Le débat qui partage les partisans et les détracteurs de l'humanisme n'est pas seulement dicté par l'ampleur des événements planétaires. La question de l'humanisme est d'abord l'héritière de toute l'histoire de la pensée. Qu'il ait cependant appartenu à Martin Heidegger, à peine arraché à un temps d'inhumanité radicale, de transformer, dans sa fameuse Lettre sur l'humanisme de 1947, le simple recours aux " valeurs ", de l'humanisme en l'affaire par excellence de la pensée, constitue une énigme sur laquelle il valait (...) la peine de s'arrêter. Depuis lors, le débat sur l'humanisme a occupé la pensée française à travers les contributions majeures de Sartre, Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, Althusser, Foucault ou, récemment encore, hors de France, de Sloterdijk. Des philosophes appartenant à plusieurs générations ont voulu proposer une nouvelle lecture de la lettre fondatrice de Heidegger. On trouvera dans cet ouvrage toutes les facettes du dossier, les circonstances de la publication de la lettre, sa réception européenne jusqu'à nos jours, le débat avec la pensée de la Renaissance qu'elle implique, ainsi que les différentes voies pour dialoguer avec un texte aussi ambigu que les événements auxquels il se mesure. Bruno Pinchard est professeur à l'Université jean Moulin-Lyon 3 Ont également contribué à ce volume Pierre Aubenque, Alain Boutot, Pierre Coye, Pascal David, Emmanuel Faye, Marc Foglio, Thierry Gontier, Dominique Janicoud, jeanFrançois Marquet, Jean-François Mottéi, Rita Messori, Henri Mongis, Roger Munier, Alexis Pinchard, Alexandra Roux, Luco Salzo, Alain Séguy-Dtrclot, Jean-Marie Voysse et Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron. Themis la Titanide, née de Ciel et de Terre, incarnait chez Hésiode la figure de la Justice qui réunissait les dieux sur l'Olympe et les hommes au caeur de la cité. En un temps de dispersion du sens, "Thémis" s'ouvre à la philosophie pour recueillir ses interrogations sur notre partage commun. Au carrefour de l'éthique, de la politique, de l'art et des sciences, cette collection présente des essais originaux qui explorent les voies obscures de notre avenir à la lumiere de notre plus ancienne tradition. Repenser la philosophie à partir de ce commencement qui était, pour Hésiode, l'exigence éternelle de la justice, c'est découvrir, en un autre mode que l'éclaircie grecque, ce que donne à voir la naissance de Thémis, pF. M. (shrink)

Marx says of alienated labor that it does not “belong” to the worker, that it issues in a product that does not belong to her, and that it is unfulfilling, unfree, egoistically motivated, and inhuman. He seems to think, moreover, that the first of these features grounds all the others. All of these features seem quite independent, however: they can come apart; they share no obvious common cause or explanation; and if they often occur together, this seems accidental. It is (...) not clear, then, how Marx’s concept of alienated labor could possess the strong unity that he takes it to have. This article defends a reinterpretation of the concept that explains this unity. The various features of alienated labor, the article argues, all follow from a single, hitherto underappreciated feature of its formal motivational structure: the fact that such labor is motivated not by its product but by an incentive. (shrink)

The thesis that mental content is normative is ambiguous and has many forms. This article deals only with the thesis that normativity is connected to our mental attitudes rather than with the content of the attitudes, and more specifically with the view that it is connected to belief. A number of writers have proposed various versions of a ‘norm of truth’ attached to belief. I examine various versions of this claim, and defend it against recent criticisms according to which this (...) norm lacks normative force, that it violates the principle that ‘ought implies can,’ and that it is viciously circular. I defend the view that we should distinguish the statement of the objective norm and the way it is regulated, and that this distinction can answer most of the criticisms of the norm of truth for belief. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to examine the relationships between perceived co-worker support, commitment to colleagues, job satisfaction, intention to help others, and pro-environmental behavior with the emphasis on eco-helping, with a view to determining the extent to which peer relationships encourage employees to engage in pro-environmental behaviors at work. This paper is framed by adopting social exchange theory through the lens of ethics of care. Data from a sample of 449 employees showed that receiving support from peers triggers (...) an exchange process that encourages eco-helping among colleagues. The implications of the findings are discussed in the light of the social exchange literature. (shrink)

Ritualized behavior, intuitively recognizable by its stereotypy, rigidity, repetition, and apparent lack of rational motivation, is found in a variety of life conditions, customs, and everyday practices: in cultural rituals, whether religious or non-religious; in many children's complicated routines; in the pathology of obsessive-compulsive disorders (OCD); in normal adults around certain stages of the life-cycle, birthing in particular. Combining evidence from evolutionary anthropology, neuropsychology and neuroimaging, we propose an explanation of ritualized behavior in terms of an evolved Precaution System geared (...) to the detection of and reaction to inferred threats to fitness. This system, distinct from fear-systems geared to respond to manifest danger, includes a repertoire of clues for potential danger as well as a repertoire of species-typical precautions. In OCD pathology, this system does not supply a negative feedback to the appraisal of potential threats, resulting in doubts about the proper performance of precautions, and repetition of action. Also, anxiety levels focus the attention on low-level gestural units of behavior rather than on the goal-related higher-level units normally used in parsing the action-flow. Normally automatized actions are submitted to cognitive control. This “swamps” working memory, an effect of which is a temporary relief from intrusions but also their long-term strengthening. Normal activation of this Precaution System explains intrusions and ritual behaviors in normal adults. Gradual calibration of the system occurs through childhood rituals. Cultural mimicry of this system's normal input makes cultural rituals attention-grabbing and compelling. A number of empirical predictions follow from this synthetic model. (Published Online February 8 2007) Key Words: childhood ritual; compulsion; event boundaries; evolutionary psychology; obsessive-compulsive disorder; ritual; thought intrusion. (shrink)

Sur un sujet fort peu abordé, la thèse implicite prévaut que les femmes sont exclues des armées des cités, parce que la fonction combattante n’est pas de leur ressort. Leur exclusion proviendrait de ce qu’elles ne sont pas citoyennes et participerait de ce déni du féminin, fondateur du politique en Grèce ancienne. Cette perspective est permise, à condition de s’en tenir à une définition restreinte de la citoyenneté et, par là, de circonscrire étroitement les limites de ce qu’il faut entendre (...) par l’armée de la cité. Or l’armée de la polis n’a jamais été confinée à une cour de caserne, y compris pour les hommes, ni son déploiement ramené au champ ouvert des seules batailles hoplitiques. La notion de fonction ou de sphère combattante permet, par ailleurs, de revenir sur la définition de la cité en armes et de ce qu’il faut entendre, en bien des contextes, défensifs en particulier, par une armée civique où les femmes ont leur place. (shrink)

This article discusses the arguments against associating epistemic responsibility with the ordinary notion of agency. I examine the various 'Kantian' views which lead to a distinctive conception of epistemic agency and epistemic responsibility. I try to explain why we can be held responsible for our beliefs in the sense of obeying norms which regulate them without being epistemic agents.

Sosa takes epistemic normativity to be kind of performance normativity: a belief is correct because a believer sets a positive value to truth as an aim and performs aptly and adroitly. I object to this teleological picture that beliefs are not performances, and that epistemic reasons or beliefs cannot be balanced against practical reasons. Although the picture fits the nature of inquiry, it does not fit the normative nature of believing, which has to be conceived along distinct lines.

Le sceptique nous demande " Comment sais-tu que tu as deux mains? Peut-être rêves-tu, ou es-tu trompé par quelque Malin Génie? Peut-on même définir ce que c'est que la connaissance? Va savoir! " Lui rétorquer, comme le faisaient G.E. Moore et la tradition de la philosophie du sens commun : " Mais je sais bien que j'ai deux mains! " semble à la fois une pétition de principe et une bien mauvaise réponse. Le mieux, depuis que nous avons perdu le (...) souci de fonder nos croyance sur des raisons ultimes, serait, tout simplement, de ne pas se soucier des questions du sceptique. Ce que l'on sait dépend, nous dit-on, des circonstances, et toutes nos connaissances sont faillibles. N'y a-t-il pas plutôt des savoirs, dont l'histoire nous montre combien leurs modes de validations sont variés? Ce livre entend refuser ce type de réponse contextualiste et relativiste. Il propose de revenir à la réponse de sens commun de Moore, à partir des reformulations contemporaines des raisonnements sceptiques issues de la philosophie analytique de la connaissance. Personne ne peut nous envoyer savoir quelque chose que nous ne pourrions pas savoir. De fait, nous savons, mais notre savoir n'est pas transparent : nous n'avons pas besoin de savoir que nous savons. Pour parvenir à cette réponse, il faut replacer la notion de connaissance, plutôt que celle de croyance justifiée ou rationnelle, au centre de l'épistémologie, et reformuler des questions traditionnelles comme celles de la nature de la perception, du témoignage, et de la connaissance a priori. On peut aussi reprendre le vieux projet d'une enquête sur la nature de la connaissance en général. (shrink)

This study shows how institutional work contributes to institutional resilience in extreme operating environments. The authors draw from a longitudinal analysis of the operations of Desjardins International Development, a French Canadian nongovernmental organization that, both before and after the major earthquake of 2010, supported the implementation of cooperative banking in Haiti. Building on a unique access to DID’s internal documents as well as on 49 interviews with DID employees, the authors highlight the ways in which political, technical, and cultural forms (...) of institutional work triggered the emergence of social capital, which in turn supported the rise of new forms of institutional work that enabled institutional resilience. The results show how organizational activities focused on shaping institutions may have unintended effects that enable institutional resilience in EOEs, and demonstrate how the accumulation of institutional work by an organization contributes to the enhancement of its social capital. (shrink)

Cancer is a singular cellular state, the emergence of which destabilises the homeostasis reached through the evolution to multicellularity. We present the idea that the onset of the cellular disobedience to the metazoan functional and structural architecture, known as the cancer phenotype, is triggered by changes in the cell's external environment that occur with ageing: what ensues is a breach of the social contract of multicellular life characteristic of metazoans. By integrating old ideas with new evidence, we propose that with (...) ageing the environmental information that maintains a multicellular organisation is eroded, rewiring internal processes of the cell, and resulting in an internal shift towards an ancestral condition resulting in the pseudo‐multicellular cancer phenotype. Once that phenotype emerges, a new local social contract is built, different from the homeostatic one, leading to tumour formation and the foundation of a novel local ecosystem. (shrink)

This paper argues that the normative dimension in mental and semantic content is not a categorical feature of content, but an hypothetical one, relative to the features of the interpretation of thoughts and meaning. The views of Robert Brandom are discussed. The thesis defended in this paper is not interpretationist about thought. It implies that the normative dimension of content arises from the real capacity of thinkers and speakers to self ascribe thoughts to themselves and to reach self knowledge of (...) their own thoughts. (shrink)

the article suggests understanding(including) better the professionalization of the formative activities and the professional activities by an approach which articulates three levels of analysis: macro (historic construction and social construction of the knowledges of the activity), méso (institutional devices (plans) of training (formation) and work) and microphone(microcomputing) (lived on the subjects, the individual dynamics). This reflection leans on the presentation (display) of various processes of professionalization stemming from empirical searches (researches) realized by the author. l’article propose de mieux comprendre la (...) professionnalisation des activités formatives et des activités professionnelles par une approche qui articule trois niveaux d’analyse: macro (construction historique et construction sociale des savoirs de l’activité), méso (dispositifs institutionnels de formation et de travail) et micro (vécu des sujets, dynamiques individuelles). Cette réflexion s’appuie sur la présentation de différents processus de professionnalisation issus de recherches empiriques réalisées par l’auteur. (shrink)

Existentialist philosophy offers an understanding of how trying to eliminate ambiguities that inevitably mark the human condition only seemingly leads to freedom. This existentialist outlook can also serve to shed light on how democratic politics may similarly show tendencies which aim at overcoming immanent tensions. Such tendencies in democratic politics can be clarified using Sartre’s notion of ignorance – and truth as its counterpart. His concept of ignorance goes beyond merely facts or knowledge and refers to a mode of being. (...) It expresses a subject’s desire to avoid, rather than confront, resistances stemming from the world. Based on a distinction of different forms in which this orientation can manifest itself, this article shows how democratic politics, too, can be threatened by ignorance as a way of doing politics. This ignorance comes in different guises which all express a desire to eliminate tensions that democratic politics cannot overcome without undermining itself. (shrink)

What is the relationship between logic and reasoning? How do logical norms guide inferential performance? This paper agrees with Gilbert Harman and most of the psychologists that logic is not directly relevant to reasoning. It argues, however, that the mental model theory of logical reasoning allows us to harmonise the basic principles of deductive reasoning and inferential perfomances, and that there is a strong connexion between our inferential norms and actual reasoning, along the lines of Peacocke’s conception of inferential role.

Presumption is often discussed in law, less often in epistemology. Is it an attitude? If so where can we locate it within the taxonomy of epistemic attitudes? Is it a kind of belief, a judgment, an assumption or a supposition? Or is it a species of inference? There are two basic models of presumption: judgmental, as a kind of judgment, and legal, taken from the use of presumptions in law. The legal model suggests that presumption is a practical inference, whereas (...) the judgmental model suggests that presumption is an epistemic attitude. I argue that presumption is neither a practical inference nor a merely epistemic attitude: it involves both, within the category of what we may call the inquiring attitudes. (shrink)

This essay addresses the following questions: How does the meta-sensory function of koine aisthesis relate to its other functions? How can a meta-level arise from the immanence of sensation? Can we give an account of meta-sensation that doesn’t assume a transcendental plane? My contention is that the representationalist model doesn’t apply to Aristotle and that Aristotle offers an alternative that is worth exploring. I propose to interpret the meta-sensory power of the koine aisthesis in terms of the sensing of the (...) limits of perception. The sensing of the limit of sensation is the sensing of sensation itself qua potentiality as exemplified by Aristotle’s observations on the experience of seeing darkness or hearing silence. If it is so, sensing-that-I-sense doesn’t require an appeal to a transcendent faculty and arises from the immanent experience of sensation itself. (shrink)

P. Michon, Marcel Mauss retrouvé. Origines de l'anthropologie du rythme, Paris, Rhuthmos, coll. « Rythmologies », 2015, 130 p. Si vous désirez le livre SOUS SA FORME IMPRIMÉE, envoyez-nous un mail à [email protected]. Vous pouvez également le commander sur Amazon.fr ou sur tout autre site plus accessible pour vous. Marcel Mauss est l'un de ceux qui ont le plus fait pour la théorie du rythme au XXe siècle. Pourtant, parmi ses héritiers directs, seul Gurvitch a prolongé sa - Anthropologie – (...) Nouvel article. (shrink)

A number of writers have attempted, since Mach, Boltzman and the psychologists of the end of the XIXth century, to give an evolutionary account of logical norms. Husserl famously argued that this account fails, for it is circular. I examine here some recent accounts, based on evolutionary psychology and game theory, in particular those of Gibbard, Millikan and Cosmides-Tooby. I argue that they suffer for similar circularities, although an evolutionary account of the cognitive mecanisms which underlie logical norms is feasible.

What is the difference between analytic and Continental philosophy? That the former has not withdrawn norms of justification and truth, whereas the latter has bred suspicion about them.

Der Schutz vor Gewalt und Verletzungen ist ohne Zweifel eine der wichtigsten Aufgaben jeder Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik. Denn kein Frieden kann von Dauer sein, in dem ein solcher Schutz nicht gewährleistet wird und in dem sich Menschen vor anderen Menschen fürchten müssen. Dies gilt umso mehr für eine Auffassung des gerechten Friedens, die nicht nur vor Gewalt, sondern auch vor Not zu schützen beansprucht. Wie allerdings dieser Schutz gewährt wird, hängt weitgehend von der Auffassung von Sicherheit ab, die ihn realisieren (...) soll. (shrink)