The new theory of reference has won popularity. However, a number of noted philosophers have also attempted to reply to the critical arguments of Kripke and others, and aimed to vindicate the description theory of reference. Such responses are often based on ingenious novel kinds of descriptions, such as rigidified descriptions, causal descriptions, and metalinguistic descriptions. This prolonged debate raises the doubt whether different parties really have any shared understanding of what the central question of the philosophical theory of reference (...) is: what is the main question to which descriptivism and the causal-historical theory have presented competing answers. One aim of the paper is to clarify this issue. The most influential objections to the new theory of reference are critically reviewed. Special attention is also paid to certain important later advances in the new theory of reference, due to Devitt and others. (shrink)

This article argues that previous research on the outcomes of corporate responsibility should be refined in two ways. First, although there is abundant research that addresses the link between corporate responsibility (CR) and financial performance, hardly any studies scrutinize whether the type of corporate responsibility makes a difference to this link. Second, while the majority of CR research conducted within business studies concentrates on the financial outcomes for the firm, the societal outcomes of CR are left largely unexplored. To tackle (...) these two deficiencies, this article extends the different conceptualizations of corporate responsibility and elaborates both the financial and the societal outcomes of different types of CR. (shrink)

_Sovereignty, Knowledge, Law_ investigates the notion of sovereignty from three different, but related perspectives: as a legal question in relation to the sovereign state, as a political question in relation to sovereign power, and as a metaphysical question in relation to sovereign self-knowledge. The varied and interchangeable uses of legal sovereignty, political sovereignty and metaphysical sovereignty in contemporary debates have resulted in a situation where the word ‘sovereignty’ itself has become something of a non-concept. Panu Minkkinen shows here how (...) these three perspectives have informed one another, by addressing their shared relationship to law, and to the ‘autocephalous’ function of sovereignty; that is, the attempt to provide a single source and foundation for law, power, and self-knowledge. Through an effort to domesticate the intrinsically ‘heterocephalous’ nature of power, the juridical and jurisprudential aim has been to confine power within the closed vertical hierarchy of traditional legal thinking. _Sovereignty, Knowledge, Law_ thus elaborates this heterocephaly, proposing new understandings of sovereignty, as well as of law and of legal scholarship. (shrink)

The essay exa­mines the views expressed in von Wright's Explanation and Understanding (1971) on human action and historical events from the perspective of the recent philosophy of science. Connecting causal explanation tightly to covering laws, as von Wright does, is found to be problematic, and his Logical connection argument invalid. On the other hand, von Wright's sketched theory of causation which is based on the concept of manipulation proves to be on the right track in light of current knowledge. From (...) this perspective, however, there is no obstacle for explaining human action causally. This is illustrated with two examples from historical research. Finally, von Wright's idea that a complete account of the historical past is never achieved, because the past can always be re-evaluated, is briefly discussed. (shrink)

"Explanation and Understanding" (1971) by Georg Henrik von Wright is a modern classic in analytic hermeneutics, and in the philosophy of the social sciences and humanities in general. In this work, von Wright argues against naturalism, or methodological monism, i.e. the idea that both the natural sciences and the social sciences follow broadly the same general scientific approach and aim to achieve causal explanations. Against this view, von Wright contends that the social sciences are qualitatively different from the natural sciences: (...) according to his view, the natural sciences aim at causal explanations, whereas the purpose of the social sciences is to understand their subjects. In support of this conviction, von Wright also puts forward a version of the so-called logical connection argument. -/- Von Wright views scientific explanation along the lines of the traditional covering law model. He suggests that the social sciences, in contrast, utilize what he calls “practical syllogism” in understanding human actions. In addition, von Wright presents in this work an original picture on causation: a version of the manipulability theory of causation. -/- In the four decades following von Wright’s classic work, the overall picture in in the philosophy of science has changed significantly, and much progress has been made in various fronts. The aim of the contribution is to revisit the central ideas of "Explanation and Understanding" and evaluate them from this perspective. The covering law model of explanation and the regularity theory of causation behind it have since then fallen into disfavor, and virtually no one believes that causal explanations even in the natural sciences comply with the covering law model. No wonder then that covering law explanations are not found in the social sciences either. Ironically, the most popular theory of causal explanation in the philosophy of science nowadays is the interventionist theory, which is a descendant of the manipulability theory of von Wright and others. However, this theory can be applied with no special difficulties in both the natural sciences and the social sciences. -/- Von Wright’s logical connection argument and his ideas concerning practical syllogisms are also critically assessed. It is argued that in closer scrutiny, they do not pose serious problems for the view that the social sciences too provide causal explanations. In sum, von Wright’s arguments against naturalism do not appear, in today’s perspective, particularly convincing. (shrink)

Jaegwon Kim’s views on mental causation and the exclusion argument are evaluated systematically. Particular attention is paid to different theories of causation. It is argued that the exclusion argument and its premises do not cohere well with any systematic view of causation.

Gödel's two incompleteness theorems are among the most important results in modern logic, and have deep implications for various issues. They concern the limits of provability in formal axiomatic theories. The first incompleteness theorem states that in any consistent formal system F within which a certain amount of arithmetic can be carried out, there are statements of the language of F which can neither be proved nor disproved in F. According to the second incompleteness theorem, such a formal system cannot (...) prove that the system itself is consistent (assuming it is indeed consistent). These results have had a great impact on the philosophy of mathematics and logic. There have been attempts to apply the results also in other areas of philosophy such as the philosophy of mind, but these attempted applications are more controversial. The present entry surveys the two incompleteness theorems and various issues surrounding them. (shrink)

The Public Trust Doctrine is the key normative premise for American wildlife management. Current interpretations suggest that natural resources, such as game species or all wildlife, are owned by the state and held in trust for the public. I argue that using the doctrine as a normative principle biases decisions in favour of consumptive uses of organisms, contrary to the field’s stated goals to employ an ecumenical normative foundation. I use the Red Cliffs Desert Reserve in Utah as a case (...) study to illustrate how this bias manifests in practice. I also provide a new normative principle for wildlife managers. (shrink)

ABSTRACTKey figures in the founding years of the United States of America were part of the first American learned agricultural society, known as the Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture. Its members were georgic farmers who set out to describe, explore and explain agricultural processes by practical experiences, observations, and theories written in British books. Those theories, however, did not provide any reason for the widespread agricultural practice in Pennsylvania of using plaster as fertilizer, which was German in origin. Although imports (...) were heavily tariffed and later even banned, plaster became, and remained, a top commodity in America. In order to keep agricultural businesses and investments afloat, several members of the PSPA began to scientifically justify the application of plaster fertilization. In so doing, they incorporated chemical theories and methods to both their agricultural practices and investigations. Thus, I argue, they acquired and developed an agrochemical knowledge that was mainly determined by a material history of plaster. Their knowledge was new, unique and more practicable in comparison to the British knowledge in this sector. Eventually, it was through the newly developed knowledge by PSPA members that contributed to the formation of agricultural chemistry as a science in its own respect. (shrink)

Dramatic economic developments have served to highlight ethical questions and responses within business life in Finland, particularly regarding the crisis of the Finnish banking system. Other issues which have aroused public discussion are maintaining the natural biodiversity in the Northern hemisphere forests, and Finland's trade with Russia. The authors, listed alphabetically, are all research fellows at the School of Business Administration in the University of Tampere, PO Box 607, 33101 Tampere,Finland.

The response developed in this book is the creation of a metaphysical understanding of law or, in other words, what Aristotle called a 'first philosophy'.

The concept of truth and competing philosophical theories on what truth amounts to have an important place in contemporary philosophy. The aim of this chapter is to give a synopsis of different theories of truth and the particular philosophical issues related to the concept of truth. The literature on this topic is vast, and we must necessarily be rather selective and very brief about complex questions of interpretation of various philosophers. The focus of the chapter is mainly on selected systematic (...) issues and the most influential and well-established philosophical theories and key concepts. (shrink)

Table of Contents: -/- Panu Raatikainen: Varieties of Ideal Language Philosophy. Jani Sinokki: Descartes on Language: How Signification Leads to Direct Reference. Matti Eklund: Carnapian Frameworks Revisited. Joseph Almog & Andrea Bianchi: The Semantics of Common Nouns and the Nature of Semantics. Gabriel Sandu: The Fallacies of the New Theory of Reference: Some Afterthoughts. Genoveva Martí: Experimental Results on Kind Terms: A Critical Reflection. Michael Devitt: Type Specimens and Reference. Jussi Haukioja: Conceptual Engineering for Externalists. Panu Raatikainen: Fictional (...) Names Revisited. Teemu Tauriainen: Indeterminism about Discourse Domains. Anandi Hattiagandi: Is Logic Normative? Jaakko Reinikainen: Constitutive Rules and Internal Criticism of Assertion. Aleksi Honkasalo: What Could and What Should Be Said? On Semantic Correctness and Semantic Prescriptions. Pasi Valtonen: Rearticulated Psychological View of Generics and Worldly Truthmakers. Joonas Pennanen: The Dual Character of Essentially Contested Concepts. Teemu Toppinen & Vilma Venesmaa: Unified Metasemantics for Expressivists. (shrink)

Nykyaikaisen formaalisen logiikan kehityksen alkutaivalta leimasivat kunnianhimoiset tavoitteet ja vahva optimismi. Tavoitteena oli osoittaa koko matematiikalle ehdottoman varma perusta. Parhaimmillaan filosofian ongelmienkin uskottiin ratkeavan formaalisen logiikan avulla. Filosofisesti kuitenkin on mielenkiintoisinta, että nykyaikainen formaalinen logiikka on mahdollistanut formaalisen lähestymistavan rajoitusten kiistattoman ja matemaattisen täsmällisen osoittamisen. Tämäntyyppisillä tuloksilla on monia tärkeitä filosofisia seurauksia. Esittelen tässä artikkelissa tiettyjä keskeisiä tällaisia logiikan rajoittavia tuloksia.

A critical notice of David J. Chalmers, Constructing the World (Oxford University Press,2012).

What does it mean to claim of law that it is a normative discipline? Can the answer be so simple that one need merely refer to law’s normative object of study and the conclusions that the legal participant must allegedly draw from this? What, in any case, is a ‘normative discipline’? The essay attempts to address these questions by analysing Hans Kelsen’s ‘normological’ theory of law through his work on sovereignty and especially by focusing on the normative character of Kelsen’s (...) epistemological claims regarding law. A theoretical critique of Kelsen is offered through Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological account of logic as a normative discipline. (shrink)

Here the relationship between understanding and knowledge of meaning is discussed from two different perspectives: that of Dummettian semantic anti-realism and that of the semantic externalism of Putnam and others. The question addressed is whether or not the truth of semantic externalism would undermine a central premise in one of Dummetts key arguments for anti-realism, insofar as Dummetts premise involves an assumption about the transparency of meaning and semantic externalism is often taken to undermine such transparency. Several notions of transparency (...) and conveyability of meaning are distinguished and it is argued that, though the Dummettian argument for anti-realism presupposes only a weak connection between knowledge of meaning and understanding, even this much is not trivially true in light of semantic externalism, and that semantic externalism, if true, would thus represent a reason for rejecting the crucial assumption on which the Dummettian argument depends. (shrink)

A survey of more philosophical applications of Gödel's incompleteness results.

Venomous snakebite is a neglected tropical disease and disease of poverty, affecting hundreds of thousands of people annually. The only effective medical intervention for snakebite is antivenom, produced primarily using captive venomous snakes as a source of venom. This paper analyzes snakes’ welfare at venom labs within this global health context. I recommend significant changes to improve the welfare of captive snakes, particularly in light of recent ethological research and attention on snakes. These recommendations are broadly consequentialist, aiming to improve (...) the lives of the snakes and ensure that people have increased access to affordable antivenom. (shrink)

Animal shelters face diverse challenges, which often necessitate making life-or-death decisions for animals in their care. One strategy used to determine whether admitting, adoption, or euthanasia is appropriate is to assess an animal’s in-shelter or pre-admission behavior to infer its “personality.” Shelters do this because potential adopters are often interested in knowing an animal’s personality as it provides information about whether the animal will fit in their home. However, shelter behavior assessments are a broad topic. To narrow focus, I explore (...) a relatively novel development: feline behavior assessments. These assessments suggest that shelter workers can make a valid inference from in-shelter behavior to long-term, consistent personality. I argue that assessments do not, and might not be able to, validly infer personality in shelters; I utilize recent philosophical work by Kaiser & Müller on personality to do so. I build on their work by showing how shelter assessments do not meet their criteria and fall victim to epistemic bias in privileging some behaviors. Because feline assessments fail to meet philosophically robust definitions of animal personality and have methodological biases, these assessments do not provide valid insight into a shelter animal’s personality and should not be used. (shrink)

In the contemporary philosophy, there is indeed lots of talk about meaning – not to mention humanities and social sciences. However, philosophers views on what meaning vary greatly. American philosopher William Lycan (Lycan 1984, p. 272) has prosed that part of this disagreement derives from the wide acceptance of what he calls “the Double Indexical Theory of Meaning”. He suggests it has the virtue of explaining why most disputes over the nature of meaning have seemed so intractable. Here it is.

The new externalist picture of natural kind terms due to Kripke, Putnam, and others has become quite popular in philosophy. Many philosophers of science have remained sceptical. Häggqvist and Wikforss have recently criticised this view severely. They contend it depends essentially on a micro-essentialist view of natural kinds that is widely rejected among philosophers of science, and that a scientifically reasonable metaphysics entails the resurrection of some version of descriptivism. It is argued in this paper that the situation is not (...) quite as dark for the new theory of reference as many critics suggest. There are several distinct questions here which should not be conflated and ought to be dealt with one by one. Descriptivism remains arguably problematic. (shrink)

In this article, I will investigate Jean-Luc Marion’s influential critique of metaphysical and natural theological approaches to the divine which he regards as “idolatrous”, and his own proposal of an “iconic” account of God’s revelation which he calls the “third way”. Marion’s idol-icon distinction, I maintain, developed in his early work “God without Being”, is the guiding thread of Marion’s philosophical project, and the key for an adequate understanding of his own account. While Marion’s account is compelling and has provided (...) new perspectives and insights to the contemporary discussion in philosophy of religion, its uncompromising excessiveness and the outright rejection of all hermeneutics leaves it deeply problematic and makes it hard to see how to follow his “third way”. (shrink)

The problem of mental causation is discussed by taking into account some recent developments in the philosophy of science. The problem is viewed from the perspective of the new interventionist theory of causation developed by Woodward. The import of the idea that causal claims involve contrastive classes in mental causation is also discussed. It is argued that mental causation is much less a problem than it has appeared to be.

Hybridization by introgression (“hybridization”) is a complex topic in conservation. Many conservation decision-makers are concerned about hybridization by introgression because it may threaten species persistence or local phenotypes, among other potential long-term problems. While attitudes have changed towards hybridization as a conservation threat, there are still concerns about hybridization as a problem, particularly if the hybridization was anthropogenically mediated. I propose that these concerns are overblown and that it is misguided to focus on whether hybridization is unintentionally human-mediated. I argue (...) that practitioners should still consider the effects of hybridization on conservation, but the reasons should concern the long-term environmental consequences, such as ecological function and social and cultural that hybridization has, rather than whether humans “caused” the hybrid. I propose a series of steps to think differently about these cases. (shrink)

This article asks whether we can identify a vitalistic undertow in Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy that would make sense for contemporary political and constitutional theory as well. The arguments are presented by contrasting Nietzsche’s philosophy with the social theory of Herbert Spencer. After an introduction, the first main part discusses Spencer and his so-called ‘organic analogy’ in which he draws parallels between natural organisms and the body politic. Spencer’s social theory is a paradigmatic example of vitalism and organic state theory and, (...) as a counterpoint, can help tease out Nietzsche’s vitalism as well. The article then examines Nietzsche’s admittedly fragmentary encounters with Spencer and his flirtations with vitalism and organic state theory. In the conclusions, the reconstructed narrative about Nietzsche’s vitalism is linked with Nietzsche’s main philosophical works in the hope of provisionally extracting a Nietzschean ‘constitutional theory’ from his notion of will to power. (shrink)

Kiinnostukseni kohteena seuraavassa on tietty suosittu ”intellektualistinen” käsitys kielen ja käsitteiden oppimisesta ja ymmärtämisestä. Käsitys on sinällään hyvin periteinen, ja voidaan väittää, että se on ollut ainakin piilevästi sisäänrakennettuna useiden uuden ajan filosofien teorioissa. Jätän tämän väitteen tarkemman erittelyn kuitenkin filosofian historioitsijoiden selvitettäväksi, ja keskityn seuraavassa käsityksen enemmän tai vähemmän julkilausuttuihin ilmentymiin nykyajan filosofiassa. Se on vaikuttanut monissa vaikutusvaltaisissa lähestymistavoissa kieleen, merkitykseen ja mieleen.

The issue of downward causation (and mental causation in particular), and the exclusion problem is discussed by taking into account some recent advances in the philosophy of science. The problem is viewed from the perspective of the new interventionist theory of causation developed by Woodward. It is argued that from this viewpoint, a higher-level (e.g., mental) state can sometimes truly be causally relevant, and moreover, that the underlying physical state which realizes it may fail to be such.