This paper investigates the link between informational consequence and credence. I first suggest a natural constraint, namely that informational consequence should preserve certainty: on any rational credence distribution, when the premises of an informational inferences have credence 1, the conclusion also has credence 1. Then I show that the certainty‐preserving constraint leads to triviality. In particular, the following three claims are incompatible: (i) informational consequence is extensionally distinct from classical consequence; (ii) informational inferences preserve certainty; (iii) credences obey (a subset (...) of) classical Bayesian constraints. The proof is straightforward, but the theoretical implications are substantial. Informational theorists need to either give up the idea that credence applies to epistemic discourse, or develop a nonclassical theory of credence and credal update. Moreover, the result also suggests that there is a connection between informational consequence and triviality results, including classical triviality results like Lewis's. (shrink)

On an influential line of thinking tracing back to Ramsey, conditionals are closely linked to the attitude of supposition. When applied to counterfactuals, this view suggests a subjunctive version of the so-called Ramsey test: the probability of a counterfactual If A, would B ought to be equivalent to the probability of B, under the subjunctive supposition that A. I present a collapse result for any view that endorses the subjunctive version of the Ramsey test. Starting from plausible assumptions, the result (...) shows that one’s rational credence in a would-counterfactual and in the corresponding might-counterfactual have to be identical. (shrink)

It is reported that in reply to John Wisdom’s request in 1944 to provide a dictionary entry describing his philosophy, Wittgenstein wrote only one sentence: “He has concerned himself principally with questions about the foundations of mathematics”. However, an understanding of his philosophy of mathematics has long been a desideratum. This was the case, in particular, for the period stretching from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to the so-called transitional phase. Marion’s book represents a giant leap forward in this direction. In the (...) preface, Marion provides a diagnosis for why it has taken such a long time to obtain an accurate picture of Wittgenstein’s ideas in the foundations of mathematics. When the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics came out in 1956 the reception by specialists, such as Kreisel, was negative. This led many Wittgenstein scholars to set aside the issues in the foundations of mathematics and go on with the business of the day, focusing on Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language and psychology. However, these early negative appraisals were severely limited by two facts. First of all, the nature of the Remarks was a hindrance to an understanding of what Wittgenstein was up to. The book was edited by Wittgenstein’s literary executors by collating together passages from several manuscripts dating from 1937 to 1944, cutting, however, many passages in between remarks. Second, many of the original manuscripts and typescripts of the transitional phase were not available and thus it was virtually impossible to obtain a balanced picture of Wittgenstein’s development. Finally, a stark contraposition between the early and late Wittgenstein did not encourage people to work seriously on the development of Wittgenstein’s position from the Tractatus through the transitional period to the later writings. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that the interpretation of Kant's a priori in Marburg neo-Kantianism involved a historiographical problem concerning the Platonic interpretation of the history of exact sci...

The aim of this article is to tackle the sociosemiotic strategies through which the relation between power and visibility is articulated in today’s metropolitan São Paulo. Drawing on the theoretical-methodological framework of Greimasian and post-Greimasian semiotics, the following hypotheses are put forth: (1) contemporary São Paulo is characterized by a true visual hypertrophy, which manifests itself, all at once, in both its architectural and mediatic landscapes; (2) in São Paulo, power is hypervisible and apparently transparent; (3) the excess of images, (...) gazes, and perspectives produces, in São Paulo, dense and wide areas of topological, mediatic, and social invisibility; (4) the predominant visibility in São Paulo can be qualified as a “populist” visibility. Based on these assumptions, this article intends to contribute to the consolidation of a critical debate on the visual matrices of power and on social processes of exclusion and inclusion currently in place in global metropolises. Likewise, it is intended to contribute to the elaboration of a theoretical-methodological framework capable of understanding and addressing the complexity of the phenomena that characterize such debate. (shrink)

In the lively discussions on Galileo's laws of motion after the Pisan's death, we observe what might be called a new “Galilean affair.” That is, a trial brought against his new science of motion mainly by French and Italian Jesuits with the substantial adherence of M. Mersenne. This new trail was originated by Gassendi's presentation of Galileo's de motu not simply as a perfectly coherent doctrine, but also as a convincing argument in favor of the truth of Copernicanism.

[Patañjali, Yogasūtras with Bhoja’s Rājamārtaṇḍa Commentary. With an Introduction, Translation, Subcommentary and Notes by Paolo Magnone].

La struttura a livelli modella il tutto e le sue parti con grande generalità. Lo dimostrano le argomentazioni teoriche (4.3), (4.4) e (4.5), e lo comprova la casistica che è stata aggiunta. Una tale struttura non presenta affatto i problemi a), b) e c) che sono tipici della struttura ad albero. Essa corregge inoltre deviazioni concettuali che sono diffuse nel settore informatico. L’immediatezza deviazioni concettuali che sono diffuse nel settore informatico. L’immediatezza visiva, infine, ne facilita la diffusione sul piano professionale (...) e tecnico.Per concludere, ritengo che la struttura a livelli possa fornire un contributo anche alle ricerche di ontologia e in particolare possa favorire i tentativi di unificazione condotti sia sul piano teorico, sia su quello applicativo [Uschold 1996]. Le difficoltà ed i limiti che la teoria degli insiemi oppone ad un formalismo generale (ad esempio quando riduce la casistica della relazione concetto di livello possiede una valenza estremamente ampia e ciò lo predispone per gli auspicati sviluppi ontologici. (shrink)

In this study some typical aspects of human behavior are reconsidered in a new evolutionary perspective. Firstly, a theoretical paradigm is introduced, according to which animals show a natural propensity to maintain behavior far beyond the time when the triggering motivation has been removed;, these drifting conducts are defined as Vestigial Drifting Drives or. Such a paradigm is then applied to those human attitudes that once conferred an adaptive advantage on our species but have now become dysfunctional within the framework (...) of the current ecological crisis. In this context, human beings are considered the repository of VDDs that may play out as evolutionary threats. This thesis is supported by many examples and references that, hopefully, could stimulate scientific debate and further research in evolutionary anthropology, psychology, and related disciplines. (shrink)

The two theories of pancreatic enzyme secretion, those of exocytosis and transmembrane flow, are described. Data thought to support the theory of transmembrane flow of single molecules from pancreatic acinar cells are first reviewed, and the conditions which could allow these data to be explained by the theory of exocytosis of enzyme quanta, i.e. secretory granules, are then discussed.The evidence suggesting short‐term modulation of the composition of pancreatic juice is also considered, and its possible explanations at the organ and cellular (...) level are discussed, in the light of suggested theories on enzyme secretion pathways. (shrink)

L’articolo si pone il problema del perché Vico avesse pensato alla sua impresa come ad una scienza e si fosse occupato di confrontarla con la scienza della natura. Si passano in rassegna l’uso di concetti come degnità, assiomi, postulati, tenendo fermo che Vico non fu né un cartesiano, né un galileiano, e come non si lasci racchiudere nelle gabbie dell’apriorismo e del platonismo: egli ha solo fatto sue alcune idee o tesi presenti entro quelle tradizioni. Vico si guarda bene dall’effettuare (...) una scelta precisa e definitiva tra quelle realtà alle quali attribuiamo oggi il nome di razionalismo e empirismo. Si richiama contemporaneamente e negli stessi testi sia alla tradizione del geometrismo cartesiano sia a quella di Bacone e delpensiero dei baconiani del tardo Seicento, facendone un uso alquanto libero. L’articolo contiene inoltre osservazioni su Vico lettore di Cogitata et visa e di De dignitate et augmentis scientarum di Bacone. (shrink)

This volume succeeds the same authors' well-known An Introduction to Modal Logic and A Companion to Modal Logic. We designate the three books and their authors NIML, IML, CML and H&C respectively. Sadly, George Hughes died partway through the writing of NIML.

This paper aims to solve the following twofold problem. Suppose that a rational speaker, Ralph, mistakenly takes (for some reason) the Roman orator Cicero and the World War II German spy Cicero to be the same individual. By sincerely uttering the sentence “Cicero is an orator and a spy”, (a) does Ralph use the name “Cicero” of the Roman orator or the name “Cicero” of the German spy or another name of the genus “Cicero”? And (b) which Cicero does Ralph (...) refer to: the Roman orator, the German spy, both of them or neither of them? After drawing a distinction between the notion of mistaking one individual for another (exemplified by Kripke's “Jones”/“Smith” case and Putnam's “water”/“water” case) and the notion of wrongly taking two individuals to be one and the same individual (exemplified by the “Cicero”/“Cicero” case under discussion), I will defend the following solution to the last puzzling case: Ralph inadvertently creates an abstract individual playing the role of “fusion” or “amalgam” of the two Ciceros and also inadvertently creates a new name “Cicero” referring to such an individual. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to put Peano’s opinion about the unacceptability of the actual infinitesimal notion into evidence. First we briefly focus on the cultural environment where Peano’s considerations originated and developed. Then we examine Peano’s article of 1892, “Dimostrazione dell’impossibilità di segmenti infinitesimi costanti” [Peano 1892].

One of the complications of a clear evaluation of different positions called “realism” in metaphysics and ontology is discrepancy in terminology and variance of basic intuitions inherent this notion. I recommend a taxonomy that distinguishes three kinds of variance: variance in the sets of conditions for a philosophical position to be acknowledged as actual realism, variance in strength and variance in conceptual frameworks. Within this last case, I propose to differentiate realism in epistemology, in ontology, and in metaphysics, intersecting these (...) three variants with the local/global realism dichotomy. The taxonomy here provided aims at being meta-philosophical; expressive enough for a fine-grained articulation of different philosophical positions in the recent debate, including the question of metaphysical grounding; and impartial, with no need to be connected to the defense of one form or another of the philosophical positions called “realism.”. (shrink)

In Umberto Eco's semiotics, the encyclopedia is a multidimensional space of semiosis. It is a complex system of shared knowledge that governs the production and interpretation of signs inside communicative contexts. Every semiotic act involves the elements that form the encyclopedia. By means of several examples and comparisons with different semiotic theories, my paper aims to show how semiosis is governed by semantic categorizations, pragmatic rules, and narrative frames that the encyclopedia articulates and makes operative for interpreters and producers of (...) signs. (shrink)

Il libro ricostruisce la vita e il pensiero di Jean Guitton (1901-1999), il grande amico di Paolo VI, a quasi ventʼanni dalla sua morte. La vicenda umana di questo scrittore e filosofo cristiano ha attraversato quasi integralmente il XX secolo quale testimone diretto di eventi epocali: i primi tentativi ecumenici, le due guerre mondiali, le radicalizzazioni ideologiche del secondo dopoguerra, lʼera atomica e il Concilio Vaticano II. Il primo capitolo del volume è dedicato alla ricostruzione della vita di Guitton (...) e alle sue prime sintesi accademiche; ed esso fanno seguito altri due capitoli che trattano della sua antropologia (il tempo, il pudore, l'amore umano) e della sua cristologia filosofica (le condizioni di possibilità della rivelazione, la filosofia della risurrezione, la sua innovativa mariologia). Ne viene il ritratto di un pensiero di impronta umanista, ben radicato nella tradizione francese e che forse, come già lamentava Yves Congar nel 1963, non ha avuto, fino ad oggi, quellʼattenzione e quellʼaccoglienza che sembra meritare. (shrink)

SummaryThis paper defends the descriptive theory of reference against recent criticisms. Saul Kripke has argued through a series of counterexamples that the descriptive theory may assign a referent to a speaker's use of a name when there is no referent, and may assign the wrong referent, or no referent at all, when there really is a referent. These conclusions follow, however, only if the speaker is not permitted to use subordinating descriptions, by means of which he borrows his reference from (...) others. It is argued that the descriptive theory can easily accomodate the use of subordinating descriptions and, on general grounds, defend their prominence in the determination of reference. The immediate consequence is that Kripke's counterexamples do not pose a serious problem for the descriptive account.RésuméCet article défend la théorie descriptive de la référence contre de récentes critiques. Saul Kripke lui a objecté, par une série de contre‐exemples, qu'elle peut assigner àľusage d'un mot par un locuteur une référence alors qǔil ňy en a pas, ou peut lui assigner une fausse référence, ou pas de référence du tout alors qǔil y en a en réalité une. Mais ces conclusions ne sont valables que si ľon ne permet pas au locuteur ľusage de descriptions subordonnantes grâce auxquelles il emprunte sa référence à?on;autres. Ľauteur montre que la théorie de la description peut facilement scar;accommoder de ľusage de descriptions subordonnantes et défend, pour des raisons générales, leur importance dans la détermination de la référence. La conséquence immédiate en est que les contre‐exemples de Kripke ne posent plus de sérieux problémes pour la théorie descriptive.ZusammenfassungIn der vorliegenden Arbeit wird die sog. deskriptive Referenztheorie gegen kritische Argu‐mente aus neuerer Zeit verteidigt. Saul Kripke hat aufgrund von Gegenbeispielen eingewendet, dass die deskriptive Theorie bei der Verwendung eines Namens durch einen Sprecher zu einer Zuschreibung eines Referenzobjekts führen kann, wo tatsächlich kein solches vorhanden ist, und dass sie ein falsches Referenzobjekt Oder gar keines zuordnen kann, wenn wirklich eines vorhanden ist. Diese Behauptung trifft jedoch nur dann zu, wenn dem Sprecher nicht erlaubt wird, unterordnende Beschreibungen zu verwenden, mit Hilfe von welchen er seine Referenz bei andern entlehnt. Es wird gezeigt, dass die deskriptive Theorie ohne weiteres die Verwendung von unter‐ordnenden Beschreibungen einbeziehen und aus allgemeinen Gründen ihre vorherrschende Rolle bei der Bestimmung der Referenz behaupten kann. Als unmittelbare Folge dieser Auffassung ergibt sich, dass Kripkes Gegenbeispiele keine unüberwindlichen Schwierigkeiten bereiten. (shrink)