Çocuk evliliği, tarih boyunca farklı toplumlarda bilinen ve uygulanan sosyal bir olgu olsa da son zamanlarda, modern duyarlılıkları giderek daha fazla rahatsız eden bir hal almıştır. Son iki asır öncesine kadar, Avrupa hukuki düşüncesinde çocuklar yargı önünde farklı bir muamele görmelerine imkan veren istisnai bir statüye sahip değildi. Diğer taraftan, İslam hukukunun çocuklara, özel bir hukuki statü kazandırma konusunda bazı öncü adımlar attığını söyleyebiliriz. Nitekim, en eski İslam hukuku kitaplarının bile, insanın fiziksel ve zihinsel gelişim aşamalarına ve her bir aşamada (...) ortaya çıkan hukuki hükümlere dair son derece teknik ayrıntılarla dolu olduğunu görebiliriz. Ancak çocuk hakları konusundaki bu erken farkındalığa rağmen, çocuk evliliği olgusu hem İslam toplumlarında hem de İslam hukukunda kendini gösterebilmiştir. Çünkü, İslam çocuk hukuku, ilk ortaya çıktığı dönemin kültürel şartlarından ciddi şekilde etkilenmiştir. Üstelik bu kültürel şartlar, İslam dünyası boyunca İslam çocuk hukukunun temel zemini olma işlevini sürdüre gelmiştir. Bu çalışma, alimlerin çocuk evliliğini delillendirmek üzere yapageldikleri bazı aşırı yorumları ortaya koymaya ve konuyla ilgili âyetleri metinsel bağlamıyla daha uyumlu bir şekilde okumaya çalışmaktadır.Özet: Her bağlam için geçerli olabilecek, standart bir çocuk tanımı yapmak göründüğünden daha güçtür. Bu nedenle çocuk araştırmaları sahasında çalışan akademisyenlerin, muhtelif sosyal disiplinler tarafından yapılacak herhangi bir çocuk tarifi konusunda memnuniyetsizlik içinde olması doğaldır. Diğer yandan, İslam hukukunda baştan beri ayrıntılı bir çocuk hukuku teorisi mevcuttur. İslam hukuk düşüncesinde, insanlar doğum ile yetişkinlik arasındaki gelişim döneminde üç aşamadan geçerler: Çocukluk (küçüklük), buluğ ve rüşt. Bütün fıkıh mezhepleri, insanın doğumu ile ergenliği arasındaki dönemde küçük çocuk sayılacağı kanaatindedirler. Bu çocukların mallarının en iyi şekilde idare edilebilmesi için yasal temsilcileri bulunmak zorundadır. Fakîhler çocuğun velisinin, özellikle de baba veya baba tarafından dedenin, velâyeti altındaki küçük çocuklar üzerinde mücbir bir yetkisi olduğu (velâyet-i mücbire) konusunda geniş bir fikir birliğine sahiptirler. Buna göre veliler, velâyetleri altında bulunan çocukları uygun gördükleri kişilerle evlendirme yetkisine de sahiptirler. Fakat zaman zaman beşik kertmesi olarak da anılan bu uygulama bir ön sözleşmeden ibarettir. Yani bu sözleşme doğrudan doğruya fiziksel boyutları da olan müşterek bir evlilik hayatını meşru kılmamaktadır. Çünkü cinsel hayatın ancak buluğdan sonra gerçekleşmesi ön görülmektedir. Modernite öncesi İslam tarihi boyunca, İbn Şubrume (ö. 144/761), Ebû Bekr el-Esamm (ö. 200/816) ve Osman el-Bettî (ö. 143/760) gibi bir kaç fakih dışında küçük çocukların evlenmesine kategorik olarak karşı çıkan kimselere pek rast gelinmemektedir.Hanefi mezhebinde, herhangi bir zihinsel özrü olmaksızın buluğa eren erkek ve kız çocuklar evlilik konusunda mücbir velâyetin kapsamı dışına çıkarlar. Bu, evlilik sözleşmelerini bizzat gerçekleştirebilecekleri anlamına gelmektedir. Fakat veli, uygunsuz bulduğu evliliğe karşı dava açarak bunu yargı yoluyla geçersiz kılma yoluna gidebilir. Diğer üç Sunnî mezhep ise erkek ve kız çocuklar arasında bir ayrım yapar: Buluğa eren erkek kendi evlilik akdini yapabilme hakkını elde ederken aynı durumdaki kız çocuklar velâyet altında kalmaya devam ederler. Şâfiʿî mezhebine göre, velâyeti gerekli kılan illet (bekaret) hâlâ geçerliliğini korumaktadır. Dolayısıyla veli, kızları evlendirme konusundaki icbâri yetkisini elinde tutmaya devam etmektedir. Bu durumda kızın rızasının alınması, akdin geçerliliği için şart olmaktan ziyade sadece nezaket gereğidir. Rüşte ulaşmak veya fizyolojik olgunlaşma sürecini tamamlamak ise İslam hukukunda evlilik için şart görülmemiştir.Modern zamanlara kadar geleneksel İslam hukukunun erken evlilik lehinde gösterdiği bu yaklaşımda herhangi bir değişiklik olmamıştır. 1917 yılında çıkan Hukuk-ı Aile Kararnamesi daha önce benzeri görülmemiş bir dizi düzenleme getirmiştir: İlk olarak, evlilik yaşı erkek için on sekiz kız için ise on yedi olarak belirlenmiştir. On sekiz yaşın altındaki erkeklerin hakimden evlenme izni alması; on yedi yaşından küçük kızların ise hem veli onayı hem de hakim iznine sahip olması zorunlu hale getirilmiştir. On iki yaşın altındaki erkekler ile dokuz yaşından küçük kızların ise asla evlendirilemeyeceği kararlaştırılmıştır.Mantıkî bağlam ve sentaktik yapı elverişli olmamasına rağmen fakihler çocuk evliliğini desteklemek üzere bazı Kur’ân âyetlerine (Nisâ 4/3-6, Nisâ 4/127, Talâk 65/4) referansta bulunmuşlardır. Makale içeriğinde detaylı şekilde açıklandığı üzere zorlama yorumlamalarda bulunmuşlardır. Bu makale, söz konusu âyetlere daha tutarlı bir yorum getirmeye çalışmaktadır. Aynı şekilde, Kur’an’ın çocuk evliliğini kolaylaştırıcı bir tavır içerisinde olmadığını, çocukların evlendirilebilmesi yönündeki yaklaşımların tarihsel ve kültürel şartlara bağlı olarak yapılan bazı zorlama yorumlara dayandığını ileri sürmektedir.Hz. ʿÂişe’nin Hz. Peygamber ile oldukça erken bir yaşta evlendiğine dair nakledilen rivâyet de konuyla ilgili olarak ileri sürülen başka bir argümandır. Bu rivâyetin sahih olduğuna inanılmaktadır. Buna rağmen ilginç bir şekilde bu rivâyet çok az fakih tarafından kullanılmıştır. Bunun sebebi, fakîhlerin Hz. Peygamberin mahremiyetinden bahsetmek istememeleri olabilir. Rivâyetin hücciyeti konusuna kuşkuya kapılmış olmaları da mümkündür. Söz konusu rivâyete daha yakından bakıldığında, ifadedeki menfi üslup hemen dikkat çekmektedir. Çünkü rivâyette Hz. ʿÂişe, Hz. Peygamberle evlendiği günü anlatırken sürekli olarak fizyolojik ve psikolojik açıdan olumsuz koşullardan bahsetmektedir. Nitekim Hz. ʿÂişe birden bire oynamakta olduğu salıncaktan alınmakta ve kendisinin de bilmediği bir yere doğru götürülmektedir. Rivâyet, sadece çocuk evliliğinin cevazını ortaya koymakla yetinmemekte, sanki aynı zamanda çocukların uygunsuz koşullardaki evlilik taleplerine bile itaatkar olmaları gerektiğini salık vermektedir. İçerik yanında teknik olarak bakıldığında bu rivâyet, haber-i vâhiddir. Çünkü rivâyet, sadece Hz. ʿÂişe tarafından bilinebilecek detayları içermektedir. Tarihî açıdan bir öneme sahip olmasına rağmen dinî hükümlere kanıt olma niteliğinden yoksundur. Çünkü bu rivâyette, râvi konuyla ilgili Hz. Peygamber’e ait resmi bir açıklamayı nakletmemekte; sadece kendi zaviyesinden maruz kaldığı bir durumdan bahsetmektedir. (shrink)

Ṣūfī people, as well as the ulema (ʿulemā), discussed the issue of how God (Ḥaḳḳ) surrounds the universe (ʿālem) and where the ʿarş (arsh / the ninth heaven) in which God ensconces himself exists. The Ṣūfī people supporting the unity of existence (Wahdat al-wujud) concept claim that God surrounds the universe by his own being and so that the ʿarş (arsh) is all the creation / created beings by God moreover they argued that people who rejected this idea could attribute (...) weakness or impotence to the power of God. On the other hand, commentators and scholastic theologians acknowledge the idea that God surrounds the universe not by his own being as Ṣūfīs claimed but God surrounds the universe by his knowledge (ʿilm) and power (ḳudret). They claimed that there was no physical connection of God with the universe. There-fore, this article discusses a couplet (beyit) written by Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī from Bayramī-Melāmī group in light of four different tracts (risāle). One of the four tracts was written by the author of the couplet Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī himself. The title of his tract is Wahdat-nameh (Vaḥdet-nāme). The other tract was written by Munīrī-yi Belgradī and the title of it is Şarḥ-i Qaṣīda-i Suleymān. The other two tracts analyzed in this article were written by Ṣalāḥ al-dīn-i ʿUşşāḳī. These two tracts try to explain how God surrounds the universe from the unity of existence (Wahdat al-wujud) perspective. Therefore, they may help in understanding the men-tioned couplet written by Lāmekānī. The outline of the article is as follows: the introduction has the text of the ghazal including the mentioned couplet and discusses how the characteris-tics of Bayramī-Melāmī people were reflected in their poems. This part also tries to determine who wrote the mentioned ghazal as there were two different pen manes / pseudonyms (mah-las) for the same ghazal in various resources. To determine the original writer of the ghazal is crucial for proper interpretation of the texts. The next part of the article discusses the accusa-tion that Lāmekānī was an heretic in the Şarḥ-i Qaṣīda-i Suleymān tract by Munīrī-yi Belgradī. This part also tries to outline Munīrī-yi Belgradī’s mode of thought to discuss the background of his criticism about the couplets. According to his way of thinking, though Munīrī had some tolerance to Ṣūfī people believing fenā fillāh, he ironically harshly criticized the Ṣūfī group supporting Wahdat al-wujud entitled as Fuṣūṣī. In the second section, based on his work named Wahdat-nameh (Vaḥdet-nāme), it is aimed to create a general portrait of Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī. In this context, it discusses how Wahdat al-wujud and Hurufism, which are generally big issues for Bayramī-Melāmī, influenced Lāmekānī. Therefore, the comparison between Oglan Sheikh İsmāʿil-i Maʿşūḳī who was clearly influenced by Wahdat al-mavjud (vaḥdet-i mevcūd) and Hurufism, and Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī is realized in this part. It was figured out that adoration of Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikem (Fuṣūṣīlik) was more influential in Bayramī-Melāmī Sheikh’s mode of thinking through the analysis of the effect of Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikem in Wahdat-nameh (Vaḥdet-nāme). It was suggested that the reason behind the allocation of Munīrī-yi Belgradī for Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī was the effect of Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikem which was salient for Melāmī Sheikh Lāmekānī. The final part of the article is about two tracts Miftāḥ al-vucūd and Zayl al-kitāb written by Ṣalāḥ al-dīn-i ʿUşşāḳī. The criticized couplet was read under the light of these tracts. These two tracts are significant as they explain how God surrounds the universe and where the ʿarş (arsh) is located by referring to the verses of Quran al-Fussilet 41/54, al-Nisā 4/126 and el-Tāhā 20/5 mentio-ned in the couplet by Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī. Ṣalāḥ al-dīn-i ʿUşşāḳī proposed a new argument about how God surrounds the universe in Zayl al-kitāb. According to this argument, in Miftāḥ al-vucūd Ṣalāḥ al-dīn-i ʿUşşāḳī tries to explain God’s surrounding potent through the or-ders/grades of the existence. In Zayl al-kitāb, he claims that there must be a center for God’s surroundings of the universe and this center must be Ḥaḳīḳat al-Muḥammediyye. Ṣalāḥ al-dīn-i ʿUşşāḳī stated that he did not acknowledge this information by himself but he acquired it from Ibn Arabī when he had a dream. Lastly, this part of the article discusses what Rahman settles in ʿarş (arsh) means in terms of circle (devir) theory. It was suggested that according to Ṣūfī people believing Wahdat (vaḥdetçi) God’s ʿarş (arsh) is the human being himself by drawing on the Kasf al-Gıtā (Keşfu’l-Gıtā) qasida written by Sunʿullāh-ı Gaybī who was a successor of Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī from the second generation. (shrink)

Journalism; journalistic ethics; Turkey.

是東漢哲學家、思想家桓譚的主要論着，但早己亡佚。今存之輯本有《指海》內佚名氏輯本、清孫馮翼輯本、清嚴可均輯本、黃以周輯本，及近人朱謙之輯本，但均有不足。有鑒於此，吳則虞先生於1962年着有新輯本，收錄 二百餘條，以類相從，分為八卷，並添加附編，匯涵桓譚佚文、存疑、訂訛之文；記載桓譚事跡、著述、評論之文。 桓譚，后漢時人，官至給事中。博學多識，破讖緯迷妄，去虛妄偽飾，先於王充、張衡，具有唯物啟蒙學者之學識，是漢時哲學思想家。《新諭》是桓譚主要論着，但早已亡佚。據歷史記載，明有二卷本，清有孫之騌輯本，皆不 傳。另有《指海》內佚名氏輯本、清孫馮翼輯本、清嚴可均輯本、黃以周輯本及近人朱謙之輯本。從今日的學術、校勘、編排諸方面來看，諸本均有不足：或短椾零篇，漫無倫紀；或望文歸屬，強系篇名；或條目重復，內容雜陳 迭見；或引用刻本，多有遺漏；或雖沿用十七卷篇目之名稱，但其條目已不能再顯現原書各篇的思想內容。有鑒於此，吳則虞先生於一九六二年着有新輯本，收錄二百余條，以類相從，分為八卷，並添加附編，匯涵桓譚佚文、存 疑、訂訛之文；記載桓譚事跡、著述、評論之文；最后殿以輯校引用書目及版本之詳目，以便於讀者查閱與研究。此書成為目前桓譚《新論》集大成之著作。.

The cosmopolitan idea of justice is commonly accused of not taking seriously the special ties and commitments of nationality and patriotism. This is because the ideal of impartial egalitarianism, which is central to the cosmopolitan view, seems to be directly opposed to the moral partiality inherent to nationalism and patriotism. In this book, Kok-Chor Tan argues that cosmopolitan justice, properly understood, can accommodate and appreciate nationalist and patriotic commitments, setting limits for these commitments without denying their moral significance. This book (...) offers a defense of cosmopolitan justice against the charge that it denies the values that ordinarily matter to people, and a defence of nationalism and patriotism against the charge that these morally partial ideals are fundamentally inconsistent with the obligations of global justice. Accessible and persuasive, this book will have broad appeal to political theorists and moral philosophers. (shrink)

Cognitive science was established as an interdisciplinary domain of research in the 1970s. Since then, the domain has flourished, despite disputes concerning its interdisciplinarity. Multiple methods exist for the assessment of interdisciplinary research. The present study proposes a methodology for quantifying interdisciplinary aspects of research in cognitive science. We propose models for text similarity analysis that provide helpful information about the relationship between publications and their specific research fields, showing potential as a robust measure of interdisciplinarity. We designed and developed (...) models utilizing the Doc2Vec method for analyzing cognitive science and related fields. Our findings reveal that cognitive science collaborates closely with most constituent disciplines. For instance, we found a balanced engagement between several constituent fields—including psychology, philosophy, linguistics, and computer science—that contribute significantly to cognitive science. On the other hand, anthropology and neuroscience have made limited contributions. In our analysis, we find that the scholarly domain of cognitive science has been exhibiting overt interdisciplinary for the past several decades. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Studying Penguins to Understand BirdsJacinta O. A. Tan (bio), Anne Stewart (bio), Ray Fitzpatrick (bio), and Tony Hope (bio)Keywordsanorexia nervosa, treatment decision-making, competence, valuesWe are grateful to Grisso, Appelbaum, Charland, and Vollmann for their thoughtful commentaries on our paper. We would like to respond by picking up on some of the points they make, although we do not address all the issues raised.Our general aims in the paper are (...) less immediately pragmatic than are the central concerns of Grisso and Appelbaum. Our interest is primarily in a number of ethical, and related conceptual, issues that arise from empirical data. In the long run, of course, we believe that these ethical and conceptual issues are important to the care of people with mental disorders, but our focus is philosophical.Our central interest is what justifies overriding treatment refusal. We are unhappy with a "status" approach according to which, for example, the mere fact that a person suffers a mental disorder provides grounds for overriding her wishes. Such an approach, it seems to us, fails to identify reasons, and discriminates against those with mental disorder, a view shared by the Law Commission (The Law Commission 1995). We are, on the other hand, attracted by the approach that grounds any overriding of treatment refusal on lack of capacity (or competence) to make treatment decisions. The concept of capacity has been well developed through legal cases and conceptual analysis, not least by Grisso and Appelbaum themselves. We were struck, however, first through clinical experience, and subsequently from the pilot study reported in our paper, that many patients with anorexia nervosa who refuse treatment do not necessarily lack capacity, using the current criteria, and yet show features or give reasons that raise serious doubts as to whether it is right to respect their refusal of treatment.To avoid reliance on a "status" approach, the issue with which we are grappling is whether the concept of capacity (and therefore lack of capacity) can be developed to encompass some of our findings, and whether it is ethically right to do so. Charland makes the important point that the concept of competence, or capacity, has both a descriptive and a prescriptive component. It is for this reason that the question of whether, for example, we should extend the criteria for capacity is part of the question of when it is morally right to override treatment refusal.Grisso and Appelbaum suggest that our work advances "our thinking about appreciation, rather than requiring that we add new elements" (2006, 297). From our perspective, and at this stage, it is a secondary issue whether we are suggesting a development of appreciation, or a new element (e.g., "pathological values"). The primary issue for us is whether the reasons for refusal to which we draw attention provide grounds for overriding refusal, and if they do how they can be characterized in [End Page 299] such a way as to avoid the ever-present danger of simply overriding autonomy in a patient's best interests.We chose to study anorexia nervosa for various reasons, but we expect that the issues raised have a more general relevance (such as to substance abuse and impulse control disorders as Grisso and Appelbaum and Charland suggest). We do not expect the results to be relevant to all, or even most, mental disorders. Our main interest is not the specific management of people with anorexia, but how the data challenge, and help to develop, the concept of capacity, and the ethical analysis of overriding patient refusal of treatment. Our paper aims to address what we understand Charland to be referring to by the "pretheoretical desiderata" (2006, 283) of the concept of capacity. One reason why we chose anorexia as the focus of this work is because it is different from many mental disorders in the issues that it raises. In this it is, perhaps, rather like studying penguins to better understand the concept of bird just because penguins, although clearly birds, have unusual features.We agree, therefore, with Grisso and Appelbaum's caution that it would be unwise to jump in and change the MacCAT-T on the basis of the results... (shrink)

Chelebi (Çelebi) Sulṭān is a Ṣūfī poet. Due to poor and limited sources, there is a hardness in finding accurate and sufficient information about him. Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı claimed that this anonymous poet could be Oğlan Sheikh İsmāʿil-i Maʿşūḳī (d. 1539) from Bayramī-Melāmī by relying on the unanimous ghazal recorded in Ḥālet Efendi 800 in Suleymaniye Library. However, the fact that the aforementioned ghazal with simple copy variations published in Eşrefoğlu Rūmī Diwan weakens the credibility of his argument that Chelebi Sulṭān (...) could be Oğlan Sheikh İsmāʿil-i Maʿşūḳī. Though the acknowledgment of this data, Gölpınarlı still insisted on the credibility of his claim that the ghazal belongs to Oğlan Sheikh. Moreover he argued that the claims suggesting that the ghazal belongs to Eşrefoğlu Rūmī (d. 1469) should be questioned. Other than this ghazal, there is one more qasida (ḳasīde) with having gizlidir word after the rhyme associate to Chelebi Sulṭān, and an annotation to this qasida by Āyīne-zāde Meḥmed Şemseddīn-i Sirozī (d. 1688/89). However, neither the qasida and ghazal attributed Chelebi Sulṭān nor the Āyīne-zāde’s annotation provide satisfying information to identify the identity of the poet. Therefore, it can be claimed that Chelebi Sulṭān’s identification is based on weak arguments. No more evidence can develop these estimations into evidence-based arguments. This article tries to provide a virtual framework for the identity of Chelebi Sulṭān. In this context, the article firstly discusses Chelebi Sulṭān’s disposition and popularity on Ṣūfī groups by considering the contents of the manuscripts mentioning him. Then, it analyzes whether Chelebi Sulṭān is associated with Ḥurūfīs or not by focusing on the ism-musemmā subject in the two first couplets of the qasida attributed to the Ṣūfī poet. Finally, the article speculates whether the poet called Chelebi Sulṭān in literature could be Misālī (d. 1577), or not, who is one of the Ḥurūfī poets. The subject of Chelebi Sulṭān's connection with Ḥurūfīsm is examined under two titles in the article. The possibility of Chelebi Sulṭān to be Misālī, one of the Ḥurūfī poets, was discussed based on the qasida with nedür rhyme. In this regard, there are two assumptions. The first one is that the pseudonym Misālī is mentioned in the qasida, and the second evidence is that there is a qasida with nedür word after rhyme belonging to Chelebi Sulṭān in the two copies of the Misālī Diwan. However, although the mentioned qasida exists in the recent copies, this qasida is not found in the oldest copies of the diwan. Therefore it is possible to conclude that this lack weakens the possibility that Chelebi Sulṭān could be Misālī, one of the Ḥurūfī poets. The second title is related to the issue of the ism-musemmā in the first two couplets of the qasida with nedür word after rhyme. Through this analysis, it was discussed whether Chelebi Sulṭān could be Ḥurūfī or not. At this point, it is revealed that there is a similarity between the two couplets of Chelebi Sulṭān in the qasida with nedür word after rhyme on the issue of ism-musemmā and some other couplets of Ḥurūfī poets (Nesīmī / Ḫalîlî, Misālī, et al.) on the same issue. Besides, the views of a few groups, apart from the Ḥurūfī Poets, that discussed ism-musemmā issue in their poetry, were evaluated. The article refers to the Ṣūfī poet's qasida with nedür word after rhyme while discussing the issue of which groups favored Chelebi Sulṭān more and it also tried to determine which groups read this qasida at that period. To discuss the general content of the manuscript, the manuscript registered in Suleymaniye Library Mihrisah Sultan number 185, the corpus cataloged in Suleymaniye Library, Galata Mevlevihanesi 233, and the manuscript cataloged in Millet Library Ali Emiri Collection (AEArb) 4341, were examined. Thus it can be claimed both Chelebi Sulṭān and his qasida were popular among heterodox groups, as it was observed that the qasida also exists in the works of Ḥurūfī, Alevi-Bektashi, and Bayramī-Melāmī groups. Despite all this, there is no clear conclusion regarding the identity of Chelebi Sulṭān. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that Chelebi Sulṭān was popular among heterodox Ṣūfī groups and that some Ḥurūfī views influenced him. (shrink)

Human existence is a reality built on paradoxical structures. Existence takes place in the state of balance between these structures on its ground. Since man is in a constant state of being the states of equilibrium that take place on the ontological ground are constantly pregnant with new states of equilibrium. Whatever the subject of human-related research is to be done, it is necessary to look for a basis in these structures the issue of sin or existential crime is also (...) based on these structures in terms of its ontological background. In our study, the processes by which the rhythm states of the structures in question, which occur in situations of conflict and harmony, produce an unreal existence, that is, existential crime, have been handled. The issue of existential crime is mostly depicted from the perspective of the existentialist approach and in its onto-theological context. The main motive that makes the study important for us is related to the relation of existential crime and/or sin to human existence itself from an existential perspective. While dealing with the issue of existential crime, the picture of the issue has been tried to be presented with a more descriptive method, and various analyzes have been made where necessary. The freedom-destiny paradox has attached the tragic to human existence, and as a result, the sin situation caused by the hopelessness and anxiety in the tragic has been encountered. The dynamic-form conflict has attached the dramatic to human existence, and the sinfulness that seeks pleasure from the meaninglessness and emptiness caused by the pain in the dramatic has emerged. The conflict of individuality-participation, on the other hand, has attached the tragicomic to human existence, and the sinfulness of the ego based on self-deception arising from the identity problem caused by the tragicomic has emerged. The argument that all this is based on and that we want to be seen is that sin does not originate from some superficial motives, but from its dyadic structure, which is the ground of human existence, and on the other hand, an ontological background that expresses necessity for its existence. To sin can make a person guilty, but the existence of the possibility to sin is an existential vacancy that makes man a free being and expresses necessity for the realization of existence. (shrink)

The longstanding philosophical orthodoxy on counterfactuals holds, in part, that counterfactuals with metaphysically impossible antecedents are indiscriminately vacuously true. Drawing on a number of examples from across scientific practice, I argue that science routinely treats counterpossibles as non-vacuously true and also routinely treats other counterpossibles as false. In fact, the success of many central scientific endeavors requires that counterpossibles can be non-vacuously true or false. So the philosophical orthodoxy that counterpossibles are indiscriminately vacuously true is inconsistent with scientific practice. I (...) argue that this provides a conclusive reason to reject the orthodoxy. (shrink)

The "comprehensive liberalism" defended in this book offers an alternative to the narrower "political liberalism" associated with the writings of John Rawls. By arguing against making tolerance as fundamental a value as individual autonomy, and extending the reach of liberalism to global society, it opens the way for dealing more adequately with problems of human rights and economic inequality in a world of cultural pluralism.

Using empirical evidence gathered from Chinese listed companies, this article explores the relationship between micro-governance mechanisms and corporate philanthropy from a corporate governance perspective. In China’s emerging market, ultimate controlling shareholders of state-owned enterprises are reluctant to donate their assets or resources to charitable organizations; in private enterprises marked by more deviation in voting and cash flow rights, such donations tend to be more likely. However, the ultimate controllers in PEs refuse to donate assets or resources they control or own, (...) which implies that corporate philanthropy by PEs comes at the cost of others, through assets or resources owned by minority shareholders. Even after devastating natural disasters such as the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake, the controlling shareholders continue to express reluctance to donate any assets they control. Despite widespread evidence that corporate philanthropy boosts corporate growth and profitability, these ultimate controllers indicate no intention to donate their own money as a means to improve corporate performance. (shrink)

Liberal nationalism is a boundary‐making project, and a feature of this boundary‐making enterprise is the belief that the compatriots have a certain priority over strangers. For this reason it is often thought that liberal nationalism cannot be compatible with the demands of global egalitarianism. In this essay, I examine the sense in which liberal nationalism privileges compatriots, and I argue that, properly understood, the idea of partiality for compatriots in the context of liberal nationalism is not at odds with global (...) equal concern for all persons. In particular, I argue that the three central goals and aspirations of liberal nationalism—promoting individual autonomy and cultural identity, the realization of deliberative democracy, and the aspiration for social justice within the state—do not entail or require a form of compatriot partiality that is inconsistent with the demands of global egalitarian justice. (shrink)

Kant divides moral duties into duties of virtue and duties of justice. Duties of virtue are imperfect duties, the fulfillment of which is left to agent discretion and so cannot be externally demanded of one. Duties of justice, while perfect, seem to be restricted to negative duties (of nondeception and noncoercion). It may seem then that Kant's moral philosophy cannot meet the demands of global justice. I argue, however, that Kantian justice when applied to the social and historical realities of (...) the world can generate positive duties to promote and provide for the well being of others. (shrink)

Many liberals have argued that a cosmopolitan perspective on global justice follows from the basic liberal principles of justice. Yet, increasingly, it is also said that intrinsic to liberalism is a doctrine of nationalism. This raises a potential problem for the liberal defense of cosmopolitan justice as it is commonly believed that nationalism and cosmopolitanism are conflicting ideals. If this is correct, there appears to be a serious tension within liberal philosophy itself, between its cosmopolitan aspiration on the one hand, (...) and its nationalist agenda on the other. I argue, however, that this alleged conflict between liberal nationalism and cosmopolitan liberalism disappears once we get clear on the scope and goals of cosmopolitan justice and the parameters of liberal nationalism. Liberal nationalism and cosmopolitan global justice, properly understood, are mutually compatible ideals. (shrink)

In this study, we aim to investigate how multinational corporations (MNCs) balance ethical pressures from both the home and host countries. Drawing on theories from institutional theory, international business, and business ethics, we build a theoretical framework to explain the ethical behavior of MNCs. We apply the institutional logic concept to examine how MNCs with established logics and principles that have grown in the home country respond to local ethical expectations in the host country. We differentiate the core values from (...) the peripheral components of a MNCs institutional logic and propose that a MNC will pursue distinctive ethical strategies under different scenarios and choose the "right" configuration of core values and peripheral components that align with institutional environment in host countries. (shrink)

In this essay Charlene Tan offers a philosophical analysis of the Singapore state's vision of shared citizenship by examining it from a Confucian perspective. The state's vision, known formally as “Our Shared Values,” consists of communitarian values that reflect the official ideology of multiculturalism. This initiative included a White Paper, entitled Shared Values, which presented pejorative assessments of the ideals of “individual rights” and “individual interests” as antithetical to national interests. Rejecting this characterization, Tan argues that a dominant Confucian perspective (...) recognizes the correlative rights of all human beings that are premised on the inherent right to human dignity, worth, and equality. Furthermore, Confucianism posits that it is in everyone's interest to attain the Confucian ethical ideal of becoming a noble person in society through self-cultivation. Tan concludes by highlighting two key implications for Singapore from a Confucian perspective on the Shared Values: first, schools in Singapore should place greater emphasis on individual moral development of their students, and second, more avenues should be provided for residents to contribute actively to the development of the vision of shared citizenship. (shrink)

What is social entrepreneurship? In, particular, what’s so social about it? Understanding what social entrepreneurship is enables researchers to study the phenomenon and policy-makers to design measures to encourage it. However, such an understanding is lacking partly because there is no universally accepted definition of entrepreneurship as yet. In this paper, we suggest a definition of social entrepreneurship that intuitively accords with what is generally accepted as entrepreneurship and that captures the way in which entrepreneurship may be altruistic. Based on (...) this we provide a taxonomy of social entrepreneurship and identify a number of real cases from Asia illustrating the different forms it could take. (shrink)

Against a backdrop of an international trend to shift from a teacher-centred to a learner-centred education, this article explores a Confucian conception of education. Focusing on an ancient Chinese text Xueji, the essay examines its educational ideals and practices based on the principles of ‘choice’, ‘doing’ and ‘power relationship’. It is argued that the educational model in the Xueji does not fit the description of a learner-centred education as commonly understood in the Western literature. Rather, the Xueji advocates a ‘teacher-directed (...) and learner-engaged’ approach by giving the teacher control over the curriculum and authority over the learners while encouraging the learners to participate actively in the learning process. In proposing a conception that is not exactly learner-centred, the Xueji challenges the assumption that ‘good’ education must necessarily be learner-centred. (shrink)

This chapter examines two basic philosophical challenges for the idea of reparations for past injustices (using colonialism as the focal point). The first challenge is that requiring people today to make reparations for an injustice they themselves did not commit is unfair. The second is that if reparative claims are invoked because of lingering injustices, then recalling the past is in fact normatively redundant if lingering present injustices can be handled by forward-looking principles. In response to the first challenge, I (...) argue that the unfairness worry is deflected if we adopt a collectivist-model of responsibility, ie, one that holds states instead of individuals to be the responsible actor. Against the redundancy objection, I suggest that reparative arguments can supplement and reinforce forward-looking distributive principles. (shrink)

Debates on humanitarian intervention have focused on the permissibility question. In this paper, I ask whether intervention can be a moral duty, and if it is a moral duty, how this duty is to be distributed and assigned. With respect to the first question, I contemplate whether an intervention that has met the "permissibility" condition is also for this reason necessary and obligatory. If so, the gap between permission and obligation closes in the case of humanitarian intervention. On the second (...) question, I propose 'institutionalizing" the duty to intervene. In this way, an otherwise imperfect obligation to intervene can be made "perfect" and specific to some agent. (shrink)

Developed here is a Confucian balance between two key democratic ideals, liberty and community, by focusing on the Confucian notion of li (ritual), which has often been considered hostile to liberty. By adopting a semiotic approach to li and relating it to recent studies of ritual in various Western disciplines, li's contribution to communication and its aesthetic dimension are explored to show how emphasizing harmony without sacrificing reflective experience and personal fulfillment renders li a concept of moral empowerment of free (...) individuals in community. (shrink)

Selected writings, including those of Gʹyu-thog Yon-tan-mgon-po, 1126 to 1202, on the morality of Tibetan medicine.

COVID-19 has been studied extensively for its direct effects on healthcare workers. Despite this, very little is known about the effect of COVID-19 fear on future orientation. Studying medical social workers’ fear of being infected with COVID-19 and their future orientation was the primary method used to examine this relationship. 204 Turkish medical social workers on the pandemic’s front lines were included in the total sample. Social workers were found to be extremely concerned about contracting COVID-19. Although only gender is (...) a significant predictor of the fear of contracting COVID-19 infection, the study also found that female social workers have a higher fear of infection than males. Also, no correlation exists between social workers’ vaccination status and their fear of contracting COVID-19. There was a weak negative correlation between social workers’ fear of contracting COVID-19 and their future orientation, but in general, social workers had a positive future orientation. Medical social workers and front-line health care providers can use these findings to develop effective and culturally appropriate intervention programs to reduce COVID-19 concerns and foster a forward-looking outlook. (shrink)

This essay argues two main points by analyzing Sengzhao’s contentions regarding several basic Buddhist concepts such as emptiness, being, and nonbeing. First, Sengzhao synthesizes Daoist methods of argumentation into his description of the middle path and other Buddhist concepts. Second, he revives Daoist concepts, giving them Buddhist meaning and expressing them in Buddhist terms. In the process, he consciously differentiates Madhyamika Buddhism from earlier Buddhism as understood from a Daoist perspective, such as the teachings of the School of Original Non-Being (...) and the School of No-Mind. However, because his understanding of the middle path is not sufficiently deep, he wavers between Buddhist and Daoist understandings of terms such as prajñā and nirvāṇa, rest and movement, and name and reality. Despite these inconsistencies, his discourse, as the first attempt to differentiate Madhyamika from Daoism, is still a milestone in the development of Chinese Buddhism and has exerted a far-reaching influence on later generations. (shrink)

Explores the significance of Dewey’s thought on democracy for the contemporary world.

We live in an increasingly globalizing world, in which countries are closely linked by international trade and investment ties. Cross-cultural comparative studies of national values and ethics have attracted growing research interest in recent years, because shared practices, values and ethical standards depend on shared beliefs. However, the findings of such studies have been unable to reach a consensus on the impact of culture on ethics-related attitudes and behavior. Empirically, many "cross–cultural" differences reported by previous studies might actually stem from (...) cross-national differences. In order to partially fill this gap, this study advocates an analytical framework that isolates the role of cultural and national differences in order to test their relationship to individual level variables. Within this framework, we test competing hypotheses based on both cultural and national contexts by comparing groups of Chinese and American respondents together with a "bridging group" of Chinese Chinese-Americans. Theoretically, this contextual approach helps resolve the debate on the role of culture, by showing that culture plays a far more important role in shaping value orientations than the national background. Specifically, the two ethnic Chinese groups had many cultural values in common, and differed significantly from the Caucasian group. Implications are discussed. (shrink)

This paper explores the ethical and conceptual implications of the findings from an empirical study (reported elsewhere) of decision-making capacity in anorexia nervosa. In the study, ten female patients aged thirteen to twenty-one years with a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa, and eight sets of parents, took part in semistructured interviews. The purpose of the interviews was to identify aspects of thinking that might be relevant to the issue of competence to refuse treatment. All the patient-participants were also tested using the (...) MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool—Treatment test of competence. This is a formalized, structured, interviewer-administered test of competence, which is a widely accepted clinical tool for determining capacity. The young women also completed five brief, self-administered questionnaires to assess their levels of psychopathology. The issues identified from the interviews are described under two headings: difficulties with thought processing and changes in values. The results suggest that competence to refuse treatment may be compromised in people with anorexia nervosa in ways that are not captured by traditional legal approaches. (shrink)