This essay considers the beginnings of the journal October's critical practice and the significance of a work by Michel Foucault: “Ceci n'est pas une pipe”.1 The theoretical issues/problematics raised by this essay became key to future debates in and around October; the essay becoming something of an emblematic means by which October might be distinguishing from other visual art critical practices. The importance of Foucault's text in relation to October was revealed during correspondences with Rosalind Krauss in August 2001. Foucault's (...) self-referential essay can be seen as crucial not only to Rosalind Krauss's intellectual development, but also to the continuing debate on the nature of text and image in which the journal would be involved. The spiralling interplay of Foucault's narrative, combined with Magritte's picture, might be interpreted as a metaphor for the mediations of post-structural visual criticism itself as its practitioners sought to institute language into the visual sign, a project that attempted to produce a theoretical rationale – and perhaps a justification – for images being treated as if they were texts; thus, paraphrasing Foucault, introducing into the plenitude of the image a certain disorder. Such a weaving together of representation and discourse is interpreted as the formation of a destabilizing dialectic, a dialectic that can be linked to the writings of October as it shifts its rhetorical locations in an attempt to break down the normative pictorial and discursive frames of reference; becoming in essence a dedisciplinary and de-formative critical practice. This essay provides an outline of the determining conditions that led to the development of this “linguistic turn” and an associated reflection on Foucault's text that seeks to direct attention specifically towards its semiotic and discursive implications in relation to the developing oeuvre of criticism exemplified by the magazine. The essay is supported by interviews with Rosalind Krauss and Douglas Crimp conducted by the author in March 2002. (shrink)

This chapter argues that central banks find themselves between a rock and a hard place when it comes to green central banking. Either they endorse the project, exposing them to the charge that they lack the input legitimacy to do so, or they eschew taking into account climate concerns, thus undermining their output legitimacy. Our discourse analysis of central bankers’ speeches shows that disagreements among officials from the same institution regarding green central banking are grounded on issues outside their core (...) expertise. Furthermore, neither the conservative nor the progressive central bankers defend positions that have the potential to overcome the legitimacy dilemma we formulate. (shrink)

Given available technologies, current consumption behaviour is incompatible with the goal of keeping global warming below 2 °C. Economists present carbon pricing as the most efficient tool to induce people to adjust their consumption behaviour. This Perspective critically analyses the ethics, economics and politics of one key form of carbon pricing: carbon taxes are levied to discourage fossil-fuel-intensive consumption. The core claim of this Perspective is that progressive individual carbon taxes (that is, taxes whose rate increases the more emissions an (...) individual generates) are not only more effective but also more just than the flat-rate carbon taxes prevalent today. (shrink)

Delegation to independent agencies can reap real benefits for policy-making. In the case of monetary policy, it shores up the credibility of the central bank. However, the discretion of IAs needs to be constrained to ensure their legitimacy. This letter focuses on one potential constraint, namely, the idea that IAs should not make choices on distributional trade-offs. Given that monetary policy today has significant distributive consequences, if this constraint were respected, the independence of central banks would have to be repealed. (...) This would be just as undesirable as a monetary policy whose distributive consequences remain unchecked. Instead, this letter encourages the search for alternative solutions and puts forward three possible institutional arrangements to manage the tension between the distributive consequences of monetary policy on the one hand and central bank legitimacy on the other. (shrink)

The writings of William H. Whyte do not loom large in the literature of my field: environmental ethics, the branch of ethics devoted to consideration of whether and how there are moral reasons for protecting non-human animals and the larger natural environment. Environmental ethics is a very new field of inquiry, only found in academic philosophy departments since the early 1970s. While there is no accepted reading list of indispensable literature in environmental ethics, certainly any attempt to create such a (...) list would begin with Henry David Thoreau, John Muir, Aldo Leopold, Rachel Carson, and a more recent handful of senior scholars who had been writing on these topics early on, such as J. Baird Callicott, Val Plumwood, Peter Singer, Richard Sylvan, Tom Regan, and Holmes Rolston III (for a review of contemporary environmental ethics, see Light 2002, Palmer 2003, and Wenz 2001). (shrink)

A central question in AI ethics concerns the moral status of robots. This article argues against the idea that they have moral status. It proceeds by defending the assumption that consciousness is necessary for welfare subjectivity. Since robots most likely lack consciousness, and welfare subjectivity is necessary for moral status, it follows that robots lack moral status. The assumption that consciousness is necessary for welfare subjectivity appears to be in tension with certain widely accepted theories of wellbeing, especially versions of (...) Desire Satisfaction Theory and Objective List Theory. However, instead of elevating non-conscious robots to welfare subjects, this tension should lead us to reject versions of these theories that have this implausible implication. (shrink)

The power to raise taxes is a sine qua non for the functioning of the modern state. Governments frequently defend the independence of their fiscal policy as a matter of sovereignty. This article challenges this defence by demonstrating that it relies on an antiquated conception of sovereignty. Instead of the Westphalian sovereignty centred on non-intervention that has long dominated relations between states, today's fiscal interdependence calls for a conception of sovereignty that assigns duties as well as rights to states. While (...) such a circumscribed conception of sovereignty has emerged in other areas of international law in recent years, it has yet to be extended to fiscal questions. Here, these duties arguably include obligations of transparency, of respect for the fiscal choices of other countries, and of distributive justice. The resulting conception of sovereignty is one that emphasises its instrumental as well as its conditional character. Neither state sovereignty nor self-determination is an end in itself, but a means to promoting individual well-being. It is conditional in the sense that if states do not live up to their fiscal obligations towards other states, their claims to autonomy are void. (shrink)

Governments increasingly use their fiscal policy to attract mobile capital from abroad. This tax competition puts a strain on the international fiscal system by undermining the capacity of states to make autonomous fiscal choices and by exacerbating inequalities. The existing regulatory framework is not able to address these challenges. Yet, what considerations should guide our efforts for reform? This chapter argues that a first necessary step consists in understanding the principles that justify the state as the principal locus of fiscal (...) control in the first place. Building on an account of the legitimacy of the state and its fiscal powers, the chapter shows how tax competition is in tension with the principal objectives this account assigns to the state. It then outlines a normative response to tax competition that relies on both reforming jurisdictional rules and redistribution between states. (shrink)

The semantic closure theory of consciousness attempts to explain the privacy of conscious representations. Such an explanation requires that representational content is more than just information carried by cognitive states but also arises in virtue of functional interrelations between such states. This paper shows that, given such a fine-grained view of representational content, the privacy or non-communicability of certain mental contents can be readily explained. Furthermore, the degree of semantic closure, i.e. the degree to which the states of a representational (...) system bear non-communicable content, can be quantified in information theoretic terms. A toy simulation of the evolution of semantic closure is presented. (shrink)

The antirealist position on temporal passage is that time exists but does not pass. Antirealists either claim that experiences of passage represent something that does not exist or that these experiences do not represent passage. This paper reconstructs and defends an argument for the reality of passage by Milič Čapek that is based on the idea of mental passage, the passage of experience itself. The belief that mental passage exists is introspectively justified. This justification is not undermined by perceptual illusions (...) and is also compatible with antirealist explanations of why the belief arises. Both physicalism and psychophysical dualism justify the premise that mental passage implies physical passage. Arguments by Huw Price and Simon Prosser purport to show that experiences do not represent physical passage. However, these arguments rely on thought experiments that presuppose the non-existence of mental passage, and therefore miss the fact that mental passage enables the representation of physical passage. (shrink)

Cohen’s book is one of the founding publications of Analytical Marxism, aiming to reconstruct and in some cases reformulate some of Marx’s core claims using the rigorous tools of contemporary philosophy. The first part of the chapter analyzes Cohen’s defense of the controversial idea of historical materialism. Can the idea that history follows some underlying law of progress, which is central to Marx’s writing, stand up to scrutiny? This part of the chapter discusses, first, the radical challenges to historical materialism (...) formulated by rational choice Marxists such as Elster; second, a series of objections against functionalist explanation in the social sciences more generally; and, finally, some modifications Cohen made to his account of historical materialism in his later writings and in response to these critiques. The second part of the chapter analyzes Cohen’s conception of exploitation to illustrate the theoretical potential of Analytic Marxism more generally. (shrink)

Monetary policy, and the response it elicits from financial markets, raises normative questions. This chapter, building on an introductory section on the objectives and instruments of monetary policy, analyzes two such questions. First, it assesses the impact of monetary policy on inequality and argues that the unconventional policies adopted in the wake of the financial crisis exacerbate inequalities in income and wealth. Depending on the theory of justice one holds, this impact is problematic. Should monetary policy be sensitive to inequalities (...) and, if so, how? Second, the chapter argues that the leverage that financial markets have today over the monetary policy agenda undermines democratic legitimacy. (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous présentons deux arguments en faveur d’une attention accrue des banques centrales à l’égard des implications distributives des politiques monétaires. En mobilisant la doctrine du double effet, nous montrons que la responsabilité des banquiers centraux quant aux effets distributifs de leurs politiques monétaires non conventionnelles est engagée. De plus, étant donné que le levier traditionnel de la fiscalité fait face à de sérieuses difficultés aujourd’hui, l’appui des banques centrales pourrait être décisif pour la réduction des inégalités économiques. (...) -/- Nous évaluons ensuite les arguments théoriques et empiriques soulevés par les banquiers centraux contre cette proposition. Nous concluons que ces objections ne minent pas l’attrait d’une responsabilité des banques centrales en matière de distribution. (shrink)

The idea that pushing for more equality comes at a cost in terms of economic efficiency is widely accepted. Underpinning this idea is the premise that some of the most productive members of society will work less if we lower their pay. If this is true, some argue, it justifies paying the most productive a premium to work, provided doing so benefits everyone. This chapter argues that the standard version of the incentives argument suffers from two important blind spots. First, (...) it assumes that the comparative advantage of the most productive members of society is rooted in their natural talents, that is, in a factor exogenous to the production process. Second, it adopts a static framework to analyze the bargaining process in which incentive payments are negotiated, where static means taking all informational inputs from the same moment in time. The chapter uses the debate between John Rawls (1999) and G.A. Cohen (2008) to illustrate the normative repercussions of making these two assumptions. The chapter qualifies as unjust incentive payments that reward individual productivity due to specialization rather than to natural talent. In addition, it argues that individuals would not be in a position to obtain such incentive payments if bargaining took place before rather than after the acquisition of specialized skills. Finally, the chapter discusses the objection that eliminating this type of incentive payments would be inefficient. (shrink)

Theories of justice and intellectual property are vast topics in their own right. The contributions to this volume examine how they relate. How do our justifications for protecting intellectual property fare from an ethical perspective? Any attempt to tackle this question in a relatively short chapter like this one will have to be restricted in scope. My claims are limited in four ways. First, I concentrate on one kind of intellectual property protection, namely patents. Second, the claims of justice put (...) forward concentrate on one context of justice, namely the distribution of health goods. Third, the discussion of distributive issues concerning health is limited further in that I single out the distribution of drugs rather than, for instance, access to doctors or hospital services. Finally, I adopt a cosmopolitan perspective, emphasising inequalities in the access to drugs at the international rather than at the national level. (shrink)

Effective altruism implies that we should donate to an asteroid deflection program at the expense of saving a nearby child’s life. I argue that anyone who finds this result counterintuitive has prima facie reason to reject, or at least doubt that their own values commit them to, effective altruism.

La concurrence fiscale internationale est une composante essentielle du paysage fiscal contemporain. Cet essai analyse les responsabilités de l’État dans ce contexte d’interdépendance des systèmes fiscaux. Il soutient que l’État a le devoir 1) de mettre en œuvre le projet collectif défini par sa population, 2) de respecter l’autonomie des autres États et 3) d’assister les pays démunis. Cette conceptualisation des responsabilités étatiques a des conséquences théoriques et pratiques. Du côté théorique, la conjonction des deux premières responsabilités pousse à abandonner (...) la notion traditionnelle de souveraineté́ comme non-ingérence. Aujourd’hui, une notion adéquate de la souveraineté́ doit être sensible aux externalités internationales produites par l’action d’un État. De plus, la conception de la souveraineté́ esquissée ici est compatible avec un impératif d’assistance envers les pays en voie de développement. Du côté pratique, le respect de ces responsabilités étatiques requiert un nouveau régime de coopération fiscale entre les pays. (shrink)

In recent decades, and in particular since the shift towards independent central banks, there has been no explicit coordination of fiscal and monetary policy. In the Eurozone, this lack of coordination represents an important flaw, especially since the Eurozone is not an optimal currency area. Complementing monetary union with a transfer union represents one possible solution. This paper argues that the negative impact of post-2008 and post-Covid-19 unconventional monetary policy on income inequalities provides a second reason to coordinate fiscal and (...) monetary policy. Among various institutional arrangements to implement such coordination, the paper defends the idea that the European Central Bank should be sensitive to distributive considerations when formulating its monetary policy. Such an arrangement would help both to contain the distributive side-effects of monetary policy and to at least partially remedy the flaw at the heart of the Eurozone as long as an outright transfer union remains unfeasible. (shrink)

All healthcare professionals (HCPs) have responsibilities to provide information to patients according to the duties found within UK decision-making guidance and with regards to theory about the doctor-patient relationship. While routinisation can be understood in a number of different ways, this paper is concerned with how routines might negatively affect patients in the decision-making process. Therefore, in this manuscript, medical decision making is understood as problematically routine when a medical test or procedure is framed as a standard one and—given the (...) way options are presented—it is implied that someone can decide to use that test or treatment without being given sufficient opportunities to think through their choices. Routinisation, when understood in this way, can affect the quality and amount of information provided to patients and the ways in which patients reflect upon their choices when making decisions. With the introduction of non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) into the UK healthcare system, bioethicists have questioned whether this new technology will be routinised and what the implications of routinisation on the decision-making process might be. While there have been numerous studies investigating the views and attitudes of pregnant women who use NIPT, there are fewer studies that look at the views and attitudes of healthcare professionals (HCPs). This study interviewed 20 UK-based HCPs who either offer NIPT or counselled pregnant women on the use of NIPT. One important finding was that many HCPs held the attitude that the NIPT decision-making process had become routine, however there was disagreement about whether routine NIPT was problematic or not. This study provides insights about the context that surrounds decision making for NIPT, and it raises important questions about how NIPT routinisation might be evaluated. (shrink)

Relational moral theories hold that at least some moral demands are grounded in a relation between individuals. But how should this relation be understood? Most contemporary relational theories have an individuals-first structure: they presuppose that the moral relations that ground moral demands can be explained in terms of relational moral properties of the individuals involved. Radical relationalism, by contrast, has a relations-first structure: it holds that the moral relations that ground relational moral demands are normatively prior to relational moral properties (...) of individuals. My aim in this paper is to argue that some moral demands are radically relational. (shrink)

Much of the focus on pain in the literature is the nature of pain’s badness. This paper addresses the relatively overlooked problem of intensity. I construe intensity as the degree to which pains demand involuntary attention, the degree to which a pain can’t be ignored. I use a global workspace framework to explain intensity, a view that is uniquely situated to explain the relevant empirical evidence. I construe intensity theoretically via a pain’s mode of representation, how pain is represented rather (...) than what is represented. This has the advantage of integrating the major views on pain’s badness. Novel explanations result from intensity as attentional demand and each view’s perspective on badness. (shrink)

Quassim Cassam argues that contemporary philosophers largely neglect the kind of “substantial” self-knowledge most people care about – knowledge of my character, beliefs, and desires – in favor of “trivial” forms of it that are nevertheless philosophically illuminating. This article takes up Cassam's challenge to turn toward accounts of substantial self-knowledge, and, building on the work of Gadamer, makes the case that any such account has to address the question of the historical formation of the knowing subject. That historical formation (...) – our ‘historicity’ – both erects barriers to self-knowledge and serves as a source of it, and raises the question of how much self-knowledge is even possible for historically situated knowers. To answer that, I take up Collingwood's claim that the aim of historical research is self-knowledge, and his view that, since its scientific turn in the nineteenth century, history has enabled self-knowledge of an especially significant sort. Developing these and other ideas in Collingwood, I draw a distinction between what I call “historico-philosophical” self-knowledge, which includes knowledge of our historicity, and “garden-variety historical” self-knowledge, which is focused on the particular historical formations in which we find ourselves. I argue that both count as substantial self-knowledge and round out an understanding of myself that includes any grasp I might have of my character, beliefs, and desires. (shrink)

I examine two arguments for the conclusion that thinking is not a physical process. James F. Ross argues that thinking is determinate in a manner that nopurely physical process can be. Peter Geach argues that thinking is a basic activity that, unlike basic physical processes, cannot be assigned a precise position in time. I present two objections to Ross’s argument. I then show that even if Geach’s argument avoids these objections, it is vulnerable to two other objections. I conclude (...) that neither argument establishes the immateriality of thinking. (shrink)

El concepto moderno de solidaridad destaca por su carácter dinámico que se asienta sobre una tensión dialéctica entre la individualización de una sociedad pluralista por un lado y la funcionalidad integradora de una comunidad delimitada por otro. Pero la inmersión de los sujetos en instituciones que remedian los intereses individuales a través de una “confiabilidad abstracta” nos exige revisar la relación entre Estado moderno e identidad nacional desde una perspectiva crítica inspirada en la teoría de Nicos Poulantzas. Esto nos lleva (...) a un nuevo concepto de solidaridad que sustituye la homogeneización nacional por otra forma de igualdad razonada sobre individuos autónomos e independientes. Un modelo de solidaridad así reconstruido resuelve las deficiencias de la teoría sociológica acerca del fundamento normativo del Estado de bienestar. (shrink)

While histories of literature and philosophy have till now presented Calcidius as if he were no more than a secondhand mediator of Platonic thought, Peter Dronke, in The Spell of Calcidius, shows that this judgement must be radically revised. Calcidius' commentary (probably of the early fourth century) on Plato's Timaeus is a deeply individual work, which was able to inspire a fresh way of looking for truth, of searching for a world-picture that was not ready-made, among exceptional thinkers across (...) eight centuries. The spell Calcidius cast was intellectual freedom, a Christian's refusal to make Christian propaganda, a spirit of open enquiry. After the discussion of some key cosmological motifs in Calcidius himself and in Boethius, there follow chapters on the brilliant transformations of Calcidian thought in the ninth century by Eriugena and others; on the odi et amo towards Calcidius of Manegold of Lautenbach in the eleventh century; and on the ardent assimilation of his thought in the early twelfth by “us who love Plato”, as William of Conches proclaimed. The final chapter shows how in Bernardus Silvestris' epic, the Cosmographia (1147/8), the daring uses of language and speculation begun by Calcidius find their culminating creative renewal. (shrink)

Kreeft takes the reader through the world of existentialist philosophy, posing questions that challenge the concepts that Sartre proposed. Based on an imagination dialogue between Socrates and Sartre that takes place in the afterlife, this profound and witty book makes an entertaining and informative exploration of modern philosophy "Peter Kreeft's work is (1) unfailingly brilliant, (2) intellectually agile, (3) astonishingly perspicacious, (4) gloriously orthodox, (5) Chestertonian aphoristic." - Thomas Howard, author of On Being Catholic.

What is art? Why do we value it? How is meaning discerned and discovered? Can art compete with science and philosophy in the search for truth? This succinct and engaging introduction tackles some of the fundamental philosophical questions of why art, in its wide variety of forms, should matter to us. In a clear and accessible style, Peter Lamarque addresses key topics such as: the definition of art representation and resemblance meaning and significance art and emotion artistic form and (...) function the pleasures of art conceptions of truth universal and cultural values the challenge of popular arts In nine well-structured chapters, _What is this Thing called Art?_ delivers critical insights into specific issues and controversies that arise from the main theoretical approaches to art. Each chapter features concise summaries of key ideas, as well as authentic examples and annotated suggestions for further reading. This is an essential introduction for undergraduates studying the philosophy of art for the first time. (shrink)

In this account of his mature thinking, Peter Marshall develops a dynamic and organic philosophy for the coming millennium which he calls liberation ecology. Liberation ecology is holistic in viewing the world as a harmonious whole and all beings and things as interwoven threads in nature's web. It is intuitive in recognizing intuition as the main source of knowledge and the imagination as the great organ of morality. It is ecological in seeing human beings as fellow voyagers with other (...) species in the magnificent odyssey of evolution. Above all, it is libertarian in seeking to release humanity, society and nature from their existing burdens so that they can unfurl and realize together their full potential. Exploring our strengths and possibilities, this book presents the ideas and values needed to ride the winds of change at this crucial stage in our development and in the history of the world. It provides a new philosophy for a new era, an uplifting and inspired vision which combines ancient wisdom and modern insights, reason and feeling, science and poetry, myth and the marvellous. It offers a guide for the future on how to rive in the most fulfilling way and how to create a genuinely free and sustainable society in harmony with nature. (shrink)

Using a simple learning agent, we show that learning self-control in the primrose path experiment does parallel learning cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma. But Rachlin's claim that “there is no essential difference between self-control and altruism” is too strong. Only iterated prisoner's dilemmas played against reciprocators are reduced to self-control problems. There is more to cooperation than self-control and even altruism in a strong sense.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)