Suppose that, yesterday at noon, Maria considered flipping a fair coin, but didn't. What probability do you assign to "If Maria had flipped the coin, the coin would have landed heads"? Now suppose that, contrary to fact, Maria did indeed flip the coin. In that counterfactual scenario, what is the probability of "The coin will land tails"? The two questions sound strikingly similar. I argue that they sound similar because they are equivalent. The chance of a counterfactual "If A, would (...) C" equals the chance of C, in the counterfactual scenario that A (and a similar principle holds for credence). This principle does better than similar principles that have been defended (like Skyrms' Thesis), avoids triviality, and gives us important clues for a semantics for counterfactuals. (shrink)

Some modal expressions in language—for example, "can" and "able'"—describe what is possible in light of someone's abilities. Ability modals are obviously related to other modalities in language, such as epistemic or deontic modality, but also give rise to anomalies that make them unique. This paper develops a general theory of ability modals that is broadly compatible with standard modal semantics, while predicting their peculiar behavior. The central idea is that ability modals include reference to a notion of dependence. At the (...) level of truth conditions, "S is able to A" simply says that there is a circumstantially accessible world where S As. On top of this, a not-at-issue element requires that whether S As depends, in part, on intrinsic features of S. Differently from most analyses, this account divorces ability modals from a notion of agency. (shrink)

Logical forgetting is NP-complete as a decision problem even in the simple case of propositional Horn formulae, and may exponentially increase their size. A way to forget is to replace each variable to forget with the body of each clause whose head is the variable. It takes polynomial time in the single-head case: each variable is the head of at most a clause. Some formulae are not single-head but can be made so to simplify forgetting. They are called single-head equivalent. (...) The first contribution of this article is the study of a semantical characterization of single-head equivalence. Two necessary conditions are given. They are sufficient when the formula is interequivalent, that is, the formula makes two sets of variables equivalent only if they are also equivalent to their intersection. All acyclic formulae are interequivalent. The second contribution of this article is an incomplete algorithm for turning a formula single-head. In case of success, forgetting becomes possible in polynomial time and produces a polynomial-size formula, none of which is otherwise guaranteed. The algorithm is complete on interequivalent formulae. (shrink)

Neuroeconomics, neuromarketing, neuroaesthetics, and neurotheology are just a few of the novel disciplines that have been inspired by a combination of ancient knowledge along with recent discoveries about how the human brain works.This fascinating and thought provoking new book critically questions our love affair with brain imaging.

The COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented event entailing long-term consequences on population health and welfare. Those who contracted the coronavirus may have suffered from both physical and mental health issues that unfold the need for tailored intervention strategies. Hence, our study aims to investigate the psychological and social consequences of COVID-19 on a sample of 86 participants, encompassing 43 patients recruited from Bari University Hospital, 19 of whom were hospitalized due to the disease. The remaining 43 were individuals not fallen (...) ill with COVID-19 to date. The investigation yielded significant gender differences in post-traumatic stress symptoms, depression, and representation of interpersonal distance, evaluated through the IES-R, the BDI-II, and the IVAS task, respectively. This pattern of results was not replicated in the control group. In general, participants who reported having experienced the most intense post-traumatic symptoms also presented a greater mood deflection and, more specifically, within the clinical group women obtained the highest scores on both scales. Women reported higher IES-R and BDI-II scores compared to men, that could indicate that women who have contracted COVID-19 are more exposed to post-traumatic and depressive symptoms. Our results also showed a significant effect of COVID-19 on IPD with a tendency of disease-experienced individuals to increase their preferred IPD from adults, children, and elderly people. Regarding gender differences in mood and proxemic behavior, a correlation between depressive symptoms and probable PTSD and a further correlation between probable PTSD and greater IPD were found in women from both clinical and control group. Overall, these findings might contribute to a better understanding of gender-based implications of the current pandemic on mental health, also leading to the development of integrated yet personalized intervention strategies. (shrink)

Our commentary suggests that different materialities (fragile, enduring, and mixed) may influence cognitive evolution. Building on Stibbard-Hawkes, we propose that predictive brains minimise errors and seek information, actively structuring environments for epistemic benefits. This perspective complements Stibbard-Hawkes' view.

This paper investigates what happens when we merge two different lines of theorizing about counterfactuals. One is the comparative closeness view, which was developed by Stalnaker and Lewis in the framework of possible worlds semantics. The second is the interventionist view, which is part of the causal models framework developed in statistics and computer science. Common lore and existing literature have it that the two views can be easily fit together, aside from a few details. I argue that, on the (...) contrary, transplanting causal-models-inspired ideas in a possible worlds framework yields a new semantics. The difference is grounded in different algorithms for handling inconsistent information, hence it touches on issues that are at the very heart of a semantics for contrary-to-fact conditionals. Roughly, Stalnaker/Lewis semantics requires us to evaluate the consequent of a counterfactual at all closest antecedent-verifying possibilities. Causal-models-based semantics also does this, but in addition uses the information contained in the antecedent, together with background causal information, to shift what worlds count as closest. This makes systematically different predictions and generates a new logic. The upshot is that we have a new semantics to study, and a substantial theoretical choice to make. (shrink)

According to the orthodox account developed by Kaplan, indexicals like I, you, and now invariably refer to elements of the context of speech. This essay argues that the orthodoxy is wrong. I, you, and the like are shifted by certain modal operators and hence can fail to refer to elements of the context, for example, I can fail to refer to the speaker. More precisely, indexicals are syntactically akin to logical variables. They can be free, in which case they work, (...) roughly, on the Kaplan model. But they can also be bound: this happens, in a systematic fashion, when they are in the scope of epistemic modals or attitude verbs. The new view has two interesting philosophical consequences. First, it vindicates a broadly Fregean perspective on referential expressions, essentially refuting the idea that indexicals are rigid designators. Second, it suggests a new picture of the interaction between context and linguistic meaning: compositional semantics does not need to look at the context and hence has no need for a context parameter. (shrink)

In the last decades, Systems Biology (including cancer research) has been driven by technology, statistical modelling and bioinformatics. In this paper we try to bring biological and philosophical thinking back. We thus aim at making diferent traditions of thought compatible: (a) causality in epidemiology and in philosophical theorizing—notably, the “sufcient-component-cause framework” and the “mark transmission” approach; (b) new acquisitions about disease pathogenesis, e.g. the “branched model” in cancer, and the role of biomarkers in this process; (c) the burgeoning of omics (...) research, with a large number of “signals” and of associations that need to be interpreted. In the paper we summarize frst the current views on carcinogenesis, and then explore the relevance of current philosophical interpretations of “cancer causes”. We try to ofer a unifying framework to incorporate biomarkers and omic data into causal models, referring to a position called “evidential pluralism”. According to this view, causal reasoning is based on both “evidence of diference-making” (e.g. associations) and on “evidence of underlying biological mechanisms”. We conceptualize the way scientists detect and trace signals in terms of information transmission, which is a generalization of the mark transmission theory developed by philosopher Wesley Salmon. Our approach is capable of helping us conceptualize how heterogeneous factors such as micro and macro-biological and psycho-social—are causally linked. This is important not only to understand cancer etiology, but also to design public health policies that target the right causal factors at the macro-level. (shrink)

Quine is one of the most influential of contemporary philosophers, whose work has ranged broadly across a great number of topics and issues in a career spanning some fifty years. In this collection a group of distinguished philosophers offer a sustained critical evaluation of the full range of Quine's writings. Amongst the topics addressed are interpretation, epistemology, ontology, modality, and mathematical truth. This collection will certainly influence all future discussion of Quine. The contributors include: George Boolos, H-N. Castaneda, Donald Davidson, (...) Umberto Eco, Dagfinn Follesdal, James Higginbotham, Charles Parsons, Hilary Putnam, Barry Stroud, and Bas van Fraassen. However, Quine is given the last word, responding to the essays in the final contribution. (shrink)

If “no ought from is,” how can bioethics be empirical? Despite the widespread recognition that we can integrate empirical and normative, Hume's Law is still often claimed to pose logical limitations to empirical bioethics. Is Hume's Law a valid argument against empirical bioethics? I argue that we have reasons to answer no. First, I outline and reject two unverified assumptions: that Hume’ s Law, the fact‐value distinction, and the naturalistic fallacy are roughly the same thing, and that Hume's Law is (...) an undisputed meta‐ethical principle which dictates how to formulate normative statements. I then show how the interpretation of Hume's Law as establishing a logical gulf between facts and morality—rather than as clarifying the logical rules of normative argumentation—is dependent upon a non‐cognitivist interpretation of the Is‐Ought problem. I argue that the version of Hume's Law that stems from ethical non‐cognitivism is what is problematic for empirical bioethics. However, other interpretations are possible. We have two reasons to reject the thesis that Hume's Law is an argument against empirical bioethics. First, conflating meta‐ethics and applied ethics is problematic. Second, a non‐cognitivist interpretation of Hume's Law is likely to constitute an argument not only against empirical bioethics, but against all bioethics that claims to be situated within ethical cognitivism, be it empirical or philosophical. Lastly, I present two meta‐ethical postulates shared by empirical and philosophical bioethics. I call them: (1) the “bridge” postulate and (2) the “ethical cognitivism” postulate. (shrink)

The notion of «the common good», which is crucial for understanding humankind and society, is not immediately obvious. It is, moreover, widely understood and used according to meanings that are irreconcilable and internally contradictory. The essay, after distinguishing between a notional exposition and the possibility of analysing the common good as the constitutive profile of human reality, deepens the structure and sense of order of life in association. This order, inasmuch as it takes shape and consistency through the free and (...) generous cooperation among individuals, may be described as the integrating moment of the common good, the nucleus of society inasmuch as expression of the original social reality of humanity. The common good is constituted through the participation of individuals and - together, circularly and progressively - opens itself up as the place of their possible realization. In this way the common good is the inescapable key to understanding the mystery of our social and historical condition. (shrink)

Despite the fact that Thomas Paine was one of the protagonists of the late eighteenth-century Atlantic revolutions, the dissemination of his political thought in revolutionary Italy has not been the subject of much research. While some remarkable works have appeared in recent years that focus on his reflections in Italy, for almost two centuries his oeuvre has remained under-studied and his most famous works were not translated into Italian. This article proposes to investigate the critical reception of Paine’s writings in (...) Italy in the last decade of the eighteenth century within the framework of the political philosopher’s activity during the Revolution. An examination of Italian counter-revolutionary thinkers’ perception of Paine’s theories will lead to an analysis of the political aims and editorial characteristics animating the Italian editions of Paine’s writings that appeared at that time. These translations did not concern his most famous works, in which Paine reflected philosophically on political issues, but rather little-known pamphlets with concrete political aims. (shrink)

Boolean algebras are one of the main algebraic tools in the region-based theory of space. T. Ivanova provided strong motivations for the study of mere semilattices with a contact relation. Another significant motivation for considering an even weaker underlying structure comes from event structures with binary conflict in the theory of concurrent systems in computer science. All the above-hinted notions deal with a binary contact relation. Several authors suggested the more general study of n-ary ‘hypercontact’ relations. A similar evolution occurred (...) in the study of the just mentioned event structures in computer science. To unify the above lines of research, in this paper, we study joining semilattices with a hypercontact relation. We provide representation theorems into Boolean algebras. With a single exception, our proofs are choice-free. We also present several examples and problems; in particular, we briefly discuss some connections with event structures and hypergraphs. (shrink)

Present day humans are the result of a continuous evolutionary process, which is still underway (although imperceptibly since the last wave of Out of Africa migrations). Our physical traits, and both our “emotional” and “rational” mental features co-evolved, dialectically interacting with each other, and with the outer physical and social-cultural environment. In fact, H. sapiens is genetically preadapted to dialectically interact with the material and cultural contexts it is exposed to, contexts that on the other hand were, and are, increasingly (...) created by mankind itself. Also, our species is the result of a “species sorting” mechanism, among a number of different, though closely related, hominid and hominin genera, species, and subspecies. At the time being, H. sapiens is the only surviving, and genetically very homogeneous, species of the genus Homo. There were blurred boundaries, however, between our species and our closely related species, especially H. neanderthal and H. denisova. Furthermore, we all evolved, physically and mentally, from our common ancestor species of the genera Australopithecus, Paranthropus, etc. Due to our profound biological roots, evolved physical traits, evolved individual and collective mind plasticity, and evolved social complexity still keep dialectically interacting with each other in an inextricable tangle. The point where Marxian historical dialectics grafts on, and merges with, Darwinian biological dialectics roughly coincides with the beginning of Holocene. In fact, there is no apparent solution of continuity between the historical timeframe of the last 10-12,000 years, and the previous period as, once reached the stage of extended consciousness, all material/social/cultural niches and mind plasticity-driven adaptations dialectically interacted with each other according to the principles of historical materialism. (shrink)

An algebraization of the notion of topology has been proposed more than 70 years ago in a classical paper by McKinsey and Tarski, leading to an area of research still active today, with connections to algebra, geometry, logic and many applications, in particular, to modal logics. In McKinsey and Tarski’s setting the model theoretical notion of homomorphism does not correspond to the notion of continuity. We notice that the two notions correspond if instead we consider a preorder relation \( \sqsubseteq (...) \) defined by \(a \sqsubseteq b\) if _a_ is contained in the topological closure of _b_, for _a_, _b_ subsets of some topological space. A _specialization poset_ is a partially ordered set endowed with a further coarser preorder relation \( \sqsubseteq \). We show that every specialization poset can be embedded in the specialization poset naturally associated to some topological space, where the order relation corresponds to set-theoretical inclusion. Specialization semilattices are defined in an analogous way and the corresponding embedding theorem is proved. Specialization semilattices have the amalgamation property. Some basic topological facts and notions are recovered in this apparently very weak setting. The interest of these structures arises from the fact that they also occur in many rather disparate contexts, even far removed from topology. (shrink)

The paper aims to describe the stakes of a Nietzschean influence on Deleuze's reflections on the transcendental and conversely to highlight the Deleuzian operation of politicising Nietzsche by ‘minorising’ him. In order to further understand such a complex relationship of becoming between Deleuze and Nietzsche, the first objective of the paper is to focus on active and reactive forces, which seem to be the core of this very relation. Thus, the paper suggests that micropolitics has its conditions of possibility in (...) the Nietzschean corpus and, in particular, in the symptomatology of decadence, resentment and nihilism. In this sense, now the title of the paper reveals its meaning: the whole Deleuzian operation could be summarised as the passage from the criticism and questioning of an image of Nietzsche ‘forbidden to minors’, typical of the interpretations of the first half of the twentieth century, to a becoming-minor of these very same Nietzschean concepts. It is precisely through such a becoming-minor that Nietzsche's diagnosis and concepts are translated in a political and emancipatory key, in order to give power to minorities. (shrink)

One of the complications of a clear evaluation of different positions called “realism” in metaphysics and ontology is discrepancy in terminology and variance of basic intuitions inherent this notion. I recommend a taxonomy that distinguishes three kinds of variance: variance in the sets of conditions for a philosophical position to be acknowledged as actual realism, variance in strength and variance in conceptual frameworks. Within this last case, I propose to differentiate realism in epistemology, in ontology, and in metaphysics, intersecting these (...) three variants with the local/global realism dichotomy. The taxonomy here provided aims at being meta-philosophical; expressive enough for a fine-grained articulation of different philosophical positions in the recent debate, including the question of metaphysical grounding; and impartial, with no need to be connected to the defense of one form or another of the philosophical positions called “realism.”. (shrink)

Italian Abstract: Mosca, Ruffini ed Einaudi vennero da molti riconosciuti come “Maestri di libertà”, soprattutto in virtù della loro strenua difesa della libertà durante il consolidamento del regime fascista. In questo articolo miro a ricostruire l’idea di libertà che emerse nelle loro riflessioni in quel torno di tempo. Mostrerò come, al di là delle differenze tra la loro riflessione politica, giuridica ed economica, l’idea di libertà si sostanzi nell’intreccio tra le istituzioni fondamentali del liberalismo ottocentesco: mercato e società civile, opinione (...) pubblica e diritti di libertà. -/- English Abstract: Mosca, Ruffini and Einaudi were variously identified as "Masters of Freedom", particularly in light of their strong defense of freedom during the consolidation of the fascist regime. In this article I aim to reconstruct the idea of freedom that emerged in their reflections during that period. I will show how, beyond the differences between their political, legal and economic approach, the idea of freedom is entailed in the intertwining between the fundamental institutions of nineteenth-century liberalism: market and civil society, public opinion and rights of freedom. (shrink)

In the sentence “Tom sits,” the name distinguishes Tom from anyone else, whereas the predicate assimilates Tom, Theaetetus, and anyone else to whom the predicate applies. The name marks out its bearer and the predicate groups together what it applies to. On that ground, his name is used to trace back Tom, and the predi- cate is used to describe and classify what it applies to. In both cases, the semantic link is a direct link between expressions and particulars. Here, (...) I will explore the workings of predicative names along the direction just hinted at. The analysis of predication has been less central to philosophical investigation than that of referen- tial expressions. Some problems have concerned the unity of the sentence—what makes us understand “The baby cries” as a sentence rather than a list of words? Other problems have been what a predicate was taken to stand for, properties and relations, and the understanding of either at the ontological level. If a predicate refers to a property or a relation, yet predication, which is central to our understand- ing of predicates, applies it to one or more particulars. On the background hinted at, these problems might be differently viewed. (shrink)

The concept of« multitude » opposes for a long time to that of the « people ». The people is a homogeneous unity, whereas the multitude is a network of peculiarities. The individuals who compose the multitude are not nevertheless atoms of one given but the result of a process of individuation. Of what consists this individuation which produces the individual from universal conditions ? One can tempt an answer by using Gilbert Simondon’s reflections and Russian psychologist L. Vygotskij. With (...) the aid of these authors one will end maybe in a more relevant comprehension of the Marxian concept of« social individual ». (shrink)

"The fact is, man is an etymologizing animal."Etymologizing—the practice of connecting one word with one or more other similar-sounding words that are believed to elucidate its meaning1—is a complex and putatively universal phenomenon.2 Thus, to take two representative examples far apart in time and space, etymologizing practices figure prominently in some episodes of the Hebrew Bible,3 but also provide some modern influential thinkers with an important mode of argument.4 Perhaps etymologizing is so pervasive because it offers a pliable and powerful (...) tool for addressing a key question, namely, why is something called what it is?While this question has universal appeal, only a few cultures seem to have addressed it... (shrink)

Hippogriffs and unicorns have a fixed role in philosophical reflection: they serve as interchangeable examples of fictional objects. The purpose of this article is to show that there are many different forms of imaginary objects and that drawing a taxonomy of these objects actually means rethinking the relation that binds imaginative products to our world – a relation that is far from being univocal.