According to most academics, different generations share common characteristics. This undoubtedly helps to better understand their behavior in different scenarios, predicting their responses. However, this seems questionable and that is the main purpose of this study. This research, although preliminary, try to confirm if millennials have common characteristics, or if, on the contrary, there are differences between them due to the culture in which they are immersed. To this end, it has been contextualized in a sector that is very sensitive (...) to cultural differences, such as tourism. Data collection was carried out through a questionnaire administered in 2019 via e-mail to young South Korean and Spanish millennials. The results suggest that there do not appear to be common personality traits between the countries analyzed. The differences between the two groups for most personality traits and travel motivations were significant. The findings of this research provide several practical implications since it will make possible a more appropriate management of the tourist destination. (shrink)

Désormais accessible du fait de l’ouverture des archives vaticanes pour le pontificat de Pie XII, le dossier de la Congrégation du Saint-Office sur le Père Congar fait toute la lumière sur les trois passages du théologien devant elle. Le premier, en janvier 1939, concerne Chrétiens désunis qui s’en tire avec un avertissement bénin, mais suffisant pour que la seconde version du livre ne soit jamais publiée. Le second, en 1951-1952, concerne Vraie et fausse réforme dans l’Église qui est interdit de (...) réédition et de traduction. Alors que les deux premiers se sont déroulés en l’absence du Père Congar et à son insu, le troisième voit sa comparution au Saint-Office, en décembre 1954, pour un interrogatoire sur l’ensemble de son œuvre. Deux dominicains français, les Pères Garrigou-Lagrange et Gagnebet ont été mêlés de près à ces différentes procédures. En octobre 1955, le théologien est assigné à Cambridge par le maître général des dominicains, avec soumission à la censure romaine du moindre de ses écrits. Son exil ne finira qu’en décembre 1956 avec son assignation au couvent de Strasbourg. (shrink)

La crise contemporaine des valeurs crée un vide éthique dans un contexte-mêlé, dénué des valeurs et repères transcendants. Notre ouvrage est une réflexion sur la fondation d'une nouvelle humanité dans ce contexte de mise en demeure. L'humanisme valadiérien atteste que le modelage de la physionomie de nos sociétés modernes et l'avènement d'un monde plus humain se feront par un humanisme nouveau. Cet humanisme se définit par le respect de la personne humaine et de ses droits, l'amour du prochain, la conscience, (...) l'égalité et la prise en compte de la vulnérabilité de l'altérité. Toutefois, l'humanisme valadiérien présente des déficits qui font penser à l'humanisme universaliste progressiste qui cadre avec notre contexte sociétal actuel en affirmant l'égalité de tous les êtres humains au-delà des cultures et des aires géographiques. L'humanisme universaliste progressiste est un héritage du père latino-américain Marsilo Ficino, une grande figure de la Renaissance italienne. L'humanisme universaliste décentre l'homme du cosmos en le plaçant au début et à la fin de toutes les entreprises humaines. Il s'emploie à créer une communauté de destin de l'humanité : cadre pratique des valeurs référentielles, de dialogue interculturel et de solidarité transmondiale. Son intégration holistique dans la mondialisation néo-libérale garantira la valorisation de l'humain universel et la reliance homme/nature. Pour son effectivité, il a recours à la pensée élargie, aux hommes de pensée de tous bords et aux médias. (shrink)

Autonomous Agents addresses the related topics of self-control and individual autonomy. "Self-control" is defined as the opposite of akrasia-weakness of will. The study of self-control seeks to understand the concept of its own terms, followed by an examination of its bearing on one's actions, beliefs, emotions, and personal values. It goes on to consider how a proper understanding of self-control and its manifestations can shed light on personal autonomy and autonomous behaviour. Perspicuous, objective, and incisive throughout, Alfred Mele makes a (...) convincing case for the value of individual autonomy. (shrink)

My topic lies on conceptual terrain that is quite familiar to philosophers. For others, a bit of background may be in order. In light of what has filtered down from quantum mechanics, few philosophers today believe that the universe is causally deterministic. That is, to use Peter van Inwagen's succinct definition of “determinism,” few philosophers believe that “there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future.” Even so, partly for obvious historical reasons, philosophers continue to argue about whether free (...) will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism. Compatibilists argue for compatibility, and incompatibilists argue against it. Some incompatibilists maintain that free will and moral responsibility are illusions. But most are libertarians, libertarianism being the conjunction of incompatibilism and the thesis that at least some human beings are possessed of free will and moral responsibility. (shrink)

Self-deception raises complex questions about the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. In this book, Alfred Mele addresses four of the most critical of these questions: What is it to deceive oneself? How do we deceive ourselves? Why do we deceive ourselves? Is self-deception really possible? -/- Drawing on cutting-edge empirical research on everyday reasoning and biases, Mele takes issue with commonplace attempts to equate the processes of self-deception with those of stereotypical interpersonal deception. Such attempts, (...) he demonstrates, are fundamentally misguided, particularly in the assumption that self-deception is intentional. In their place, Mele proposes a compelling, empirically informed account of the motivational causes of biased beliefs. At the heart of this theory is an appreciation of how emotion and motivation may, without our knowing it, bias our assessment of evidence for beliefs. Highlighting motivation and emotion, Mele develops a pair of approaches for explaining the two forms of self-deception: the "straight" form, in which we believe what we want to be true, and the "twisted" form, in which we believe what we wish to be false. -/- Underlying Mele's work is an abiding interest in understanding and explaining the behavior of real human beings. The result is a comprehensive, elegant, empirically grounded theory of everyday self-deception that should engage philosophers and social scientists alike. (shrink)

Although much human action serves as proof that irrational behavior is remarkably common, certain forms of irrationality--most notably, incontinent action and self-deception--pose such difficult theoretical problems that philosophers have rejected them as logically or psychologically impossible. Here, Mele shows that, and how, incontinent action and self-deception are indeed possible. Drawing upon recent experimental work in the psychology of action and inference, he advances naturalized explanations of akratic action and self-deception while resolving the paradoxes around which the philosophical literature revolves. In (...) addition, he defends an account of self-control, argues that "strict" akratic action is an insurmountable obstacle for traditional belief-desire models of action-explanation, and explains how a considerably modified model accommodates action of this sort. (shrink)

We shall formulate an analysis of the ordinary notion of intentional action that clarifies a commonsense distinction between intentional and nonintentional action. Our analysis will build on some typically neglected considerations about relations between lucky action and intentional action. It will highlight the often- overlooked role of evidential considerations in intentional action, thus identifying the key role of certain epistemological considerations in action theory. We shall also explain why some vagueness is indispensable in a characterization of intentional action as ordinarily (...) understood. (shrink)

Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issues in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will--one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible (...) with determinism (incompatibilists), and the other for readers who are convinced of the opposite (compatibilists). Luck poses problems for all believers in free will, and Mele offers novel solutions to those problems--one for incompatibilist believers in free will and the other for compatibilists. An early chapter of this empirically well-informed book clearly explains influential neuroscientific studies of free will and debunks some extravagant interpretations of the data. Other featured topics include abilities and alternative possibilities, control and decision-making, the bearing of manipulation on free will, and the development of human infants into free agents. Mele's theory offers an original perspective on an important problem and will garner the attention of anyone interested in the debate on free will. (shrink)

Claims about agents’ abilities—practical abilities—are common in theliterature on free will, moral responsibility, moral obligation, personalautonomy, weakness of will, and related topics. These claims typicallyignore differences among various kinds or levels of practical ability. Inthis article, using ‘A’ as an action variable, I distinguish among threekinds or levels: simple ability toA; ability toAintentionally; and a morereliable kind of ability toAassociated with promising toA. I believe thatattention to them will foster progress on the topics I mentioned. Substan-tiating that belief—by making progress (...) on these topics in light of suchattention—is a project for other occasions. My aim here is to lay a partialfoundation for that project. (shrink)

Within a variety of contemplative traditions, non-dual-oriented practices were developed to evoke an experiential shift into a mode of experiencing in which the cognitive structures of self-other and subject–object subside. These practices serve to de-reify the enactment of an observing witness which is usually experienced as separate from the objects of awareness. While several contemplative traditions, such as Zen, Mahāmudrā, Dzogchen, and Advaita Vedanta emphasize the importance of such a non-dual insight for the cultivation of genuine wellbeing, only very few (...) attempts in contemplative science have turned toward the study of non-dual-oriented practices. This article starts from a recently developed theoretical cognitive science framework that models the requirements of a temporary experiential shift into a mode of experiencing free from cognitive subject–object structure. This model inspired by the enactive approach contributes theoretically grounded hypotheses for the much-needed rigorous study of non-dual practices and non-dual experiences. To do so, three steps are taken: first, common elements of non-dual-oriented practices are outlined. Second, the main ideas of enactive cognitive science are presented including a principled theoretical model of what is required for a shift to a pure non-dual experience, that is, an experiential mode that is unbound by subject–object duality. Third, this synthesized theoretical model of the requirements for the recognition of the non-dual is then compared with a specific non-dual style of meditation practice, namely,Mahāmudrāpractice from Tibetan Buddhism. This third step represents a heuristic for evaluating the external coherence of the presented model. With this, the aim is to point toward a principled enactive view of non-dual meditative practice. In drawing the implications of the presented model, this article ends with an outlook toward next steps for further developing a research agenda that may fully address the concrete elements of non-dual practices. (shrink)

This article is my contribution to an author-meets-critics session on Daniel Dennett’s Freedom Evolves (Viking, 2003) at the 2004 meetings of the American Philosophical Association – Pacific Division. Dennett criticizes a view I defend in Autonomous Agents (Oxford University Press, 1995) about the importance of agents’ histories for autonomy, freedom, and moral responsibility and defends a competing view. Our disagreement on this issue is the major focus of this article. Additional topics are manipulation, avoidance, and avoidability.

This critical examination of Roderick Chisholm's agent causal brand of libertarianism develops a problem about luck that undermines his earlier and later libertarian views on free will and moral responsibility and defends the thesis that a modest libertarian alternative considerably softens the problem. The alternative calls for an indeterministic connection in the action-producing process that is further removed from action than Chisholm demands. The article also explores the implications of a relatively new variant of a Frankfurt-style case for Chisholm's views (...) of free will and moral responsibility and for libertarianism in general. It is suggested that Chisholm's efforts will and should continue to offer important assistance to libertarians who are determined to succeed where he apparently fell short. (shrink)

Self-determination theory considers motivation as a multidimensional phenomenon, with different levels of intensity, purposes, intentions, wills and autonomies. It distinguishes between intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation and amotivation. In this paper, we are going to focus on extrinsic motivation, which is related to those tasks that the subject performs without having a purpose in themselves, and which is composed of identified regulation, introjected regulation and external regulation. The aim of this research is to analyse the relationship between them and emotional intelligence (...) in 165 students with university degrees related to Physical Activity and Sport Sciences. The main findings of this work lie mainly in the demonstration of the fact that emotional intelligence is a predictor of identified regulation, introjected regulation and external regulation. (shrink)

Pristine belief/desire psychology has its limitations. Recognizing this, some have attempted to fill various gaps by adding more of the same, but at higher levels. Thus, for example, second-order desires have been imported into a more stream- lined view to explicate such important notions as freedom of the will, personhood, and valuing. I believe that we need to branch out as well as up, augmenting a familiar 'philosophical psychology' with psychological items that are irreducible to beliefs and desires (for support, (...) see Mele 1987 and 1992). That theme will be left largely in the background here, however. The issue to be explored is a narrower one: the place of higher-order desires in a proper conception of continent and incontinent behavior. My guiding question is whether an action's counting as continent or incontinent depends upon the agent's having at the time a pertinent higher-order desire. The answer that I shall defend is, in a word, 'No.'. (shrink)

Tackling some central problems in the philosophy of action, Mele constructs an explanatory model for intentional behavior, locating the place and significance of such mental phenomena as beliefs, desires, reason, and intentions in the etiology of intentional action. Part One comprises a comprehensive examination of the standard treatments of the relations between desires, beliefs, and actions. In Part Two, Mele goes on to develop a subtle and well-defended view that the motivational role of intentions is of a different sort from (...) that of beliefs and desires. Mele, also offers a provocative explanation of how we come to have intentions and elaborates on his earlier work concerning akratic failures of will. (shrink)

Philosophers traditionally have been concerned both to explain intentional behavior and to evaluate it from a moral point of view. Some have maintained that whether actions (and their consequences) properly count as intended sometimes hinges on moral considerations - specifically, considerations of moral responsibility. The same claim has been made about an action's properly counting as having been done intentionally. These contentions will be made more precise in subsequent sections, where influential proponents are identified. Our aim in this paper is (...) to show that familiar defenses of these more precise claims are unpersuasive and that the claims do not merit acceptance. Our concern, more broadly, is to illuminate the place occupied by intention and intentional action in a conceptual scheme suited both to explanatory needs in the philosophy of mind to evaluative needs in moral philosophy. (shrink)

This article revisits the work of the Argentine political scientist Guillermo O’Donnell (1936–2011), one of Latin America’s leading intellectual figures of the twentieth century. While previous analyses have concentrated on his legacy in the social sciences, this study offers an intellectual history of O’Donnell’s ideas on democracy and inequality. It traces O’Donnell’s shifting perspectives, from a structuralist view of global centre-periphery relationships to an emphasis on individual agency concerning inequalities. The article presents, first, an analysis of his early work, in (...) particular his conceptualization of the “Bureaucratic-Authoritarian” State, which was connected to a specific view of inequality characteristic of the 1960s and 1970s. Second, the article focuses on his second major work, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, in relation to the most important political event in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, namely the various transitions from dictatorship to democracy. Thirdly, the article examines in detail O’Donnell’s ideas on the quality of democracy, the state, and inequality in Latin America in the 1990s and 2000s. By exploring O’Donnell’s intellectual journey chronologically, the article illuminates the shifts and continuities in his work, thereby highlighting the evolving perspectives on inequality of one of Latin America’s foremost intellectuals. (shrink)

Common sense and philosophical tradition agree that mind makes a difference. What we do depends not only on how our bodies are put together, but also on what we think. Explaining how mind can make a difference has proved challenging, however. Some have urged that the project faces an insurmountable dilemma: either we concede that mentalistic explanations of behavior have only a pragmatic standing or we abandon our conception of the physical domain as causally autonomous. Although each option has its (...) advocates, most theorists have sought a middle way that accommodates both the common-sense view of mind and the metaphysical conviction about the physical world. This volume presents a collection of new, specially written essays by a diverse group of philosophers, each of whom is widely known for defending a particular conception of minds and their place in nature. Contributors include Robert Audi, Lynne Rudder Baker, Tyler Burge, Donald Davidson, Fred Dretske, Ted Honderich, Jennifer Hornsby, Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Brian P. McLaughlin, Ruth Garrett Millikan, H. W. Noonan, Philip Pettit, Ernest Sosa, and Robert Van Gulick. (shrink)

Popper conceived an experiment whose analysis led to a result that he deemed absurd. Popper wrote that his reasoning was based on the Copenhagen interpretation and therefore invalidated it. Many authors who have examined Popper's analysis have found in it various technical flaws which are briefly summarized here. However, the aim of the present article is not technical. My concern is to redress logical flaws in Popper's argument: the terminology he uses is ambiguous, his analysis involves counterfactual hypotheses, and it (...) violates Bohr's complementarity principle. Therefore, the absurdity of Popper's result only confirms Bohr's approach. (shrink)

Almost thirty years ago, in an attempt to undermine what he termed "the principle of alternate possibilities" (the thesis that people are morally responsible for what they have done only if they could have done otherwise), Harry Frankfurt offered an ingenious thought-experiment that has played a major role in subsequent work on moral responsibility and free will. Several philosophers, including David Widerker and Robert Kane, argued recently that this thought-experiment and others like it are fundamentally flawed. This paper develops a (...) new Frankfurt-style example that is immune to their objections. [Reprinted in Laura Waddell Ekstrom, ed., Agency and Responsibility: Essays on the Metaphysics of Freedom (Westview Press, 2001), pp. 241-54; and in John Martin Fischer, ed., Free Will, Vol. III (Routledge, 2005), pp. 330-42.]. (shrink)

Each of the following claims has been defended in the scientific literature on free will and consciousness: your brain routinely decides what you will do before you become conscious of its decision; there is only a 100 millisecond window of opportunity for free will, and all it can do is veto conscious decisions, intentions, or urges; intentions never play a role in producing corresponding actions; and free will is an illusion. In Effective Intentions Alfred Mele shows that the evidence offered (...) to support these claims is sorely deficient. He also shows that there is strong empirical support for the thesis that some conscious decisions and intentions have a genuine place in causal explanations of corresponding actions. In short, there is weighty evidence of the existence of effective conscious intentions or the power of conscious will. Mele examines the accuracy of subjects' reports about when they first became aware of decisions or intentions in laboratory settings and develops some implications of warranted skepticism about the accuracy of these reports. In addition, he explores such questions as whether we must be conscious of all of our intentions and why scientists disagree about this. Mele's final chapter closes with a discussion of imaginary scientific findings that would warrant bold claims about free will and consciousness of the sort he examines in this book. (shrink)

What did you do a moment ago? What will you do after you read this? Are you deciding as we speak, or is something else going on in your brain or elsewhere in your body that is determining your actions? Stopping to think this way can freeze us in our tracks. A lot in the world feels far beyond our control--the last thing we need is to question whether we make our own choices in the way we usually assume we (...) do. Questions about free will are so major and consequential that we may prefer not to think about them at all, lest we feel completely lost and unsure of everything we thought we knew! Free Will: An Opinionated Guide offers a clear and straightforward introduction to this vexing topic. Drawing on decades of extensive research in philosophy, neuroscience, and psychology, internationally recognized authority on free will Alfred R. Mele explains and explores the most prominent theories, puzzles, and arguments in free will, all the while presenting his own distinctive take on the topic. like determinism, neuroscience, and control. (shrink)

Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issues in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will--one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible (...) with determinism (incompatibilists), and the other for readers who are convinced of the opposite (compatibilists). Luck poses problems for all believers in free will, and Mele offers novel solutions to those problems--one for incompatibilist believers in free will and the other for compatibilists. An early chapter of this empirically well-informed book clearly explains influential neuroscientific studies of free will and debunks some extravagant interpretations of the data. Other featured topics include abilities and alternative possibilities, control and decision-making, the bearing of manipulation on free will, and the development of human infants into free agents. Mele's theory offers an original perspective on an important problem and will garner the attention of anyone interested in the debate on free will. (shrink)

Mele develops a view of paradigmatically free actions--including decisions--as indeterministically caused by their proximal causes. He mounts a masterful defense of this thesis that includes solutions to problems about luck and control widely discussed in the literature on free will and moral responsibility.

It is often suggested that our desires vary in motivational strength or power. In a paper expressing skepticism about this idea, Irving Thalberg asked what he described, tongue in cheek, as "a disgracefully naive question" (1985, p. 88): "What do causal and any other theorists mean when they rate the strength of our PAs," that is, our "desires, aversions, preferences, schemes, and so forth"? His "guiding question" in the paper seems straightforward (p. 98): "What is it for our motivational states (...) to have some degree of power to generate behavior?" Yet, he argued, ''as soon as we endeavor to clarify what philosophers of action and drive theorists in psychology mean by motivational strength, we run across one obscurity after another" (p. 103). This essay is an attempt to answer a more specific version of Thalberg's question. (shrink)

Do people sometimes exercise self-control in such a way as to bring it about that they do not act on present-directed motivation that continues to be motivationally strongest for a significant stretch of time (even though they are able to act on that motivation at the time) and intentionally act otherwise during that stretch of time? This paper explores the relative merits of two different theories about synchronic self-control that provide different answers to this question. One is due to Sripada (...) (Noûs 1–38, 2012) and the other to Mele (Irrationality, 1987; Autonomous agents, 1995; Motivation and agency, 2003). Special attention is paid to evidence Sripada offers for an affirmative answer to the question, and some guidance is offered on the project of finding evidence for an affirmative answer. (shrink)

In Manipulated Agents, Alfred R. Mele examines the role one's history plays in whether or not one is morally responsible for one's actions. Mele develops a "history-sensitive" theory of moral responsibility through reflection on a wide range of thought experiments which feature agents who have been manipulated or designed in ways that directly affect their actions.

A great deal of attention has been paid in recent years to the function- al roles of intentions in intentional action. In this paper we sketch and defend a position on this issue while attacking a provocative alternative. Our position has its roots in a cybernetic theory of purposive behavior and is only part of the larger task of understanding all goal-directed behavior. Indeed, a unified model of goal-directed behavior, with appropriate modifications for different types of systems, is a long-range (...) ambition. (shrink)

After Lavoisier's execution, the leading French chemists were Antoine-François Fourcroy , Louis-Bernard Guyton de Morveau and Claude-Louis Berthollet . At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Berthollet introduced a new conception of chemical change that challenged the theory of elective affinities which had dominated chemistry for nearly a hundred years. Berthollet's new affinities raised controversy among chemists and had to coexist with the firmly established theory of elective affinities. Apart from the public debate in research articles, Berthollet's affinities also had (...) to compete with the influence of Fourcroy and his school in the textbook market. This paper seeks to assess the extent to which French textbooks published at the beginning of the nineteenth century were committed to Berthollet's innovation, and how they contributed to its marginalization. (shrink)

Intention, intentional action, and the connections between them are central topics of the philosophy of action, a branch of the philosophy of mind. One who regards the subject matter of the philosophy of mind as having at its core some aspect of what lies between environmental input to beings with minds and behavioural output may be inclined to see the philosophy of action as concerned only with the output end of things. That would be a mistake. Many intentional actions depend (...) for their development on the processing of input — both from the environment and from the body. (shrink)

What place does motivation have in the lives of intelligent agents? Mele's answer is sensitive to the concerns of philosophers of mind and moral philosophers and informed by empirical work. He offers a distinctive, comprehensive, attractive view of human agency. This book stands boldly at the intersection of philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and metaphysics.

Whereas some philosophers view all reasons for action as psychological states of agents, others—objective favourers theorists—locate the overwhelming majority of reasons for action outside the agent, in items that objectively favour courses of action. (The latter may count such psychological states as a person's belief that demons dance in his kitchen as a reason for him to seek psychiatric help.) This article explores options that objective favourers theorists have regarding cases in which, owing significantly to a false belief, an agent (...) performs an action for which there is no objective favourer. Topics addressed include whether such theorists, including Jonathan Dancy himself, should accept Dancy's thesis that 'intentional, deliberate, purposeful action is always done for a reason' and whether there are two different concepts of reasons for action, one geared to action-evaluation and the other to action-explanation. (shrink)

El control efectivo de la calidad y seguridad de los ali­mentos requiere de métodos analíticos que garanticen la deter­minación fiable de cualquier sustancia potencialmente perjudicial para el consumidor que pueda estar presente en el alimento antes de su distribución y comercialización. Una de las aproximaciones analíticas que contribuye a garantizar este objetivo engloba una serie de técnicas que tienen en común la utilización de anticuerpos como elementos esenciales para la detección del analito diana, y que en conjunto reciben el nombre (...) de métodos inmunoquímicos. Este artículo pretender aportar una visión básica de los principios bioquímicos subyacentes a estas tecnologías y cuáles son sus venta­jas y limitaciones en la determinación de contaminantes químicos, residuos y aditivos en matrices alimentarias. En la última parte se comentan algunas de nuestras iniciativas en este ámbito que han dado lugar a kits rápidos disponibles comercialmente tras haber transferido la tecnología correspondiente al sector industrial. (shrink)

Bien étudiée par les sociologues nord-améri-cains, spécialement par des féministes, la problématique des femmes battues qui tuent appelle une compréhension clinique. Centré sur huit cas, cet article montre comment leur aptitude à la symbolisation a été systématiquement entravée. Grandissant dans des familles où les femmes étaient strictement confinées à la sphère domestique, où un strict contrôle de leur sexualité n’empêchait pas de sévères négligences, qui parfois allaient jusqu’à les exposer à des abus sexuels, elles ont été confrontées à un véritable (...) interdit de s’appartenir. Essentiellement, ces femmes ne se sont senties protégées ni réellement par la constance de leurs parents, ni affectivement par leur bienveillance, ni symboliquement par leur soumission à la Loi. (shrink)

Dans les textes inédits « Effets moraux de l’accélération de l’histoire» (1969-1970) et « Sommes-nous libres?» (1989-1990), Jules Vuillemin montre un visage peu connu : celui d’un observateur engagé de son époque. Il y critique des mouvements sociaux et politiques contemporains – mai 1968 et la réforme du Code pénal de 1989 – en s’appuyant sur des considérations métaphysiques et morales. Plus que des tribunes politiques, ces textes montrent que la politique n’est pas, pour Vuillemin, simple affaire d’« opinion» et (...) que l’engagement n’a de valeur que soutenu par l’argumentation. (shrink)

Si l’on devait en croire les revendications explicites de Jules Vuillemin, sa relation envers Martial Gueroult aurait essentiellement été d’élève à maître. Un examen plus attentif de l’œuvre de Vuillemin révèle pourtant des écarts significatifs quoique non revendiqués. Nous analyserons dans un premier temps l’autoportrait de Vuillemin en disciple – d’une œuvre, d’une autorité et d’un chef d’école. Nous décrirons ensuite à quelles transformations, dans son œuvre concrète, il soumet celle de Gueroult : des procédés de sélection, de traduction et (...) d’élargissement. Nous montrerons enfin que l’élève, tôt et résolument, s’écarte du maître au moment – sinon dans la mesure – même où il s’en réclame. (shrink)

Le texte de Jules Vuillemin « De la connaissance sensible et de la parité qu’elle manifeste entre l’homme et l’animal » semble être un chapitre de livre abandonné. Vuillemin y décrit sous le nom de connaissance sensible l’ensemble des facultés, définies matériellement, que l’homme partage avec les animaux. Cette connaissance sensible conditionne jusqu’aux sciences naturelles et la philosophie. La spécificité humaine ne peut être définie matériellement : elle réside dans l’organisation formelle de l’expérience, source de laperfectibilité humaine.