In this article two problems with the recently developed "practice or virtue approach" to business ethics are discussed. The first problem concerns an alleged harmony between common demands of morality (generally understood) and the internal goods of actual business practice. The claimed harmony is strong in essence since it holds that the role expectations a good manager has to live up to, do in fact coincide with what morality demands. The second problem is related to the first and concerns the (...) alleged relevance of a virtue perspective for business ethics. According to the virtue perspective discussed in this article, moral reasoning should take actual practice, and only actual practice, as a point of departure. In so doing ethics is claimed to become insulated from e.g. putting irrelevant demands on practitioners. Such demands are understood as based on abstract principles alien to the practice in question. The thesis of this article is that neither of the above mentioned two claims are plausible. This is so basically because one needs to turn elsewhere than to actual business practice in order to detect a morally laden notion of managerial goodness. (shrink)

The purpose of this coauthored research is to develop a Christian ethical argument that better addresses the various social ills of financial neoliberalism, especially the growing wealth gap between the haves—the top 1%—and the have-nots—the bottom 50%. We find that a more progressive and integrative approach to monetary and fiscal policy is necessary. First, we critically review the histories of United States and Swedish monetary policies. We then provide a theological perspective regarding how Christian ethicists should engage with neoliberal structural (...) injustice. Finally, we propose an ethical principle of justice for use in the state's macroeconomic management of money: the accumulation of financial capital should also promote the increase of social capital. Put negatively, the accumulation of financial capital should not be achieved at the expense of depleting social capital. (shrink)

This article critically examines two different answers to the ancient question, why be moral. The first suggests that valid reasons refer to a specific relation between human beings and God. Here, being moral means to treat oneself and others with the respect that is the due of God’s closest friend. The second argues that we have good reasons for being moral when being moral makes us happy (realizes Eudaimonia). The investigation offers two results, one critical and the other constructive. The (...) critical shows how and why both theistic accounts of bestowed human dignity and eudaimonistic accounts offer no relevant reasons for being moral. The constructive result builds on an observation; both accounts presuppose the inherent force of the obligation to act morally right. It shows that the reasons for being moral should be explicated as internal to the very meaning of being moral. (shrink)

Human rights language is often used as a universal benchmark for moral criticism. However, its philosophical basis has been seriously questioned. The purpose of this study is to investigate the contributions of Christian ethics (1) to the reconstruction of a plausible conception of a human right and (2) to the elaboration of a satisfying justification of human rights. Three different Christian ethical models of human rights are set forth and evaluated.