This article is devoted to the work of Józef Czapski, a Polish painter, writer, epistolographer and diarist who died in Maisons-Laffitte in 1993. The artist was also engaged in the matters of human life and politics. The article deals solely with his paintings. After a short presentation of Czapski’s artistic biography, a more in depth analysis of his works is provided. The article uses the artist’s letters and memoirs on top of the basic literature. The analysis shows that the Czapski’s (...) artistic work constitutes a closed whole; no new work, neither drawing nor painting will be added to his legacy, but, at the same time it is open because the threads of Czapski’s art remain unclosed. Czapski’s works constitute a logical whole in the sense that one can draw a circle around which they are arranged, except that the beginning of the journey does not coincide with the end. Czapski abandoned his first, rather inept expressionist works to take up in the broad sense a challenge of Post-Impressionism. However, not satisfied with the vision of Post-Impressionism and the painting focused on pure color delectations, he returned to his initial interest in de l’horreur de la vie, absorbing the lessons and experiences that his life gave him, digesting and consequently abandoning Post-Impressionism. To him, color is understood not as Impressionism understood it, but rather, as it was treated by Expressionism, howewer, he tempered it according to the school of Post-Impressionism and the French art. Czapski’s painting completes the full circle: his journey begins with “the scary head”, experiences post-impressionism, and blossoms with paintings depicting l’horreur de la vie and anxiety hidden in the stark colors of his late landscapes. The author describes Józef Czapski’s art as the great one, what is ultimately determined by the whole output, which, like a keystone brings together all the themes: of the painter, of the writer and of the man devoted to public affairs. (shrink)

Wladyslaw Strózewski's Dialektvka Tworczosci develops the thesis that art, having not only its raison d'être, has its final effect lying within the wholeness of being. Strózewski, whose roots are deep in scholastic tradition and phenomenology, as well as in Hegel, has always seen being as seated in allusion to nothingness, which as non-being is indirectly accessible to us through experiences of an essential, existential, or axiological nature.

Paweł Gładziejewski, Is empathy is mental simulation? Remarks on the representative approach based on the concept of mirror neurons., Diametros 27 This paper draws on the theoretical achievements of analytic philosophy of mind and the empirical results of psychology and cognitive neuroscience in order to understand the nature of empathy and the sub-personal mechanisms upon which it is based. The paper distinguishes two types of empathy, which are often not sufficiently clearly distinguished in the literature, empathy as a kind of (...) social perception and empathy as compassion. The argument attempts show to that neither of these can be identified with a mental simulation process understood as a sub-personal process. Nevertheless mental simulation may play a limited explanatory role with respect to these two types of empathy. (shrink)

In September 1999 "Nature" magazine announced that atomic orbitals were di-rectly observed. Opposing it, Eric Scerri, editor-in-chief of "Foundations of Chemistry", claimed that what could be observed in the experiment was electron density, not orbitals. The main purpose of this paper is to consider philosophical and methodological aspects of the above controversy. Especially, the problems of direct observability and reality of theoretical entities are taken under detailed discussion. From the point of view of quantum mechanics there are not any reasons (...) to believe that orbitals exist. However, realistically treated orbitals are very effective tools in the laboratory practice of chemistry. (shrink)

In this paper we are focused on the relation between an Ontology (with the capital "O") qua philosophical discipline and an ontology (with the lowercase "o") qua branch of Computer Science. In our view "Ontology" refers to all philosophical groups or schools which take some position on the reality. The meaning of 'ontology' in the second case is not that easy to grasp because of the variety of artefacts which are called 'ontologies' and many activities - aiming at creating the (...) ontologies - called ontological engineering . In general we could state that an ontology is something what is called "ontology" beyond Philosophy, mostly in the Knowledge Management, Artificial Intelligence, Conceptual Modelling or Ontological Engineering and what refers to an engineering artefact describing certain aspect of reality. So understood ontology is always tied to certain language (preferably a logical one) or more precisely to the set of the sentences of this language. It is said that these sentences constitute an ontology and specify the intended meaning of the terms used in these sentences. The ontologists usually focus on describing their conceptualization of the relevant for them aspects of reality. In their ontologies only these properties of reality are taken into account, which are considered as important for the sake of the application. In this sense ontological engineering may ignore Ontologically essential properties, i.e. the ones important from the purely philosophical perspective. The simplest ontologies are catalogues - the list of terms or numbers denoting certain object, glossaries - containing additionally the definitions of the terms, thesauri - the glossaries in which the hierarchy of the terms appear and taxonomies - in which the primitives are hierarchically structured in order to enabling the properties' inheritance. The most sophisticated ontologies are called formal ontologies and they are logical theories fully axiomatized. Ontologies are also divided on the top-level ontologies concerning very general and mostly abstract entities (e.g. property, agent, time) and the domain ontologies dealing with some small domains (e.g. car's parts). For a better understanding of the wide variety of ontologies we give an example of three ontologies: WordNet (thesaurus-like ontology), Cyc (top-level, formal ontology) and Enterprise Ontology (domain ontology). The Ontology plays an important role in ontological engineering. We notice that the ontological engineers more and more often rely on the philosophical literature looking for the solutions of the ontological problems. It is especially visible in the top-ontologies where many Ontological distinctions have been directly adopted. On the other hand we must sadly stress that philosophers seem to be not interested in the ontological engineering at all. We'd like to introduce ontology to t. (shrink)

Formal Ontology in Information Systems is the flagship conference of the International Association for Ontology and its Applications. Its interdisciplinary research focus lies at the intersection of philosophical ontology, linguistics, logic, cognitive science, and computer science, as well as in the applications of ontological analysis to conceptual modeling, knowledge engineering, knowledge management, information-systems development, library and information science, scientific research, and semantic technologies in general.As in previous years, FOIS 2014 was a nexus of interdisciplinary research and communication. The current proceedings (...) is divided into four main sections, dealing with: foundations; processes, agency and dispositions; methods and tools; and applications. The last of these covers a broad spectrum of areas, including in particular biology and medicine, engineering, and economy. For the first time in its history, the conference hosted a special track: an ontology competition, the aim of which was to encourage authors to make their ontologies publicly available and to allow them to be evaluated according to a set of predetermined criteria. Papers discussing these ontologies can also be found in this volume.The book will be of interest to all those whose work involves the application of ontologies, and who are looking for a current overview of developments in formal ontology. (shrink)

Metaphysical nihilism can be defined as the view that there might be no con-crete objects. One may argue for this view defining a finite procedure of sub-traction on a set of concrete, contingent objects juxtaposed across possible worlds, which procedure will eventually terminate in an empty possible world. Obviously, this subtraction argument is not applicable if all non-empty possible worlds contain an infinite number of objects. In this paper, I will discuss in detail the limitations of this argument and then (...) investigate whether and how they can be relaxed. (shrink)

Modernity and What Has Been Lost comes out of a conference held at the Jagiellonian University in Krakw̤, Poland, on June 4-5, 2009 that sought to identify Leo Strauss's intellectual background in re: the repudiation of a modern idea of homogenous, universal state (considered as an illegitimate synthesis of Jerusalem and Athens, i.e., the claims of Reason and Revelation). The world we live in, molded by science and historical relativism, may be described as hostile to human dignity or perfection, or (...) abhorrent to those who love the search for wisdom. Straussian teaching consisted in the steady effort to reopen "the quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns," and refers to the esoteric way of writing practiced by the most profound thinkers of the past which has been apparently forgotten in the last three centuries. Strauss binds the concept of natural right with the question of maintenance of conditions for philosophizing, and it probably seems to him that such defense of philosophy is the highest task in our times. However, one must be well aware that philosophizing always means a perilous way of life. Indeed, it may be destructive of the city (polis) itself as far as the city exists due to some crucial beliefs the philosopher might put in doubt. Reflecting on those issues, Strauss engaged in several highly important debates with his contemporaries, in an open way with, e.g., Carl Schmitt, Karl Lw̲ith and Alexandre Kojv̈e, and more tacitly with Martin Heidegger"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

The title of this article refers to one of the best-known essays written by David Hume, That Politics may be reduced to a Science. Hume assumed that politics was a science because it admitted of some general truths, which could not be varied by human beings. He adopted a similar stance, albeit indirectly, in the case of economics, discovering several general truths concerning the origins of wealth, money and international trade. At times, however, he was far from being consistent and (...) this undermined these truths. Consequently, it can be argued that, from his perspective, economics was a science on a theoretical level, but it lost this character at a more practical level. Similar doubts can be raised when it comes to Hume’s role in the history of economic thought. In some respects he was an original thinker, but several of his key concepts resembled to some extent ideas that had been put forward by ‘mercantilists’, especially those ‘mercantilists’ who were active in his native Scotland in the first decade of the 18 th century. (shrink)

According to the predictive coding theory of cognition , brains are predictive machines that use perception and action to minimize prediction error, i.e. the discrepancy between bottom–up, externally-generated sensory signals and top–down, internally-generated sensory predictions. Many consider PCT to have an explanatory scope that is unparalleled in contemporary cognitive science and see in it a framework that could potentially provide us with a unified account of cognition. It is also commonly assumed that PCT is a representational theory of sorts, in (...) the sense that it postulates that our cognitive contact with the world is mediated by internal representations. However, the exact sense in which PCT is representational remains unclear; neither is it clear that it deserves such status—that is, whether it really invokes structures that are truly and nontrivially representational in nature. In the present article, I argue that the representational pretensions of PCT are completely justified. This is because the theory postulates cognitive structures—namely action-guiding, detachable, structural models that afford representational error detection—that play genuinely representational functions within the cognitive system. (shrink)

Psychedelic substances elicit powerful, uncanny conscious experiences that are thought to possess therapeutic value. In those who undergo them, these altered states of consciousness often induce shifts in metaphysical beliefs about the fundamental structure of reality. The contents of those beliefs range from contentious to bizarre, especially when considered from the point of view of naturalism. Can chemically induced, radically altered states of consciousness provide reasons for or play some positive epistemic role with respect to metaphysical beliefs? In this paper, (...) I discuss a view that has been underexplored in recent literature. I argue that psychedelic states can be rationally integrated into one’s epistemic life. Consequently, updating one’s metaphysical beliefs based on altered states of consciousness does not have to constitute an instance of epistemic irrationality. (shrink)

In den philosophischen Diskussionen, die bereits im Vorfeld der Postmoderne unter dem Titel Jenseits des Subjekts stattfinden, geht es um eine radikale Infragestellung des Subjektbegriffs, eines der wesentlichen Konzepte der Philosophie der Neuzeit und der Moderne. Die Grundlage der Problematisierung des Subjekts ist eine kritische Diagnose, die der modernen Welt gestellt wird. Postmoderne Theorien vermitteln den Eindruck, in einer Welt zu leben, in der sich der Mensch aus dem Zentrum ins Ungewisse bewegt. Die «nachkopernikanische Welt» befindet sich in der Krise: (...) Individuen sehen sich unkontrollierbaren anonoymen Prozessen ausgeliefert und als Subjekte entmachtet. Zivilisations-, Kultur- und Technikkritik prägen das Weltbild, in dessen Zentrum die Kritik der Subjektivität steht. Die Kritik richtet sich gegen die als illusionär behauptete Selbstherrschaft des Subjekts. In den Beiträgen zu diesem Band geht es um die Frage, inwiefern eine derart radikale Infragestellung des Subjekts philosophisch gerechtfertigt werden kann. (shrink)

A survey of the modern theories of explanation leads us to conclude that it is J. Woodward\'s conterfactual approach that seems to set out a promising agenda for setting up a satisfactory model of explanation. Such a model would need to come to terms with two stipulations, i.e. to reflect causal asymmetry and be empirically adequate. To meet the latter I modify the counterfactual model of explanation to require a class of observationally equivalent (Bayesian) causal models instead of the true (...) causal model. For in most cases empirical adequacy of causal models, i.e. their identifiability and consistency with observed distributions, would neither grant the stronger conclusion Woodward embeds in his conterfactual account of explanation nor license metaphysical naturalism. (shrink)

The article deals with the issue of turning in the thought of Martin Heidegger. I show that, in Being and time the question of being posed from the perspective of a distinguished being as Dasein has led to the objectification of being, thus rather reproducing instead of overcoming, the so far way of thinking that Heidegger named “metaphysical”. The turning in Heidegger’s thought consists in his effort to make being independent from human being, i.e. he tries to go beyond the (...) transcendental and subjectivist point of view of Dasein by placing historicality of Dasein against the background of the very existence of being. It is not Dasein who designs being, but on the contrary, being designs understanding for Dasein. In this context, I show that the thinking of being postulated by Heidegger takes the form of thinking the very process of historical presencing of the historic types of interpretation of being. (shrink)

This study was designed to determine the quality of service through the evaluation of hospitalized patients. An analysis of hospitalized patients’ subjective feelings towards service quality was carried out, in the context of the application of the SERVQUAL method. The pilot study was conducted in a Silesian hospital in a group of 29 young patients diagnosed with kidney disease. The study used a standard sheet of 22 SERVQUAL statements and an analysis of the significance of the 5 areas of quality (...) material important for the patient. According to the respondents, the most important of the 5 features that influence the quality of life is the ability of the ward staff to provide adequate medical services The least important were the aesthetics and ergonomics of rooms. Service quality gaps were seen in all the five dimensions as well as in the overall service quality. Hence, the following conclusions could be made: 1. The SERVQUAL method helps to identify discrepancies between perceptions of patients’ expectations in all the dimensions of quality of medical services. 2. For patients, the least important is the material dimension, whereas the one most affecting them is the dimension associated with the reliability of medical services. 3. An improvement of the level of satisfaction with the quality of medical services requires proper planning and effectiveness of implementation of health care services. 4. Research should be conducted on a larger population of patients. (shrink)

As formulated by Duncan Pritchard and John McDowell, epistemological disjunctivism is the claim that perceptual experience can provide the subject with epistemic justification that is reflectively accessible and externally grounded at the same time. Pritchard calls this thesis ‘the holy grail of epistemology’, since it reconciles two traditionally rival theories of justification, namely epistemic internalism and epistemic externalism. The main objection against epistemological disjunctivism thus understood is that it does not do justice to the well-known internalist intuitions expressed in The (...) New Evil Demon and Brain-in-a-Vat scenarios. I defend epistemological disjunctivism from this objection by indicating that those who apply to such scenarios commit themselves to implausible views in the philosophy of mind. I conclude that epistemological disjunctivism accurately expresses the epistemological attitude of a non-reductive materialist regarding the body-mind problem. (shrink)

This paper presents Michael Heller’s notion of “philosophy in science” and re-introduces Michael Heller’s classical text that first presented this concept of philosophy entitled How is “philosophy in science” possible?. The paper discusses the historical context of Heller’s idea as it emerged from the discussions and works of the Krakow philosophical scene and discusses the basic tenants of this philosophy, its analytic character, the role of intellectual tradition in the development of this philosophy, and the critical role played by an (...) interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophy, science, and theology. Despite the idea of philosophy in science having emerged about 40 years ago, this concept still inspires and fuels innovative research. The notion of “philosophy in science” lies at the foundations of the philosophy published in two journals: Philosophical Problems in Science and Philosophy in Science. (shrink)

This paper centers around the notion that internal, mental representations are grounded in structural similarity, i.e., that they are so-called S-representations. We show how S-representations may be causally relevant and argue that they are distinct from mere detectors. First, using the neomechanist theory of explanation and the interventionist account of causal relevance, we provide a precise interpretation of the claim that in S-representations, structural similarity serves as a “fuel of success”, i.e., a relation that is exploitable for the representation using (...) system. Then, we discuss crucial differences between S-representations and indicators or detectors, showing that—contrary to claims made in the literature—there is an important theoretical distinction to be drawn between the two. (shrink)

Philosophy in technology is a research program that studies the philosophical roots of engineering and technology. Technologists, by virtue of their education, believe that the limits, goals, possibilities, and effects of technology on society and humankind are exclusively technological problems, hence their solutions must lie exclusively in technology. In contrast, philosophy in technology asserts that the resolutions to these problems need to be rooted in an understanding of their philosophical origins. This program paper defines the objectives of philosophy in technology, (...) the kinds of questions it explores, the methods it uses, and how it differs from the philosophy of technology. (shrink)

Despite the fact that the notion of internal representation has - at least according to some - a fundamental role to play in the sciences of the mind, not only has its explanatory utility been under attack for a while now, but it also remains unclear what criteria should an explanation of a given cognitive phenomenon meet to count as a representational explanation in the first place. The aim of this article is to propose a solution to this latter problem. (...) I will assume that representational explanations should be construed as a form of mechanistic explanations and proceed by proposing a general sketch of a functional architecture of a representational cognitive mechanism. According to the view on offer here, representational mechanisms are mechanisms that meet four conditions: the structural resemblance condition, the action-guidance condition, the decouplability condition, and the error-detection condition. (shrink)

Debunking arguments aim to undermine common sense beliefs by showing that they are not explanatorily or causally linked to the entities they are purportedly about. Rarely are facts about the aetiology of common sense beliefs invoked for the opposite aim, that is, to support the reality of entities that furnish our manifest image of the world. Here I undertake this sort of un-debunking project. My focus is on the metaphysics of ordinary physical objects. I use the view of perception as (...) approximate Bayesian inference to show how representations of ordinary objects can be extracted from sensory input in a rational and truth-tracking manner. Drawing an analogy between perception construed as Bayesian hypothesis testing and scientific inquiry, I sketch out how some of the intuitions that traditionally inspired arguments for scientific realism also find application with regards to proverbial tables and chairs. (shrink)

Author: Bytniewski Paweł Title: “WHAT IS AN AUTHOR?” ON FOUCAULT’S CONSCIOUSNESS OF AN AUTHORSHIP („Kim jest Autor?” O krytycznej świadomości autorstwa) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2010, vol:.10, number: 2010/1, pages: 73-106 Keywords: FOUCAULT, AUTHOR, LITERATURE, LANGUAGE, EXPERIENCE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:One of the major obstacles to reconstructing Foucault’s attitude towards an authorship issue is multiplicity of his own roles which as an author he fulfilled. An Authorship as a theme (...) of his texts, as a prefiguration of nonexistent “Man” and his own authorship as a problem, as a way of “detaching myself from myself” – all these are the forms of Foucauldian ideas about an authorship and, at the same time, forms of his consciousness of his own authorship. Foucault historicizes and dissipates an authorship: an author is a function rather than the originator of texts. Writing, in this perspective, is a kind of conversion, decomposition of subjectivity into something else and even explosion. To say “I” doesn’t prove to be an ego. Additionally, Foucault notoriously suggests that his books are fiction. To be an author in this way is a way of being within the discourse and, as a consequence of it, to be trapped in its power. Foucault’s own rewriting of his theoretical biography includes turns and returns: as he repeatedly claims, he wrote in order to transform himself. He uses the processes of writing to simulate production of his subjective identity and, at the same time, to summarize, recapitulate his own oeuvre from current position. To cope with this suggestive and bizarre claims one should employ Roland Barthes distinction: écrivains (authors) et écrivants (writers). When Foucault-écrivain decomposes his ego, his own mode of existence by the use of writing, Foucault-écrivant, in an act of writing, writes himself, as an author. When Foucault-écrivain “writes fictions”, Foucault écrivant, in an act of “self-writing” (l’écriture de soi), establishes the object of a critique – Foucault. (shrink)

The Climate Anxiety Scale is a 13-item questionnaire for assessing climate anxiety as a psychological response to climate change. The CAS consists of two subscales, namely, cognitive impairment and functional impairment. This study aimed to validate the Polish version of the CAS. The sample included 603 respondents, aged 18–70 years. Based on the exploratory factor analysis results, we proposed a 3-factor solution, which seems to be theoretically more consistent with the content of the CAS statements. The confirmatory factor analysis showed (...) that the original 2-factor solution and the 3-factor one had a satisfactory and a good fit to the data, respectively, as well as both were invariant across different gender, age, and educational level categories. Despite the fact that the 3-factor solution had the best-fit indices, we recommended to examine the CAS structure in different samples and use the overall CAS score in cross-cultural research. Cognitive and functional impairment subscales were positively correlated with personal experience of climate change, behavioral engagement, environmental identity, and environmental motives, but they were negatively correlated with climate change denial and sense of safety. The CAS subscales were correlated with depressive symptoms, but contrary to expectations, they were not associated with anxiety symptoms and any cognitive coping strategies. The Polish version of the CAS has satisfactory psychometric properties. Overall, we reported low CA levels in the Polish sample. Women and younger people experienced higher CA. (shrink)

In this article, apart from a brief review of the relationship between mythos and logos, the author, who has based his study on the Freudian category of the social unconscious and Durkheim’s category of social consciousness, presents the characteristics of three modes of social memory: unconscious memory, interconscious memory and conscious memory. Based on Gilbert Durand’s mytho-analytical tool, the structure of the triad of memory: THE UNCONCIOUS – AWAITING – THE CONSCIOUS is shown as the memory of the Father, Son (...) and Mother. The mythological aspect of elapsing, past, reminiscence, living memory and anticipation is captured on the examples taken from Postmodern (the global society), Modern and even Pre-Modern). In this way, the author concludes that the contemporary transformation of memory into hallucinations means the beginning of anticipation for the End of History. (shrink)