Background: The Clinical Ethics Residency for Nurses was offered selectively to nurses affiliated with two academic medical centers to increase confidence in ethical decision-making. Research Question/Aim: To discover how effective the participants perceived the program and if their goals of participation had been met. Research design: A total of 65 end-of-course essays (from three cohorts) were analyzed using modified directed content analysis. In-depth and recursive readings of the essays by faculty were guided by six questions that had been posed to (...) graduates. Ethical considerations: Institutional review board approval was granted for the duration of the program and its reporting period. Confidentiality was maintained via the use of codes for all evaluations including the essays and potentially identifying content redacted. Findings: An umbrella theme emerged: participants had developed ethical knowledge and skills that provided a “moral compass to navigate the many gray areas of decision-making that confront them in daily practice.” Six major themes corresponding to questions posed to the participants included the ability to advocate for good patient care; to support and empower colleagues, patients, and families; they experienced personal and professional transformation; they valued the multimodal nature of the program; and were using their new knowledge and skills in practice. However, they also recognized that their development as moral agents was an ongoing process. Discussion: Findings support that enhancing nurse confidence in their moral agency with a multimodal educational approach that includes mentored practice in ethical decision-making, enhancing communication skills and role-play can mitigate moral distress. A majority found the program personally and professionally transformative. However, they recognized that ongoing ethics discussion involvement and supportive environments would be important in their continued development of ethical agency. Conclusion: Multimodal ethics education programs have potential to be transformative and enhance nurse confidence in their ethical decision-making. (shrink)

Trust in science post-Covid appears to be a complex matter. On the one hand, the COVID-19 pandemic added value to the epistemic trustworthiness of scientific opinion and its potential to drive evidence-based policies, while it also spurred scientific distrust and societal polarization (e.g., vaccines), especially on social media. In this work we sought to understand the ways in which trust in science might be bolstered by adopting a multistakeholder perspective. This objective was achieved by considering stakeholders’ views on (a) _how_ (...) perceived key actors affect trust in science, and (b) _what_ proposed actions can be taken by each actor identified. Data were collected using 16 focus groups and 10 individual interviews across different European contexts with general public (_n_ = 66), journalists (_n_ = 23) and scientists (_n_ = 35), and were analysed using thematic analysis. Regarding _how_ perceived key actors affect trust in science, participants viewed policymakers, media, scientific and social media actors as occupying a dual function (facilitators and hinderers of trust in science), and pointed to the value of multi-actor collaboration. Regarding _what_ actions should be taken for enhancing trust in science, participants indicated the value of enhancing understanding of scientific integrity and practices, through science literacy and science communication, and also pointed to social media platform regulation. Implications stemming from the data are discussed, considering how multiple identified stewards of trust can contribute to an ecosystem of trust. (shrink)

Responses to the COVID-19 pandemic globally disrupted lives and contributed to the exacerbation of pre-existing inequalities. Women in research were also affected. The prominent role that women played in professional and personal care duties had a detrimental effect on their research outputs, potentially hindering their career progression. Moreover, the challenges faced by women academics during the pandemic, including job loss, increased mental health issues, and the intersection of gender with other socio-demographic traits exacerbated existing gender disparities within academia. By systematically (...) scoping the qualitative literature on the experiences of women researchers during the pandemic, this study sought to explore how women experienced and reacted to the challenges generated by the COVID-19 pandemic. A qualitative meta synthesis of the included studies revealed three themes: gendered professional expectations, colliding identities and coping strategies. These themes show how gendered roles such as teaching and professional care work, associated with the hierarchical and gendered division of tasks both at home and in the workplace, made women feel unsupported and alienated as relevant agents in the academic context. The study reveals the importance of pastoral care, teaching and service work as the essential backbone of the academic infrastructure, especially in times of crises. It also exposes how productivity-focused researcher assessment criteria, rewarding mainly individual results and unrewarding of care and service work, can be viewed as perpetuating structural inequalities based on gender, parenting situations, contractual situations and background. In conclusion, this study exposes the need to proactively address the gendered practices and implicit biases which reproduce inequalities within academia and highlights how paying attention to the experiences and needs of women researchers is essential for improving the resilience and crises preparedness of academic the system. (shrink)

Background Machine learning (ML) is utilized increasingly in health care, and can pose harms to patients, clinicians, health systems, and the public. In response, regulators have proposed an approach that would shift more responsibility to ML developers for mitigating potential harms. To be effective, this approach requires ML developers to recognize, accept, and act on responsibility for mitigating harms. However, little is known regarding the perspectives of developers themselves regarding their obligations to mitigate harms.Methods We conducted 40 semi-structured interviews with (...) developers of ML predictive analytics applications for health care in the United States.Results Participants varied widely in their perspectives on personal responsibility and included examples of both moral engagement and disengagement, albeit in a variety of forms. While most (70%) of participants made a statement indicative of moral engagement, most of these statements reflected an awareness of moral issues, while only a subset of these included additional elements of engagement such as recognizing responsibility, alignment with personal values, addressing conflicts of interests, and opportunities for action. Further, we identified eight distinct categories of moral disengagement reflecting efforts to minimize potential harms or deflect personal responsibility for preventing or mitigating harms.Conclusions These findings suggest possible facilitators and barriers to the development of ethical ML that could act by encouraging moral engagement or discouraging moral disengagement. Regulatory approaches that depend on the ability of ML developers to recognize, accept, and act on responsibility for mitigating harms might have limited success without education and guidance for ML developers about the extent of their responsibilities and how to implement them. (shrink)

Aunque el modelo de atención en salud ha evolucionado, aún suele desplazar la importancia de incluir la narrativa del paciente e intenta uniformar las necesidades de las personas enfermas. La medicina narrativa nos da la capacidad de interpretar y comunicar los relatos de nuestros pacientes, a través de la escucha activa, así como de valorar la complejidad del ser humano, a diferencia de la salud basada en la evidencia, donde las experiencias de un individuo son extrapolables a otros pacientes sin (...) importar su historia, con lo que se reduce gran parte de la narración a una clasificación objetiva en la ficha clínica, cuando lo correcto sería integrar el paradigma narrativo en la atención de personas enfermas. Creemos que enseñar competencias narrativas y saber científico a profesionales de odontología permitirá estrechar la relación clínica con los pacientes a partir de valores como la empatía y la compasión, mermando el sufrimiento ligado a lo objetivo de sus enfermedades. (shrink)

The results of the investigation were aligned with the objective of determining the influence of the program in the strengthening of social skills in university students of Medical Technology of the National University of Jaén. It is an applied, explanatory, longitudinal research, with a quantitative approach and quasi-experimental design, with pre-test and post-test in experimental and control groups. The hypothetical-deductive method was used, with a population of 289 students and 80 for the sample. The Observation Form and the Social Skills (...) Evaluation Scale were used. The results showed a good to excellent level of social skills in all the participants of the experimental group of the II and VI cycle. The means per academic cycle increased by 32 and 35.75 respectively. By dimensions according to academic cycle, the first social skills increased by 6.2 and 5.4, advanced social skills by 5.05 and 4.85, skills related to feelings by 5.45 and 5.1, alternative social skills to aggression by 3.95 and 6.7, social skills to cope with stress by 7.4 and 8.45, and finally social planning skills by 3.95 and 5.25 respectively. In conclusion, the program has a significant influence on strengthening social skills in university students, with a greater influence in the experimental group of the VI cycle (35.75 percentage points). (shrink)

I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will.

A good number of people currently thinking and writing about reasons identify a reason as a consideration that counts in favor of an action or attitude.1 I will argue that using this as our fundamental account of what a reason is generates a fairly deep and recalcitrant ambiguity; this account fails to distinguish between two quite different sets of considerations that count in favor of certain attitudes, only one of which are the “proper” or “appropriate” kind of reason for them. (...) This ambiguity has been the topic of recent discussion, under the head “the wrong kind of reasons problem.”2 I will suggest that confusion about “the wrong kind of reason” will be dispelled by changing our account of what a reason is. While I agree both that reasons are considerations and that certain.. (shrink)

In spite of the seemingly omnipresent corruption and Mafia activity plaguing modern Russia it is nevertheless possible, and desirable, to conduct business ethically there, as the author testifies. Pamela Woolley has recently completed a full time MBA at London Business School, prior to which her career was in international telecommunications. She has long been interested in Russia and worked in Moscow during the summer between her two years of study. The experience has prompted her to seek a more permanent (...) position in the region and was the impetus behind writing this article. She also wishes to thank Dr Jan Dauman of InterMatrix Group for his interest and contribution to the information gathered in the preparation of this article. (shrink)

Many assume that we can be responsible only what is voluntary. This leads to puzzlement about our responsibility for our beliefs, since beliefs seem not to be voluntary. I argue against the initial assumption, presenting an account of responsibility and of voluntariness according to which, not only is voluntariness not required for responsibility, but the feature which renders an attitude a fundamental object of responsibility (that the attitude embodies one’s take on the world and one’s place in it) also guarantees (...) that it could not be voluntary. It turns out, then, that, for failing to be voluntary, beliefs are a central example of the sort of thing for which we are most fundamentally responsible. (shrink)

I argue to a conclusion I find at once surprising and intuitive: although many considerations show trust useful, valuable, important, or required, these are not the reasons for which one trusts a particular person to do a particular thing. The reasons for which one trusts a particular person on a particular occasion concern, not the value, importance, or necessity of trust itself, but rather the trustworthiness of the person in question in the matter at hand. In fact, I will suggest (...) that the degree to which you trust a particular person to do a particular thing will vary inversely with the degree to which you must rely, for the motivation or justification of your trusting response, on reasons that concern the importance, or value, or necessity of having such a response. (shrink)

Here I defend my solution to the wrong-kind-of-reason problem against Mark Schroeder’s criticisms. In doing so, I highlight an important difference between other accounts of reasons and my own. While others understand reasons as considerations that count in favor of attitudes, I understand reasons as considerations that bear (or are taken to bear) on questions. Thus, to relate reasons to attitudes, on my account, we must consider the relation between attitudes and questions. By considering that relation, we not only solve (...) the wrong-kind-of-reason problem, but we also bring into view rational agency—the use of reasons in thought. (shrink)

This article is made available under Creative Commons licence CC BY-NC-ND, which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited.

In this paper I consider fairness of blaming a wrongdoer. In particular, I consider the claim that blaming a wrongdoer can be unfair because blame has a certain characteristic force, a force which is not fairly imposed upon the wrongdoer unless certain conditions are met--unless, e.g., the wrongdoer could have done otherwise, or unless she is someone capable of having done right, or unless she is able to control her behavior by the light of moral reasons. While agreeing that blame (...) has a characteristic force, I am skeptical of this charge of unfairness. My skepticism concerns itself less with the particular conditions of fairness proposed than with the idea that blame can be rendered unfair by its characteristic force. If to blame a person were simply to perform certain intentional actions, then, as we will see, blame could be rendered unfair by its force. But to blame a person is not just to act in certain ways. It is, at least in large part, to make certain judgments or adopt certain attitudes. However, it is unclear how these attitudes or judgments carry "force"? and also unclear whether they can be rendered unfair by their force. Examining these issues, I will suggest that much of the force of blame is found in a set of judgments--most centrally, the judgment that one person failed to show proper regard for others. But, I will argue, once it is granted that such judgments are true, their characteristic force cannot render them unfair. (shrink)

I first pose a challenge which, it seems to me, any philosophical account of forgiveness must meet: the account must be articulate and it must allow for forgiveness that is uncompromising. I then examine an account of forgiveness which appears to meet this challenge. Upon closer examination we discover that this account actually fails to meet the challenge—but it fails in very instructive ways. The account takes two missteps which seem to be taken by almost everyone discussing forgiveness. At the (...) end, I sketch an alternative account of forgiveness, one that I think meets the challenge and avoids the missteps. (shrink)

In this rich cultural history, Pamela Robertson Wojcik examines America's ambivalent and shifting attitude toward homelessness through a close study of film cycles from five distinct historical moments that show characters as unhomed and placeless, mobile rather than fixed: failing, resisting, or opting out of the mandate for a home of one's own. From the tramp films of the Silent Era to the Oscar-winning Nomadland in 2021, Wojcik shows how film cycles reveal a tension in the American imaginary between (...) viewing homelessness as, on the one hand, deviant or threatening, and, on the other, emblematic of freedom and independence. Blending social history with insights drawn from a complex array of films, both canonical and fringe, Wojcik effectively 'unhomes' dominant narratives that cast aspirations for success and social mobility as the focus of American cinema, reminding us that genres of precarity have been central to the American cinema (and American story) all along. (shrink)

Donald Davidson opens ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’ by asking, ‘What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did?’ His answer has generated some confusion about reasons for action and made for some difficulty in understanding the place for the agent's own reasons for acting, in the explanation of an action. I offer here a different account of the explanation of action, one that, though (...) minimal and formal, preserves the proper role for the agent's own reasons for acting. (shrink)

I will argue that making a certain assumption allows us to conceptualize more clearly our agency over our minds. The assumption is this: certain attitudes (most uncontroversially, belief and intention) embody their subject’s answer to some question or set of questions. I will first explain the assumption and then show that, given the assumption, we should expect to exercise agency over this class of attitudes in (at least) two distinct ways: by answering for ourselves the question they embody and by (...) acting upon them in ways designed to affect them according to our purposes—in roughly the way we exercise agency over most ordinary objects. (shrink)

Barrett, Pamela Believers or atheists, generous or tight, Hero or coward, black, yellow or white, Female or male, fully grown or a child, Those of vast wealth or the desperately poor, At the end we're all equal. We are all shown the door..

This chapter presents feminist perspectives on core topics in natural theology. It suggests that a philosophical openness to thinking about nature, about our human relationships, capacities, concepts, and conceptual scheme would enable a constructive feminist perspective on natural theology. Topics discussed include the feminist challenge to the western tradition of natural theology; myth, absolute truth, and male supremacy; sexual difference, transcendence, and religious epistemology. The views of feminist philosophers such as Simone de Beauvoir, Michèle Le Doeuff, Mary Daly, Luce Irigaray, (...) and Patrice Haynes are analyzed. (shrink)

This paper discusses the tenability of John Greco's solution to the problems of the nature and value of knowledge in his book, Achieving knowledge (2010). Divided into two parts, the discussion (1) specifies how both problems have developed until the current period and (2) determines whether Greco, with his virtue reliabilism, supplies an adequate solution to both problems. I take the view that regardless of Greco's adoption of a contextualist semantics, his epistemic theory remains inadequate so long as it is (...) unable to specify the extent to which a person's abilities can be appropriately involved in the attainment of knowledge or any success from ability. (shrink)

In this article, we argue that, in order for white racial consciousness and practice to shift toward an antiracist praxis, a relational understanding of racism, the "self, "and society is necessary We find that such understanding arises from a confluence of propositional, affective, and tacit forms of knowledge about racism and one's own situatedness within it. We consider the claims sociologists have made about transformations in racial consciousness, bringing sociological theories of racism into dialogue with research on whiteness and antiracism. (...) We assert that sociological research on white racism and "whiteness" tends to privilege propositional and tacit/common sense knowledge, respectively, as critical to shifting white racial consciousness. Research on antiracism privileges affective knowledge as the source of antiracist change. We examine some of Perry's recent ethnographic research with white people who attended either multiracial or majority white high schools to argue that the confluence of these three types of knowledge is necessary to transform white racial praxis because it produces a relational understanding of self and "other, "and, by extension, race, racism, and antiracist practice. (shrink)

Bridging the traditionally separate domains of analytic and Continental philosophies, Pamela Sue Anderson presents for the first time, a feminist framework for studying the philosophy of religion.

This volume forms part of the large international Theophrastus project started by Brill in 1992 and edited by W.W. Fortenbaugh, R.W. Sharples and D. Gutas. Together with volumes comprising the texts and translations, the commentary volumes provide a new generation of classicists with an up-to-date collection of the fragments and testimonia relating to Theophrastus, Aristotle's pupil and successor as head of the Lyceum. This will be the fourth volume of commentary on _Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought (...) and Influence_, and is on the psychological and epistemological material. It includes contributions by Dimitri Gutas on the Arabic passages, and Pamela Huby has covered the rest, including close study of the quotations given by Priscian of Lydia and the extensive but little known medieval Latin passages. Different approaches to the use of medieval material as evidence for Theophrastus' thought are discussed in the Introduction. (shrink)

The paper presents evidence in bacteria for the utility of Godfrey-Smith’s environmental complexity thesis, using certain kinds of signal transduction systems as proxies for cognitive/behavioral complexity. Microbiologists already accept that the number of signal transduction proteins in a bacterial genome indicates the level of ecological complexity to which the organism is subject: the more signalling proteins, the greater the complexity. Sheer numbers are not always a reliable indicator of behavioral complexity, however. The paper proposes a new, ECT-based procedure for identifying, (...) from genomic sequence and signalling repertoire, novel bacterial candidates likely to exhibit behavioral complexity in response to a complex ecological niche. (shrink)

I here defend an account of the will as practical reason —or, using Kant's phrase, as " reason in its practical employment"—as against a view of the will as a capacity for choice, in addition to reason, by which we execute practical judgments in action. Certain commonplaces show distance between judgment and action and thus seem to reveal the need for a capacity, in addition to reason, by which we execute judgment in action. However, another ordinary fact pushes in the (...) other direction: the activities of the will are activities for which the person is answerable in a very particular sort of way. This answerability is most easily understood if willing involves settling a question. Settling a question seems to be a capacity of reason. Thus it can seem that activities of will are activities of our capacity for reasoning. I will suggest that we can accommodate the commonplaces while still understanding the will as reason in its practical employment, by abandoning the assumption that practical reasoning concludes in a judgment. Rather, reasoning which concludes in a judgment—reasoning directed at the question of whether p—is theoretical reasoning. In its practical employment, reason is directed at the question of whether to x; it concludes, not in a judgment about x-ing, but rather in an intention to x. (shrink)

Although theoretically rigorous, the book is comprehensible to the beginning qualitative researcher.

It has seemed to many philosophers—perhaps to most—that believing is not voluntary, that we cannot believe at will. It has seemed to many of these that this inability is not a merely contingent psychological limitation but rather is a deep fact about belief, perhaps a conceptual limitation. But it has been very difficult to say exactly why we cannot believe at will. I earlier offered an account of why we cannot believe at will. I argued that nothing could qualify both (...) as having been done “at will,” in the relevant sense, and as a belief. Thus, no believer could believe at will. If my arguments are correct, our inability to believe at will reveals no genuine lack in our powers of mind, any more than an inability to draw a square circle reveals a lack of artistic skill. My account has been recently criticized by Kieran Setiya, who has provided an account of his own. Here I revisit and defend my account, hopefully in a way that will both make my thought clearer and illumine some of the broader differences between Setiya’s approach and my own. I then briefly consider Setiya’s own argument, in part to further develop the contrast. (shrink)

Conscientious objections (CO) can be disruptive in a variety of ways and may disadvantage patients and colleagues who must step-in to assume care. Nevertheless, nurses have a right and responsibility to object to participation in interventions that would seriously harm their sense of integrity. This is an ethical problem of balancing risks and responsibilities related to patient care. Here we explore the problem and propose a nonlinear framework for exploring the authenticity of a claim of CO from the perspective of (...) the nurse and of those who must evaluate such claims. We synthesized the framework using Rest’s Four Component Model of moral reasoning along with tenets of the International Council of Nursing’s (ICN) Code of Ethics for Nurses and insights from relevant ethics and nursing ethics literature. The resulting framework facilitates evaluating potential consequences of a given CO for all involved. We propose that the framework can also serve as an aid for nurse educators as they prepare students for practice. Gaining clarity about the sense in which the concept of conscience provides a defensible foundation for objecting to legally, or otherwise ethically, permissible actions, in any given case is critical to arriving at an ethical and reasonable plan of action. (shrink)

The work of Michèle Le Dœuff creatively disrupts established notions of what philosophy might be. Far from being a discipline about the leader and the disciple, a hierarchy of knowledge and paternalism, Le Dœuff proposes a philosophy of dialogue and friendship. The conversations in this book explore how this philosophy can be enacted and explored, and show how openness and generosity can be the starting point of truly rigorous thinking. Introduced and curated by the late philosopher, Pamela Sue Anderson, (...) In Dialogue with Michèle Le Dœuff explores themes like contemporary feminism, joy in philosophy, memory, the significance of friendship to thinking and a key Le Dœuffian concept, the imaginary. Le Dœuff's interlocutors, including Penelope Deutscher, Elizabeth Fallaize and Meenda Dhanda, are some of the most significant thinkers in the fields of feminism and continental thought and provide insights and ways into considering philosophy as a profoundly dialogical exercise. (shrink)

La Plataforma de Acción de Beijing en 1995, señala que la violencia contra las mujeres "es una manifestación de las relaciones de poder históricamente desiguales entre hombres y mujeres". En todos los ámbitos y etapas de la vida de las mujeres existen diversas formas en que la violencia de genero se expresa, pudiendo citar la violencia física, psicológica y sexual por parte de miembros de la familia o de su pareja, el abuso sexual por individuos que no son su pareja, (...) la prostitución forzada, la mutilación genital, el aborto selectivo, entre otras. Las consecuencias para la salud de las mujeres y sus familias urgen al sistema sanitario a tomar medidas para su identificación oportuna y respuestas adecuadas. Sin embargo, para que esto sea cierto se deben examinar las formas de reproducción de las desiguales relaciones de poder entre hombres y mujeres al interior del sistema y sus instituciones. (shrink)

Richard Rorty claims that philosophy can either be seen as a practice whose primary goal is to show the interrelationship between the different practices in our society or as a discipline whose main aim is to discover the essence of the objects we posit as well as the normative concepts we employ in different discourses. Michel Foucault’s works have usually been associated with the initial characterization of philosophy mentioned above. However, in what follows, I demonstrate how Foucault’s general theme, what (...) he dubs “the discourse of true and false,” intersects with the view that philosophy is the search for the nature of the normative notions we employ in different discourses. In a similar manner, I demonstrate how Foucault’s conception of truth conforms to minimalism’s schema for truth. Though his theme’s intersection with the characterization of philosophy as the search for universal categories and essences is in line with his criticism of how discourses dictate the ways of constituting, seeing and compartmentalizing an object, the manner in which his conception of truth conforms to minimalism’s schema for truth leads to a paradoxical situation for his conception of truth may also be seen as a byproduct of a discourse about truth itself. Keywords - Rorty, Foucault, truth, minimalism, deflationism, discourse of true and false. (shrink)