Cette étude est née de la remarque troublante d’un roman dans lequel un personnage relit Anna Karénine et se rend compte qu’il a tout oublié de sa première lecture : l’histoire, les émotions vécues alors, tout cela paraît n’avoir pas laissé de traces. Je me suis donc interrogée sur la nature de l’expérience esthétique et le type de souvenir qu’elle engendre. Une expé­rience peut-elle ne pas laisser de traces ? mais alors est-elle encore une expérience ? ou bien peut-on envisager (...) des traces qui ne soient pas des souvenirs disponibles, mobilisables à volonté ? et comment alors les conce­voir ? Il s’agissait donc de cerner à la fois le type d’expérience que forme l’expérience esthétique et le type de souvenirs qui s’y constituent. Partant de Husserl, l’analyse a permis de définir l’expérience esthétique comme expé­rience menée dans la neutralité, sur le mode du quasi ; ce faisant cela paraît accréditer la possibilité qu’il n’y ait pas de réels souvenirs mais seulement des quasi-souvenirs. Néanmoins parce que cette thèse reste paradoxale, j’ai cherché le moyen de concilier à la fois la neutralité existentielle de cette expérience dans l’appréhension de l’objet esthétique et la possibilité d’une affection réelle voire d’une transformation en profondeur du sujet. J’ai alors poursuivi l’examen en m’appuyant sur un texte de Roman Ingarden ( Vom Erkennen des literarischen Kunstwerks , § 24) et sur les leçons des synthèses passives de Husserl. L’enjeu de cette recherche engage donc la place et le rôle de l’expérience esthétique dans la constitution de la personnalité. (shrink)

Il s’agira ici de préciser les enjeux, les résultats et les lignes de tension de l’analyse ontologique des œuvres d’art telle qu’elle est développée par Roman Ingarden. Si en effet le programme ontologique d’Ingarden se déploie de manière large et complexe entre ontologie formelle, matérielle et existentiale, il tend aussi à absorber la phénoménologie de la conscience pure en tant que celle-ci constitue une région ontologique spécifique. À partir de ce renversement des rapports entre ontologie et phénoménologie, Ingarden élabore une (...) conception de la constitution réservée aux seuls objets intentionnels et expressément distincte de la phénoménologie génétique transcendantale. Ce faisant Ingarden rencontre sur le terrain esthétique une double difficulté et comme une double contrainte : rendre compte, d’une part, de la constitution des objets esthétiques qui ne sont pas donnés d’avance mais résultent variablement des opérations de concrétisation des divers récepteurs, et déterminer, d’autre part, les conditions de leurs valeurs, lesquelles relèvent à leur tour d’une opération de constitution soumise à variation. Nous essaierons alors d’envisager jusqu’à quel point Ingarden peut maintenir l’approche ontologique en position exclusive. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show that the notion of landscape is a phenomenological typical object and a perfect meeting point of different fields of study, and, in particular, a distinctive topic for a dialogue between phenomenology and human sciences. Starting from an analysis of a text of Erwin Straus, we attempt to support the view that into all kinds of landscape—sensory, perceptual, geographical, pictorial or built—we can read various ways of living, dwelling or being in the world, (...) or in other words we can read into them some forms of the original experience. This means that within all landscapes, as embedded in these forms of experience, we can read various ways of living, dwelling or being in the world. So we believe it is possible to constitute and to think a unitary sense of landscape from a phenomenological interpretation of space and human behaviour. (shrink)

L'espace fait partie de ces réalités quotidiennes qui, selon Georges Pérec, loin d'être des évidences, sont en fait des opacités. Opacité au sens de ce qui est toujours déjà là mais sans être jamais interrogé, sans que sa réalité ni sa nature ne soient questionnées. Pourtant l'espace est à la fois notre matière et notre forme, ce dans quoi nous vivons et ce que nous créons, ce qui nous habite et ce que nous tissons. Pour tenter d'éclairer cette réalité énigmatique, (...) nous prendrons un chemin de biais, et nous interrogerons la manière dont les différents arts (peinture, architecture, art des jardins, danse, arts plastiques) s'emparent de l'espace et nous invitent à en faire une expérience à chaque fois singulière et intrigante. (shrink)

L’article se propose de présenter la conception de la lecture défendue par Roman Ingarden. Elle est comprise comme un processus complexe entre un lecteur et une œuvre littéraire, au cours duquel le lecteur porte la responsabilité de faire exister le sens du texte, soit d’en actualiser la vérité. Cette conception trouve des prolongements et des affinités aussi bien chez Jean-Paul Sartre que chez Hans-Georg Gadamer. Tous les trois s’accordent sur le fait qu’il y a une rectitude de la lecture qui (...) trouve ses normes et ses règles dans l’œuvre mais suppose un lecteur scrupuleux et généreux, qualifié pour s’efforcer d’éviter le relativisme et le nihilisme. La lecture ainsi prise au sérieux s’avère une expérience cognitive et esthétique au service des valeurs. Elle se caractérise comme une expérience de création et de découverte au terme de laquelle la vérité est toujours l’apparition de « la chose même ». (shrink)

Le Polonais Roman Ingarden (1893-1970) est un phénoménologue disciple de Husserl à Göttingen. Leur dialogue continu représente le conflit classique entre idéalisme et réalisme, mais aussi la tension qu'est l'articulation entre la description eidétique de régions ontologiques et l'entreprise de constitution génétique du monde. Une première approche à travers quatre des textes d'Ingarden.

This handbook brings together leading international scholars to study the diverse figures, movements, and approaches that constitute Presocratic philosophy. More than a survey of scholarship, this study presents new interpretations and evaluations of the Presocratics' accomplishments, from Thales to the sophists and from theology to science.

This important book proposes a new account of the nature of language, founded upon an original interpretation of Wittgenstein. The authors deny the existence of a direct referential relationship between words and things. Rather, the link between language and world is a two-stage one, in which meaning is used and in which a natural language should be understood as fundamentally a collection of socially devised and maintained practices. Arguing against the philosophical mainstream descending from Frege and Russell to Quine, Davidson, (...) Dummett, McDowell, Evans, Putnam, Kripke and others, the authors demonstrate that discarding the notion of reference does not entail relativism or semantic nihilism. A provocative re-examination of the interrelations of language and social practice, this book will interest not only philosophers of language but also linguists, psycholinguists, students of communication and all those concerned with the nature and acquisition of human linguistic capacities. (shrink)

Abstract:This essay suggests that the word decolonial offers analytic power for feminist historians of women. As a category, it creates interpretive space for female experience beyond the elite/subaltern binary, where arguably most women live and work in the modern period. As a reading practice, the decolonial fosters intellectual awareness of social and intellectual practices that neither address the state, as in “anti-imperialism,” nor proffer counter nationalism or counter racialization as responses to coloniality. Offering examples from the archive, the media, and (...) teaching, this essay describes the decolonial as a productive site of women's agency in domains all too easily overlooked when historians focus on the conventional categories of state and nation. (shrink)

Resumo O objetivo deste artigo é interpretar o livro Dialética do esclarecimento e seus principais argumentos, considerando a dominação masculina que perpassa a racionalidade moderna. Para isso, sugere-se uma interpretação acerca do entrelaçamento entre mito e esclarecimento, durante o processo de civilização ocidental, indicando que os argumentos de Adorno e Horkheimer tomam a modernidade como um projeto fundamentalmente masculino.This article aims to interpret the book Dialectic of Enlightenment and its main arguments considering the masculine domination which permeates the modern rationality. (...) In order to do this an interpretation about the intertwining between myth and enlightenment during the process of western civilization is suggested, indicating that the arguments of Adorno and Horkheimer take modernity as a fundamentally male project. (shrink)

This paper describes the semiotic process by which parents, as attachment figures, enable infants to learn to make meaning. It also applies these ideas to psychotherapy, with the therapist functioning as transitional attachment figures to patients where therapy attempts to change semiotic processes that have led to maladaptive behavior. Three types of semiotic processes are described in attachment terminology and these are offered as possible precursors of a neuro-behavioral nosology tying mental illness to adaptation. Non-conscious biosemiotic processes in infant-parent attachment (...) are the basis for early adaptation as well as adaptation or maladaptation in adulthood. Mother-infant interaction can be described as a series of signs, each interpreted so as to dispose the behavior of the other interactant towards the goal of protecting the infant from danger and distress. Regulating arousal, scaffolding infants’ behavior in the infants’ zone of proximal development, and repairing ruptures in the interaction are crucial to infants’ development and adaptation. In semiotic terms, each person activates multiple interpretants to make meaning of sensory stimulation. Non-verbal semiotic synchrony establishes the relationship whereas shared repair of ruptures promotes change. Attachment strategies, as learned adaptations to threat, are neuro-psychological strategies for making meaning of sensory information so as to dispose protective behavior. Type A privileges cognitive-temporal information, Type C affective information, Type B has no bias. Type A and C limit semiotic freedom by using ‘short-cuts’ in processing that produce quick protective behavior in the short-term. Type B includes more representations, and thus more semiotic freedom, resulting in slower responses and long-term flexibility. Attachment strategies function as meta-interpretants for applying one semiotic process to most incoming information about danger. A, B, and C case examples are analyzed in semiotic terms. Psychotherapy can be considered a helping process embedded in a transitional attachment relationship. For psychotherapy to be successful, both somatic stabilization and a therapeutic relationship are needed. Treatment that uses scaffolded semiotic processes in each patient’s ZPD to repair moment-to-moment ruptures holds the potential to reorganize attachment strategies and transfer that potential to reflective language and relationships outside the therapy. The outcome should be greater semiotic freedom such that the individual can trust their own mental processes and use them to establish safe relationships. Language can speed the process, but premature reliance on verbal transformations of non-conscious information can carry misattributions into a second layer of misconstrued meaning and maladaptive behavior. Even when dangerous family relationships and external danger cannot be changed, patients can come to know their own minds and use information to regulate their behavior. The goal of psychotherapy is to free patients from their past by enabling them to be secure about the functioning of their own minds, so that they can both avoid eliciting harm and also establish supportive relationships. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Antiutopianism: An IntroductionPatricia McManus (bio) and Darko Suvin (bio)Utopia is endangered today! Such a sentence seems redundant: utopia—the shape of the possibility that things could be better—is always in danger. But the present danger is something distinct from the dangers that historically have attended utopia. These have not gone away but, added to them, and largely superseding utopia’s other perils in our twenty-first century, is the disappearance of utopianism (...) from the culture and politics that dominate our collective sense of any future. Politically, this is a conscious and unconscious erasure serving the interests of ecocide and the present mass killings of poverty and declared or undeclared wars. Our axiom is that the unchecked drive for profits will necessarily continue serving such interests, so that we cannot take seriously either presumed new “green” interests as today enforced, or group “identities” unless they challenge that drive.The collection of essays that make up the following “bloc” contains an argument that there is a need, political and historical, to disentangle our understanding of antiutopianism today from the overt “anti-utopianisms” of previous epochs, giving weight if not shape to the Cold War identification of utopia with authoritarianism or uniformity under the fake sign of [End Page 289] “totalitarianism.” Where such older predecessors still linger, they have been turned to face the past, as if those past models of tyranny themselves buried not just particular utopias but also the need for utopia. We now have antiutopianism as a thing in itself, antiutopianism without utopia. It deserves to be taken very seriously, without the hyphen.This argument was first put forward by Darko Suvin in the final essays of his most recent collection Disputing the Deluge (Bloomsbury, 2022). The editor of that collection, Hugh C. O’Connell, glossed Suvin’s use of the unhyphenated term “antiutopianism” as follows: “we might think of antiutopianism today as the blurring of the boundaries between a stalwart negation of all utopian thought... and the hallucinatory proclamations of the End of History accompanying the triumph of the global capitalist world system.”Following the release of Disputing the Deluge, Suvin took up a Visiting Fellowship at the University of Brighton’s Centre for Research in Narrative, History and Memory. He developed the materials for a two-day workshop on antiutopianism in early April 2023. After conversation with Patricia McManus, that workshop was titled “Antiutopia as an Enforced Dominant Horizon of Mass Culture,” and it proposed to investigate the causes and consequences of this dominance for personality and utopianism today. It adopted the TV series Game of Thrones as its concrete exemplum. The first day of the workshop was introduced by Suvin’s presentation on the theory of antiutopia(nism), with a response by Antonis Balasopulos; the second day by McManus’s reading of Game of Thrones with a response by Lazar Atanasković. All of these presentations were rewritten for this volume of Utopian Studies. We were happy with the interest generated, which ran to over seventy registrants from all over the world.Suvin’s contribution, “On Antiutopianism in Pragmatics and Narrative,” sets the scene for the interventions that follow it. It engages with two aspects of our present in some detail, the self or woebegone “personality” of late or catastrophic capitalism, and the gathering signs of “neofeudalism,” possibly issuing into a Fascism 2.0, as a way of probing the historical horizon of this capitalism.In his response on the first day, “Antiutopianism, Social Darwinism, and Self-Preservation,” Balasopoulos picked up Suvin’s focusing on the “personality” in relation to both utopia and the bourgeois revolutions. That concept is here subjected to an analysis that traces its filiations with both Social Darwinist and Marxist conceptualizations of “survival.” [End Page 290]The two essays from the second day of the workshop move from the explorations opened by Suvin and Balasopoulos to focus on analysing HBO’s hit TV series Game of Thrones. Following up a suggestion by Suvin, McManus makes the case for understanding the series as articulating antiutopianism and thriving on so doing. Atanasković, in “On the Antiutopian Effect in Game of Thrones,” examines the series’s use of an aesthetic of “Fantastic history,” and... (shrink)

Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (a major Greek city of Ionian Asia Minor), a Greek philosopher of the 5th century B.C.E. (born ca. 500–480), was the first of the Presocratic philosophers to live in Athens. He propounded a physical theory of “everything-in-everything,” and claimed that nous (intellect or mind) was the motive cause of the cosmos. He was the first to give a correct explanation of eclipses, and was both famous and notorious for his scientific theories, including the claims that the sun (...) is a mass of red-hot metal, that the moon is earthy, and that the stars are fiery stones. Anaxagoras maintained that the original state of the cosmos was a mixture of all its ingredients (the basic realities of his system). The ingredients are thoroughly mixed, so that no individual ingredient as such is evident, but the mixture is not entirely uniform or homogeneous. (shrink)

*[Intertheoretic Reduction]: ___ When a new and very powerful theory turns out to entail a set of propositions and principles that mirror perfectly the propositions of some older theory or conceptual framework, we can conclude that the old terms and the new terms refer to the very same thing, or express the very same properties. (e.g. heat = high average molecular kinetic energy) The old theory is then said to be "reducible" to the new theory.

In his later writings, Wittgenstein is generally taken as committed to anti-realism. In this paper, I argue that this is mistaken. Although he is committed to ontic anti-realism, this does not preclude his acceptance of epistemic realism. I argue that the possibility of using practices to fix meanings and to provide aframework for conceptual differentiation of our experiences rests upon a version of realism, which I call "praxial realism", which does not presuppose anything like a Kantian noumenal world.

One of the most pressing and urgent academic tasks of the day is to dismantle the persistent Eurocentrism of philosophy. In the quest to remedy the white, middle-class, heteronormative, and European biases of philosophy's initial expressions, feminist theorizing has cultivated culturally and ethnically specific forms, intersectional analyses, and global articulations. Buddhism beyond Gender and Women and Buddhist Philosophy breathe new vitality into these pursuits. Both books underscore the immense potential of the core doctrines of Buddhist philosophy, such as the nonsubstantialist (...) view of self, the nondualistic outlook, and the ontological premise of the interdependence of all beings, for overcoming Western hierarchies, reified conceptions of identity, and pernicious dichotomies. The two women represented in these books—Rita Gross herself and Kim Iryŏp, a Buddhist nun —ground philosophy in a narrative, existential journey and in their personal practices as Buddhists. In contrast with Gross's second-wave methodology and revisionist aims, Park's contribution to comparative feminist scholarship underscores the originality of Iryŏp's attempt to rethink Buddhist ideas in a contemporary feminist context. Particularly compelling is that Park unequivocally defends existential narrative as a genre of philosophy largely through an analysis of the Buddhist nun's love letters. (shrink)

While sympathetic to Tilley’s call for a practical philosophy of religion, I raise three questions: Does Tilley think that one can do philosophy of religion from a position other than that of a committed believer? Does Tilley’s description of the ordinary believer disburden most people from doubt and answerability? Does Tilley’s description of the role of the theologian place too much trust in the theologian? I suggest that some insights from contemporary phenomenology and hermeneutics would lead to a clearer understanding (...) of the role that philosophy of religion can play in the development of a practical philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Edward Mooney describes Continental philosophy of religion as “marked by labor under the shadow of Nietzsche’s death of God, under the associated threats and realities of loss of unified authors, selves, texts, and ethics, and under the loss of confidence in epistemology, ontology, and representation” . The question this anthology of nineteen essays raises is what this labor may be after the deaths of Derrida, Deleuze, Foucault, and Levinas. Is there a future for Continental philosophy of religion? What labor do (...) philosophers who are part of this tradition want to take up? The editors organize the essays to focus on three current directions and select a single guiding concept for each of these directions: the messianic, liberation, and plasticity. Each of these sections is also framed by the work of one philosopher. While this organization is helpful, the book would have benefitted greatly if the editors had developed a concluding essay for each section that pulled the essays int .. (shrink)