The present article addresses the logic of the sphere, or the Sphere Model of Consciousness developed by Patrizio Paoletti over three decades of research. M.E.D. Ed., 2002; Flussi, territori, luogo II. M.E.D. Ed., 2002; Fare il punto nave. M.E.D. Ed., 2005; In: Proceedings conference at Leslie and Susan Gonda Multidisciplinary Brain Research Center. Bar Ilan University. Faculty of Neuroscience, Israel, 2007; Osservazione—Quaderni di Pedagogia per il Terzo Millennio, Ed. 3P, 2011; Mediazione—Quaderni di Pedagogia per il Terzo Millennio, Ed. 3P, 2011). (...) The SMC model has been experimentally applied in the educational field and lies at the base of neuroscientific and psychoeducational research conducted by the Paoletti Foundation. In recent years, it has been studied by several researchers in the field of neuroscience. Following a logical-mathematical introduction regarding the properties of the spherical shape, we illustrate for the first time the structuring of the model and its neural foundations. We emphasize the central space of the sphere, defined by the geometric model and highlight its descriptive and heuristic properties in relation to the study of consciousness. Finally, we present educational applications of the model, particularly with respect to the center of the sphere, defined in the current context as the “place of pre-existence.”. (shrink)

The author's central thesis is that a knowledge of set theory can be put to good use by the linguist interested in the syntax of natural languages. The author first points out the role of set theory in formal science, and then gives a short summary of some of the more important ideas. He then develops certain relations in set theory which are of special importance in the study of languages. A fair number of examples—admittedly in rather trivial form—which occur (...) in the study of language are exhibited to show some of the applications in mind. The last few pages are devoted to a review of how his thesis has fared. Although it may seem obvious to some that set theory is the means par excellence for the formal study of any discipline, many linguists apparently do not yet see this; this book will go some way toward demonstrating this.—P. J. M. (shrink)

In the Fray collects David Gushee's most significant essays over twenty years as a Christian intellectual. Most of the essays were written in situations of ethical conflict on the highly contested ground of Christian public ethics. Topics addressed include torture, climate change, marriage and divorce, the treatment of gays and lesbians in the church, war, genocide, nuclear weapons, race, global poverty, faith and politics, Israel/Palestine, and even whether Christian ethics is a real academic discipline. Quite visible in the collection is (...) Gushee's deep research interest in the Nazi era in Germany and how the churches fared in resisting Nazi intimidations and seductions and, finally, the Holocaust. All essays reflect the desire for a church that has learned the lessons of that period--a church with resistance to racism, militarism, nationalism, and other social-ideological toxins, and with the discernment and courage to resist these in favor of a courageous allegiance to the lordship of Christ at the time of testing. Considerable attention is directed to contesting some of the public ethics found in the author's own US evangelical Christian community. Concluding reflections on Gushee's ethical vision are offered in an illuminating essay by senior Christian ethicist Glen Harold Stassen. (shrink)

The relationship between classical and quantum theory is of central importance to the philosophy of physics, and any interpretation of quantum mechanics has to clarify it. Our discussion of this relationship is partly historical and conceptual, but mostly technical and mathematically rigorous, including over 500 references. For example, we sketch how certain intuitive ideas of the founders of quantum theory have fared in the light of current mathematical knowledge. One such idea that has certainly stood the test of time is (...) Heisenberg's `quantum-theoretical Umdeutung (reinterpretation) of classical observables', which lies at the basis of quantization theory. Similarly, Bohr's correspondence principle (in somewhat revised form) and Schroedinger's wave packets (or coherent states) continue to be of great importance in understanding classical behaviour from quantum mechanics. On the other hand, no consensus has been reached on the Copenhagen Interpretation, but in view of the parodies of it one typically finds in the literature we describe it in detail. On the assumption that quantum mechanics is universal and complete, we discuss three ways in which classical physics has so far been believed to emerge from quantum physics, namely in the limit h -> 0 of small Planck's constant (in a finite system), in the limit N goes to infinity of a large system with $N$ degrees of freedom (at fixed h), and through decoherence and consistent histories. The first limit is closely related to modern quantization theory and microlocal analysis, whereas the second involves methods of C*-algebras and the concepts of superselection sectors and macroscopic observables. In these limits, the classical world does not emerge as a sharply defined objective reality, but rather as an approximate appearance relative to certain ``classical" states and observables. Decoherence subsequently clarifies the role of such states, in that they are ``einselected", i.e. robust against coupling to the environment. Furthermore, the nature of classical observables is elucidated by the fact that they typically define (approximately) consistent sets of histories. This combination of ideas and techniques does not quite resolve the measurement problem, but it does make the point that classicality results from the elimination of certain states and observables from quantum theory. Thus the classical world is not created by observation (as Heisenberg once claimed), but rather by the lack of it. (shrink)

Works of music do not appear to be concrete objects; but they do appear to be created by composers, and abstract objects do not seem to be the kind of things that can be created. In this paper I aim to develop an ontological position that lets us salvage the creativity intuition without either adopting an ontology of created abstracta or identifying musical works with concreta. I will argue that there are no musical works in our ontology, but nevertheless the (...) English sentences we want to hold true are literally true. I rely on a meta-ontological view whereby ‘a exists’ can be true without committing us to an entity that is a. This meta-ontological view is illustrated by its application to the familiar example of the statue and the clay. I argue that my account of musical ontology fares better on the balance of costs and benefits than its rivals. (shrink)

Dan Baras has recently argued for the claim that Theistic Mathematical Platonism fares no better than Mathematical Platonism with respect to explaining why our mathematical beliefs are correlated with mind-independent mathematical truths. In this paper I argue that, insofar as TMP provides a proximate or local explanation for this truth-tracking correlation whereas MP fails to offer any corresponding explanation, Baras’s claim that TMP fares no better than MP with respect to explaining this correlation is false.

The debate within the Christian academic community over open theism, or "openism", has been quite intense of late. Progress in this debate depends upon our examining how openism and its rivals fare when applied to particular Christian doctrines, beliefs, and practices. I hope to further the debate by raising a question regarding the Incarnation: ’Was Jesus Christ free in a morally significant way?’ After arguing that the two principal alternatives to openism (Thomism and Molinism) can offer internally plausible answers to (...) this question, I examine responses available to the open theist. None of these responses, I argue, seems particularly appealing. (shrink)

Secondo un recente bilancio della filosofia del Novecento di Rossi e Viano, nel nostro secolo «il successo maggiore è toccato alle dottrine filosofiche che si sono proposte di offrire alternative alla conoscenza tecnico-scientifica e che sostengono la possibilità di alleggerire i vincoli che il sapere positivo porrebbe al modo di pensare e ai progetti di azione»2. Tali dottrine prospettano un ritorno all’antica metafisica, a cui «si ricorre non come a una forma di sapere sistematico, bensì come alla testimonianza di una (...) possibilità di pensare qualcosa che vada al di là del sapere positivo»3. Perciò il Novecento si è concluso con la vittoria, se non del «duro conservatorismo di Heidegger», almeno di «un più blando tradizionalismo, che si limita a sostenere il primato della cultura umanistica tradizionale rispetto alla cultura tecnico-scientifica»4. Per Rossi e Viano la filosofia del Novecento ha avuto questo esito poiché è risultata insostenibile la convinzione, diffusa nella filosofia analitica all’inizio degli anni Trenta, «che la filosofia avesse imboccato la strada giusta per inserirsi nel mondo del sapere scientifico specializzato»5. Dopo «che si era affermata la specializzazione del sapere, la filosofia aveva cercato di stabilire una posizione di dominio legandosi a quelle che erano sembrate le discipline titolari di un qualche primato: ora a quelle matematiche, ora a quelle naturalistiche, ora a quelle storiche»6. Essa, inoltre, aveva cercato di accreditare l’idea che l’analisi logica delle teorie scientifiche fosse comunque lo strumento più attendibile per fare filosofia. Questo tentativo della filosofia analitica, però, è fallito, e così nella cultura contemporanea è diventato chiaro che non «ci sono legami particolarmente stretti tra la filosofia e qualche scienza particolare»7. Insieme all’idea che esistesse un legame privilegiato tra la filosofia e qualche scienza particolare, «la cultura filosofica del Novecento respingeva anche l’idea che l’analisi logica delle teorie scientifiche fosse comunque lo strumento più attendibile per fare filosofia»8.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 321 metaphysical conclusions: " It was assumed by the medieval theists •.• that there is something inherently inferior about the temporal compared with the timeless. Being temporal was an infliction, a sort of body odor from which everything of this world reeked. For a complex set of reasons, some psychological having to do with the fear of death and decay, others socioeconomic concerning their disdain for the (...) inferior class of people who were forced to manipulate changing objects, they assumed that true being must he found in what is immutable..." (p. 54). Gale's hook is quite thorough in its review of the relevant literature of contemporary analytical philosophers on the existence of God and affords a rich feast for anyone looking for an almost boundless supply of carefully fashioned logical arguments questioning the conclusions of those who have used analytic philosopy to defend theistic tenets. For philosophers hungering for a truly insightful contemporary approach to the question of God's existence and nature, however, the hook provides hut meager fare. Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology Berkeley, California MICHAEL J. DODDS, 0.P. Die Gnade vollendeter Endlichkeit: Zur transzendentaltheologischen Auslegung der thomanischen Anthropologie. By RICHARD SCHENK, O.P. Freihurg: Herder, 1989. Pp. 638. 98 DM. The title of this hook, which could he rendered into English as, roughly, The Grace of Perfect Imperfection, could strike one as ironic, and yet it intrigues by promising a new way of looking at a fundamental anthropological problem. The hook delivers on this promise hut, in so doing, creates difficulties for the reviewer. For this new way of looking is so thoroughly grounded in the history of philosophy and theology, its scope is so broad, its implications so profound that it demands a greater arena than a hook review to do it justice. There· fore, I will content myself with introducing its structure and content as well as indicating to whom this hook may appeal. The work is the doctoral dissertation of Schenk, done at the University of Munich. It is an attempt to develop an historically grounded, yet transcendental interpretation of Thomistic anthropology which avoids the experiential supernaturalism of Karl Rahner's theology. Schenk demonstrates the possibility of an alternative reading by developing the differences between Heidegger and Rahner in their respec· 322 BOOK REVIEWS tive notions of transcendence. These three, Thomas, Heidegger and Rahner, are the chief discussion partners for Schenk, although the foot· notes and bibliography reveal a familiarity with the secondary literature that is breathtaking. The first chapter is Schenk's exploration of twelve antitheses. Its purpose seems more negative than positive in that it prevents the reader from simply categorizing Schenk's work and interpretation as either " history " or a " new interpretation," as either " perennial " or " contemporary ", to mention just two of the antitheses. The second chapter is the longest, most difficult and, from a systematic viewpoint, most important of the work. Schenk lays out the alternative views, stemming from Porphyry's and Proclus' schools of Neoplatonism respectively, of the theodicy problematics, which were available to Thomas in constructing his anthropology. Schenk's choice of the theodicy problem as a focus is particularly fruitful, since it allows him to show how all of the fundamental theological anthropological issues, such as nature and grace, death, epistemology and freedom are involved and affected. The fundamental question can he formullated thus: Is the perfection of the human being accomplished in his or her own subjectivity or in its being surmounted? It is also here that Schenk's work shows its power in areas beyond the merely speculative. His concentration on the theodicy problem brings an almost " pastoral " side to the work, in that it seeks to avoid easy answers to the difficult question of why God allows human suffering. This question is not put aside by the Gospel hut made more pointed. Thomas seeks to follow and enhance what went before him (and here we have moved into the third chapter) by not functionalizing suffering and yet maintaining the call of the individual to salvation. It is precisely in this place, in this antinomy between the pri· mordial hope for perfection and the equally primordial doubt of ever attaining it, that... (shrink)

L'articolo mette in evidenza le convergenze e differenze tra religione, pensiero moderno e postmoderno. Tutti i tre appartengono alle culture e le loro storie sociali, però questa convergenza non garantisce l'indentificazione delle loro prospettive. La religione si consente di fare affermazioni di relazione non razionabile, al di là delle condizioni sociali e culturali. Il pensiero, lo stesso se postmoderno, è invece d'ordine ideologico e autoreferenziale, inseparabile di concetti organizzati in una cultura particolare. La postmodernità, che intende liberarsi della prepotenza della (...) razionalità moderna, potrebbe fornire un orizzonte di pensiero la cui appertura sembra stabilire un'alleanza con la religione. Ma alla fine si mostra insufficiente. Il postmoderno rimane ancora in una concezione sull'individuo nell'ambito dell'emozione di un esse in, un piano radicalmente distinto dell'esperienza religiosa autentica che ha la sua origine nell'interiorità personale, nell'affettività di un esse ad. Palavras-chave: Religione, ragione, pensiero postmoderno, modernità, cultura Resumo O artigo coloca em evidência as convergências e diferenças entre religião, pensamento moderno e pós-moderno. Todos eles pertencem às culturas e suas histórias sociais, porém tal convergência não garante a identificação de suas perspectivas. A religião se consente em fazer afirmações de relação não racional, para além das condições sociais e culturais. O pensamento, mesmo o pós-moderno, é, por sua vez, de ordem ideológica e autoreferencial, inseparável de conceitos organizados numa cultura particular. A pós-modernidade, que tem a intenção de se libertar da prepotência da racionalidade moderna, poderia oferecer um horizonte de pensamento cuja abertura parece estabelecer uma aliança com a religião. Mas, afinal de contas, se mostra insuficiente. O pós-moderno permanece ainda em uma concepção sobre o indivíduo no âmbito da emoção de um esse in, em um plano radicalmente distinto da experiência religiosa autêntica, que tem sua origem na interioridade pessoal, na afetividade de um esse ad. Palavras-chave: Religião, razão, pensamento pós-moderno, modernidade, culturaThe present article highlights the similarities and differences among religion, modern and postmodern thought. They all belong to cultures and their social histories, but such convergence does not guarantee the identification of their perspectives. Religion has consented in making irrational statements, beyond social and cultural conditions. The thought, even the postmodern one should be comprehended in its ideological and self-referential bias, and not separated from the concepts organized in a particular culture. Post-modernity, which has the intention to release itself from the tyranny of modern rationality, could offer an open horizon of though in order to establish an alliance with religion. But, after all, it has not worked. Postmodernism is still based in a conception of the individual under the emotion of the so called esse in, within a plan which is totally distinct of genuine religious experience, which has its origin in the inner personal emotion of the so called esse ad. Key words: Religion, reason, postmodern thought, modernity, culture. (shrink)

Il multiculturalismo è un modello culturale e politico-istituzionale per la gestione della diversità in una società multietnica, la cui base teorica viene dal relativismo culturale. Come nessuna cultura può pretendere una validità universale, il processo di storicizzazione della razionalità occidentale segna la fine della pretesa metafisica di dire la verità dell’uomo e del mondo, nononstante si crede che il fare della scienza è l’accadere della verità. Nel gestire la diversità e nell’assicurare la tolleranza risiede la «necessità» del multiculturalismo. Sua debolezza (...) teorica risiede paradossalmente nell’incapacità di pensare la differenza. Universale non è la cultura, che è sempre particolare, ma l’ umano . Solo l’affermazione di questa dimensione universale dell’esperienza può fondare il rispetto della singolarità dell’altro, di sua infinita alterità e differenza. L’umano si dice sempre in una cultura determinata. La struttura universale dell’esperienza è al tempo stesso in e al di là di ogni cultura, insieme trascendente e immanente, trans-immanente . Questa identità strutturale è costitutivamente assegnata a una emergenza molteplice. In questo contesto, si può parlare di una ragione che, in nome di una fedeltà all’esperienza, si dispone a ripensare il problema dell’universalità, il rapporto tra il singolare e l’universale. Palavras-chave : Multiculturalismo, relativismo culturale, cultura, Universale, singolare Resumo O multiculturalismo é um modelo cultural e político-institucional para a gestão da diversidade numa sociedade multiétnica, cuja base teórica procede do relativismo cultural. Como nenhuma cultura pode pretender uma validade universal, o processo de historicização da racionalidade ocidental marca o fim da pretensão metafísica de dizer a verdade do homem e do mundo, não obstante se acredite que fazer ciência já seja o acontecer da verdade. A necessidade do multiculturalismo reside no administrar a diversidade e no assegurar a tolerância. Sua fraqueza teórica se encontra paradoxalmente na incapacidade de pensar a própria diferença. Universal não é a cultura, que é sempre particular, mas o humano . Somente a afirmação desta dimensão universal da experiência pode fundar o respeito da singularidade do outro, de sua infinita alteridade e diferença. O humano se diz sempre numa cultura determinada. A estrutura universal da experiência está, ao mesmo tempo, em e além de cada cultura, ao mesmo tempo transcendente e imanente, trans-imanente . Esta identidade estrutural é constitutivamente assinalada a uma experiência múltipla. Nesse contexto, pode-se falar de uma razão que, em nome da fidelidada à experiência, dispõe-se a repensar o problema da universalidade, a relação entre o singular e o universal. Palavras-chave : Multiculturalismo, relativismo cultural, cultura, Universal, singularMulticulturalism is a cultural and political-institutional framework for managing diversity in a multiethnic society, whose theoretical basis proceeds of cultural relativism. As no culture can claim to universal validity, the historicizing process of western rationality points out the end of metaphysical pretension of telling the truth about man and the world, although one believe that doing science is already the case for truth. The necessity of multiculturalism lies in managing diversity and in ensuring tolerance. Its theoretical weakness is paradoxically unable to think of difference itself. Culture always emerges as being the particular as the human appears as being the universal. Only the statement of this universal dimension of experience can establish the respect of other's uniqueness, of his infinite otherness and difference. The human is always understood within a specific culture. The universal structure of experience is at the same time, in and beyond each culture in particular, at the same time immanent and transcendent, there is to say, trans-immanent. This structural identity is constitutively marked by a multiple experience. In this context, one can speak of a reason that in the name of fidelity to experience is willing to rethink the problem of universality, the relationship between the singular and universal. Key words : Multiculturalism, cultural relativism, culture, Universal, singular. (shrink)

Epistemically akratic agents believe both p and that believing p is irrational for them. Some of the costs of thinking that epistemic akrasia can be rational are clear. It is hypocritical, and outright weird, to have beliefs that we consider irrational, let alone to reason with or act on those beliefs. However, as Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2020) and Brian Weatherson (2019) have argued, the weirdness of akrasia does not obviously tell against its rationality. Here I argue that views permitting epistemic akrasia (...) fare worse than previously thought. These views imply that we should sometimes have beliefs that we know for certain are either irrational or false. And while having a belief that we know to be irrational is straightforwardly irrational, the additional possibility that the belief may be false cannot make having it any more rational. (shrink)

According to the “knowability thesis,” every truth is knowable. Fitch’s paradox refutes the knowability thesis by showing that if we are not omniscient, then not only are some truths not known, but there are some truths that are not knowable. In this paper, I propose a weakening of the knowability thesis (which I call the “conjunctive knowability thesis”) to the e:ect that for every truth p there is a collection of truths such that (i) each of them is knowable and (...) (ii) their conjunction is equivalent to p. I show that the conjunctive knowability thesis avoids triviality arguments against it, and that it fares very di:erently depending on another thesis connecting knowledge and possibility. If there are two propositions, inconsistent with one another, but both knowable, then the conjunctive knowability thesis is trivially true. On the other hand, if knowability entails truth, the conjunctive knowability thesis is coherent, but only if the logic of possibility is weak. (shrink)

Millions of pounds are spent on educational research each year in the UK alone. By far the greatest proportion of this expenditure is on research which is thought to have practical relevance to educational problems and the vast majority of this is spent on empirical educational research, that is educational research which examines and seeks explanations for actual or proposed educational practices or the kinds of activities, institutions or policies that prepare young people for life (Pring, 2015, p. 27). Invariably, (...) the aim of such research is not merely to gain understanding of these practices, but to improve or replace them with better ones. This practical aspect of educational research exercises most commentators, although it should not be forgotten that educational research can be carried out in a relatively disinterested manner, out of intellectual curiosity (Hammersley, 2006). There are two related issues to be considered here: 1] is it possible to gain knowledge of how educational practices work?; 2] is it possible to use such knowledge to improve existing practices, replace existing ones with better ones or introduce practices which will improve the overall practice of education? In this book, both these questions will be addressed. If the answer to 1] is negative, then it is futile to address 2]. By implication then the answer to 1] will be positive. The answer to 2] will not be negative, but there are degrees of positivity attached to a positive answer and what those degrees are will be crucial to the ultimate claims of the book. It is no exaggeration to say that in recent decades educational research has undergone a crisis of confidence, particularly but not exclusively within the world of educational policymaking. Dissatisfaction has been expressed both with the quality and the usefulness of such research. Conceptual research on education tends to be regarded with some suspicion as something that is either of little practical value or which undermines existing practices. But empirical research fares little better, with scepticism expressed both about its quality (Tooley and Darby, 1998) and about its applicability (Hillage et al., 1998). More recently there have been moves to tie funding to preferred approaches to empirical research such as intervention studies and randomised control trials (RCTs) and to disseminate in accessible form what the findings of such studies are and how they are relevant to the improvement of educational practice. In the UK alone we see organisations such as the Educational Policy Institute (EPI), the Educational Endowment Foundation (EEF), and the Sutton Trust, not to mention meta-researchers Robert Slavin and John Hattie gaining a significant amount of influence in the propagation of studies of 'what works' in educational practice. One should also mention the rising interest in the deliverances of educational research from within the teaching profession, such as ResearchEd in the UK, which betoken a wish by teachers to become more active. (shrink)

This volume presents twenty-two uncollected philosophical essays by Sir Peter Strawson, one of the leading philosophers of the second half of the twentieth century. The essays (two of them previously unpublished) are drawn from seven decades of work, from 1949 to 2003. They span the broad range of Strawson's work: metaphysics, epistemology, philosophical logic, philosophy of language, ethical theory, and history of philosophy, along with metaphilosophical reflections and intellectual autobiography.

My dissertation develops a novel theory of free will and moral responsibility, Strawsonian libertarianism, which combines Strawsonianism about the concept of moral responsibility with event-causal libertarianism concerning its conditions of application. I construct this theory in light of and response to the three main objections to libertarianism: the moral shallowness objection, the intelligibility objection, and the empirical plausibility objection.The moral shallowness objection contends that libertarianism seems plausible only in the absence of a robust understanding of the nature of moral responsibility. (...) P.F. Strawson's work is the fount of this objection. In response I argue, surprisingly, that Strawson's account of the nature of responsibility, according to which the essence of responsibility is defined in terms of the reactive attitudes (such as gratitude and resentment), actually leads to libertarianism about its conditions of application. In defense of this contention I offer a theory of the normative force of excuse which shows that moral responsibility requires that agents have free will. I then construct the No Opportunity Argument which demonstrates that free will, and thus moral responsibility, is incompatible with determinism.In the remainder of the dissertation I develop and defend this account of moral responsibility against the intelligibility and empirical objections, both of which focus on my contention that indeterminism is necessary for freedom and responsibility. The intelligibility objection contends that libertarians cannot provide an intelligible account of freedom and responsibility because indeterminism is either (at best) irrelevant or (at worst) inimical to control. I respond to these objections by showing that if we locate indeterminism at the moment of free choice, libertarianism can explain both why indeterminism does not diminish control and also how it is relevant to enhancing it.Finally, I turn to the empirical plausibility objection which contends that libertarianism is scientifically implausible. This objection centers on my contention that humans must be indeterministic systems in order to be free and responsible. I argue that my commitment to neuronal indeterminism fares well in light of current physical and neurobiological findings and, therefore, that Strawsonian libertarianism is not as scientifically demanding as many have thought. (shrink)

It is the impression of neurologists who deal with cancer patients that the incidence of neurologic complications of cancer is increasing (Posner 1995). ...

It is commonplace to distinguish between propositional justification (having good reasons for believing p) and doxastic justification (believing p on the basis of those good reasons).One necessary requirement for bridging the gap between S’s merely having propositional justification that p and S’s having doxastic justification that p is that S base her belief that p on her reasons (propositional justification).A plausible suggestion for what it takes for S’s belief to be based on her reasons is that her reasons must contribute (...) causally to S’s having that belief. Though this suggestion is plausible, causal accounts of the basing relation that have been proposed have not fared well. In particular, cases involving causal deviancy and cases involving over-determination have posed serious problems for causal accounts of the basing relation. Although previous causal accounts of the basing relation seem to fall before these problems, it is possible to construct an acceptable causal account of the basing relation. That is, it is possible to construct a causal account of the basing relation that not only fits our intuitions about doxastic justification in general, but also is not susceptible to the problems posed by causal deviancy and causal over-determination. The interventionist account of causation provides the tools for constructing such an account. My aim is to make use of the insights of the interventionist account of causation to develop and defend an adequate causal account of the basing relation. (shrink)

According to the “knowability thesis,” every truth is knowable. Fitch’s paradox refutes the knowability thesis by showing that if we are not omniscient, then not only are some truths not known, but there are some truths that are not knowable. In this paper, I propose a weakening of the knowability thesis (which I call the “conjunctive knowability thesis”) to the e:ect that for every truth p there is a collection of truths such that (i) each of them is knowable and (...) (ii) their conjunction is equivalent to p. I show that the conjunctive knowability thesis avoids triviality arguments against it, and that it fares very di:erently depending on another thesis connecting knowledge and possibility. If there are two propositions, inconsistent with one another, but both knowable, then the conjunctive knowability thesis is trivially true. On the other hand, if knowability entails truth, the conjunctive knowability thesis is coherent, but only if the logic of possibility is weak. (shrink)

Reflection Principles are commonly thought to produce only strong axioms of infinity consistent with V = L. It would be desirable to have some notion of strong reflection to remedy this, and we have proposed Global Reflection Principles based on a somewhat Cantorian view of the universe. Such principles justify the kind of cardinals needed for, inter alia , Woodin’s Ω-Logic.

Single-premise epistemic closure is the principle that: if one is in an evidential position to know that P where P entails Q, then one is in an evidential position to know that Q. In this paper, I defend the viability of opposition to closure. A key task for such an opponent is to precisely formulate a restricted closure principle that remains true to the motivations for abandoning unrestricted closure but does not endorse particularly egregious instances of closure violation. I focus (...) on two brands of epistemic theory that naturally incorporate closure restrictions. The first type holds that the truth value of a knowledge ascription is relative to a relevant question. The second holds that the truth value of a knowledge ascription is relative to a relevant topic. For each approach, I offer a formalization of a leading theory from the literature and use this formalization to evaluate the theory’s adequacy in terms of a precise set of desiderata. I conclude that neither theory succeeds in meeting these desiderata, casting doubt on the viability of the underlying approaches. Finally, I offer a novel variant of the topic-sensitive approach that fares better. (shrink)

According to evidentialist views, credence in a proposition p should be proportional to the degree of evidential support that one has in favor of p. However, empirical evidence suggests that our credences are systematically sensitive to practical factors. In this article, I provide a cost–benefit analysis of credences' practical sensitivity. The upshot of this analysis is that credences sensitive to practical factors fare better than practically insensitive ones along several dimensions. All things considered, our credences should be sensitive to practical (...) factors. (shrink)

Richard Holton has developed a view of the nature of weak-willed actions, and I have done the same for akratic actions. How well does this view of mine fare in the sphere of weakness of will? Considerably better than Holton’s view. That is a thesis of this article. The article’s aim is to clarify the nature of weak-willed actions. Holton reports that he is "trying to give an account of our ordinary notion of weakness of will" (1999, p. 262). One (...) way to get evidence about ordinary notions is to conduct survey studies with ordinary people. I conducted four such studies on weakness of will. (shrink)

Contrary to chimpanzees and bonobos, humans display long-term exclusive relationships between males and females. Probably all human cultures have some kind of marriage system, apparently designed to protect these exclusive relationships and the resulting offspring in a potentially sexual competitive environment. Different hypotheses about the origin of human pair-bonds are compared and it is shown how they may refer to different phases of human evolution.

At the heart of the underdetermination of scientific theory by evidence is the simple idea that the evidence available to us at a given time may fail to determine what beliefs we should hold in response to it. In a textbook example, if I all I know is that you spent $10 on apples and oranges and that apples cost $1 while oranges cost $2, then I know that you did not buy six oranges, but I do not know whether (...) you bought one orange and eight apples, two oranges and six apples, and so on. A simple scientific example can be found in the rationale behind the sensible methodological adage that “correlation does not imply causation”. If watching lots of cartoons causes children to be more violent in their playground behavior then we should (barring complications) expect to find a correlation between levels of cartoon viewing and violent playground behavior. But that is also what we would expect to find if children who are prone to violence tend to enjoy and seek out cartoons more than other children, or if propensities to violence and increased cartoon viewing are both caused by some third factor (like general parental neglect or excessive consumption of jellybeans). So a high correlation between cartoon viewing and violent playground behavior is evidence that (by itself) simply underdetermines what we should believe about the causal relationship between these two activities. As we will see, however, the challenge of distinguishing correlation from causation is far from the only important circumstance in which underdetermination is thought to arise in scientific inquiry. (shrink)

The author clarifies the existential philosophy that is implicit in Kurt Goldstein's philosophy of organism (Goldstein, 1963; 1995). Situated in response to the growing trend that psychological phenomena are reducible to the nervous system, the author argues for the reverse: that the significance of nervous system activity can only be understood by viewing it as background to foreground performances. Like the organization of perception into meaningful figure-- ground Gestalts, the existential modes of embodiment, sociality, temporality, spatiality, and attunement are organized (...) together to accomplish foreground performances. It is only within this context that the activity of the nervous system may be understood as significant or insignificant. Speech is given as an example. The article concludes with a commentary on how the trend of reducing psychological phenomena to neurological phenomena has impaired our understanding of brain disorders and psychological disorders. (shrink)

Aan de hand van een breed scala aan actuele onderwerpen worden de praktische, medische en psychologische aspecten belicht van de onderlinge samenhang tussen lichaam en geest.

Richard Alexander explains human uniqueness by postulating that at some point an ancestral species became 'ecological dominant' and the external forces of natural selection were replaced by within-species, intergroup competition. It is argued that this transition probably took place in archaic Homo sapiens (Homo heidelbergensis) and not in Homo erectus. Homo erectus was an ecological very flexible species, however.

In a recent discussion of Amartya Sen's concept of the capabilities of people for functioning in their society – and the idea of targeting people's functioning capabilities in evaluating the society – G. A. Cohen accuses Sen of espousing an inappropriate, ‘athletic’ image of the person (Cohen, 1993, pp. 24–5). The idea is that if Sen's formulations are to be taken at face value, then life is valuable only so far as people actively choose most facets of their existence: if (...) they fare well in the material stakes, for example, they must fare well as a result of active choice and effort, not because anyone else looks after them. ‘That’, says Cohen, ‘overestimates the place of freedom and activity in well-being’ (p. 25). (shrink)

Quine, criticism of Quine's Naturalized Epistemology.

Migration and Islamic Ethics, Issues of Residence, Naturalization and Citizenship addresses how Islamic ethical and legal traditions can contribute to current global debates on migration and displacement; how Islamic ethics of muʼakha, ḍiyāfa, ijāra, amān, jiwār, sutra, kafāla, among others, may provide common ethical grounds for a new paradigm of social and political virtues applicable to all humanity, not only Muslims. The present volume more broadly defines the Islamic tradition to cover not only theology but also to encompass ethics, customs (...) and social norms, as well as modern political, humanitarian and rights discourses. The first section addresses theorizations and conceptualizations using contemporary Islamic examples, mainly in the treatment of asylum-seekers and refugees; the second, contains empirical analyses of contemporary case studies; the third provides historical accounts of Muslim migratory experiences. (shrink)

Physicalism dominated Anglo‐American philosophy in the latter half of the twentieth century, and is perhaps still the most popular view among analytic philosophers. Panpsychism is increasingly being seen as a serious option, both for explaining consciousness and for providing a satisfactory theory of the natural world. Perhaps the most popular form of panpsychism at present is constitutive panpsychism. At least some fundamental material entities are conscious; facts about human and animal consciousness are grounded in facts about the consciousness of their (...) fundamental material parts. This chapter equates panpsychism with constitutive panpsychism. In considering responses to the notorious combination problem for panpsychism, the chapter moves onto other forms of panpsychism to examine whether they fare any better against this challenge. It adopts the via negativa definition of physicalism. Panqualityism is the only form of panprotopsychism which offers a clear positive proposal as to what protophenomenal properties are. (shrink)