Subjectivism about well-being holds that an object contributes to one's well-being to the extent that one has a pro-attitude toward this object under certain conditions. Most subjectivists have contended that these conditions should be ideal. One reason in favor of this idea is that when people adapt their pro-attitudes to situations of oppression, the levels of well-being they may attain is diminished. Nevertheless, I first argue that appealing to idealized conditions of autonomy or any other condition to erase or replace (...) adaptive pro-attitudes is mistaken. Second, I show that the most natural version of subjectivism that does not appeal to any such idealizing condition can explain why the well-being of people having adaptive pro-attitudes should not be restricted to the fulfillment of these pro-attitudes. In sum, the existence of adaptive preferences does not militate in favor of the introduction of conditions of idealization but against it. (shrink)

It is often suggested that emotions are intrinsically normative or that they have conditions of correctness that are intrinsic. In order to assess this thesis, I consider whether the main argument in favor of the normativity of belief can be transposed to emotions. In the case of belief, the argument is that when we wonder whether to believe that p, we acknowledge that we must abide by some norms. This is understood as showing that these norms are intrinsic to the (...) concept of belief. In contrast, it appears that no similar constraint applies when we deliberate about emotions. Indeed, I argue that extrinsic norms are suf ficient to understand thoroughly the normativity of emotions. Therefore, the postulation of intrinsic norms or correctness conditions seems unmotivated. Worse, if emotions had intrinsic norms or correctness conditions, they would manifest themselves when we wonder whether an emotion is appropriate in this or that context. But they don’t. (shrink)

Du moment où, en juin 1934, se noue entre eux une relation amoureuse et jusqu’à leur mariage en août 1937, les ethnologues Denise Paulme et André Schaeffner entretiennent une correspondance régulière. Si les lettres d’André Schaeffner n’ont pas été retrouvées, celles de Denise Paulme constituent une source essentielle pour observer les débuts d’une carrière scientifique féminine dans l’entre-deux-guerres. Elles nous révèlent que l’expérience de terrain, désormais située au cœur du parcours de l’ethnologue professionnel, a permis à Denise Paulme d’asseoir les (...) bases d’une légitimité qui ne lui était pas acquise. Mais elles mettent également en évidence la nécessité, pour une femme, de penser conjointement sa vie affective et sa vie scientifique, pour conquérir une place dans celle de ces deux vies où elle n’était pas attendue. (shrink)

Dans cette introduction, je situe en premier lieu la métaéthique vis-à-vis des autres recherches qui s’intéressent à la morale. Je distingue pour commencer la métaéthique de l’éthique normative et des éthiques appliquées. Alors que ces dernières s’intéressent à ce que la morale nous demande de faire, la métaéthique est une interrogation de second ordre sur la nature de la morale, du discours moral et sur la possibilité de justifier des jugements moraux. Je distingue ensuite parmi ces questions de second ordre (...) celles qui constituent plus proprement la métaéthique par opposition à la psychologie morale tout en soulignant leurs relations de dépendance. Pour finir, je présente assez brièvement les questions centrales propres aux différents sous-domaines de la métaéthique : la sémantique morale qui porte sur la signification des termes moraux, l’épistémologie morale qui porte sur la connaissance morale, et l’ontologie morale qui porte sur les faits moraux susceptibles d’expliquer pourquoi certains de nos jugements moraux sont vrais. Dans cette brève introduction à la métaéthique, notre ambition sera essentiellement de situer la métaéthique par rapport aux autres approches philosophiques de la morale. Nous nous efforcerons en outre de présenter assez sommairement les grandes questions qui structurent ce vaste domaine de recherche. (shrink)

Kritische bijdragen over ideologisch gekleurde vormen van westerse culturele antropologie.

A popular idea at present is that emotions are perceptions of values. Most defenders of this idea have interpreted it as the perceptual thesis that emotions present (rather than merely represent) evaluative states of affairs in the way sensory experiences present us with sensible aspects of the world. We argue against the perceptual thesis. We show that the phenomenology of emotions is compatible with the fact that the evaluative aspect of apparent emotional contents has been incorporated from outside. We then (...) deal with the only two views that can make sense of the perceptual thesis. On the response–dependence view, emotional experiences present evaluative responsedependent properties (being fearsome, being disgusting, etc.) in the way visual experiences present response-dependent properties such as colors. On the response–independence view, emotional experiences present evaluative response-independent properties (being dangerous, being indigestible, etc.), conceived as ‘Gestalten’ independent of emotional feelings themselves. We show that neither view can make plausible the idea that emotions present values as such, i.e., in an open and transparent way. If emotions have apparent evaluative contents, this is in fact due to evaluative enrichments of the non-evaluative presentational contents of emotions. (shrink)

Post-modernism offers a revolutionary approach to the study of society: in questioning the validity of modern science and the notion of objective knowledge, this movement discards history, rejects humanism, and resists any truth claims. In this comprehensive assessment of post-modernism, Pauline Rosenau traces its origins in the humanities and describes how its key concepts are today being applied to, and are restructuring, the social sciences. Serving as neither an opponent nor an apologist for the movement, she cuts through post-modernism's often (...) incomprehensible jargon in order to offer all readers a lucid exposition of its propositions. Rosenau shows how the post-modern challenge to reason and rational organization radiates across academic fields. For example, in psychology it questions the conscious, logical, coherent subject; in public administration it encourages a retreat from central planning and from reliance on specialists; in political science it calls into question the authority of hierarchical, bureaucratic decision-making structures that function in carefully defined spheres; in anthropology it inspires the protection of local, primitive cultures from First World attempts to reorganize them. In all of the social sciences, she argues, post-modernism repudiates representative democracy and plays havoc with the very meaning of "left-wing" and "right-wing." Rosenau also highlights how post-modernism has inspired a new generation of social movements, ranging from New Age sensitivities to Third World fundamentalism. In weighing its strengths and weaknesses, the author examines two major tendencies within post-modernism, the largely European, skeptical form and the predominantly Anglo-North-American form, which suggests alternative political, social, and cultural projects. She draws examples from anthropology, economics, geography, history, international relations, law, planning, political science, psychology, sociology, urban studies, and women's studies, and provides a glossary of post-modern terms to assist the uninitiated reader with special meanings not found in standard dictionaries. (shrink)

The work of seventeenth-century polymath Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz has proved inspirational to philosophers and scientists alike. In this thought-provoking book, Pauline Phemister explores the ecological potential of Leibniz’s dynamic, pluralist, panpsychist, metaphysical system. She argues that Leibniz’s philosophy has a renewed relevance in the twenty-first century, particularly in relation to the environmental change and crises that threaten human and non-human life on earth. Drawing on Leibniz’s theory of soul-like, interconnected metaphysical entities he termed 'monads', Phemister explains how an individual’s true (...) good is inextricably linked to the good of all. Phemister also finds in Leibniz’s works the rudiments of a theory of empathy and strategies for strengthening human feelings of compassion towards all living things. Leibniz and the Environment is essential reading for historians of philosophy and environmental philosophers, and will also be of interest to anyone seeking a metaphysical perspective from which to pursue environmental action and policy. (shrink)

Selon le subjectivisme à propos du bien-être, un événement contribue au bien-être d’un individu dans la mesure où cet individu a ou aurait une certaine pro-attitude à l’égard de cet événement dans des circonstances à préciser. Une telle approche doit donc spécifier un certain nombre d’éléments de cette définition, par exemple les circonstances pertinentes. Dans cet article, je me concentre sur la pro-attitude pertinente. Afin d’organiser la discussion, je soutiens que cette pro-attitude doit satisfaire trois desiderata. Elle doit permettre de (...) formuler une conception du bien-être qui serait extensionnellement adéquate moyennant une détermination satisfaisante des circonstances pertinentes. Elle doit offrir une conception du bien-être qui ne varie pas, peu importe que l’on considère des êtres humains à la naissance, jeunes ou adultes. Elle doit enfin exister effectivement. Ces desiderata posés, je montre qu’un subjectivisme faisant appel au désir, à une pro-attitude cognitive ou plus complexe, éventuellement comprise en termes de désirs, ne peut satisfaire à la fois le critère d’adéquation extensionnelle et le critère d’invariabilité. En réponse à cette difficulté, je suggère que le subjectivisme devrait adopter une pro-attitude de valorisation. Une telle pro-attitude a été introduite par différents auteurs, mais j’en propose une interprétation plus simple et je soutiens qu’elle est la seule à satisfaire les trois desiderata initialement présentés. (shrink)

Maurice Blondel’s philosophy has had a decisive influence on the theology of Henri de Lubac, but more than an influence, it goes of an encounter and a dialogue between two great Catholic thinkers. This article proposes, over the course of successive encounters and collaborations between Blondel and Lubac, a presentation of Lubac’s reflection in that it extends Blondel’s critique of extrinsicity to the field of theology. This friendship between Lubac and Blondel testifies to the inherent character of the mystical question (...) to both philosophy and theology. This anchoring signifies the Mystery of Christ at work in the gesture of reason and in the understanding of faith. At the same time, Lubac promotes, in philosophy itself, an intelligence through faith. Friendship has not been an empty word with Lubac who openly defended Maurice Blondel on several occasions, and even after Blondel’s death, when Lubac continued to make the philosopher’s thought known by publishing and annotating a large part of his correspondence. (shrink)

Nous nous demandons souvent ce que nous aurions interet a faire ou ce que nous devrions faire, ce que les autres peuvent legitimement exiger de nous. Rien ne nous semble plus immediat que cette reflexion sur nos desirs et nos devoirs. Pourtant, des que l'on s'efforce de decrire les processus effectifs qui sont en jeu et les normes de rationalite ou morales qui pesent sur cette reflexion, l'evidence s'evanouit. Comment connaissons-nous nos desirs? Qu'est-ce qui sous-tend nos jugements moraux? Quelle place (...) les demandes de la morale laissent a nos desirs? La reflexion pratique ne nous sert-elle qu'a justifier nos actions a posteriori ou nous permet-elle de guider nos actions? Le present livre s'attache a repondre a ces questions, anciennes pour la plupart, en discutant les recherches recemment menees a leur sujet en philosophie de l'action, en philosophie de l'esprit et en philosophie morale, dans l'esprit de la tradition analytique. (shrink)

L’ambition de ce livre est de présenter les éléments d’une réévaluation de l’aveu. Introduit par une réflexion sur son usage contemporain dans le droit, il croise des approches philosophiques profondément distinctes si ce n’est opposées. La phénoménologie, la psychanalyse et la philosophie analytique sont autant d’éclairages sur ce phénomène multiforme.

Ce livre apporte des éclaircissements et des compléments à Passions et raison aujourd'hui à la lumière de Descartes et de Spinoza, en centrant encore davantage sur le monde actuel la description des passions ou affects, prolongée par l'étude de leurs relations avec la raison. Il est question en particulier de trois oppositions qui ne sont pas aussi tranchées qu'on le croit. En effet, ces philosophes sont proches l'un de l'autre en dépit de leurs différences de principe ; malgré les siècles (...) qui nous séparent d'eux, il existe des liens de proximité entre notre temps et le leur ; surtout, les passions et la raison ne sont pas forcément antinomiques. Des passions remarquablement analysées il y a plus de trois siècles prédominent aujourd'hui : en particulier les passions de l'opinion (comme la faveur et l'indignation) et celles du mimétisme (comme la compassion et l'envie). Outre ces analyses qui nous aident à ouvrir davantage les yeux sur notre temps, Descartes et Spinoza nous ont transmis une leçon : la mise en question des idées reçues, qui n'est pas moins nécessaire aujourd'hui. Ils ont écrit leurs oeuvres au début du grand développement de la raison scientifique, et ils ont toujours quelque chose à nous dire à ce sujet. (shrink)

The emerging view of early dorso‐ventral patterning of amphibian embryos is that two opposing gradients of dorsalising and ventralising secreted factors are necessary. while several transcription factors acting upstream or downstream of the dorsalising molecules have been identified, until recently little was known about the transcriptional response to ventralising signals. Now two groups describe the identification of related homeodomain proteins, Xvent‐1 and Vox, which are able to convert dorsal cells of Xenopus embryos into more ventral ones(1,2).

Les thérapies psychanalytiques auprès des couples apportent un bénéfice thérapeutique personnel à chacun des patients et, souvent, à leur lien douloureux ambivalent, comme en témoigne une méta-analyse comparative des approches thérapeutiques anciennes ou contemporaines. Une compréhension psychanalytique plus groupale s’impose aujourd’hui pour mieux saisir les problématiques identitaires mises en jeu par les processus inconscients qui structurent tout groupe humain, mais aussi la spécificité groupale transgénérationnelle des familles et des couples, laquelle donne à leur vie émotionnelle et affective une si grande (...) intensité. (shrink)

What does Plato mean when he declares at Soph. 250b8 that Theaetetus is positing Being in his soul (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τιθείς) as a third something encompassing Change and Rest? Is he merely clarifying that the act of positing is a mental act? Or is he making a further point? This paper argues that the locution ‘in the soul’ plays a significant role in the passage in alerting to a contrast between the way Being and its relation to Change and (...) Rest are intelligible to Theaetetus and the way Being really is and relates to those two other kinds. This interpretation is set against another interpretation, defended by Leigh, according to which the phrase should be understood as drawing a contrast between what is done by the agency of the soul and what is done by the agency of the body. The paper then explores the consequences of the proposed interpretation for our understanding of the broader context of the passage. In particular, it argues that the claim that Being is a third something encompassing Change and Rest is more problematic than critics have usually assumed. To account for Theaetetus’ depiction, it develops the notion of ‘conceived parthood’, which are part-whole relations posited by the mind for the needs of a philosophical enquiry. (shrink)

The privacy, real or illusory, afforded by the personal letter allows each participant the philosophical freedom to explore a range of possible opinions, to experiment with different ideas, to hesitate, and to change his or her mind in ways that published articles and books discourage. The private letter also allows the use of language and style of writing to be altered to suit the particular recipient. This is especially evident in Leibniz's correspondence with Des Bosses. Sometimes, however, the intended recipient (...) is not the addressee, as when Leibniz engaged with Locke through Thomas Burnett of Kemney. This situation was not an isolated occurrence in Leibniz's dealings with Locke. In this chapter, we shall see how Leibniz attempted to engage with Locke through a second correspondence and how he adapted the style and presentation of his views, not for the main correspondent, Lady Masham, but for the other intended recipient. We shall also see that the views Leibniz presents confirm his loyalty during this period to an ontology of embodied, perceiving substances. -/- The correspondence with Damaris Masham began shortly after Lady Masham sent Leibniz a copy of her father's The True Intellectual System of the Universe (TIS) at the end of 1703. Learning that the book was on its way, Leibniz's first letter was intended to thank her in advance. (shrink)

Le lien de couple n’est pas seulement relation d’Objet intrapsychique, mais processus interactif étayé sur les pulsions d’attachement et d’emprise de chaque partenaire. Ce processus est, dans l’espace transitionnel de chacun, très proche de l’action intuitive et anticipatrice du « croire ». Les thérapeutes se doivent d’aider à son élaboration en séance conjointe permettant l’accès à la reconnaissance de Soi et de l’altérité du partenaire.

On ne résume pas une vignette clinique, surtout si elle est brève... Une croyance se couvre souvent du statut de la certitude, d’un « savoir », voire d’une « évidence », écartant tout doute ou toute critique jusqu’à l’irruption traumatique apportée par la violence d’une émotion. La clinique montre la confusion entre « croire », « savoir », croire qu’on croit, dire qu’on croit, et notamment « vouloir croire ». Les convictions les plus fragiles sont celles de ceux qui « (...) veulent croire ». Même non partagées, elles ont besoin d’être acceptées a priori par l’entourage ou les thérapeutes pour qu’une élaboration puisse se faire, qui les confirmera ou les infirmera. D’autant que la clinique montre que la vie conjugale permet souvent bien des aménagements. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant viewed himself as the first person to have properly defined the concept of a human ‘race’. He distinguished four human ‘races’ and ranked the.

The goal of this study is to reconstruct and evaluate the systematic role of Kant's views on history within his ‛critical' philosophy. Kant's philosophy of history has been neglected in the literature, largely due to the widespread though mistaken perception that it is at odds with central assumptions of Kant’s ‘critical’ thought. I discuss Kant's most important texts on history and examine the relationship between Kant's view of history and the central tenets of his Critiques (in particular, Kant's conception of (...) teleology, his notion of an 'interest of reason,' and the problem of the possibility of the highest good). I argue that Kant's philosophy of history should be seen as an integral (though not entirely unproblematic) part of his mature philosophy. I show this in part by correcting the standard view of Kant's philosophy of history, and in part by highlighting hitherto neglected aspects of his critical philosophy. (shrink)

Advance care planning is a voluntary process whereby individual preferences, values and beliefs are used to aid a person in planning for end-of-life care. Currently, there is no local instrument to assess an individual’s awareness and attitude towards advance care planning. This study aimed to develop an Advance Care Planning Questionnaire and to determine its validity and reliability among older people in Malaysia. The Advance Care Planning Questionnaire was developed based on literature review. Face and content validity was verified by (...) an expert panel, and piloted among 15 participants. Our study was conducted from October 2013 to February 2014, at an urban primary care clinic in Malaysia. Included were those aged >50 years, who could understand English. A retest was conducted 2 weeks after the first administration. Participants from the pilot study did not encounter any problems in answering the Advance Care Planning Questionnaire. Hence, no further modifications were made. Flesch reading ease was 71. The final version of the Advance Care Planning Questionnaire consists of 66 items: 30 items were measured on a nominal scale, whilst 36 items were measured on a Likert-like scale; of which we were only able to validate 22 items, as the remaining 14 items were descriptive in nature. A total of 245 eligible participants were approached; of which 230 agreed to participate. Factor analysis on the 22 items measured on a Likert-scale revealed four domains: “feelings regarding advance care planning”, “justifications for advance care planning”, “justifications for not having advance care planning: fate and religion”, and “justifications for not having advance care planning: avoid thinking about death”. The Cronbach’s alpha values for items each domain ranged from 0.637–0.915. In test-retest, kappa values ranged from 0.738–0.947. The final Advance Care Planning Questionnaire consisted of 63 items and 4 domains. It was found to be a valid and reliable instrument to assess the awareness and attitude of older people in Malaysia towards advance care planning. (shrink)

The prohibition against using others ‘merely as means’ is one of Kant’s most famous ideas, but it has proven difficult to spell out with precision what it requires of us in practice. In ‘How to Use Someone “Merely as a Means”’ (2020), I proposed a new interpretation of the necessary and sufficient conditions for using someone ‘merely as a means’. I argued that my agent-focused actual consent inter- pretation has strong textual support and significant advantages over other readings of the (...) prohibition. In the present essay, I respond to comments by Claudia Blöser, Irina Schumski, and Oliver Sensen. I first address the role of maxims in relation to the Formula of Humanity, and I spell out in more detail the relation between the agent’s belief and the actual facts pertaining to the consent of the person who is used as means to the agent’s end. I then discuss the importance of the requirement that agents make their use of others conditional on the others’ consent as a matter of moral principle. I next show that the proposed reading of the prohibition, despite its focus on the agent’s maxims and practical reasoning, yields important conclusions about the moral status of external actions, and I address several cases that are pur- ported to spell trouble for my reading of Kant’s prohibition. I end by outlining two challenges for possible (rational) consent readings of the prohibition against using others merely as means. (shrink)

In the present book, Pauline Phemister argues against traditional Anglo-American interpretations of Leibniz as an idealist who conceives ultimate reality as a plurality of mind-like immaterial beings and for whom physical bodies are ultimately unreal and our perceptions of them illusory. Re-reading the texts without the prior assumption of idealism allows the more material aspects of Leibniz's metaphysics to emerge. Leibniz is found to advance a synthesis of idealism and materialism. His ontology posits indivisible, living, animal-like corporeal substances as the (...) real metaphysical constituents of the universe; his epistemology combines sense-experience and reason; and his ethics fuses confused perceptions and insensible appetites with distinct perceptions and rational choice. In the light of his sustained commitment to the reality of bodies, Phemister re-examines his dynamics, the doctrine of pre-established harmony and his views on freedom. The image of Leibniz as a rationalist philosopher who values activity and reason over passivity and sense-experience is replaced by the one of a philosopher who recognises that, in the created world, there can only be activity if there is also passivity; minds, souls and forms if there is also matter; good if there is evil; perfection if there is imperfection. (shrink)

Background Respect for autonomy is a key principle in bioethics. However, respecting autonomy in practice is complex because most people define themselves and make decisions influenced by a complex network of social relationships. The extent to which individual autonomy operates for each partner within the context of decision-making within marital or similar relationships is largely unexplored. This paper explores issues related to decision-making by couples for health care and the circumstances under which such a practice should be respected as compatible (...) with autonomous decision-making. Discussion We discuss the concept of autonomy as it applies to persons and to actions, human interdependency and gender roles in decision-making, the dynamics and outcomes of couples’ joint decision-making, and the ethics of couples’ joint decision-making. We believe that the extent to which couples’ joint decision-making might be deemed ethically acceptable will vary depending on the context. Given that in many traditional marriages the woman is the less dominant partner, we consider a spectrum of scenarios of couples’ joint decision-making about a woman’s own health care that move from those that are acceptably autonomous to those that are not consistent with respecting the woman’s autonomous decision-making. To the extent that there is evidence that both members of a couple understand a decision, intend it, and that neither completely controls the other, couples’ joint decision-making should be viewed as consistent with the principle of respect for the woman’s autonomy. At the other end of the spectrum are decisions made by the man without the woman’s input, representing domination of one partner by the other. Conclusions We recommend viewing the dynamics of couples’ joint decision-making as existing on a continuum of degrees of autonomy. This continuum-based perspective implies that couples’ joint decision-making should not be taken at face value but should be assessed against the specific cultural, ethnic, and religious backgrounds and personal circumstances of the individuals in question. (shrink)

People who wish to end their lives when they consider that they cannot endure further pain and suffering cannot legally obtain help to produce a peaceful death. The reality of practice seems to be that, covertly, physician-assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia do take place. The value of personal autonomy in issues of consent has been clarified in the courts in that a competent adult person has the right to refuse or choose alternative treatments even if death will be the outcome. (...) This issue needs open discussion and regulation in order to protect those vulnerable people in our society. (shrink)

This article considers the origins of alphabetic writing, tracing its probable source to ancient Egypt, southern Levant or the Sinai during the Egyptian Middle Kingdom (17th century BCE). It supports the view that the earliest scripts were acrophonic representations of a West-Semitic language, whose use developed under the rule of the Hyksos in Egypt but was arrested there with the expulsion of this foreign dynasty at the end of the 16th century BCE. The development is then traced through the Levant, (...) with particular attention given to the emergence of cuneiform alphabetic scripts in Ugarit (c. 1300 BCE). This form of writing disappeared with the fall of Ugarit, but linear alphabetic scripts were preserved in a variety of Near-Eastern languages, notably Aramaic and Phoenician. These two languages, by becoming linguae francae respectively of the Syria-northern Mesopotamia and the Anatolia-Eastern Mediterranean regions, brought about the spread of alphabetic writing up until the 8th century BCE. The article concludes by examining the influence of the Phoenician script on Greek, Etruscan and ultimately Latin forms of writing. (shrink)