptoms of psychosis. Forty-percent of the sample met criteria for cPTSD, compared to 10% who met diagnostic criteria for PTSD. PTSD and DSOs mediated the relationship between trauma and positive symptoms, controlling for dataset membership. Both PTSD and DSOs mediated the relationship between trauma and affective symptoms but did not explain a significant proportion of variance in negative symptoms. Cognitive and excitative symptoms of psychosis did not correlate with trauma, PTSD or DSO scores. These findings indicate the possible value of adjunct therapies to manage cPTSD symptoms in people with psychosis, pending replication in larger epidemiological samples and longitudinal studies. (shrink)

Gödel initiated the program of finding and justifying axioms that effect a significant reduction in incompleteness and he drew a fundamental distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic justifications. Reflection principles are the most promising candidates for new axioms that are intrinsically justified. Taking as our starting point Tait’s work on general reflection principles, we prove a series of limitative results concerning this approach. These results collectively show that general reflection principles are either weak ) or inconsistent. The philosophical significance of these (...) results is discussed. (shrink)

We generalize standard Turing machines, which work in time ω on a tape of length ω, to α-machines with time α and tape length α, for α some limit ordinal. We show that this provides a simple machine model adequate for classical admissible recursion theory as developed by G. Sacks and his school. For α an admissible ordinal, the basic notions of α-recursive or α-recursively enumerable are equivalent to being computable or computably enumerable by an α-machine, respectively. We emphasize the (...) algorithmic approach to admissible recursion theory by indicating how the proof of the Sacks–Simpson theorem, i.e., the solution of Post’s problem in α-recursion theory, could be based on α-machines, without involving constructibility theory. (shrink)

Contemporary emotion theories have come to conceptualise emotions as multicomponential and dynamic processes that do not necessarily cohere in fixed packages and continuously change over time. In this introduction to the Special Issue, we give a brief overview of what led to this conceptualisation of emotions, and propose how it can provide the key to our understanding of individual differences in emotional responding.

The work of Brentano's English contemporary J. E. McTaggart is in several ways profitable for Brentano scholars to study: I here cosider his views on the nature and classification of mental states. In McTaggart's account the characteristic of being a 'cognition', one that some but not all 'cogitations' have, corresponds to Brentano's notion of Anerkennen; quite unlike Brentano, he holds that contrariety obtains only between the contents of judgments, not between contrary acts of affirming and denying; like Brentano however he (...) recognizes contrariety in the realm of emotion and feeling, e.g. between love and hate, pleasure and pain. He regards feelings and emotions as mere colourings of cogitations, and thinks that their relation to an object (intentionality, as Brentano would say) comes about merely from their cogitative aspect. This view is attractively simple; but by considering McTaggart's own view of emotions' being in respect of characteristics of their objects, we can find serious ground to reject it. (shrink)

It is shown that the Boolean center of complemented elements in a bounded integral residuated lattice characterizes direct decompositions. Generalizing both Boolean products and poset sums of residuated lattices, the concepts of poset product, Priestley product and Esakia product of algebras are defined and used to prove decomposition theorems for various ordered algebras. In particular, we show that FLw-algebras decompose as a poset product over any finite set of join irreducible strongly central elements, and that bounded n-potent GBL-algebras are represented (...) as Esakia products of simple n-potent MV-algebras. (shrink)

Protein–protein interactions are thought to be mediated by domains, which are autonomous folding units of proteins. Recently, a second type of interaction has been suggested, mediated by short segments termed linear motifs, which are related to recognition elements of intrinsically disordered regions. Here, we propose a third kind of protein–protein recognition mechanism, mediated by disordered regions longer than 20–30 residues. Bioinformatics predictions and well‐characterized examples, such as the kinase‐inhibitory domain of Cdk inhibitors and the Wiskott–Aldrich syndrome protein (WASP)‐homology domain 2 (...) of actin‐binding proteins, show that these disordered regions conform to the definition of domains rather than motifs, i.e., they represent functional, evolutionary, and structural units. Their functions are distinct from those of short motifs and ordered domains, and establish a third kind of interaction principle. With these points, we argue that these long disordered regions should be recognized as a distinct class of biologically functional protein domains. (shrink)

In dieser zwischen 1135 und 1139 verfaßten Schrift, der er zwei Titel gab: Ethica oder Scito te ipsum, erörtert Abaelard die Frage nach dem Guten und dem Bösen, vor allem aber erstmals die Bedeutung des Gewissens für die Selbstbestimmung des Menschen. Er unterscheidet zwischen der Schwäche des Menschen, die durch Selbstbeherrschung überwunden werden kann, und der Sünde, die darin besteht, sich den eigenen Schwächen zu unterwerfen. Seine These, das Gewissen sei die oberste Instanz der Moral und die Moralität oder Verwerflichkeit (...) einer Handlung bestimme sich daher aus der Gesinnung des Handelnden, führte ihn zu der Folgerung, daß derjenige, der böse handelt, ohne es doch selbst zu wissen, dadurch noch nicht schuldig wird - sondern erst dann, wenn er entgegen besserer Einsicht, die ihm aufgegeben und möglich ist, das Böse wählt. Diese Behauptung stieß bei den Zeitgenossen und der Kirche auf Kritik und führte zur Verurteilung Abaelards auf dem Konzil von Sens ; wirkungsgeschichtlich gewann sie gleichwohl große Kraft und Bedeutung, da durch diesen Gedanken die überkommene Doxa, allein der Verstoß gegen moralisch geltende Regeln gebe den Maßstab dafür ab, ein Individuum der Sünde zu bezichtigen, dahingehend zu relativieren, daß nur der sich schuldig macht, der auch wußte, daß er eine Verfehlung begeht. Aus diesem Grund zählt die Schrift zu den bedeutendsten Werken der Weltliteratur. Die Ausgabe präsentiert sie erstmalig in einer vollständigen deutschen Übersetzung. Beigegeben sind der lateinische Text und eine kompetente Einleitung, die die besondere Stellung dieser Schrift im Gesamtwerk Abaelards prägnant vor Augen führt. (shrink)

This scarce antiquarian book is a facsimile reprint of the original. Due to its age, it may contain imperfections such as marks, notations, marginalia and flawed pages. Because we believe this work is culturally important, we have made it available as part of our commitment for protecting, preserving, and promoting the world's literature in affordable, high quality, modern editions that are true to the original work.

During the first four decades of the nineteenth century a debate raged over the nature of light. Following proposals of Isaac Newton made early in the eighteenth century, many physicists accepted the theory that light is composed of tiny particles subject to mechanical forces (see newton). At the beginning of the nineteenth century Thomas Young and Augustin Fresnel revived a competing theory originally suggested by Christiaan Huygens in the seventeenth century, according to which light consists not of particles, but of (...) waves in a medium called the ether. In both cases theorists postulated entities ‐ particles and waves in an ether ‐ that could not be observed. Yet theorists on both sides gave arguments for the existence of these entities and the properties they ascribed to them. They did so on the basis of what they could observe. How was this possible? (shrink)

The book has two parts. The first looks at the destructive use to which Descartes puts the method of doubt. But this is just half the story since, according to Broughton, Descartes also uses the method of doubt constructively. The second part of the book takes up the constructive use. Both uses fit into an overarching claim that is set out in the introduction. According to this claim, Descartes employs the method of doubt in order to establish fundamental metaphysical claims (...) – or, as he says, claims of first philosophy (recall Descartes’s title: Meditations on First Philosophy). These include: God exists, we ought to assent only to what we clearly and distinctly perceive, the essential attribute of matter is extension, the essential attribute of the human mind is thought, and sense experience allows us to know the primary qualities of material objects. This metaphysical interpretation of the method’s aim is contrasted with others: that the aim is to secure some form of high-grade knowledge, to clear the way for Descartes’s mechanistic physics, to refute the skepticism of the day, and to free the mind from the senses so we can think better about supersensible entities. Broughton cites passages in support of each interpretation. As her survey shows, there is (at least) decent textual support for each interpretation. Perhaps then the method of doubt is multi-purposed. After all, there is no obvious incompatibility between any two or more of the aims – so why take the various interpretations as competing with one another? Unfortunately, Broughton doesn’t say. (shrink)

Not only the direct physical experiences of deployment can severely harm soldiers’ mental health. Witnessing violations of their moral principles by the enemy, or by their fellow soldiers and superiors, can also have a devastating impact. It can cause soldiers’ moral disorientation, increasing feelings of shame, guilt, or hate, and the need for general answers on questions of right and wrong. Various attempts have been made to keep soldiers mentally sane. One is to provide convincing causes for their deployment, which (...) risks an “end justifies the means” way of thinking. The good cause can provide a moral justification for horrible atrocities. Another method, introduced in the USA, Canada, and Australia, aims to strengthen military personnel’s resistance by promoting and maintaining a happy, optimistic state of mind through the use of positive psychology. Alongside making soldiers “morally fit” for all kinds of situations, the focus could also be on moral recovery and forgiveness. Such a care-based military ethics approach, aimed at mutual understanding and interdependence, could help soldiers handle the emotional impact of moral conflicts. This demands that military units reflect on their organizational culture and rethink oaths and codes of conduct that focus mainly on efficiency and readiness, as well as the soldierly self-image with its seemingly still deeply rooted warrior ethos. Today, resilience and positive psychology in the military is apparently mainly geared to assuring its soldiers’ readiness. An appropriate set of virtues and understanding of virtue ethics that are less centered on self-perfection and autonomy could point to a different form of character-building and lead to a better understanding of others. (shrink)

This is an online book exhibition at the University of Otago Library. It contains images of Hume's copy of Berkeley's New Theory of Vision, 1709.

This introductory chapter discusses the theme of this book, which is about the state, nature, and practices related to British philosophy in the seventeenth century. The book is divided into five parts dealing with the philosophy of nature, the study of knowledge and human understanding, moral philosophy, political philosophy, and the works of leading seventeenth-century philosophers, including Francis Bacon, Robert Boyle, Isaac Newton, and Thomas Hobbes. The chapter also discusses key developments in modern philosophy during this period, which include heightened (...) historiographical awareness and the reassessment of the philosophical canon. (shrink)

The chapter examines the views of John Locke on the study of human understanding, focusing on his work entitled An Essay concerning Human Understanding and Of the Conduct of the Understanding. It highlights Locke's use of the Stoic tripartite division of knowledge into natural philosophy, ethics, and logic, and his emphasis on the importance of the senses in the acquisition of sensitive knowledge of the natural world. The chapter also discusses the normative aims for the study of the understanding, and (...) the relation between understanding and the will. (shrink)

Provides an advanced overview of the issues that are informing research on the subject of British philosophy in the seventeenth century, while at the same time offering new directions for research to take. It covers the whole of the seventeenth century, ranging from Francis Bacon to John Locke and Isaac Newton. The book contains five parts: the introductory Part I examines the state of the discipline and the nature of its practitioners as the century unfolded; Part II discusses the leading (...) natural philosophers and the philosophy of nature, including Bacon, Boyle, and Newton; Part III covers knowledge and the human faculty of the understanding; Part IV explores the leading topics in British moral philosophy from the period; and Part V concerns political philosophy. In addition to dealing with canonical authors and celebrated texts, such as Thomas Hobbes and his Leviathan, it discusses many less-well-known figures and debates from the period whose importance is only now being appreciated. (shrink)

The seventeenth century marked a critical phase in the emergence of modern science. But we misunderstand this process, if we assume that seventeenth-century modes of natural inquiry were identical to the highly specialised, professionalised and ever proliferating family of modern sciences practised today.