Although considerable research has been devoted to cognitive functions deteriorating due to diseases of cardiovascular system, rather less attention has been paid to their theoretical background. Progressive vascular disorders as hypertension, atherosclerosis and carotid artery stenosis generate most of all pathological changes in the white matter, that cause specific cognitive disorder: disconnection syndromes, and disturbances in the dynamic aspect of information processing. These features made neuropsychological disorders secondary to cardiovascular diseases different than the effects of cerebral cortex damage, which may (...) be interpreted modularly. (shrink)

This paper re-examines the origins, meaning, and application of the notion of evil/detestable human nature in Xunzi’s thought. Commonly considered the crucial factor that determined the premodern fate of Xunzi’s project, it has regained proper scholarly attention in recent years. As part of this interest in a unique approach to moral psychology, this paper will start with a critical re-assessment of Xunzi’s immediate motivation—Mengzi’s arguments in favour of the goodness of human nature. In the subsequent steps, it will revisit Xunzi’s (...) lines of argument regarding the evil/detestable nature, as presented in the 23rd chapter of the Xunzi, Xing e, the only one in which the notion appears. It will argue that its role in Xunzi’s system had been primarily misinterpreted despite contributing to one essential debate in Chinese philosophy. The paper will demonstrate that if only one follows the lines of Xunzi’s argument, it becomes apparent that the notion of evilness/detestability of human nature serves different than a simple denouncement of human moral insufficiency purpose. On the contrary, as rooted in empirical experience of socio-moral reality constatation, the notion of evil/detestable is meant as a tool allowing for embracing the human agency in the Confucian quest for an ethical society. Such a changed perspective on Xunzi’s intention is then hoped to stimulate further research and re-assessment of Xunzi’s thought significance and utility in the context of moral psychology. (shrink)

This paper centers around the notion that internal, mental representations are grounded in structural similarity, i.e., that they are so-called S-representations. We show how S-representations may be causally relevant and argue that they are distinct from mere detectors. First, using the neomechanist theory of explanation and the interventionist account of causal relevance, we provide a precise interpretation of the claim that in S-representations, structural similarity serves as a “fuel of success”, i.e., a relation that is exploitable for the representation using (...) system. Then, we discuss crucial differences between S-representations and indicators or detectors, showing that—contrary to claims made in the literature—there is an important theoretical distinction to be drawn between the two. (shrink)

Contra both phenomenalists and anti-phenomenalists, I defend the following thesis in this paper: the epistemic power of perceptual experience is grounded in its presentational property that is (i) uniquely possessed by the experience in the good case and (ii) essentially a phenomenal property. In §2, I set the ground for my argument by elaborating on the phenomenalist account of presentational phenomenology. In §3, I argue (against phenomenalism) for the first part of the phenomenal presentation thesis: (i) perceptual experience’s epistemic power (...) is grounded in instances of a presentational property possessed by perceptual experience in the good, but not in the bad case. In §4, I argue (against anti-phenomenalists) for the second part of the phenomenal presentation thesis: (ii) presentational property is essentially a phenomenal property. In §5, I address some potential objections to the phenomenal presentation thesis. §6 concludes. (shrink)

Paweł Gładziejewski, Is empathy is mental simulation? Remarks on the representative approach based on the concept of mirror neurons., Diametros 27 This paper draws on the theoretical achievements of analytic philosophy of mind and the empirical results of psychology and cognitive neuroscience in order to understand the nature of empathy and the sub-personal mechanisms upon which it is based. The paper distinguishes two types of empathy, which are often not sufficiently clearly distinguished in the literature, empathy as a kind (...) of social perception and empathy as compassion. The argument attempts show to that neither of these can be identified with a mental simulation process understood as a sub-personal process. Nevertheless mental simulation may play a limited explanatory role with respect to these two types of empathy. (shrink)

Die Beiträge dieses Buches untersuchen die Vielfalt der Herangehensweisen an die diversen Erscheinungsformen von Sprache, an das Wort und die Wortsemantik sowie an den Gebrauch von Sprache. Der Band enthält Arbeiten, die linguistische Fragestellungen zu sprachsystematischen Aspekten der Wort-, Satz-, Text- und Diskursebene behandeln sowie Perspektiven eröffnen, um diverse Aspekte von Sprache in einem über diese Domänen hinausgehenden Rahmen zu betrachten. Die Beiträger diskutieren Fragen der lexikalischen Semantik, Pragmalinguistik, Morphologie und der Lexikographie. Das Buch setzt seine Schwerpunkte neben der Wortsemantik (...) auf die Eingebundenheit lexikalischer Bedeutungen in registerspezifische Diskursmuster, öffentliche, interpersonelle und geschäftlich-beruflich orientierte Diskurse. (shrink)

In his book Representation Reconsidered, William Ramsey argues against the view that the concept of mental representation employed by cognitive scientists should be based on the folk-psychological concept of mental representation as propositional attitudes. The author of the present article will attempt to show that, contrary to what Ramsey himself claims, the fact that the folk concept of mental representation will most likely not be a part of the conceptual repository of cognitive science does not imply that beliefs, desires or (...) the rationality of human cognition should be eliminated from the naturalistic outlook on the nature of mind and cognitive processes. The key to see that this is the case lies in understanding cognitive systems as multi-level, hierarchically organized mechanisms. (shrink)

The article briefly presents the notions of invariance and variance as used with regard to the transfer of three essential codes which we can discern in a literary work, i.e. aesthetic code, lexical­-semantic code and cultural code. The analysis is provided on the basis of four novels by the Austrian author Wolf Haas, whose unique writing style can be demanding for any translator.

Debunking arguments aim to undermine common sense beliefs by showing that they are not explanatorily or causally linked to the entities they are purportedly about. Rarely are facts about the aetiology of common sense beliefs invoked for the opposite aim, that is, to support the reality of entities that furnish our manifest image of the world. Here I undertake this sort of un-debunking project. My focus is on the metaphysics of ordinary physical objects. I use the view of perception as (...) approximate Bayesian inference to show how representations of ordinary objects can be extracted from sensory input in a rational and truth-tracking manner. Drawing an analogy between perception construed as Bayesian hypothesis testing and scientific inquiry, I sketch out how some of the intuitions that traditionally inspired arguments for scientific realism also find application with regards to proverbial tables and chairs. (shrink)

Infertility is a serious social problem. Very often the only treatment possibility are IVF methods. This study explores the possibility of outcome prediction in the early stages of treatment. The data, collected from the previous treatment cycles, were divided into four subsets, which corresponded to the selected stages of treatment. On each such subset, sophisticated data mining analysis was carried out, with appropriate imputations and classification procedures. The obtained results indicate that there is a possibility of predicting the final outcome (...) at the beginning of treatment. (shrink)

The responsibility that rests with the current generation, which has a duty of preserving the ecosystem for the next generations, has become not only the responsibility of governments of the particular states and politicians, but also managers and companies managed by them since the most serious contamination is a result of the industrial activity. Not negating a need of industrial activities’ development; still, one must consider a change of management’s style itself, which would; apart from the economic growth, take ethics (...) and ecology under consideration. The managers as a organizational and social leaders must learn how to make decisions with the extremely higher caution than it has been done so far. The possibilities that they have, cause that the burden of changes leading to create, propagate, and realize the outlook that allows responsibility for the future is also on their shoulders. Therefore, we need the changes that consist in revaluing the previous anthropocentric stance in ethics into the ethics based on responsibility principle, in which the biosphere might be perceived not only as an object of man’s industrial activity, but first of all as a subject of his responsibility. (shrink)

E. Berti, Arystoteles w XX wieku, tłum. A. Dudzińska-Facca, D. Facca, Warszawa 2015, ss. 270.

[K. Marciniak, Pro Cicerone poeta. Poezja Marka Tulliusza Cycerona na przestrzeni stuleci, Warszawa 2008].

No more than a few years ago could open an article concerning neurophenomenology with a statement describing recent rediscovery of the problem of consciousness by the cognitive sciences and pointing to the fact that right now, explaining conscious experience in neuroscientific or computational terms poses the greatest challenge for those sciences. Today however, constatations of this sort start to sound like trivial descriptions of a universally recognized state of affairs. The question of “how the water of the physical brain is (...) turned into a wine of consciousness” is now among the mainstream problems of cognitive science. (shrink)

The article deals with the issue of turning in the thought of Martin Heidegger. I show that, in Being and time the question of being posed from the perspective of a distinguished being as Dasein has led to the objectification of being, thus rather reproducing instead of overcoming, the so far way of thinking that Heidegger named “metaphysical”. The turning in Heidegger’s thought consists in his effort to make being independent from human being, i.e. he tries to go beyond the (...) transcendental and subjectivist point of view of Dasein by placing historicality of Dasein against the background of the very existence of being. It is not Dasein who designs being, but on the contrary, being designs understanding for Dasein. In this context, I show that the thinking of being postulated by Heidegger takes the form of thinking the very process of historical presencing of the historic types of interpretation of being. (shrink)

This book presents a new approach to semantics based on Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s Directival Theory of Meaning, which in effect reduces semantics of the analysed language to the combination of its syntax and pragmatics. The author argues that the DTM was forgotten because for many years philosophers didn’t have conceptual tools to appreciate its innovative nature, and that the theory was far ahead of its time. The book shows how a redesigned and modernised version of the DTM can deliver a new (...) solution to the problem of defining linguistic meaning and that the theory can be understood as a new type of functional role semantics. The defining feature of the DTM is that it presents meaning as a product of constraints on the usage of words. According to the DTM meaning is not use, but the avoidance of misuse. Readers will see how the DTM was shelved for reasons that we don’t find so dramatic anymore, and how it contains enough original ideas and solutions to warrant developing it into a full-blown contemporary account. It is shown how many of the underlying ideas of the theory have been embraced later by philosophers and treated simply as brute facts about natural languages or even as new philosophical discoveries. Philosophers of language and researchers with an interest in how languages and the mind work will find this book a fascinating read. (shrink)

Our conscious experience seemingly involves the subjective sense or feeling of the passage of time. However, in recent years, several authors have denied that such an aspect or feature of experience can be found. If the experience of the flow of time exists, it remains elusive and intangible. My aim here is to try to pin it down. For this purpose, I will investigate acute disturbances of normal temporal experience that accompany deep meditative and psychedelic states. I will argue that (...) these experiences of altered temporality provide phenomenal contrast cases to ordinary passage phenomenology, allowing us to establish the existence of the latter and making it amenable to theorizing. (shrink)

This paper presents Michael Heller’s notion of “philosophy in science” and re-introduces Michael Heller’s classical text that first presented this concept of philosophy entitled How is “philosophy in science” possible?. The paper discusses the historical context of Heller’s idea as it emerged from the discussions and works of the Krakow philosophical scene and discusses the basic tenants of this philosophy, its analytic character, the role of intellectual tradition in the development of this philosophy, and the critical role played by an (...) interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophy, science, and theology. Despite the idea of philosophy in science having emerged about 40 years ago, this concept still inspires and fuels innovative research. The notion of “philosophy in science” lies at the foundations of the philosophy published in two journals: Philosophical Problems in Science and Philosophy in Science. (shrink)

Like most goods‐producing sectors in the West, modern health‐care systems have been profoundly changed by globalization and the neoliberal policies that attend it. Since the 1970s, the role of the welfare state has been considerably reduced; funding and management of health systems have been subjected to wave upon wave of reorganization and assimilated to the private sector. At the same time, neoliberal policy has imposed the notion of patient empowerment, thus turning patients into consumers of health. The literature on nursing (...) has accordingly reported on the significant repercussions on all aspects of the profession, from delivery of care and treatment, through training for new nurses, to legislated policy reforms regarding the role and responsibilities of modern nurses. In light of these developments, this paper analyses and theorizes about the way the injection of neoliberal policy is linked to and affects the practice of nursing. Drawing on a number of Nietzschean arguments, we begin with an exploration of the complex effects of neoliberalism, bureaucratization, and technocratization on the health system and the practice of nursing. Our main theoretical point here is that neoliberal policy engenders and promotes a neoliberal tide, which results in the conversion of the values that drive modern nursing practice. We then examine this tide in the light of Nietzsche's concepts. Starting with an analysis based on the ontology of the will to power, we show that nurses are dominated by neoliberal values embedded in technocratic and bureaucratic ideologies. Finally, we argue that the application of neoliberal policy constitutes a form of domestication from which one might potentially be freed through the Nietzschean concept of transvaluation of values. This transvaluation, as its freeing from some of the neoliberal tide, may be accomplished in accordance with a hierarchy of specific life‐affirming values for nursing culture and practice. (shrink)

Are perceptual experiences epistemically appraisable? In this paper, I argue, contra Siegel (Rationality of perception, Oxford 2017) that they are not (§§ 2–3). I also show how the problem of hijacked experience can be solved without endorsing the view that perceptual experience is epistemically appraisable (§§ 4–5). A key idea behind my proposal is a disjunctivist view on rationalising and epistemic powers of perceptual experience.

In this article, apart from a brief review of the relationship between mythos and logos, the author, who has based his study on the Freudian category of the social unconscious and Durkheim’s category of social consciousness, presents the characteristics of three modes of social memory: unconscious memory, interconscious memory and conscious memory. Based on Gilbert Durand’s mytho-analytical tool, the structure of the triad of memory: THE UNCONCIOUS – AWAITING – THE CONSCIOUS is shown as the memory of the Father, Son (...) and Mother. The mythological aspect of elapsing, past, reminiscence, living memory and anticipation is captured on the examples taken from Postmodern (the global society), Modern and even Pre-Modern). In this way, the author concludes that the contemporary transformation of memory into hallucinations means the beginning of anticipation for the End of History. (shrink)

Migration and refugeeism have become widespread phenomena in the contemporary world. They affect both the migrants’ countries of origin, as well as transit and target countries. The contemporary migrant crisis is becoming a challenge not only for politicians, diplomats and economists, but also for sociologists, demographers and philosophers. It is also a challenge for the Catholic Church because it affects millions of Christians to whose countries migrants and refugees are coming. The purpose of this article is to explain the social (...) teaching of the Church in this regard. It contains examples of statements made by the Second Vatican Council and the Popes: John Paul II, Benedict XVI and Francis. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe present study examined relationships between attention to negative words and daily rumination and daily adjustment in a sample of clinically depressed individuals. We recorded eye movements of 43 individuals diagnosed with major depression while they were freely viewing dysphoric, threat-related, neutral, and positive words. Then, each day for one week, participants provided measures of their daily rumination and psychological adjustment. Multilevel analyses found that attention to dysphoric and threat-related words was positively related to daily rumination and attention to threat-related (...) words was negatively related to daily adjustment. These findings suggest that the impaired ability to disengage from negative words is positively related to rumination in daily life and is negatively related to well-being, as defined in terms of Beck’s Triad. (shrink)

According to Phillips, (1) genuine perception is attributable to the individual (i.e. it’s a personal state/event, as opposed to sub-personal states/events in the individual’s brain); (2) since unconscious perceptual representations are ill-suited to guide action, there’s no good reason to attribute them to the individual; (3) not being attributable to the individual, they don’t instantiate genuine perception, thereby failing to support the hypothesis that genuine perception can occur unconsciously. I argue that this reasoning is flawed and can’t be easily fixed. (...) Phillips contends that unconscious perceptual representations don’t guide action because they fail to meet certain conditions that are sufficient for action guidance. But those conditions may not be necessary for action guidance. Consequently, unconscious perceptual representations may guide action even if they don’t meet Phillips’ conditions. Furthermore, due to his commitment to the distinction between personal and sub-personal states/events, Phillips isn’t in a position to argue that his conditions are necessary for action guidance. For the distinction applies to action as well as to perception, and when genuine action is identified by personal-level criteria, Phillips’ conditions turn out unnecessary for action guidance. (shrink)

This paper aims to present and discuss an argumentation against the Turing test (TT), which we shall call the CCSC (Complete Conversation System Claim). Exemplary arguments of the CCSC type include Lem’s “Space Gramophone,” the “machine equipped with a dictionary” proposed by Shannon and McCarthy, Block’s “Aunt Bubbles,” and Searle’s “Chinese Room” argument. CCSC argumentation is constructed to show that the TT is not properly designed and, consequently, is not a good hallmark of intelligence. Based on the original TT rules (...) reconstruction, I argue that CCSC-type argumentation seems to be aimed at a certain interpretation of the TT, which, as I demonstrate, commits the straw man fallacy. In light of the results presented by Łupkowski and Wiśniewski, I also discuss whether a complete conversation system is theoretically possible. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a populational schema of modeling that consists of: a linear AFSV schema, and a higher-level schema employing the genetic algorithm. The basic ideas of the proposed solution are as follows: whole populations of models are considered at subsequent stages of the modeling process, successive populations are subjected to the activity of genetic operators and undergo selection procedures, the basis for selection is the evaluation function of the genetic algorithm. The schema can be applied to automate (...) the modeling of the mind/brain by means of artificial neural networks: the structure of each network is modified by genetic operators, modified networks undergo a learning cycle, and successive populations of networks are verified during the selection procedure. The whole process can be automated only partially, because it is the researcher who defines the evaluation function of the genetic algorithm. (shrink)

Austere relationalism combines two claims. First, the phenomenal character of perception is at least partially constituted by the perceived items. Second, perception doesn’t consist in representing the perceived items as being a certain way. Recently, Daniel Kalpokas, Avner Baz, and Søren Overgaard have cast doubt on the ability of austere relationalism to account for the peculiar phenomenology of aspect-seeing. I show that this explanatory challenge can be met. Some of the claims made by the critics can be resisted, whereas other (...) can be accommodated into austere relationalism. Most notably, I argue that austere relationalists should acknowledge that aspect-seeing is enabled by unconscious perceptual judgment. This not only allows them to meet the challenge, but also provides the means to reconcile the apparently belief-independent phenomenology of aspect-seeing with the arguably indispensable role that concepts and recognition play in it. (shrink)

The present contribution is an attempt at showing that Tocqueville’s conception of liberty transcended the divisions between negative and positive aspects of freedom. The author starts by juxtaposing it with the opposition drawn by Constant between liberty of the ancients and liberty of the moderns. While Tocqueville and Constant shared a concern for the preservation of individual rights, as Claude Lefort has rightly pointed out, Tocqueville was much more reluctant to accept the modern loss of the communal dimension of liberty. (...) He did not accept the view that jouissances privées, private pleasures, are the main compensation that the modern world has to offer for the lost ancient treasure of political participation. The article then looks into the relevance of Tocqueville’s standpoint for current debates between liberal defenders of negative freedom and republican advocates of freedom as non-domination. Opponents in this discussion seem to be so devoted to demonstrating that their particular approach provides the best guarantees against any threats to liberty, both factual and potential, that they overlook the fact that their definitions of freedom remain significantly similar. By arguing that 'to be free is to be guided by one’s own will' contemporary republicans, as well as their liberal counterparts, move along the lines drawn by Constant and towards private pleasures. By questioning the inevitability of this turn, Tocqueville provides us with a valuable contribution to crucial discussions in contemporary political philosophy. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to use a formal approach to the Turing test. This approach is based on a tool developed within Inferential Erotetic Logic, so called erotetic search scenarios. First, I reconstruct the setting of the Turing test proposed by A.M. Turing. On this basis, I build a model of the test using erotetic search scenarios framework. I use the model to investigate one of the most interesting issues of the TT setting – the interrogator’s perspective and (...) role in the test. (shrink)

Semen Frank (1877–1950) was one of the first and most ardent advocates of the ontological argument in the twentieth century. He proposed an original interpretation of the ontological argument based on its analogy to Descartes’ Cogito. Frank believed that it is possible to develop Cogito ergo sum into Cogito ergo est ens absolutum. In this paper, I analyze his version of the ontological argument. First, I propose a simple reconstruction of his reasoning, paying attention to its hidden premise. Second, departing (...) from the classical logical interpretations of Descartes’ argument, I show that for Frank the claim that God exists had the same logical properties as Cogito. As a result, it seems that his argument was formally correct, though based on a premise which could hardly be convincing for a non-believer. This should not be surprising, however, since Frank, as most Russian religious philosophers, was not interested in the project of philosophical theology. His main concern was rather the development of philosophy based on religious premises, which might be called “theological philosophy”. (shrink)

In this paper I take a closer look at Fr. Georges Florovsky’s original view on the relation between philosophy and theology. I argue that he tried to formulate an approach based on patristic experience and opposed to the dominating secular paradigm of philosophy. In some sense he wanted to reverse the traditional account. As Teresa Obolevitch aptly suggested, he wanted to replace the principle fides quaerens intellectum by the rule intellectus quaerens fidem. In that first default case the faith needs (...) to be justified or proved by the reason, in the second, unobvious one, the faith has an absolute priority and illuminates itself the natural thought. According to Florovsky, philosophy should not attempt to ground the theology, formulating arguments for the existence of God or proving the coherence of theism, but rather should accept theology as a fundamental premise and then develop a new, non-secular account for the old philosophical topics. (shrink)