As much a doubter as a believer, Emily Dickinson often expressed views about God in general—and God with respect to suffering in particular. In many of her poems, she contemplates the question posed by countless theologians and poets before her: how can one reconcile a benevolent deity with evil in the world? Examining Dickinson’s perspectives on the role played by a supposedly omnipotent and all-loving God in a world marked by violence and pain, Patrick Keane initially focuses on (...) her poem “Apparently with no surprise,” in which frost, a “blonde Assassin,” beheads a “happy Flower,” a spectacle presided over by “an Approving God.” This tiny lyric,Keane shows, epitomizes the poet’s embattled relationship with the deity of her Calvinist tradition. Although the problem of sufferingis usually couched in terms of natural disasters or human injustice, Dickinson found new ways of considering it. By choosing a flower as her innocent “victim,” she bypassed standard “answers” to the dilemma in order to focus on the problem in its purest symbolic form. Keane goes on toprovide close readings of many of Dickinson’s poems and letters engaging God, showing how she addressed the challenges posed—by her own experience and by an innate skepticism reinforced by a nascent Darwinism—to the argument from design and the concept of a benevolent deity. More than a dissection of a single poem, Keane’s book is a sweeping personal reflection on literature and religion, faith and skepticism, theology and science. He traces the evolving history of the Problem of Suffering from the Hebrew Scriptures, through the writings of Paul, Augustine, and Aquinas, to the most recent theological and philosophical studies of the problem. Keane is interested in _how_ readers today respond to Emily Dickinson’s often combative poems about God; at the same time, she is located as a poet whose creative life coincided with the momentous changes and challenges to religious faith associated with Darwin andNietzsche.Keane also considers Dickinson’s poems and letters in the context of the great Romantic tradition, as it runs fromMilton throughWordsworth, demonstrating how thework of these poets helps illuminate Dickinson’s poetry and thought. Because Dickinson the poet was also Emily the gardener, her love of flowers was an appropriate vehicle for her observations on mortality and her expressions of doubt. _Emily Dickinson’s Approving God _is a graceful study that reveals not only the audacity of Dickinson’s thought but also its relevance to modern readers. In light of ongoing confrontations between Darwinism and design, science and literal conceptions of a divine Creator, it is an equally provocative read for students of literature and students of life. (shrink)

00 Drawing on the phenomenological tradition in the philosophy of science and philosophy of nature, Patrick Heelan concludes that perception is a cognitive, ...

Vagueness is given a philosophically neutral definition in terms of an epistemic notion of tolerance. Such a notion is intended to capture the thesis that vague terms draw no known boundary across their range of signification and contrasts sharply with the semantic notion of tolerance given by Wright (1975, 1976). This allows us to distinguish vagueness from superficially similar but distinct phenomena such as semantic incompleteness. Two proofs are given which show that vagueness qua epistemic tolerance and vagueness qua borderline (...) cases (when properly construed to exclude terms which are stipulated to give rise to borderline cases) are in fact conceptually equivalent dimensions of vagueness, contrary to what might initially be expected. It is also argued that the common confusion of tolerance and epistemic tolerance has skewed the vagueness debate in favour of indeterminist over epistemic conceptions of vagueness. Clearing up that confusion provides an indirect argument in favour of epistemicism. Finally, given the equation of vagueness with epistemic tolerance, it is shown that there must be radical higher-order vagueness, contrary to what many authors have argued. (shrink)

This paper develops a novel, neo-republican account of just state surveillance in the information age. The goal of state surveillance should be to avoid and prevent domination, both public and private. In light of that conception of justice, the paper makes three substantive points. First, it argues that modern state surveillance based upon information technology and predicated upon a close partnership with the tech sector gives the state significant power and represents a serious potential source of domination. Second, it argues (...) that, nonetheless, state surveillance can serve legitimate republican ends and so unilateral and private technological attempts to block it may be wrongful. Third, it argues that, despite the serious normative failings of current institutions, state surveillance can be justly regulated and made accountable through a legal liability regime that incentivizes tech company intermediaries to ally with civil society groups in order to safeguard the privacy rights of potential subjects of state surveillance. (shrink)

This paper lays out the moral theory of philosopher and educator Maria Montessori (1870–1952). Based on a moral epistemology wherein moral concepts are grounded in a well-cultivated moral sense, Montessori develops a threefold account of moral life. She starts with an account of character as an ideal of individual self-perfection through concentrated attention on effortful work. She shows how respect for others grows from and supplements individual character, and she further develops a notion of social solidarity that goes beyond cooperation (...) toward shared agency. Partly because she attends to children's ethical lives, Montessori highlights how character, respect, and solidarity all appear first as prereflective, embodied orientations of agency. Full moral virtue takes up prereflective orientations reflectively and extends them through moral concepts. Overall, Montessori's ethic improves on features similar to some in Nietzschean, Kantian, Hegelian, or Aristotelian ethical theories while situating these within a developmental and perfectionist ethics. (shrink)

Affective experience in nonhuman animals is of great interest for both theoretical and practical reasons. This paper highlights research by the psychologists Anthony Dickinson and Bernard Balleine which provides particularly good evidence of conscious affective experience in rats. This evidence is compelling because it implicates a sophisticated system for goal-directed action selection, and demonstrates a contrast between apparently conscious and unconscious evaluative representations with similar content. Meanwhile, the evidence provided by some well-known studies on pain in nonhuman animals is much (...) less convincing. This comparison may offer lessons for the future study of animal consciousness. (shrink)

Up to now theories of semantic information have implicitly relied on logical monism, or the view that there is one true logic. The latter position has been explicitly challenged by logical pluralists. Adopting an unbiased attitude in the philosophy of information, we take a suggestion from Beall and Restall at heart and exploit logical pluralism to recognise another kind of pluralism. The latter is called informational pluralism, a thesis whose implications for a theory of semantic information we explore.

Cette contribution se centre sur le rapport que l'on est en mesure d'établir entre la façon dont est construit un corpus de discours et les objectifs de l'analyse, ce qui explique son titre. On part des définitions larges qui sont données sur cette notion en sciences sociales et en linguistique pour montrer les problèmes qu'elle pose au regard des opérations de recueil des données, de la question de l'exhaustivité, des catégories sur lesquelles il porte, de la nature de l'outil de (...) traitement des données. Puis en on précise la différence qu'il faut opérer entre langue et discours, texte et discours, texte et contexte, distinctions sur lesquelles il faut être au clair lorsqu'on traite de corpus. Suite à ces distinctions, on montre de quelle façon la construction d'un corpus dépend d'un positionnement théorique lié à un objectif d'analyse, ce que l'on appelle une problématique. On envisage trois types de corpus selon qu'ils se réfèrent à une problématique dite cognitive, communicative ou représentationnelle. Puis on montre comment un corpus de textes s'élabore dans un jeu de déconstruction et de reconstruction selon des critères d'ouverture ou de clôture (intertexte et hypertexte), de contraste (interne et externe) et de pertinence quantitative et/ou qualitative. On termine par le renvoi à un exemple d'analyse pratiqué par le Centre d'Analyse du Discours à propos du discours d'information télévisé, afin de montrer comment on peut tirer parti de certaines de ces options, et comment elles peuvent se combiner. (shrink)

Let R(X, B) denote the class of probability functions that are defined on algebra X and that represent rationally permissible degrees of certainty for a person whose total relevant background evidence is B. This paper is concerned with characterizing R(X, B) for the case in whichX is an algebra of propositions involving two properties and B is empty. It proposes necessary conditions for a probability function to be in R(X, B), some of which involve the notion of statistical dependence. The (...) class of probability functions that satisfy these conditions, here denoted PI, includes a class that Carnap once proposed for the same situation. Probability functions in PI violate Carnap's axiom of analogy but, it is argued, that axiom should be rejected. A derivation of Carnap's model by Hesse has limitations that are not present in the derivation of PI given here. Various alternative probability models are considered and rejected. (shrink)

Cet article étudie le renouvellement de sens que Nietzsche fait subir à la notion de scepticisme. Il part de la double appréciation déroutante du scepticisme grec, loué pour la probité intellectuelle de son ephexis et critiqué simultanément comme une forme de nihilisme de type bouddhiste préservant les valeurs ascétiques, pour montrer que le scepticisme évoqué par la formule « les grands esprits sont des sceptiques. Zarathoustra est un sceptique » renvoie au « frédéricisme » ( Par-delà bien et mal ), (...) c ’ est-à-dire à une expérimentation pratique – audacieuse et dangereuse – menée sur les valeurs. (shrink)

This study argues that the notion of transparency requires reconsideration as an essence of ethical agency. It provides a brief explication of the concept of transparency, rooted in the principle of human dignity of Immanuel Kant, and suggests that it has been inadequately appreciated by media ethics scholars and instructors more focused on relatively simplistic applications of his categorical imperative. This study suggests that the concept's Kantian roots raise a radical challenge to conventional understandings of human interaction and, by extension, (...) what it means to exercise freedom. (shrink)

Central to the contemporary dispute over 'naturalizing epistemology' is the question of the continuity of epistemology with science, i.e., how far purely descriptive, psychological matters can or should inform the traditional evaluative epistemological enterprise. Thus all parties tend to agree that the distinction between psychology and epistemology corresponds to a firm fact/value distinction. This is something Reid denies with respect to the first principles of common sense: while insisting on the continuity of epistemology with the rest of science, he does (...) not wish to derive an 'ought' from an 'is', nor to reduce the epistemological to the psychological. His view is that the first principles are constitutive principles, hence that they are simultaneously descriptive and prescriptive, and thus that with regard to them there is in this sense simply no fact/value gap to be bridged. (shrink)

The central role of corporate leaders in setting the ethical tone for their organization is widely accepted. Four well known former CEOs are profiled to illustrate how their managerial ethical leadership not only influenced their firms but also the practice of business. Insights are drawn from their writings and speeches as well as other sources which examine demonstrated leadership abilities. Their behavior not only provides examples of leadership but also is exemplary from an ethical point of view. The article concludes (...) with five common themes that describe these individuals and the essence of managerial ethical leadership. (shrink)

I defend the position argued previously by Germain Grisez and me that total brain death is a valid criterion of death on the grounds that a human being is essentially a rational animal, and a brain-dead body lacks the radical capacity for rational actions. I reply to Josef Seifert’s objection that our positions rest on a reductionist view of the human person, and to other objections concerning the inter-relation between the human soul, its powers, and functions of the brain. I (...) argue that a brain-dead body lacks the material dispositions needed for having the form or soul of a human being. (shrink)

Social entrepreneurship activity continues to surge tremendously in market and economic systems around the world. Yet, social entrepreneurship theory and understanding lag far behind its practice. For instance, the nature of the entrepreneurial discovery phenomenon, a critical area of inquiry in general entrepreneurship theory, receives no attention in the specific context of social entrepreneurship. To address the gap, we conceptualize social entrepreneurial discovery based on an extension of corporate social responsibility into social entrepreneurship contexts. We develop a model that emphasizes (...) mobilization and timing as underpinnings of social entrepreneurial discovery and offer distinct conceptual aspects and theoretic propositions instrumental to future social entrepreneurship research. (shrink)

L’analyse menée par Nietzsche dans le second traité des Éléments pour la généalogie de la morale ne se heurte-t-elle pas à une sourde contradiction? Bien qu’il rejette l’idée de contrat comme modèle pour comprendre la genèse de l’État, c’est en effet sur cette notion que semble reposer toute la logique argumentative du traité. C’est sur cette tension interne que se penche le présent article, qui s’efforce de la résoudre en réexaminant le statut exact que Nietzsche prête au schéma contractuel.

Cette étude part du privilège accordé par Nietzsche au problème de la hiérarchie, et à l'idée de commandment, qui peuvent sembler de préjugés. Elle en interroge la significations et montre qu'ils se justifient pas ni par la condamnation de la croyance, ni par la valorisation du philosophe comme esprit libre, mais par la logiqu de la vie pulsionnelle, qui repose intégralement sur la relation de commandment et d'obéissance. Cette dernière est par conséquent reconnue pour la logique qui structure la réalité (...) tout entière.Die Studie geht vom Vorrang des Problems der Rangordnung bei Nietzsche und des Gedankens des Befehlens aus, die als bloße vorurteile seinerseits erscheinen können. Sie fragt nach ihrer bedeutung und zeigt, dass sie sich weder durch die Verurteilung des Glaubens noch durch die Hochschätzung des Philsophen als freien Geistes, sondern durch die Logik des Trieblebens rechtfertigen, die völlig auf dem Verhälnis von Befehl und Gehorsam beruht. Nietzsche erkennt in ihm die Logik, die Realität im ganzen strukturiert.This paper starts from the priority Nietzsche attaches to the problem of hierarchy and to the idea of command, which may seem to be prejudices. it analyzes tehir meanings, and shows their justifications are not based on the ruling out of belief, nor on the praise of the philosopher as a free spirit, but on the logic of drives, which rests wholly on the command/obedience relationship. The latter should therefore be recognized as the logic organizing the whole of reality. (shrink)

Le propos de cet article est d’interroger l’usage déroutant de la première personne chez Nietzsche, qui semble tout à la fois, en introduisant des notations biographiques, constituer une entorse à l’analyse philosophique et entrer en contradiction avec son rejet de la réalité du moi. À l’examen, il s’avère que ces textes n’ont pas pour fonction de renvoyer à une unité empirique, mais doivent se comprendre comme le signe d’un problème que la philosophie bien entendue doit affronter, à savoir le défi (...) constitué par l’aptitude à évaluer les valeurs. Sous cet angle, l’écriture à la première personne ne vise pas la mise en avant d’un modèle qu’il s’agirait pour les penseurs d’imiter, mais a pour objet, tout au contraire, de révéler la situation atypique qui confère à Nietzsche un privilège quant à l’entreprise philosophique : l’étendue du spectre pulsionnel qui le caractérise, lui permettant de connaître et d’apprécier une vaste série de conditions d’existence, de la maladie à la santé. (shrink)

Sur quelles raisons Nietzsche fonde-t-il sa critique de la vérité et quelles en sont les retombées pour la caractérisation de la pratique philosophique? La découverte d'un antagonisme entre pensée et verité établit que l'irréfutable n'est pas assimilable au vrai, et en quoi la vérité est interprétation. Se révèle alors son statut de valeur, ainsi que la logique d'incorporation dont elle relève, qui en fait un genre d'erreur devenu pour nous indispensable. À titre de conséquence, la philosophie ne peut plus se (...) comprendre comme recherche de la vérité, mais bien plutôt comme interrogation sur la valeur de cette valeur et création de « vérités » nouvelles. Le philosophe authentique, esprit libre, est alors à penser comme amateur d' énigmes, sur un modèle épicurien et non plus platonicien. What are Nietzsche's reasons for criticizing truth, and how does he understand the consequences of his position for the philosophical praxis? The discovery of the opposition of truth and thought shows that being irrefutable cannot be assimilated to being true, and that truth is interpretation. It appears therefore to be a value, a type of error which has become essential for us, linked to a process of physical-psychological absorption. As a consequence, philosophy cannot be equated with the pursuit of truth any longer ; its aim is to investigate the value of this particular value, and to create new « truths ». Being a free spirit, the genuine philosopher is to be thought of as a lover of riddles, shaped on Epicure's pattern rather than on Plato's. (shrink)

Humean instrumentalism is the view that all of one’s reasons for action are ultimately grounded in one’s antecedent desires, whatever those happen to be. According to this view, what determines which actions are rational is ultimately what the agent wants or desires, while the role of rational deliberation is to inform the agent about how to best gratify these desires. In this paper I aim to weaken commitment to Humean instrumentalism by showing that (a) the main supporting argument for HI (...) fails and that (b) Humean instrumentalism conflicts with a very plausible principle of practical rationality. (shrink)

This paper argues that it is permissible for computer scientists and engineers—working with advanced militaries that are making good faith efforts to follow the laws of war—to engage in the research and development of lethal autonomous weapons systems. Research and development into a new weapons system is permissible if and only if the new weapons system can plausibly generate a superior risk profile for all morally relevant classes and it is not intrinsically wrong. The paper then suggests that these conditions (...) are satisfied by at least some potential LAWS development programs. More specifically, since LAWS will lead to greater force protection, warfighters are free to become more risk-acceptant in protecting civilian lives and property. Further, various malicious motivations that lead to war crimes will not apply to LAWS or will apply to no greater extent than with human warfighters. Finally, intrinsic objections—such as the claims that LAWS violate human dignity or that it creates ‘responsibility gaps’—are rejected on the basis that they rely upon implausibly idealized and atomized understandings of human decision-making in combat. (shrink)

Patrick Gardiner; XII—Error, Faith and Self-Deception, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 70, Issue 1, 1 June 1970, Pages 221–244, https://doi.org/.

Employing insights from Italian sexual difference theory on law and rights, this article examines how both the text of the Italian Abortion Law of 1978 and its operation reveal the contradictions within liberal rights discourse on reproductive freedom. The Act itself contains traces of both Roman Catholic and liberal pluralist worldviews and has, since its introduction, been the site of conflict over competing notions of citizenship and legal identity. This article explores the impact of the Act's paradoxical nature on its (...) operation against the background of the complex debates within the different strands of feminist theory in Italy over the question of reproductive freedom. (shrink)

An influential body of recent work on moral psychology has stressed the interconnections among ethics, narrative, and empathy. Yet as Patrick Colm Hogan argues, this work is so vague in its use of the term 'narrative' as to be almost substanceless, and this vagueness is in large part due to the neglect of literary study. Extending his previous work on universal story structures, Hogan argues that we can transform ill-defined intuitions about narrative and ethics into explicit and systematic accounts (...) of the deep connections between moral attitudes and narratives. These connections are, in turn, inseparable from empathy, a concept that Hogan proceeds to clarify and defend against a number of widely read critiques. In the course of the book, Hogan develops and illustrates his arguments through analyses of global narratives, constructing illuminating ethical interpretations of literary works ranging from Shakespeare to Chinese drama and the Bhagavad Gita. (shrink)

As J. Baird Callicott has argued, Adam Smith's moral theory is a philosophical ancestor of recent work in environmental ethics. However, Smith's "all important emotion of sympathy" (Callicott, 2001, p. 209) seems incapable of extension to entities that lack emotions with which one can sympathize. Drawing on the distinctive account of sympathy developed in Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, as well as his account of anthropomorphizing nature in "History of Astronomy and Physics," I show that sympathy with non-sentient nature is (...) possible within a Smithian ethics. This provides the possibility of extending sympathy, and thereby benevolence and justice, to nature. (shrink)

Should all digital communication be accessible to government inspection? Is robust cryptography in the hands of the public a threat to our national security? With Dorothy Denning and Patrick Sullivan.

Bayesian confirmation theory offers an explicatum for a pretheoretic concept of confirmation. The “problem of irrelevant conjunction” for this theory is that, according to some people's intuitions, the pretheoretic concept differs from the explicatum with regard to conjunctions involving irrelevant propositions. Previous Bayesian solutions to this problem consist in showing that irrelevant conjuncts reduce the degree of confirmation; they have the drawbacks that (i) they don't hold for all ways of measuring degree of confirmation and (ii) they don't remove the (...) conflict with intuition but merely “soften the impact” (as Fitelson has written). A better solution, which avoids both these drawbacks, is to show that the intuition is wrong. (shrink)

SELF-INJURY IS A COMPLEX phenomenon that is encountered on a regular basis by health care professionals in mental health care. In this article, I use the concept of epistemic injustice to examine this complex phenomenon and argue that this helps us to understand developments in the way we think about and support people who self-injure. Individuals with lived experience have important knowledge about the nature of self-injury and particularly how it relates to them. If the credibility of this knowledge is (...) denied, for example through accusations of emotional instability, manipulation and attention seeking, then we may cause epistemic and non-epistemic harms. The former by denying the capacity for knowledge, by not... (shrink)

This is a developmental study of Wittgenstein. It is concerned exclusively with his philosophy of language and is remarkably clear and simple in contrasting the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations.

Indispensability arguments are among the strongest arguments in support of mathematical realism. Given the controversial nature of their conclusions, it is not surprising that critics have supplied a number of rejoinders to these arguments. In this paper, I focus on one such rejoinder, Melia’s ‘Weasel Response’. The weasel is someone who accepts that scientific theories imply that there are mathematical objects, but then proceeds to ‘take back’ this commitment. While weaseling seems improper, accounts supplied in the literature have failed to (...) explain why. Drawing on examples of weaseling in more mundane contexts, I develop an account of the presumption against weaseling as grounded in a misalignment between two types of commitments. This is good news to the weasel’s opponents. It reinforces that they were right to question the legitimacy of weaseling. This account is also beneficial to the weasel. Uncovering the source of the presumption against weaseling also serves to draw out the challenge that the weasel must meet to override this presumption—what is required to be an ‘honest weasel’. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The publication of Pope Leo XIII's encyclical Rerum Novarum in 1891 established a tradition of Catholic social teaching concerned with the moral obligations that should exist between capital and labour. In Ireland the encyclical instigated enthusiasm among some clergy for their congregation's welfare. An urgency given to social and economic questions coincided with the co-operative movement's introduction to the Irish countryside. Rural co-operative societies were established as part of a wider programme of economic democracy that placed ownership of production (...) in the hands of farmers. The growth of the co-operative movement benefitted from the participation of members of the clergy at both a national and local level. Co-operative organisers and socially minded priests shared an interest in addressing the iniquities of capitalist modernisation. Co-operators championed a communal form of business organisation that emphasised the moral importance of economic activity as much as its productive importance. The involvement of Catholic priests in the co-operative movement naturalised priest-led social action in the sphere of rural development. This article analyses intersections between the economic objectives of co-operation and Catholic social teaching to understand how attempts to promote a more democratic economy had a profound influence over the country's economic development. (shrink)