It may be an exaggeration to say that a reappraisal of the concept of evolution is taking place. But it cannot be denied that in the last few years a number of extremely important studies have given new formulations to some of the fundamental questions concerning the rhythm, structure and meaning of biological evolution. It might be of interest, therefore, to discuss the present state of these problems and to indulge in some critical considerations regarding them.

Aron reflects with simplicity and depth on industrial society, communism, the future of democracy, peace and war, the nuclear age, and also Charles de Gaulle, Jean-Paul Sartre, Andre Malraux, Henry Kissinger and others.

Building on the success and importance of three previous volumes, _Relational Psychoanalysis_ continues to expand and develop the relational turn. Under the keen editorship of Lewis Aron and Adrienne Harris, and comprised of the contributions of many of the leading voices in the relational world, _Volume 5_ carries on the legacy of this rich and diversified psychoanalytic approach by taking a fresh look at the progress in therapeutic process. Included here are chapters on transference and countertransference, engagement, dissociation and (...) self-states, analytic impasses, privacy and disclosure, enactments, improvisation, development, and more. Thoughtful, capacious, and integrative, this new volume places the leading edge of relational thought close at hand, and pushes the boundaries of the relational turn that much closer to the horizon. Contributors: Lewis Aron, Anthony Bass, Beatrice Beebe, Philip Bromberg, Steven Cooper, Jody Messler Davies, Darlene Ehrenberg, Dianne Elise, Glen Gabbard, Adrienne Harris, Irwin Hoffman, Steven Knoblauch, Thomas Ogden, Spyros Orfanos, Stuart Pizer, Philip Ringstrom, Jill Salberg, Stephen Seligman, Joyce Slochower, Donnel Stern, Paul Wachtel. (shrink)

“Credit-worthiness” accounts of the value of knowledge focus on the exercise of agency as the source of value in question. This focus is shared by an approach suggested by Sally Haslanger to the value of belief. The standard examples and counterexamples from the “value of knowledge” literature treat the relevant sort of agency in fundamentally individualistic terms. But recent work on relational autonomy recommends that we think of agency as fundamentally socially embedded. This reorientation not only disarms a standard objection (...) to the “credit-worthiness” approach, but suggests that the putative counterexample is actually a paradigm-case of the exercise of epistemic agency for creatures like us. In so doing, it also exhibits the agency-based account of the value of knowledge and its main competitor, which focuses on the status of potential informants, as two sides of the same coin. Meanwhile, epistemic agency is an essential component of agency tout court. Effective action requires information. But perhaps the possession of information can take other forms than the having of true beliefs. Paul Churchland characterizes what’s peculiar to belief in terms of the sentential form in “that”-clauses in belief attributions. The alternatives that he envisages divorce informational content from sentence content. But for creatures like us, sentences are the basic units of communication of information. If our agency is paradigmatically exercised in socially embedded contexts, an essential part of the picture is that our information be in substantial measure communicable in sentences, i.e., that it take the form of beliefs. So the socially-oriented version of the agency-based approach to the value of knowledge also confirms Haslanger’s hunch that the value of belief can be vindicated and developed in terms of the role of belief in the exercise of agency for creatures like us. (shrink)

A little over one hundred years after his birth, and not quite twenty-five years since his death, interest in the French political philosopher and sociologist Raymond Aron continues to grow. Aron is now widely recognized as one of the most significant intellectual figures of the postwar period, whose wide-ranging reflections played a key part in preserving liberal democracy in Europe and abroad. His sober analyses of modern society, his trenchant critique of ideological politics and every form of totalitarianism, (...) and his philosophical reflections on politics and history have given powerful support to democratic liberalism throughout the western world. Aron's work combines passion and observation, disinterested reflection and love of liberty in a way that is an imitable model for humane and balanced political reflection. In this stimulating collection of essays, inspired by the centennial of Aron's birth, a distinguished group of North American and European scholars—including Pierre Manent, Stanley Hoffmann, Irving Louis Horowitz, Liah Greenfeld, Claude Lefort, and Aurelian Craiutu—examine four key aspects of Aron's thought and work: his educative legacy; his reflections on other philosophers and intellectuals; his distinctive approach to international relations; and the unique character of his own political reflection. The result is a masterful engagement with Aron's intellectual legacy and a thoughtful coming to terms with the political and intellectual substance of the twentieth century. (shrink)

Beschrijving van leven, werk en gedachtegoed van de Franse politieke journalist en analist.

This volume illuminates and critically assesses Paul A. Samuelson's voluminous and groundbreaking contributions to the field of economics. The volume includes contributions from eminent scholars, including 6 Nobel Laureates, covering the extraordinary depth and breadth of Samuelson's contributions. Samuelson, the first American economist to win the Nobel prize in 1970, was the foremost voice in economics in the latter half of the 20th century. He single-handedly transformed the discipline by creating a new way of presenting economics, making it possible (...) for it to be cast all in mathematical terms. Samuelson developed broad frameworks, such as the neoclassical synthesis, a mixed economy, and the surrogate production function, which provided practitioners with a vision for research. Samuelson's contributions to economics are rich, complex, consequential, and relevant to the ordinary economics of life. The quality of Samuelson's output and methods leave no doubt that his contributions continue to be timely and relevant even in the 21st century. Ideal as a reference or an introduction to Samuelson's work, this is a must-have for students and academics alike. (shrink)

Raymond Aron is best known for his intellectual sparring with Jean-Paul Sartre and for his stature as the pre-eminent Cold War liberal in France. He is credited with establishing an aut...

Raymond Aron and his Dialogues in an Age of Ideologies examines the thought and rhetoric of the most interesting thinker of the twentieth century of whom no one has heard. This book investigates Raymond Aron's conversations on politics during the Cold War with several of his more well-known interlocutors including Jean-Paul Sartre, Friedrich Hayek, and Charles de Gaulle. Through exploring these dialogues on the subjects of Marxism, freedom, and nationalism, we see the prudence of Aron's politics (...) of understanding as well as the emphasis he places on and virtue he demonstrates in public discourse. Through his dialogues, Aron shows us not only how to think politically but also how to engage in constructive public debate. He stands as a model for us to emulate in our own age of ideologies. (shrink)

Taking as its starting point recent claims that Jean-Paul Sartre's Critique de la Raison Dialectique was written as an attempt to overcome the historical relativism of Raymond Aron's Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire , the present article traces this covert dialogue back to a fundamental disagreement between the two men over the interpretation of Wilhelm Dilthey's anti-positivist theory of Verstehen or 'understanding'. In so doing it counters a longstanding tendency to emphasise the convergence of Aron and (...) Sartre's philosophical interests prior to the break in their friendship occasioned by the onset of the Cold War, suggesting that the causes of their later, radical political divergence were pregnant within this earlier philosophical divergence. (shrink)

Raymond Aron was a student of Léon Brunschvicg, a representative of French historical epistemology. This article explores Aron’s relation to this tradition through three claims. First of all, it contests that Raymond Aron’s philosophy of history constituted a complete break with this tradition. Secondly, resituating Aron in this tradition is valuable, because it highlights how Aron’s own philosophy of history is to be understood as a normative project, seen as an alternative to that of Brunschvicg. (...) Finally, Aron’s philosophy can still hold valuable lessons for present-day historical epistemology and history and philosophy of science in general. (shrink)

Jean-Paul Sartre is an undisputed giant of twentieth-century philosophy. His intellectual writings popularizing existentialism combined with his creative and artistic flair have made him a legend of French thought. His tumultuous personal life - so inextricably bound up with his philosophical thinking - is a fascinating tale of love and lust, drug abuse, high profile fallings-out and political and cultural rebellion. This substantial and meticulously researched biography is accessible, fast-paced, often amusing and at times deeply moving. Existentialism and Excess (...) covers all the main events of Sartre's remarkable seventy-five-year life from his early years as a precocious brat devouring his grandfather's library, through his time as a brilliant student in Paris, his wilderness years as a provincial teacher-writer experimenting with mescaline, his World War II adventures as a POW and member of the resistance, his post-war politicization, his immense amphetamine fueled feats of writing productivity, his harem of women, his many travels and his final decline into blindness and old age. Along the way there are countless intriguing anecdotes, some amusing, some tragic, some controversial: his loathing of crustaceans and his belief that he was being pursued by a giant lobster, his escape from a POW camp, the bombing of his apartment, his influence on the May 1968 uprising and his many love affairs. Cox deftly moves from these episodes to discussing his intellectual development, his famous feuds with Aron, Camus, and Merleau-Ponty, his encounters with other giant figures of his day: Roosevelt, Hemingway, Heidegger, John Huston, Mao, Castro, Che Guevara, Khrushchev and Tito, and, above all, his long, complex and creative relationship with Simone de Beauvoir. Existentialism and Excess also gives serious consideration to Sartre's ideas and many philosophical works, novels, stories, plays and biographies, revealing their intimate connection with his personal life. Cox has written an entertaining, thought-provoking and compulsive book, much like the man himself. (shrink)

Named one of the Ten Best Books of 2016 by the New York Times, a spirited account of a major intellectual movement of the twentieth century and the revolutionary thinkers who came to shape it, by the best-selling author of How to Live Sarah Bakewell. Paris, 1933: three contemporaries meet over apricot cocktails at the Bec-de-Gaz bar on the rue Montparnasse. They are the young Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and longtime friend Raymond Aron, a fellow philosopher who (...) raves to them about a new conceptual framework from Berlin called Phenomenology. "You see," he says, "if you are a phenomenologist you can talk about this cocktail and make philosophy out of it!" It was this simple phrase that would ignite a movement, inspiring Sartre to integrate Phenomenology into his own French, humanistic sensibility, thereby creating an entirely new philosophical approach inspired by themes of radical freedom, authentic being, and political activism. This movement would sweep through the jazz clubs and cafés of the Left Bank before making its way across the world as Existentialism. Featuring not only philosophers, but also playwrights, anthropologists, convicts, and revolutionaries, At the Existentialist Café follows the existentialists' story, from the first rebellious spark through the Second World War, to its role in postwar liberation movements such as anti-colonialism, feminism, and gay rights. Interweaving biography and philosophy, it is the epic account of passionate encounters--fights, love affairs, mentorships, rebellions, and long partnerships--and a vital investigation into what the existentialists have to offer us today, at a moment when we are once again confronting the major questions of freedom, global responsibility, and human authenticity in a fractious and technology-driven world. (shrink)

Paul Benacerraf's argument from multiple reductions consists of a general argument against realism about the natural numbers (the view that numbers are objects), and a limited argument against reductionism about them (the view that numbers are identical with prima facie distinct entities). There is a widely recognized and severe difficulty with the former argument, but no comparably recognized such difficulty with the latter. Even so, reductionism in mathematics continues to thrive. In this paper I develop a difficulty for Benacerraf's (...) argument against reductionism that is of comparable severity to the now widely recognized difficulty with his general argument against realism. Thanks to Kit Fine, Hartry Field, Jeff Sebo, Ted Sider, Stephen Schiffer, and anonymous referees at Philosophia Mathematica for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Thanks to Aron Edidin for many helpful discussions of the problems that inspired it. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

This paper focuses on the connection between meaning, the specific field of phenomenological philosophy, and mattering, the cornerstone of personal identity. Doing so requires that we take a stand on the scope and method of phenomenological philosophy itself. I will argue that while we can describe our lives in an “impersonal” way, such descriptions will necessarily omit what makes it the case that such lives can matter at all. This will require distinguishing between “personal” identity and “self” identity, an idea (...) well-established in the phenomenological literature – for instance, in Husserl’s distinction between the “transcendental ego” and the person -- but I will argue that self-identity is a normative achievement whose clarification requires a move into second-person phenomenology. The argument moves through three sections. First, I will discuss Aron Gurwitsch’s “non-egological” conception of consciousness and will explain the most important reason Husserl rejected this view in his transcendental phenomenology. Second, I will discuss some contemporary approaches to Husserl’s distinction between person and ego. Third, I will argue that these approaches testify to an ambiguity in Husserl’s account of being “true” to oneself that requires us to understand selfhood as having the structure Heidegger called care. The importance of this will be demonstrated phenomenologically in a critical examination of Paul Ricoeur’s ontology of selfhood, particularly his interpretation of the second-person phenomenology of conscience. (shrink)

This article extends Aron Gurwitsch’s ( 1964 ) central insight about the field of consciousness—that it is always organized in a theme, thematic field, margin pattern—to the human capacity for reverence. It offers an original phenomenology of reverent awe, inspired by Gurwitsch’s work, as an articulation of reverential index and reverential attitude. According to Paul Woodruff ( 2014 ) in Reverence: Renewing a Forgotten Virtue, reverence names those times when we become aware of something larger than human and (...) simultaneously our human limitations. By bridging the concepts of reverence from Woodruff and relevancy from Gurwitsch, this study shows that in reverent awe the emphasis in consciousness shifts to the edge of relevancy, the zones farthest removed from the theme, as the “indefinite continuation of context,” “order of existence,” or what Gurwitsch also calls an “inarticulate mass”. Reverent awe is clarified phenomenologically as an emphasis in consciousness between the theme and the order of existence as indefinite continuation of thematic context, maintaining a specific relevancy-principle (a Gestalt-connection) between the theme and the order of existence. In a reverential attitude with a reverential index we become aware more immediately of an order of existence and we become aware of our place in the order of existence. (shrink)

In the Thirties, European personalism was an inspirational philosophical movement, with its birthplace in France, but with proponents and sympathizers in many other countries as well. Following the Second World War, Christian-Democratic politicians translated personalistic ideas into a political doctrine. Sometimes they still refer to personalism, but most often this reference is little more than a nostalgic salute. In the mainstream of Anglo-Saxon political philosophy, there are practically no references to personalistic philosophers. Is personalism exhausted as a philosophy or political (...) ideology? Yes and no. Paul Ricoeur, writing in Esprit , summed up the situation like this: “personalism is dead”, but he was careful to mention a “return of the person”. Indeed, no tradition or movement can simply perpetuate itself. It must, in order to continue making history, always abolish itself as a `system' so as to make room for the unsaid and the unthought in its tradition, an idea that Mounier also fervently believed in.To better situate the current discussion of personalism, however, it is necessary to look back to the original characteristics of personalism in the Thirties. As a response to the crisis provoked by the economic depression, failing democracy and existential uncertainty, there arose in France a number of `non-conformist movements' who labelled themselves personalistic. They did not constitute a unified movement with a commonly shared theory. It was rather a collection of `personalisms'. The article by the historian Christian Roy about the ecological personalism of Bernard Charbonneau and Jacques Ellul sheds interesting light on the multiple origins of French personalism, which is all too easily identified with the work of Maritain and Mounier alone. The work of Jacques Maritain, and the network of writers and artists surrounding him, undoubtedly remains a significant historical reference point when speaking of personalism.Another group was formed around Alexandre Marc who, along with Raymond Aron, Arnaud Dandieu, Daniel-Rops and Denis de Rougemont, kept the journal Ordre Nouveau alive for five years . They elaborated the idea of federalism as a way out of liberalism and totalitarianism. The most important and durable group, however, was formed by the movement and journal Esprit, founded in 1932 by Emmanuel Mounier and George Izard. In order to stress the historical importance of Esprit, we are including here a testimony from 1982, written by Paulette Mounier, the founder's wife, in which she looks back on 50 years of Esprit. After the war, some new and related groups formed, such as Economy and Humanism around Louis-Joseph Lebret. An historical survey of the dissemination of personalistic centres and movements, not only in France but over all of Europe, would be material for a stimulating historical research project. In this issue, there will also be mention of, among others, the Prague personalism of Jan Patocka and Vaclav Havel, the Leuven personalism of Louis Janssens, and the Polish personalism of Tadeusz Mazowiecki and others. But this list is far from exhaustive.What unites these various branches of the personalistic tree? It is a certain conception — or better perhaps: a certain attitude to the human person. Personalists were not seeking in the first instance a new academic theory about the person, but rather a practical philosophy of engagement. In the Thirties, quite a few personalists finished their university studies and chose not for an academic career but for non-conformist, demanding and vulnerable commitments with limited financial means. What motivated them? Primarily a strong sense that the time in which they were living was a turning point, one which was being ignored by the academic world. They interpreted the diverse economic, political and cultural crisis phenomena as symptoms of a more global crisis of civilization which demanded a response through radical change.Hence a certain rhetoric of a `new order', `spiritual revolution', `radical reform' and `rebirth'. But the rhetoric was supported by innovative ideas regarding political federalism, the third way economy and human alienation. The motivation for all this derived from a strong commitment to defend the concrete human person against the arrogance of systems, bureaucracies and ideologies, while at the same time avoiding the pitfalls of individualism — the reason why some personalists always qualified personalism as `communitarian'.In fact, much of what presents itself as communitarian philosophy today is a retrieval of personalistic themes from the Thirties applied to the current situation, a situation which is also interpreted by communitarians as a global cultural crisis. One should not forget, however, that alongside and sometimes opposed to the communitarian theme with its call to bring people back to their communitarian roots, personalists underscored the priority of metaphysics over politics, a theme that can likewise be found in the writings of personalistic dissidents in Eastern Europe. In the words of Mounier in Qu'est-ce que le personnalisme : “personalism combines faith in a certain human absolute with a progressive historical experience”.To what extent is personalistic thinking still relevant today? Its current relevance will be examined in three ways. In the first section, a number of articles are presented which illustrate the active presence of personalistic thought in the domains of politics and applied ethics. Vaclav Havel sent one of his recent addresses in which he links the theme of human rights with that of a world spirituality. His article is preceded by an introduction by Guido Van Heeswijck, situating Prague personalism.The need for an orientational philosophy of the person is not only manifest today in the political arena. Developments in economics, ecology, health care, the media, technology and in the world of the professions have had an extraordinarily large impact on the human person's lifeworld. The whole area of applied ethics requires a dynamic and orientational concept of the person. The contributions by Paul Schotsmans and Luk Bouckaert are seeking a personalistic point of departure for applied ethics. The more historical article by Christian Roy on ecological personalism has been included in the first section because it can be inspiring for an environmental ethics.The second section is more philosophical. To what extent does the `personalistic' conception of the person put forward in the Thirties still have any relevance today, following the waves of structuralism, post-structuralism and postmodernism? Paul Ricoeur's article, Approaching the Human Person — originally published in Esprit in 1990 and now translated for the first time — can be seen as a reference text. Ricoeur shows in what sense the concept of the person must be broadened in order to continue functioning. The person as `narrative identity' can only write history through the medium of language and institutions. Starting from very different assumptions, the articles by Louis Janssens & Joseph Selling and the analysis of Roland Breeur also explore the idea that a person is what he is only when his identity is opened up, touched by an exteriority or conceived as a focal point . It is this radical openness and vulnerability that gives the person its historical and transcendent dynamic, and prevents us from encapsulating it in existing systems, theories and power relations. The connection with Emmanuel Levinas and his hermeneutic of the idea of the infinite is an obvious one to draw.The third section contains a historical survey in which a number of active `personalistic' centres and journals are presented.Various European centres that appeal explicitly to some form of personalistic thinking were posed the following questions: What is the main historical reference to personalism at your centre? and How do you implement, today, a personalist credo in your work? John Dick organized the responses to these questions under a number of headings. This survey aims to provide not so much an exhaustive but a representative picture of the ways in which European personalism lives on as a mosaic of centres engaged in everyday history. (shrink)

La réception française d’Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936), au début du xxe siècle, s’inscrit tout d’abord au cœur des débats épistémologiques autour de la constitution des sciences historiques et des sciences sociales, ainsi que l’atteste la controverse entre Paul Lacombe et Alexandru Dimitri Xenopol. Le second volet de la réception de Rickert en France concerne la philosophie des valeurs et le lien qu’elle entretient avec les positions épistémologiques défendues par le néokantien de Bade. L’étude de cet aspect de la réception se (...) fera à partir de la lecture qu’en proposent Georges Gurvitch d’une part, et Raymond Aron d’autre part, tous deux formulant, à leur manière, une accusation visant le formalisme de la théorie rickertienne des valeurs. Si les discussions philosophiques des positions du philosophe allemand sont assez rares, elles constituent néanmoins un révélateur pertinent des débats qui animaient la philosophie et les sciences historiques et sociales de l’époque. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:diacritics 34.2 (2006) 3-13 [Access article in PDF] Biographical Illusion and Methodological Reality Leland De La Durantaye Pierre Bourdieu. Esquisse Pour Une Auto-Analyse. Paris: Raisons d'Agir, 2004. 1 Like his student and friend Nietzsche, Jacob Burckhardt often stressed the necessity for a scholar to work in solitude. Like Nietzsche, he also possessed a gift for acidic analogy and likened the world of academia to a group of dogs sniffing (...) one another.Few observers of the academic interactions of his time had such sharp senses as Pierre Bourdieu, and few have been as torn between solitary reflection and communal exchange. Trained by France's most elite academic institutions (such as the celebrated Parisian lycée Louis-le-Grand and the even more celebrated École Normale Supérieure), Bourdieu was grateful for the opportunities that this training afforded him. And he felt that this gratitude could best be repaid by submitting those elite academic institutions and their insular world to an unsparing critique, to unveiling the distance that separated their stated ideals from their real effects.Like Bergson and Jaurès, like Sartre and Aron, like Foucault and Derrida, Bourdieu studied that which was most difficult and most prestigious where it was most difficult and prestigious: philosophy at the École Normale Supérieure. Like those famous fellow alumni, he was a brilliant student, and like them, he longed to distinguish his personal vision from those around him. This led him to do something surprising, something that, despite their separate and significant dissatisfactions with the philosophy of their day, neither Bergson nor Sartre, neither Foucault nor Derrida ever did: he abandoned philosophy. He left what he saw as the intellectual royal road for the most pedestrian of paths—that of sociology.As he often reminded his readers, sociology was in a sorry state when he entered it. Both in academic appraisal and the popular imagination, it was considered dry and provincial. It was thought to have no true intellectual adventure in it—nothing of the ethnologist tramping through the rain forests of the Amazon, nothing of the lone philosopher working through the night on an opus to end metaphysics. It was laborious and abstract; it dealt in statistical generalities. Bourdieu repeatedly described sociology as "the pariah of disciplines."1 He had, however, a special mission for it in mind. [End Page 3]In Bourdieu's posthumous memoir Esquisse pour une auto-analyse, published in February 2004—two years after his death—by the small publishing house he helped found, Raisons d'Agir, he notes how, "a bit as a joke," he had often defined himself as "the leader of a liberation movement aiming to free the social sciences from philosophy's imperialism" [94].2 From early on in his career, he had wished to revolt against the "empire of the total philosopher"—an empire reigned over by, more than any other, Jean-Paul Sartre [cf. 25].3 Looking back upon this decisive period of his development, Bourdieu goes so far as to state that the shaping of his identity was done "against everything which the Sartrian enterprise represented for me" [37]. In historical accounts, Sartre is often given as counterfigure his friend and fellow normalien Raymond Aron. In his Esquisse, Bourdieu proposes a different, and less conventional, counterfigure for the imperial philosopher: the brilliant Austrian satirist and cultural critic Karl Kraus. Bourdieu notes the particular affection he had always felt for Kraus and attributes it to the latter's singular capacity for "critical reflectivenesss" [37]. Subtly, and appropriately, Bourdieu follows this remark with something that occurs nowhere else in his memoir: an epigram (the composing of which Kraus excelled in). Bourdieu writes: "there are a great many intellectuals who question the world, but there are very few intellectuals who question the intellectual world" [37]. The remark could not more compactly and precisely reflect what Bourdieu had aspired all his life to do: to excel in the art and science of questioning the intellectual world. 2 Leo Spitzer liked to cite Friedrich Gundolf's dictum "Methode ist Erlebnis" (method is lived experience). Nearing the end of his career... (shrink)

Il est cinq heures, le cours est terminé? sont les dernières paroles prêtées à Henri Bergson sur son lit de mort début janvier 1941 à Paris.00Avec Bergson disparaissait ± le dernier grand nom de l'intelligence européenne? (Paul Valéry). Né au milieu du siècle précédent, Bergson avait suivi un itinéraire à nul autre pareil qui le conduisit des salles obscures d'une pension israélite à Paris où ses parents l'avaient abandonné enfant, aux cimes éblouissantes de l'École normale supérieure, de l'agrégation de (...) philosophie, du Collège de France, de l'Académie française et du Prix Nobel de littérature, en laissant derrière lui une oeuvre magistrale nimbée, comme d'une poussière d'étoiles, d'honneurs, de distinctions, de récompenses et de titres.00Ascension vertigineuse, qui porta Bergson à l'apogée de la gloire et même de cette ± rallonge bizarre de la gloire qu'est la légende? (Thibaudet), mais qui s'acheva dans la désolation d'une nuit d'hiver où la France qu'il chérissait tant, s'enfonçait dans la honte de la collaboration et de la persécution des Juifs dont il ne voulut pas se désolidariser en renonçant à une conversion catholique annoncée.00Plus de quatre-vingts ans après sa disparition, la figure de Bergson s'est estompée comme sur ces vieilles photographies qui avec le temps ne laissent voir que des silhouettes fantomatiques.00Il est cinq heures, le cours est terminé veut replacer dans la lumière celui que Raymond Aron sacrait ± le plus français des philosophes?. (shrink)

Lauréat du Grand Prix de Philosophie de l'Académie française, Vincent Descombes est aujourd'hui Directeur d'études à l'EHESS et membre du Centre de recherches politiques Raymond Aron. Il est l'un des rares philosophes français à s'inscrire dans le courant de la philosophie analytique, mouvement qui place la question du langage au centre de sa réflexion. Que savoir? Comment dire? Telles sont les questions que n'aura de cesse de poser le philosophe analytique. Ces entretiens avec Philippe de Lara, maître de conférences (...) à l'université Panthéon Assas, permettront aux non-spécialistes de découvrir l'essentiel de sa pensée. Vincent Descombes revient sur son parcours aux côtés de Paul Ricoeur, sa rencontre intellectuelle avec Russell, et dégage sa méthode conceptuelle, avant d'exposer et d'approfondir les questions qu'il aborde dans ses oeuvres, celle de l'identité, les rapports entre politique et langage... (shrink)

Philosophy and history (with Jean Hyppolite) -- Philosophy and science (with Georges Canguilhem) -- Philosophy and sociology (with Raymond Aron) -- Philosophy and psychology (with Michel Foucault) -- Philosophy and language (with Paul Ricœur) -- Philosophy and truth (with Jean Hyppolite, Georges Canguilhem, Raymond Aron, Michel Foucault, Paul Ricœur, Alain Badiou and Dina Dreyfus) -- Philosophy and ethics (with Michel Henry) -- Model and structure (with Michel Serres) -- Teaching philosophy through television (with excerpts from Jean (...) Hyppolite, Georges Canguilhem, Raymond Aron, Michel Foucault and Paul Ricœur. Alain Badiou by telephone and Dina Dreyfus in the studio). (shrink)

El artículo analiza el impacto de la Revolución húngara de 1956 en el pensamiento político de Claude Lefort desde sus comienzos como intelectual y militante de una organización revolucionaria hasta su consagrada teorización acerca de la democracia en contraposición con el totalitarismo. Para ello, el artículo reconstruye los rasgos principales de la Revolución húngara y recoge tres interpretaciones del suceso —la de Jean Paul Sartre, Raymond Aron y Hannah Arendt— a fin de contrastarlas con la de Claude Lefort; (...) también, con idéntico fin, indaga las discrepancias en el seno de Socialisme ou barbarie ocasionadas como consecuencia del acontecimiento húngaro. En el plano teórico-político, el artículo pretende mostrar la relación estrecha entre democracia, revolución y emancipación en la noción de democracia salvaje movilizada por Lefort, revelando la existencia de un hilo conductor entre la ponderación lefortiana de la Revolución húngara y dicha noción crucial. (shrink)

Phenomenology and philosophy of mind can be defined either as disciplines or as historical traditions—they are both. As disciplines: phenomenology is the study of conscious experience as lived, as experienced from the first-person point of view, while philosophy of mind is the study of mind—states of belief, perception, action, etc.—focusing especially on the mind–body problem, how mental activities are related to brain activities. As traditions or literatures: phenomenology features the writings of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, (...) Roman Ingarden, Aron Gurwitsch, and many others, while philosophy of mind includes the writings of Gilbert Ryle, David Armstrong, Hilary Putnam, Jerry Fodor, Daniel Dennett, John Searle, Paul Churchland and Patricia Smith Churchland, and many others. Historically, philosophy of mind has been considered part of the wider tradition called analytic philosophy, while phenomenology has been considered part of the wider tradition called continental philosophy. But all that is changing as we write, and the present volume is designed to express the change. (shrink)

This collection of more than two dozen essays by philosophy scholars of international repute traces the profound impact exerted by Husserl’s Meisterwerk, known in its shortened title as Ideen, whose first book was released in 1913. Published to coincide with the centenary of its original appearance, and fifty years after the second book went to print in 1952, the contributors offer a comprehensive array of perspectives on the ways in which Husserl’s concept of phenomenology influenced leading figures and movements of (...) the last century, including, among others, Ortega y Gassett, Edith Stein, Martin Heidegger, Aron Gurwitsch, Ludwig Landgrebe, Dorion Cairns, Simone de Beauvoir, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jacques Derrida and Giles Deleuze. -/- In addition to its documentation and analysis of the historical reception of these works, this volume also illustrates the ongoing relevance of the Ideen, offering scholarly discussion of the issues raised by his ideas as well as by the figures who took part in critical phenomenological dialogue with them. Among the topics discussed are autism, empathy, the nature of the emotions, the method and practice of phenomenology, the foundations of ethics, naturalism, intentionality, and human rights, to name but a few. Taken together, these specially commissioned original essays offer an unrivaled overview of the reception of Husserl‘s Ideen, and the expanding phenomenological enterprise it initiated. They show that the critical discussion of issues by phenomenologists continues to be relevant for the 21st century. (shrink)

The Reformed Ecumenical Synod has published a Testimony on Human Rights written by a team of twenty-two Christian scholars from various areas of the world. Paul G. Schrotenboer has produced this pre'cis, selecting key passages from the full 160 page report, which is published by the RES Secretariat, 1677 Gentian Drive S.E., Grand Rapids, Michigan, USA 49508, $8.00 post paid. The numbers in brackets refer to pages in the full report.

Georges Seurat, one of the most popular and admired of post-Impressionist painters, has been the focus of much attention in recent years. This book by Paul Smith views the artist in a new context and explodes some of the myths that have grown up about him. Challenging the assumption that Seurat's work was scientific or that it expressed a serious commitment to anarchism, Smith instead traces the painters involvement with the various factions of the avant-garde and shows that he (...) was perhaps the earliest exponent of Idealism in modern art. Smith studies contemporary interpretations of Impressionism and analyzes how the groups surrounding Seurat constructed meaning from his art. From this investigation he creates a portrait of Seurat as one who was willing to accept, even encourage, interpretations of his art that he may not have intended. Smith shows, for example, that the "scientific" account of Seurat's color first developed by Félix Fénéon actually represents the theory and practice of Pissaro. He examines Seurat's involvement with anarchist critics and concludes that he merely posed as a painter with left-wing sympathies in order to benefit from the publicity these writers gave him. He explains that Seurat was sympathetic to Symbolism from its very inception and that he and his early Symbolist critics developed a theory of his art that was founded on Schopenhauer and Wagner's ideas on art. And he explores the ways that Seurat focused on the musicality of art and on incorporating certain "musical" features in his work. Beautifully illustrated and engagingly written, this book presents a convincing new interpretation of the work of a major artist. (shrink)

Noam Chomsky and Frances Egan argue that David Marr’s computational theory of vision is not intentional, claiming that the formal scientific theory does not include description of visual content. They also argue that the theory is internalist in the sense of not describing things physically external to the perceiver. They argue that these claims hold for computational theories of vision in general. Beyond theories of vision, they argue that representational content does not figure as a topic within formal computational theories (...) in cognitive science. I demonstrate that Chomsky’s and Egan’s claims about Marr’s theory are false. Marr’s computational theory contains a mathematical theory of visual content, based on empirical psychophysical evidence. It also contains mathematical descriptions of distal physical surfaces and objects, and of their optic projection to the perceiver. Much computational research on vision contains these types of intentional and externalist components within the formal, mathematical, theories. Chomsky’s and Egan’s claims demonstrate inadequate study and understanding of Marr’s work and other research in this area. Computational theories of vision, by containing empirically based mathematical theories of visual content, to this extent present naturalizations of semantics. (shrink)

This article combines an appreciation of several themes in Josh Reeves's Against Methodology in Science and Religion: Recent Debates on Rationality and Theology while arguing in favor of critical realism. The author holds that critical realism manages to combine the objective truth reached through inference and especially cognitive acts of judgment as well as the various, contingent historical contexts that also define where science is practiced. Reeves advocates a historical perspective, but this article claims that in order for critical realism (...) to be credible, a philosophical perspective must be maintained. (shrink)

This dissertation explores the dialectic of thought and existence implicit in the human person's task of self-constitution as both a knower and a chooser. By way of comparative interpretation and critical analysis of the thought of Soren Kierkegaard and Bernard Lonergan, it argues for the complementarity of cognitional and existential praxis and adumbrates the possibility of an intellectualist existentialism. ;The Kierkegaardian polarization of thought and existence is situated within the context of a polemic against Hegelian holism and its totalizing aspirations. (...) Not only does Hegelian speculation attempt to reduce Christianity to a mere philosophical theory, it also absentmindedly yet oppressively neglects the ethical and religious exigencies of the concretely existing individual. ;In Lonergan's account of the dynamism of conscious intentionality , there is found support for Kierkegaard's critique of speculative aestheticism. There occurs not only a clear differentiation between knowledge and decisiveness, but also an affirmation of the primacy of conscience. In the full expansion of this dynamism, the cognitional is sublated by the existential; immanent exigencies of intelligence are preserved, yet knowing is to be contextualized within a wider horizon of concern for actualizing the good. Hence Lonergan's intellectualism offers the possibility of re-integrating thought and existence; it is an alternative both to anti-intellectual existentialism and to anti-existential rationalism. ;The task of self-appropriation, which is the core of Lonergan's philosophy, is complementary to the Kierkegaardian retrieval of existential subjectivity. Full self-appropriation involves both self-knowledge and self-choice. Yet self-appropriation, unlike Kierkegaardian and later existentialism, also reveals how objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity. Lonergan avoids, as Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus does not, a denigration of objectivity and theoretical knowing. ;On grounds of performative self-contradiction, an objection is raised concerning existentialism's tendency to view objectivity in a merely pejorative manner. Theoretical knowing is more relevant to ethico-religious existence and to the actualization of personalist values than is commonly realized. A normative notion of objectivity is a necessary condition for the possibility of an ethics of historical authenticity. (shrink)

Constellations, Volume 28, Issue 3, Page 447-449, September 2021.

Reply to a commentary by Felicitas Holzer and Ignacio Mastroleoon “Models of Consent to Return of Incidental Findings in Genomic Research.”.