The logic of ‘being informed’ gives a formal analysis of a cognitive state that does not coincide with either belief, or knowledge. To Floridi, who first proposed the formal analysis, the latter is supported by the fact that unlike knowledge or belief, being informed is a factive, but not a reflective state. This paper takes a closer look at the formal analysis itself, provides a pure and an applied semantics for the logic of being informed, and tries to find out (...) to what extent the formal analysis can contribute to an information-based epistemology. (shrink)

What is it to see the world, other people, and imagined situations as making personal moral demands of us? What is it to experience stories as speaking to us personally and directly? Kierkegaard's Mirrors explores Kierkegaard's answers to these questions, with a new phenomenological interpretation of Kierkegaardian 'interest'.

Auch in der katholischen Kirche nimmt ein Lagerdenken zu: eine "moderne", "linke" Seite gegen eine "konservative", "traditionalistische". Becker zeichnet nach, wie sich die Kontroverse um die zugrunde liegenden ungleichen Wahrheitsverstandnisse durch die europaische Philosophiegeschichte zieht. Er nimmt so der innerkirchlichen Polarisierung die Scharfe und zeigt, wie das vorherrschende relativistische Wahrheitsverstandnis mit dem Wahrheitsanspruch der christlichen Botschaft vereint werden kann.

Geometric underdetermination (i.e., the underdetermination of the geometric properties of space and time) is a live possibility in light of some of our best theories of physics. In response to this, geometric conventionalism offers a selective anti-realism, refusing to assign truth values to variant geometric propositions. Although often regarded as being dead in the water by modern philosophers, in this article we propose to revitalise the programme of geometric conventionalism both on its own terms, and as an attractive response to (...) the above-mentioned live cases of geometric underdetermination. Specifically, we (1) articulate geometrical conventionalism as we conceive it, (2) anticipate various objections to the view, and defend it against those objections, and (3) demonstrate how geometric conventionalism plays out in the context of a wide variety of spacetime theories, both classical and relativistic. (shrink)

By way of essays and a selection of primary sources in parallel text, Biography, Historiography, and Modes of Philosophizing provides an introduction to a vast, significant, but neglected corpus of early modern literature: collective biography. It focuses especially on the various related strands of political, philosophical, and intellectual and cultural biography as well as on the intersection between biography, historiography, and philosophy. Individual texts from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century are presented as examples of how the ancient collective biographical (...) tradition--as represented above all by Plutarch, Suetonius, Diogenes Laertius, and Jerome--was received and transformed in the Renaissance and beyond in accordance with the needs of humanism, religious controversy, politics, and the development of modern philosophy and science"--Provided by publisehr. (shrink)

Leftist political theory remains trapped between two dominant conceptions of sovereignty: the liberal conception of popular sovereignty and the decisionist conception of sovereignty as the power to declare a state of exception. This essay offers a historical critique of the liberal and decisionist conceptions of sovereignty and develops a descriptive theory of aristocratic sovereignty, which is more suited to the history and the needs of radical political theory and praxis. By tracing the genealogy of sovereignty through early modern European political (...) thought to the founding of the United States, this essay reveals the debilitating shortcoming of notions of sovereignty derived from both Carl Schmitt and the liberal tradition and provides a basis for a distinctively radical analysis of the sovereign aristocracy in Amerika. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to state the single most powerful argument for use of a non-classical logic in quantum mechanics. In outline the argument is the following. The working logic of a science is the logic of the events and propositions to which probabilities are assigned. A probability should be assigned to every element of the algebra of events. In the case of quantum mechanics probabilities may be assigned to events but not, without restriction, to the conjunction of (...) two events. The conclusion is that the working logic of quantum mechanics is not classical. The nature of the logic that is appropriate for quantum mechanics is examined. (shrink)

“I have but one language—yet that language is not mine.” This book intertwines theoretical reflection with historical and cultural particularity to enunciate, then analyze this conundrum in terms of the author’s own relationship to the French language. The book operates on three levels. At the first level, a theoretical inquiry investigates the relation between individuals and their “own” language. It also explores the structural limits, desires, and interdictions inherent in such “possession,” as well as the corporeal aspect of language and (...) the question of the “countability” of languages. At the second level, the author testifies to aspects of his acculturation as an Algerian Jew with respect to language acquisition, schooling, citizenship, and the dynamics of cultural-political exclusion and inclusion. At the third level, the book is comparative, drawing on statements from a wide range of figures, from the Moroccan Abdelkebir Khatibi to Franz Rosenzweig, Gershom Scholem, Hannah Arendt, and Emmanuel Levinas. Since one of the book’s central themes is the question of linguistic and cultural identity, its argument touches on several issues relevant to the current debates on multiculturalism. These issues include the implementation of colonialism in the schools, the tacit or explicit censorship that excludes other languages from serious critical consideration, the investment in an ideal of linguistic purity, and the problematics of translation. The author also reveals the complex interplay of psychological factors that invests the subject of identity with the desire to recover a “lost” language of origin and with the ambition to master the language of the colonizer. (shrink)

Over the last two decades, the various attempts to “radicalize” Levinas have resulted in two interesting and often separated debates: one the one hand, there is the debate regarding the relationship between Levinas and colonialism and racism, and on the other hand, there is the debate regarding the relationship between Levinas and Judaism. Whether scholars interested in issues of colonialism disregard Levinas's Judaism or use his "subaltern" identity to challenge European hegemony, they do not take seriously the Jewish content of (...) Levinas's thought. In this essay, I challenge the prevailing postcolonial orinetation of the Levinas-colonialism conversation, approaching Levinas's phenomenology from an anticolonial perspective. I will use Frantz Fanon’s dualistic understanding of the colonial world to evaluate the adequacy of Levinas’s phenomenology in describing the ontological structure of the colony and the historical experience of the colonized within it. Levinas’s incomplete understanding of the Holocaust as colonialism contributes to his failure to recognize the dividing line of colonial ontology, the zone of nonbeing, the non-human status of the colonized, and ultimately contributes to the insufficiency of his phenomenology to describe the colony. Because my purpose is not to reject Levinas’s thought in general but to encourage a new approach to his work, in the conclusion I will gesture toward the need for an anticolonial reading of Levinas’s project for Jewish education. (shrink)

The Polymath Project is an online collaborative enterprise that was initiated in 2009, when Timothy Gowers asked whether and how groups could work together to solve mathematical problems that “do not naturally split up into a vast number of subtasks.” Gowers proposed to answer this question himself by actually trying to set up such a collaboration, based on interactions taking place in the comment-threads of a series of posts on a WordPress blog. Hence, the first project officially started in early (...) 2009, to be proclaimed successful only 6 weeks later (Gowers and Nielsen 2009). From its inception until April 2018, 15 more Polymath problems (and a handful of smaller or related ones) have been launched. These projects have attracted attention from different scholarly communities, including the philosophy of mathematical practices, from the perspective of which the Polymath Project can be seen as a vast repository of mathematics in action. This chapter continues previous work by its authors on the topic in question and topics related. More specifically, for the purposes of this volume, it is our aim to both summarize and expand upon these earlier contributions. The starting point is the above observation that in the past decade, the issue of “massively collaborative mathematics” (to be qualified below) has drawn quite some attention. However, does it also warrant intensive philosophical attention in particular? For, as exciting as these developments might be from mathematical and other points of view, the enhanced possibilities that have come with it do not per se give rise to any philosophical import. In Van Bendegem (2011), one of us has indeed tentatively argued for the philosophical relevance of these new dynamics of proof construction flowing from the wide availability and efficiency of Internet technology. We shall below briefly rehearse and update the argument given there. (shrink)

One prominent welfarist axiology, critical-level utilitarianism, says that individual lives must surpass a specified ‘critical level’ in order to make a positive contribution to the comparative status of a given population. In this article I develop a new dilemma for critical-level utilitarians. When comparatively evaluating populations composed of different species, critical-level utilitarians must decide whether the critical level is a universal threshold or whether the critical level is a species-relative threshold. I argue that both thresholds lead to a range of (...) axiological puzzles and objections as yet undiscussed within the literature, and therefore conclude that critical-level utilitarianism should not be taken as a morally plausible welfarist axiology. I show that certain competitive formulations of critical range utilitarianism are subject to the argument too, and that further attempts to relativise critical levels to a particular group or category of welfare bearer are unsustainable. (shrink)

This paper explores themethodological consequences of AmericanPragmatism for the social sciences. It alsocriticises some rival perspectives onmethodology of social research, in particularfalsificationist, realist and someanti-naturalist views. It is argued thatAmerican Pragmatism shows striking affinitieswith the genealogical method of history and thereflexive turn in cultural anthropology. It isalso argued that Pragmatism forces us to thinkdifferently about the relationship betweentheory and empirical research.

Bayesian confirmation theory offers an explicatum for a pretheoretic concept of confirmation. The “problem of irrelevant conjunction” for this theory is that, according to some people's intuitions, the pretheoretic concept differs from the explicatum with regard to conjunctions involving irrelevant propositions. Previous Bayesian solutions to this problem consist in showing that irrelevant conjuncts reduce the degree of confirmation; they have the drawbacks that (i) they don't hold for all ways of measuring degree of confirmation and (ii) they don't remove the (...) conflict with intuition but merely “soften the impact” (as Fitelson has written). A better solution, which avoids both these drawbacks, is to show that the intuition is wrong. (shrink)

Die Studie handelt von Nietzsches ursprünglicher Fragestellung, Sie geht von Nietzsches Satz in der vorrede zur Genealogie der Moral "Was habe ich mit Widerlegungen zu schaffen!" aus und zeigt, wie er zu verstehen ist. Nietzsche verschiebt sowohl die Fragestellung wie die Methode des Philosophierens: von der traditionellen Frage nach der Wahrheit über die Frage nach den Werten , nach der décadence, der Moral und der Rangordnung zur Frage nach der Kultur und zur Aufgabe der "Züchtung" im Sinne einer "Erhöhung der (...) Kultur". Diese Aufgabe ist das zweite Strukturmoment von Nietzches Denken neben der Genealogie.Diese bereitet die "Erhöhung der Kultur" nur vor.The purpose of this study is to identify the original problem which organizes the whole of Nietzsche's reflection. Starting from the statement, "what have I to do with refutations!" and the analysis of its meaning, it shows that Nietzsche imposes a mutation on both the problem of philosophy and its method; he dismisses the traditional question of truth and replaces it with the problem of culture, of which the questions of values , of morals, of décadence or hierarchy are particular aspects. Consequently, the task he assigns to the philosopher is that of Züchtung, which is to be understood as "the enhancement of culture". This task appears therefore as the second dimension of Nietzsche's reflection, in addition to geneology, which merely prepares the "enhancement of culture". (shrink)

Ein rortyanischer Pragmatismus sieht sich im Kontext der Debatte um „postfaktische Politik“ mit dem Vorwurf konfrontiert, dass er mit seiner Kritik an Wahrheit und Objektivität für deren Entstehung und Erfolg mitverantwortlich ist. Nach einer Klärung der Bedeutung des Begriffs „postfaktische Politik“ werde ich darlegen wie eine rortyanische Pragmatistin diesen Vorwurf in seiner einfachen und raffinierten Variante entkräften kann. Hierbei erörtere ich die Unterschiede zwischen einer subjektivistischen und einer objektivistischen Verteidigungsstrategie und argumentiere dafür, dass die letztgenannte erfolgsversprechender ist. Abschließend skizziere ich, (...) wie eine Rezeption von Rortys Denken konstruktiv etwas zur Lösung der Probleme beitragen kann, die unter dem Stichwort „postfaktische Politik“ diskutiert werden. (shrink)

A modal logic is developed to deal with finite ordered binary trees a they are used in linguistics. A modal language is introduced with operators for the ‘mother of’, ‘first daughter of’ and ‘second daughter of’ relations together with their transitive reflexive closures. The relevant class of tree models is defined and three linguistic applications of this language are discussed: context free grammars, command relations, and trees decorated with feature structures. An axiomatic proof system is given for which completeness is (...) shown with respect to the class of finite ordered binary trees. A number of decidability results follow. (shrink)

" Je parle. Mes mots sont des pensées qui représentent. Dans leur essence même, ces pensées sont des énoncés vrais. Il est impossible en effet que ces mots qui s'imposent au nom de ma pensée puissent, dans leur évocation même, témoigner du faux. Comment l'acte de penser, dans ce qui l'institue comme énoncé encore une fois, pourrait-il m'abuser à travers ce qui constitue son acte même d'énonciation? " Que l'on ait pu parler de " mort de la métaphysique " est (...) absolument invraisemblable ; la métaphysique, en effet, n'a jamais été aussi " vivante " qu'aujourd'hui. Que l'on puisse, tout pareillement, imaginer que l'action aujourd'hui nécessaire à effectuer dans tous les domaines du savoir soit celle d'une " déconstruction " est tout aussi déconcertant ; il s'agit bien plutôt de tout l'inverse : de reconstruire. Non pas tellement de reconstruire des modes de savoir " nouveaux " mais, plus exactement, de reconstruire les questions de méthode par lesquelles nous pensons savoir. (shrink)

In his published work and even more in conversations, Tarski emphasized what he thought were important philosophical aspects of his work. The English translation of his more philosophical papers [56m] was dedicated to his teacher Tadeusz Kotarbinski, and in informal discussions of philosophy he often referred to the influence of Kotarbinski. Also, the influence of Leiniewski, his dissertation adviser, is evident in his early papers. Moreover, some of his important papers of the 1930s were initially given to philosophical audiences. For (...) example, the famous monograph on the concepotf truth ([33”], [35b]) was first given as twol ectures to the Logic Section of the Philosophical Society in Warsaw in 1930. Second, his paper [33], which introduced the concepts of co-consistency and co-completeness as well as the rule of infinite induction: was first given at the Second Conference of the Polish Philosophical Society in Warsaw in 1927. Also [35c] was based upon an address given in 1934 to the conference for the Unity of Science in Prague; C361 and [36a] summarize an address given at the International Congress of Scientific Philosophy in Paris in 1935. The article [44a] was published in a philosophical journal and widely reprinted in philosophical texts. This list is of course not exhaustiveb ut only representative of Tarski’s philosophical interactions as reflected in lectures given to philosophical audiences, which were later embodied in substantial papers. After 1945 almost all of Tarski’s publications and presentations are mathematical in character with one or two minor exceptions. This division, occurring about 1945, does not, however, indicate al oss of interest in philosophical questionbsu t is a result of Tarski’s moving to the Department of Mathematics at Berkeley. There he assumed an important role in the development of logic within mathematics in the United States. (shrink)

Heisenberg, in constructing quantum mechanics, explicitly followed certain principles exemplified, as he believed, in Einstein's construction of the special theory of relativity which for him was the paradigm for radical theoretic change in physics. These were the principles of scientific realism, stability of background knowledge, E-observability, contextual re-interpretation, pragmatic continuity, model continuity, simplicity. Fifty years later, in retrospect, Heisenberg added the following two: a principle of non-proliferation of competing theories - scientific revolutions are not a legitimate goal of physics - (...) and a principle of tenacity - existing theories are to be conserved as far as possible. The conservative as well as the revolutionary potential of these principles is then discussed. A more penetrating philosophical criticism of these principles is postponed. (shrink)

Historically, Western philosophy has struggled to accommodate, or has simply denied, the moral value of spontaneous, non-reflective action. One important exception is in the work of K.E. Løgstrup, whose phenomenological ethics involves a claim that the ‘ethical demand’ of care for the other can only be realized through spontaneous assent to ‘sovereign expressions of life’ such as trust and mercy. Løgstrup attacks Kierkegaard for devaluing spontaneous moral action, but as I argue, Kierkegaard too offers an implicit view of spontaneous moral (...) response as a regulative ideal. In attempting to articulate the model of character-formation that such an ethics requires, we can see both Løgstrup and Kierkegaard as engaging with an ancient problematic, running from Classical Daoism to medieval mysticism, of achieving spontaneity through purgation rather than edification—not building the subject up, but demolishing personality in order to become a conduit for a transcendent normativity. (shrink)