In this book, Paul K. Moser offers a new approach to religious experience and the kind of evidence it provides. Here, he explains the nature of theistic and non-theistic experience in relation to the meaning of human life and its underlying evidence, with special attention given to the perspectives of Tolstoy, Buddha, Confucius, Krishna, Moses, the apostle Paul, and Muhammad. Among the many topics explored in this timely volume are: religious experience characterized in a unifying conception; religious experience (...) naturalized relative to science; religious experience psychologized in merely psychological phenomena; and religious experience cognized relative to potential defeaters from evil, divine hiddenness, and religious diversity. Understanding Religious Experience will benefit those interested in the nature of religion and can be used in relevant courses in religious studies, philosophy, theology, Biblical studies, and the history of religion. (shrink)

Paul Moser's book defends what has been an unfashionable view in recent epistemology: the foundationalist account of knowledge and justification. Since the time of Plato philosophers have wondered what exactly knowledge is. This book develops a new account of perceptual knowledge which specifies the exact sense in which knowledge has foundations. The author argues that experiential foundations are indeed essential to perceptual knowledge, and he explains what knowledge requires beyond justified true beliefs. In challenging prominent sceptical claims that we (...) have no justified beliefs about the external world, the book outlines a theory of rational belief. (shrink)

From the ancient Greeks to the formative voices of contemporary analytic philosophy, this collection of readings deftly blends the foremost classical sources with important comtemporary philosophical thinkers to present a wide-ranging and in-depth examination of the major theories of knowledge.

The order of influence from thesis to hypothesis, and from philosophy to the social sciences, has historically governed the way in which the abstraction and significance of language as an empirical object is determined. In this article, an argument is made for the development of a more reflexive intellectual relationship between ordinary language philosophy (OLP) and the social sciences that it helped inspire. It is demonstrated that, and how, the social scientific traditions of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (CA) press OLP (...) to re-consider the variety of problematic abstractions it has previously made for the sake of philosophical clarity, thereby self-reinvigorating. (shrink)

This article examines the kind of power available to a God worthy of worship, in connection with the prospect for a full theodicy for the world's suffering and evil. It portrays how such a God would seek to relate to people with uncoerced reconciliation to God as a gift having definite expectations of them. To that end, God would be elusive and hidden at times, including regarding ultimate purposes, to minimize the alienation of humans from God. We have no good (...) reason to suppose that God would reveal divine purposes to humans in a way that gives them a full theodicy. Similarly, we have no good reason to acknowledge a certain kind of limitation in divine power over evil, but, given divine goodness, we would expect to have such a clear reason if God had such a limitation. The absence of the latter clear reason counts against a proposed full theodicy. (shrink)

We develop an untyped framework for the multiverse of set theory. $\mathsf {ZF}$ is extended with semantically motivated axioms utilizing the new symbols $\mathsf {Uni}(\mathcal {U})$ and $\mathsf {Mod}(\mathcal {U, \sigma })$, expressing that $\mathcal {U}$ is a universe and that $\sigma $ is true in the universe $\mathcal {U}$, respectively. Here $\sigma $ ranges over the augmented language, leading to liar-style phenomena that are analyzed. The framework is both compatible with a broad range of multiverse conceptions and suggests its (...) own philosophically and semantically motivated multiverse principles. In particular, the framework is closely linked with a deductive rule of Necessitation expressing that the multiverse theory can only prove statements that it also proves to hold in all universes. We argue that this may be philosophically thought of as a Copernican principle that the background theory does not hold a privileged position over the theories of its internal universes. Our main mathematical result is a lemma encapsulating a technique for locally interpreting a wide variety of extensions of our basic framework in more familiar theories. We apply this to show, for a range of such semantically motivated extensions, that their consistency strength is at most slightly above that of the base theory $\mathsf {ZF}$, and thus not seriously limiting to the diversity of the set-theoretic multiverse. We end with case studies applying the framework to two multiverse conceptions of set theory: arithmetic absoluteness and Joel D. Hamkins’ multiverse theory. (shrink)

Historians cannot escape the obligation to give the best possible causal explanations but should recognize that they cannot be more rigorous than the subject matter permits. Rarely if ever can historians identify necessary and sufficient conditions of events, or even sufficient conditions; their aim is usually to seek out the necessary antecedents. Also, they inevitably deal with the teleology of ends and purposes, and with the variable symbolic meanings that constitute culture. But the converse of the limitations on causal claims (...) is the ability to deal with questions of value, taste, and policy. Reductionism is logically appealing, but it leads to a non-historical form of knowledge which has achieved no success in understanding the activities of cultural man. (shrink)

This is a critical notice of Richard Swinburne's book, _The Resurrection of God Incarnate (Oxford University Press, 2003). It argues that Swinburne's epistemology fails to yield an adequate cognitive foundation for genuine knowledge that Jesus is the resurrected Lord of heaven and earth. It also indicates where to look for the needed cognitive foundation.

The Wisdom of the Christian Faith joins philosophy and New Testament theology to offer a unique product: an anthology of accessible essays by prominent Christian philosophers on topics of religious and philosophical interest.

This essay replies to the responses of Harold Netland, Charles Taliaferro, and Kate Waidler to my symposium paper, “Gethsemane Epistemology.” It contends that a God worthy of worship would not need the arguments of traditional natural theology, and that such arguments would not lead to such a God in the way desired by God. In addition, it explains why Paul’s position in Romans 1 offers no support to the arguments of traditional natural theology.

This paper outIines an account of rational action. It distinguishes three species of reasons: motivating reasons, evidential reasons, and normative reasons. It also contends that there is a univocal notion of reason common to the notions of motivating reasons, evidential reasons, and normative reasons. Given this thesis, the paper explains how we can have a unified theory of reasons for action. It also explains the role of values in rational action. It sketches an affective approach to value that contrasts with (...) prominent desire-satisfaction approaches. (shrink)

It is argued that a pure coherence theory of epistemic empirical justification fails to avoid an isolation objection according to which empirical justification has been divorced from one's total empirical evidence. Also, it is shown that several recent efforts to meet this objection either are outright failures or are irrelevant inasmuch as they diverge from epistemic coherentism. The overall moral is that we should look beyond coherentism for an adequate theory of epistemic empirical justification.

Many people in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic monotheistic traditions testify to their experience of being commanded by God to do something or to be a certain way. Is this kind of testimony from experience credible in some cases, and, if so, on what ground? The main thesis of this article is that it is credible in some cases and a suitable ground is available in the morally purifying experience of the human conscience. The article looks to the Hebrew Bible, the (...) New Testament, and the Qur’an for relevant testimony to the importance of righteous divine commanding experienced by humans. The relevant commands are not abstract or merely theoretical but grounded in human moral experience and potentially motivating for righteous action. The article doubts that God would be God if there were no divine commanding given directly to receptive people in their moral experience. It contends that God would not be a morally righteous guide of the divine kind needed for the worthiness of worship by humans in the absence of God’s commanding people directly in their experience. (shrink)

BackgroundFear of cancer recurrence is an important cause of suffering for cancer survivors, and both empirical evidence and theoretical models suggest that prognostic uncertainty plays a causal role in its development. However, the relationship between prognostic uncertainty and FCR is incompletely understood.ObjectiveTo explore the relationship between prognostic uncertainty and FCR among patients with ovarian cancer.DesignA qualitative study was conducted utilizing individual in-depth interviews with a convenience sample of patients with epithelial ovarian cancer who had completed first-line treatment with surgery and/or (...) chemotherapy. Semi-structured interviews explored participants’ understanding of their prognosis; experiences, preferences, and attitudes regarding prognostic information; and strategies for coping with prognostic uncertainty. Inductive qualitative analysis and line-by-line software-assisted coding of interview transcripts was conducted to identify key themes and generate theoretical insights on the relationship between prognostic uncertainty and FCR.ResultsThe study sample consisted of 21 participants, nearly all of whom reported experiencing significant FCR, which they traced to an awareness of the possibility of a bad outcome. Some participants valued and pursued prognostic information as a means of coping with this awareness, suggesting that prognostic uncertainty causes FCR. However, most participants acknowledged fundamental limits to both the certainty and value of prognostic information, and engaged in various strategies aimed not at reducing but constructing and maintaining prognostic uncertainty as a means of sustaining hope in the possibility of a good outcome. Participants’ comments suggested that prognostic uncertainty, fear, and hope are connected by complex, bi-directional causal pathways mediated by processes that allow patients to cope with, construct, and maintain their uncertainty. A provisional dual-process theoretical model was developed to capture these pathways.ConclusionAmong patients with OC, prognostic uncertainty is both a cause and an effect of FCR—a fear-inducing stimulus and a hope-sustaining response constructed and maintained through various strategies. More work is needed to elucidate the relationships between prognostic uncertainty, fear, and hope, to validate and refine our theoretical model, and to develop interventions to help patients with OC and other serious illnesses to achieve an optimal balance between these states. (shrink)

Many philosophers and theologians try to add credibility to Christian faith by means of philosophical arguments and explanations. There are two main ways to pursue this aim, and one way is arguably more defensible than the other, at least from the perspective of the apostle Paul. Philosophers and theologians who hold that Paul has a contribution to make in this area should consider the relative efficacy of these two ways. The key area of contrast lies in the epistemic (...) basis of relevant philosophical arguments and explanations: either a basis in the power of direct divine self-manifestation or a basis just in philosophical claims. The latter basis will neglect or obscure the power distinctive of the Christian God and thus miss out on foundational evidence characteristic of that God. This article clarifies what that power is, in terms of responsive divine self-manifestation as God’s self-witness to divine reality and goodness in receptive human moral experience and character formation. The article explains how such power, being interactive toward divine righteousness, serves as a significant alternative to such prominent philosophical overlays on Christian faith as Platonism, Thomism, and Kantianism. The latter overlays improperly depersonalize key evidence for God’s reality and goodness. (shrink)

This paper is part of a symposium on Paul Moser, _Philosophy After Objectivity (Oxford University Press, 1993). The paper replies to contributions by Philip Quinn and Robert Audi.

Three questions motivate this book's account of evidence for the existence of God. First, if God's existence is hidden, why suppose He exists at all? Second, if God exists, why is He hidden, particularly if God seeks to communicate with people? Third, what are the implications of divine hiddenness for philosophy, theology, and religion's supposed knowledge of God? This book answers these questions on the basis of a new account of evidence and knowledge of divine reality that challenges skepticism about (...) God's existence. The central thesis is that we should expect evidence of divine reality to be purposively available to humans, that is, available only in a manner suitable to divine purposes in self-revelation. This lesson generates a seismic shift in our understanding of evidence and knowledge of divine reality. The result is a needed reorienting of religious epistemology to accommodate the character and purposes of an authoritative, perfectly loving God. (shrink)