La determinación de la identidad de los presbíteros en los documentos del Concilio Vaticano II no es clara. La recepción de la enseñanza conciliar, en consecuencia, ha sido compleja, en especial en la formación del clero. En términos generales, los aportes de Optatam totius y Presbyterorum ordinis deben interpretarse a la luz de Lumen gentium 10, 2, pues este texto constituiría el principio de armonización teológica de la enseñanza conciliar. En esta investigación se da cuenta de la doctrina (...) de dichos textos conciliares, de Pastores dabo vobis, de las normas vaticanas para la formación del clero (rationes) y de la recepción de estos documentos en el magisterio y las directrices correspondientes de la Iglesia en América Latina y el Caribe. El resultado, en pocas palabras, es preocupante. En las rationes nationales se reconoce una involución respecto de las innovaciones más importantes del Concilio. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Life of Virtue as an Act of Worship:On the Eucharistic Orientation of the Moral LifeMichael A. WahlThe Second Vatican Council's sole mention of moral theology, which occurs in the decree on priestly formation Optatam Totius, consists in a brief but unmistakable call for its renewal (§16). The need for such renewal stems from the state of moral theology in the mid-twentieth century, dominated by the manualist (...) tradition that had emerged after the Council of Trent. The manuals were increasingly thought to be inadequate in at least two important respects. First, they framed the moral life primarily in juridical terms of duty and obligation.1 As the author of one early-twentieth-century manual put it, the manuals do not "hold up a high ideal of Christian perfection for the imitation of the faithful. Rather, they deal with what is of obligation under pain of sin; they are books of moral pathology."2 Second, the focus of the manuals was principally on resolving cases of conscience rather than on treating the theological principles at the heart of Christian ethics, and the method they employed in this task was primarily philosophical, occasionally supplemented by biblical citations. What resulted from this approach is what one contemporary moral theologian describes as a "stifling of the theological imagination," a severing of moral theology from its place within [End Page 1399] the larger context of Christian theology and its self-relegation to the domain of problem-solving.3Given this context, the Council's summons to renewal would entail a significant reorientation of moral theology in at least two ways. First and perhaps most pressingly, the Council's injunction that moral theology "should shed light on the loftiness of the vocation of the faithful in Christ" calls on moral theologians to re-conceive the moral life in positive terms, as the pursuit of beatitude through growth in holiness, rather than solely in the minimalist terms of avoiding sin (Optatam Totius §16). Second, the Council's insistence that moral theology "should be renewed by a more living contact with the mystery of Christ" and "more nourished by Sacred Scripture" demands a recovery of the properly theological character of moral theology and its more intentional integration with Scripture, dogmatic theology, the liturgy, and spirituality (§16).Over the past seventy-five years—in the time both leading up to and following the Council—Catholic moral theologians have returned to the sources of Christian ethics in fresh and creative ways in order to renew moral theology.4 One crucial component of this renewal, especially in the wake of Pope John Paul II's 1993 encyclical Veritatis Splendor—approximately the midpoint between the end of the Council and the present—has been the resurgence of virtue ethics, including and especially the virtue ethics of Thomas Aquinas, in Catholic moral theology.5 This return to virtue has incorporated several important elements of the Council's call for renewal. For example, many virtue ethicists have emphasized the teleological character of the moral life by emphasizing the call to supernatural beatitude as the foundation for moral theology.6 In addition, contemporary works in [End Page 1400] theological virtues ethics have given special consideration to the relationship between Scripture and the moral life.7 For these reasons and others, many scholars regard virtue ethics as the most promising way forward for developing a theological approach to the Christian moral life aligned to the vision of the Council.There remains, however, one of the Council's desiderata for moral theology's renewal to which virtue ethics has devoted less attention. While theological virtue ethics has striven to "shed light on the loftiness of the vocation of the faithful in Christ" and to ensure that it has been "more nourished by Sacred Scripture," comparatively less consideration has been given to ensuring that moral theology is put in "living contact with the mystery of Christ." To be sure, several recent contributions to Catholic virtue ethics have emphasized the role of grace, the infused virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit in order to highlight the properly supernatural character of the Christian moral life.8 But at the same time, virtue ethics... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE USE OF SCRIPTURE AND THE RENEWAL OF MORAL THEOLOGY: THE CATECHISM AND VERITATIS SPLENDOR 1 SERVAIS PINCKAERS, 0.P. L'Universite de Fribourg Fribourg, Switzerland T.HE SECOND Vatican Council ratified the biblical reewal that had prepared it. It truly gave Scripture back o the Catholic people and recommended it as " the very soul of sacred theology." 2 The Council invited theologians to show the inner coherence of the mysteries (...) of salvation proposed by the Scriptures. They were exhorted to make use of the teaching of the Fathers and to engage in speculative reflection, with St. Thomas as a guide, in order to search for the solutions to human problems in a manner suitable to contemporary man. In particular, the Council affirmed : Special care should be given to the perfecting of moral theology. Its scientific presentation should draw more fully on the teaching of holy Scripture and should throw light upon the exalted vocation of the faithful in Christ and their obligation to bring forth fruit in charity for the life of the world.3 The document on the formation of future priests published on February 22, 1976 by the Congregation for Catholic Education 1 This paper was presented at the Theological Consultation of American Bishops at the Pontifical North American College in Rome, September 12, 1994. The English translation was prepared by Sister Mary Thomas Noble, O.P. 2Dei Verbum 24; English translation by Liam Walsh,O.P., Vatican Council II, ed. Austin Flannery, O.P., revised edition, (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1992), 764. See 0Ptatam totius 16. s Optatam totius 16; English translation by B. Hayes, S.M., S. Fagan, S.M., and Austin Flannery, O.P., Vatican Council II, 720. 1 2 SERVAIS PINCKAERS, O.P. makes the directives in this conciliar text beautifully explicit and helps us to perceive its main lines. Notably, it states : In the past, moral theology exhibited at times a certain narrowness of vision and some lacunas. This was due in large part to a kind of legalism, to an individualistic orientation, and to a separation from the sources of Revelation. To counter all this,... it is necessary to clarify the method by which moral theology ought to be developed in close contact with Holy Scripture (n. 96). The Catechism of the Catholic Church and the encyclical V eritatis Splendor have each in its own way effected the reestablishment of the bonds between Scripture and moral theology. I propose to touch upon the principal points of this scriptural renewal in the teaching of moral theology. In order to get an idea of the novelty of these recent developments, a comparison will help. We shall look at the presentation of Catholic moral teaching given in the manuals which have served as textbooks in seminaries and which have oriented preaching and moral catechesis over the last four centuries, following the Council of Trent. These manuals developed and transmitted a certain systematization of moral theology based on categories which have become classic. Even those who criticize the manuals, proportionalists and consequentialists, for example, still use these categories. The moral theory of the manuals constitutes a common cultural base, one whose concepts and categories (for the most part connected with certain currents in modern philosophy such as Kantian ethics) have exercised a determining role in the relationship between the teaching of Christian ethics and Scripture. In our effort to delineate the principal elements of scriptural renewal proposed to us by the Catechism and the Encyclical, we shall examine six points: firstly, the use of Scripture; next, the great moral texts it offers us, the Decalogue, the Sermon on the Mount, apostolic catechesis, and the treatment of cases of conscience ; finally, we shall respond to the difficulty created by new ethical problems and by recent cultural changes. CATECHISM AND VERITATIS SPLENDOR 3 I. SCRIPTURAL QUOTATIONS We need only run through the moral section of the Catechism to see that Biblical citations are there far more numerous than in the manuals of former times. These citations appear even in the section titles, such as " Life in Christ" and " Life in the Spirit," taken from Saint Paul in order to describe the moral life. The table of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:DESIRE FOR HAPPINESS AND THE COMMANDMENTS IN THE FIRST CHAPTER OF VER/TATIS SPLENDOR* LIVIO MELINA Pontijicio Istituto Giovanni Paolo II Rome, Italy ' ' THE DESIRE for happiness" and "the commandments " seem to constitute two irreducible alternatives, representing a contrariety that separates the classical conception of morality from the modern. The choice that Catholic post-Tridentine handbook theology made to remove the treatise on happiness from moral theology and (...) to focus on the commandments appears unavoidable, even to contemporary moral theology. The perspective of the desire for happiness, which is thought to bind the ethical imperative to an empirical element that is indeterminate, subjective, and, above all, self-interested, has been eliminated from the ambit of moral thinking as incapable of guaranteeing the absolute and unconditional character of morality. This has been achieved by means of a philosophical critique 1 that appears not to have lost currency and persuasiveness. Moreover, from a theological point of view, the perspective of the desire for happiness seems unwittingly to risk turning God, the end of all, into the means of"my" self-realization.2 Faithfulness to Biblical inspiration, rather than to an Aristotelian schema, seems necessarily to privilege the commandments as the original form of morality.3 ' Translated by Margaret Harper McCarthy. 1 Cf. Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1981), 7-43. 2 Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, "Homo creatus est," in Homo creatus est, vol. 5 of Skizzen zur Theologie (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1986), 9-26. 3 Cf. G. Angelini, Il senso orientato al sapere: L'etica come questione teologica, in G. Colombo, ed., L'evidenza e lafede (Milan, 1988), 387-443, esp. 414-19. 341 342 LIVIO MELINA It is therefore surprising to note how the Encyclical Veritatis splendor, in its evocative rereading of the dialogue between Jesus and the young rich man (in Mt. 19:16-21), reintroduces the category of the "desire for happiness," cha~~cterizing it as proper content for moral inquiry. The Encyclical also, however, associates this perspective wjth that of the commandments when it cites the response of Jesus, who, after having invited the rich man to turn his gaze toward the One who alone is good, directs the young man to observe the Decalogue. This is not simply a juxtaposition of different and mutually incompatible perspectives. While it is not obliged to provide a theoretical and systematic justification, the papal document does solicit attempts to grasp the constitutive connections that would provide for an integration of these two categories; this is specifically the task of the moral theologian. Thus, when the Encyclical suggests that the question about happiness-as the question "about the full meaning of life," and as prior to the question "about rules to be followed"-is the "echo of a call from God who is the origin and end of man's life" (n. 7), it situates itself within the perspective of the renewal to which the Second Vatican Council called moral theology, which, in its theoretical exposition, will have the task of illustrating "the lofty vocation which the faithful have received in Christ, the only response fully capable of satisfying the desire of the human heart" (n. 7).4 This article intends to accept the invitation of the Encyclical and the Council by thematizing the relation between the desire for happiness and the commandments. Starting from the indications of the first chapter of Veritatis splendor, moral theology is called to establish this relation at a fundamental level. I shall develop my reflection on this theme in three stages. In the first place, I shall present an examination of the three terms at issue (desire, happiness, and commandments) with the intention of grasping the similarities and dissimilarities between them. In the second place I shall take up the global context within which Veritatis splendor situates the relation between these terms, and which is provided by the link between freedom and truth. 4 Cf. The Decree on Priestly Formation, Optatam totius, n. 16. DESIRE FOR HAPPINESS AND THE COMMANDMENTS 343 Finally, the specific theme of the first chapter of the Encyclical will be put into relief by displaying the novel points of departure of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Bible and the Priesthood: Priestly Participation in the One Sacrifice for Sins by Anthony GiambroneMichael S. HahnThe Bible and the Priesthood: Priestly Participation in the One Sacrifice for Sins. By Anthony Giambrone, O.P. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2022. Pp. xxi + 297. $22.99 (paper). ISBN: 978-1-5409-6186-0.In the Vatican II decree on priestly training, Optatam Totius, the council Fathers prescribe a five-stage pedagogical approach to (...) the treating of topics in dogmatic or systematic theology, such as the sacrament of holy orders. Consideration is to be given first to the witness of Scripture, then to patristic testimony, to subsequent historical developments, to Scholastic speculation, and finally, to the contemporary life of the Church, especially in the addressing of current problems. Although this genetic method of theological instruction may appear plausible and attractive on paper, in actual practice it runs certain risks. Among other things, the immediate relevance of what is to be considered in the final stage threatens to overrun or distort what is to be considered in the earlier stages, such that these sources are mined with too much of an eye to their applicability to present issues. Moreover, even if more equally balanced attention is paid to each stage, the danger arises that in covering so much ground one remains chiefly at surface level, inadvertently foreclosing appreciation for the depths of the mysteries in view and inoculating against the theological studiositas that drives toward greater [End Page 692] understanding. Further compounding the challenges of fruitfully implementing the council Fathers’ vision is the ever-widening divergence of specialization within theological subdisciplines, which too often renders the field Babel-like and crippled by mutual incomprehension. Perhaps nowhere is this tendency toward breakdown of communication more evident than in the disconnect between biblical studies and other theological areas—a tragedy of special import, given the stress placed by Optatam Totius and by other magisterial texts on Scripture as the foundational for theology.While there appears on the horizon neither a one-size-fits-all fix to the problems of theological integration nor an algorithmic means of implementing it, glimmers of hope remain. Holding promise, for instance, are recent trends toward the “theological interpretation of Scripture” and the continued emergence of a self-styled “biblical theology” which, while admitting of great variety in expression and emphasis, nonetheless constitute explicit attempts to bridge this particular gap. What the strongest of these and other endeavors tend to illustrate is that genuine theological integration is to be found not so much in methods or programs of study as in the actual thinking and writing of individual theologians and exegetes, who will approach the consideranda identified by Optatam Totius not as discrete stages of inquiry but as essential ingredients that ought to be creatively and responsibly blended in varying proportions, reflecting both their own particular specializations and their personal attentiveness to the pertinent biblical, patristic, historical, speculative, and practical concerns.A worthy example of such creative and responsible blending is Anthony Giambrone’s The Bible and the Priesthood, the second of seven planned entries in Baker Academic’s new series “A Catholic Biblical Theology of the Sacraments,” edited by Tim Gray and John Sehorn. In keeping with its stated focus on the Bible and Giambrone’s own training as an exegete, the book is chiefly a work of Scripture scholarship, yet it also thoroughly theological, and this not only in its concern with priesthood and the sacrament of orders, but also in how and why the author engages with the biblical (and extrabiblical) texts under investigation in treating these topics. Taking a cue from a 2019 essay by Pope Benedict XVI, Giambrone zeros in on certain “deep roots” of the ongoing priestly crisis that were identified by the late pontiff, including “a methodological flaw in the reception of Scripture as the Word of God” and a related “reject[ion]... of an authentically cultic priesthood in the New Covenant” (3). In directly countering the second of these problems across the bulk of its chapters, the book also exemplifies a corrective to the first, providing remedies to this “flaw” on both the hermeneutical and the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Paul and Virtue Ethics: Building Bridges between New Testament Studies and Moral Theologyby Daniel J. Harrington, SJ, and James F. Keenan, SJKerry B. DannerPaul and Virtue Ethics: Building Bridges between New Testament Studies and Moral TheologyDaniel J. Harrington, SJ, and James F. Keenan, SJ lanham, md: rowman & littlefield, 2010. 220 pp. $44.00.James Keenan and the late Daniel Harrington deepen discourse between New Testament studies and virtue ethics (...) in Paul and Virtue Ethics, a companion to their 2002 Jesus and Virtue Ethics. Both books contribute to the Second Vatican Council’s call to perfect moral theology by deeply engaging with scripture ( Optatam totius, no. 16), and both demonstrate the richness of a virtue approach to scripture. Paul and Virtue Ethicsimproves on the previous work in two significant ways. First, the authors divide the book into four parts, allowing the reader to better follow and appreciate how it contributes to both fields. Second, while this book maintains a dialogue structure, it does so by alternating between chapters by Harrington on Pauline perspectives and chapters by Keenan on theological perspectives. Questions for discussion are omitted here; select bibliographies remain.Part 1 covers Pauline and theological perspectives on anthropology, conversion, and conscience, beginning with a solid introductory chapter: “Virtue Ethics and Fundamental Moral Theology.” The second chapter, “The Shape of Paul’s Virtue Ethics,” lays out what Harrington describes as Paul’s “modified apocalyptic dualism” (24). A chapter on conscience is an important reiteration of the fundamental role of experience and how “virtuous practices become the exercises for the formation of conscience” (71). Since Paul’s uncontested corpus focuses more on Jesus’s death and resurrection than the life of Jesus, this section could have been bolstered by explicitly stating the challenges this raises for both disciplines. [End Page 225]Part 2 focuses on the theological virtues. The placement of Paul alongside Thomas Aquinas is refreshing, as is their embrace of Aquinas as a biblical theologian (though more stated than shown). In this section the book’s emergence from the classroom is most evident, making Harrington’s recent passing particularly poignant. His chapter on Paul’s appeal to experience is ripe for dialogue with Keenan’s engagement of Stephen Brown’s work on the role of assent in Thomas’s virtue of faith; the authors also choose to treat separately the Pauline virtue of love and Thomas’s virtue of charity. While the juxtapositions were thought provoking, I wish they engaged these choices in the text. The reality that classroom dialogue between them is no longer possible is a palatable loss.Part 3 moves to a more focused exploration of other virtues and vices in the Pauline corpus, as well as ethics done in a communal setting, and the importance of Eucharist in Christian life. The brief chapter on theological perspectives of humility was particularly insightful. The last section, “The Virtues and Social and Sexual Issues,” has two very compelling chapters on social ethics. Harrington speaks to the Pauline tendency to hold in tension the subversive focus on Christ alone as master and his imminent return, and the maintenance of social roles to preserve the fledgling community. Immediately following, Keenan reiterates the current Church’s call to be hospitable. In doing so, they have—perhaps intentionally—highlighted the tensions in the way Christian virtue ethics can challenge our communal understandings of scripture. Given that the Church is no longer a fledgling community but a massive institution, often more analogous to oppressive strands of first-century Judaism than the communities to which Paul was pastor, how do we understand this tension? Without clearly addressing it, they demonstrate their thesis that these fields call for fruitful dialogue.All projects have their limits, and this was an ambitious and successful one. While I was left hungry for more connections to Jesus’s ministry as portrayed in the gospels, I was energized by the scaffolding of important bridges that is evident in the work. [End Page 226]Kerry B. DannerGeorgetown UniversityCopyright © 2016 Society of Christian Ethics. (shrink)

The article investigates the language of the faith of the Church on the mystery of God. It analyzes its origin and typology, its specificity and ecclesial meaning, its ecumenical relevance, its logical coherence and its theological actuality. It follows the definitions and declarations of the Magisterium while placing the doctrine within the bi-millennial history of Trinitarian theology. The study underlines the importance for the unity of the Church of the formulation of the faith which in adoring the inseparable Trinity proclaims (...) the Holy Monarchy - origin of the divine life and of the sacramental economy - of the eternal, unbegotten Father, principle of the whole deity. After having followed the efforts made by the first apologists to sketch out the language of the ineffable mystery, and the various models of trinitarian language, the study exposes the language used by the councils in East and West: Nicea I and II, Constantinople I to III, Lateran I to IV, Lyons II to Florence, Vatican I to II, so as better to formulate the principles which articulate the rule of faith of the Church. The logic of the ecclesial language is resumed in propositions concerned with the main affirmations of faith and the proclamation of the mystery. The first propositions treat the knowability of the mystery, the possibility of its verification and the dialectic of its language. The main propositions refer to the three divine hypostases, Father, Son and Spirit, in the economy of salvation and in. (shrink)

Spinoza’s account of human agency is presented as a solution to the fundamental dichotomy between physicalism and mentalism in psychology. It is argued that this dichotomy originates in the 17th century with the Cartesian and Hobbesian responses to the collapse of the Scholastic synthesis. Spinoza’s view of nature as equally Mind and Body, and his understanding of efficient causality as grounded in a self-caused natural totality are described. Spinozism’s relative lack of influence on contemporary scientific culture is attributed to his (...) work having been marginalized during the 1st century after his death by political and religious authorities. Contemporary responses to the mentalist/physicalist dichotomy are discussed, as are trends in contemporary psychology that were foreshadowed by Spinoza’s observations. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

There seems to be an important historical connexion between changes in the concept of evidence and that of the person capable of giving evidence. Michel Foucault urged that during the classical age the relationship between evidence and the person was reversed: scholasticism derived statements’ authority from that of their authors, while scientists now hold that matters of fact are the most impersonal of statements.1 In a similar vein, Ian Hacking defines a kind of evidence which ‘consists in one thing pointing (...) beyond itself’, and claims that until the early modern period ‘testimony and authority were primary, and things could count as evidence only insofar as they resembled the witness of observers and the authority of books’.2 This captures a rather familiar theme of the ideology of early modern natural philosophy. Nullius in verba was the Royal Society of London’s motto. Robert Boyle, doyen of the Society’s experimental philosophers, tried to build up the credit of laboratory objects at the expense of untrustworthy humans. He reckoned that ‘inanimate bodies … are not capable of prepossessions, or giving us partial informations’, while vulgar men may be influenced by predispositions, and so many other circumstances, that they may easily give occasion to mistakes’. So an inanimate body’s deeds could function as signs of some other state of affairs in a way that the stories of vulgar humans could not.3 1. See Michel Foucault, L’Ordre du discours: Leçon inaugurale au Collêge de France prononcée le 2 décembre 1970 .2. Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference , pp. 34, 33.3. Quoted in Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air Pump , p. 218. See also Peter Dear, ‘Totius in verba:’ Rhetoric and Authority in the Early Royal Society’, Isis 76 : 145-61. Simon Schaffer lectures in history and philosophy at the University of Cambridge. He is the coauthor of Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life and coauthors of The Uses of Experiment: Studies in the Natural Sciences. (shrink)

In the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP), Spinoza argues that an individual’s natural right extends as far as their power. Subsequently, in the Tractatus Politicus (TP), he offers a revised argument for the same conclusion. Here I offer an account of the reasons for the revision. In both arguments, an individual’s natural right derives from God’s natural right. However, the TTP argument hinges on the claim that each individual is part of the whole of nature (totius naturae), and for this reason (...) inherits part of the natural right of that whole. Using several analogous cases from the Ethics, I show that this form of argument from division is not compatible with Spinoza’s considered metaphysical views. The revised argument, by contrast, avoids the pitfalls of his earlier efforts. It also better reveals the deep roots by which the monistic metaphysics of the Ethics feeds into Spinoza’s conception of natural right. (shrink)

Jodocus Trutfetter (also Trutvetter) was a philosopher and theologian of the via moderna, at the University of Erfurt, in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. His main works include a textbook on logic, the Summule totius logice, and another on natural philosophy, the Summa in totam physicen. As a proponent of the via moderna, Trutfetter stressed the importance of taking both ancient and modern authorities into account. In questions concerning universals, categories, and psychology, his views were close to (...) those of John Buridan. On the relationship between theology and philosophy he shared, for the most part, William of Ockham’s position. (shrink)

This paper argues that the science of logic follows the theory of knowledge. The objects are ens rationis. It admits that we have two kind of logic: formal logic, which follows via rationis, named abstractio formalis; and real logic, which follows via rationis, named abstractio totius. In consequence, there are divers habits of logic, which permit the use of our different acts of understanding, which pertain to both uses of ratio. Each one of these different logics has different principles: (...) the rational principle, the axioms of logic; the formal principle; the principle of generalisation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IntroductionWilliam J. ConnellOne of the more unusual works in the corpus of the Italian humanist Lorenzo Valla is the Oratio in principio sui studii, on the relation between Latin letters and the Christian faith. The speech was written and delivered in October 1455, toward the end of Valla’s life, as a lecture to inaugurate the academic year at the University of Rome where he had held the chair in (...) rhetoric since 1450. It was traditional at Rome to hold such an address each year not only to encourage the assembled students and faculty in their studies but also to thank the papacy for its support of the university, the Studium Urbis. For this reason Valla’s speech ends with customary words praising Pope Calixtus III for having increased the stipends of the lecturers in the university, even though, notwithstanding some remarkable kindnesses to Valla himself, Calixtus’s reputation was not that of a friend to scholarship. Valla’s Schoolyear Inaugural was not lengthy: it can only have lasted fifteen minutes. Nor is there indication that anyone was displeased with it. In fact, that is precisely what is oddest about the Inaugural, for throughout his career Valla had shown himself to be the sort of person who seized on such occasions to make polemical arguments. We read the speech—and it is possible that his audience also listened to it this way—expecting with each step that Valla will let fly a critical or unorthodox statement, but that never happens. 1Beginning with his earliest formal work, a comparison of Cicero and Quintilian written in 1428 and now lost, in which the humanist argued against Cicero on behalf of Quintilian, Valla seemed to delight in challenging established authorities. 2 His next important work, an attack on Bartolus of [End Page 1] Sassoferrato and the scholastic method of contemporary jurists, resulted in his forced departure from the University of Pavia. 3 A continuing combativeness is illustrated in subsequent writings, reaching an apogee in the work on the Donation. Even when Valla was developing another writer’s idea, he had a consistent way of pushing the argument to a daring extreme. This, as Riccardo Fubini argues below, is what Valla did in the De donatione, a work Fubini suggests relied more heavily on Nicholas of Cusa’s De concordantia catholica than hitherto realized, but written to promote an agenda far more radical than that of Cusanus. One of the surest indications of Valla’s brilliance as a polemicist is the fact that seventy years after his death humanists of the caliber of Agostino Steuco, the subject of Ronald K. Delph’s essay in this number, were still eager to take up cudgels against him.Valla paid a price for initiating so many disputes. In 1444, when he was called before the Inquisition in Naples after the attack on the Donation of Constantine, Valla was made to answer charges against not only that work, but also against the De vero bono for its Epicureanism, the De libero arbitrio for its determinism, the De professione religiosorum for its criticism of religious orders, and the Repastinatio totius dialectice et philosophie for various unorthodox statements, especially concerning the Trinity. This last work was the humanist’s most ambitious project, and he seems to have been aware of its explosive quality, since he alluded to a “peril to his life” should it be published. 4The 1455 Schoolyear Inaugural shows no trace of the risks that Valla took in his other writings, of his polemical temperament, or of his past disagreements with the Church. With style and vigor the speech argues that the Church deserves great thanks and praise for having ensured the survival [End Page 2] of Latin letters after the collapse of the Empire. This may seem a notable change of heart in the author who had written the oration On the Falsely Believed and Forged Donation of Constantin—a text which always seems to be lurking in the background of the Inaugural but which finds no explicit reference there. Given the proximity of Valla’s argument to the well-worn medieval theme of the translatio studii, his argument could hardly have been... (shrink)

In this paper, I address the problem of generation and destruction in Spinoza’s philosophical system. I approach this problem by providing an account of how Spinoza can maintain that contrary finite modes cannot inhere in the same substance, while substance itself does not change. One must distinguish between the formal essence of a mode and the existence of a mode and how these two entities are “in” substance. Formal essences are eternal and are in substance in a Platonic sense, while (...) existent modes are temporal and are in substance insofar as they are parts of the whole of nature, or facies totius universi. Furthermore, the former are modes understood as pure relations, while the latter are modes understood as finite individuals. Formal essences are relations that specify how finite individuals will behave once they come into existence, while existent modes are individuals that express the relations defined by formal essences, as forces that possess a capacity to act and to be acted upon. According to these distinctions, I maintain that it is possible to develop a coherent account of contrariety and, consequently, of generation and destruction in Spinoza’s system. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 66.4 (2005) 483-506 [Access article in PDF] Lorenzo Valla and the Traditions and Transmissions of Philosophy C. S. Celenza Johns Hopkins University What is "philosophy"? Who is a "philosopher"? These questions underlay much of Salvatore Camporeale's work, and they are deeper than one might suppose. We can begin with one of Camporeale's favorite figures, Lorenzo Valla, and listen to one of the ways (...) he answered these questions. In the introduction to his work reforming Aristotelian logic, the Repastinatio totius dialectice, Valla situates the debate on wisdom by recalling the case of Pythagoras.1 "What a marvelous praise of modesty it was," Valla wrote, when Pythagoras, asked whether he considered himself wise, replied that he was not "wise," but was rather a "lover of wisdom"—not sophos, but philosophos.2 Valla uses here a humanistic trope, found also in Petrarch's advice to Luigi Marsili, to the effect that Marsili should shape the practice of his life in order to become a "verae sapientiae amator," a "lover of true wisdom."3These citations from Petrarch and Valla alert us to the well-studied fact that, in the view of some humanists, academic "philosophy" had usurped the name "philosophy" and the self-searching meaning behind it. Certain humanists were proposing an alternative notion of what wisdom signified and consequently of what philosophy itself—the "love of wisdom"—represented. It seemed that wisdom needed to be located in a more persuasive way in the world of human beings, history, and language, rather than in one of eternal [End Page 483] suprahuman essences; in short, "philosophy" had to be brought closer to rhetoric and philology.The goal of this paper is to examine this idea in a twofold manner: through the history of terms and concepts as these are refracted by and through the history of institutionalized learning; and through a brief foray into Valla's preface to his great critique of western logic. There has been a lot of challenging and interesting work on this topic in the last few decades. At the same time, there may be cause to wonder whether relatively recent historians have unwittingly become too bogged down in names, failing to see the real conflict. They have tended to assume that the modern, sharp separation of humanistic "disciplines," such as rhetoric and philosophy, existed in the same way and with the same force of conviction in the premodern era. True, there are famous ancient, medieval, and early modern examples of self-defined "philosophers" differentiating themselves from "philologists" and vice versa, most notably Seneca, who—lamenting the professionalization of education in his day—complained in a letter that "what was once philosophy, has become philology" (Ep. 108.23). Yet, the more one investigates this problem, and the more one peers beneath the surface of the seemingly stark divisions between "philosophy" and "philology," the more difficult this strong separation is to maintain.This notion of the possible interpenetrability of "philosophy," and "philology," and "rhetoric" as concepts was probably easier to understand in the Renaissance than it is now. The differences between the Renaissance and our own era lie in institutional context and personal approach, both of which have been, for about six or seven intellectual generations now (but no more than that), supported by a fourfold set of assumptions about what "real" or "professional" philosophy represents: first, that philosophy is primarily about metaphysics and ontology, or rather that there exists a hierarchy in which metaphysics and ontology stand at the top; other things, such as history, language, or rhetoric are "just not philosophy." Second, a retrospectively understood Cartesian split between mind and body is basically true (and that it is legitimate to project that dualistic split back onto thinkers who did not hold the same sort of dualism as axiomatic); and consequently third, that epistemology should be privileged, that is, that knowing and the study of how knowing happens are primarily what philosophy is about. Hence "philosophy" is regulative, a master-discipline that oversees the truth claims of all... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 66.4 (2005) 483-506 [Access article in PDF] Lorenzo Valla and the Traditions and Transmissions of Philosophy C. S. Celenza Johns Hopkins University What is "philosophy"? Who is a "philosopher"? These questions underlay much of Salvatore Camporeale's work, and they are deeper than one might suppose. We can begin with one of Camporeale's favorite figures, Lorenzo Valla, and listen to one of the ways (...) he answered these questions. In the introduction to his work reforming Aristotelian logic, the Repastinatio totius dialectice, Valla situates the debate on wisdom by recalling the case of Pythagoras.1 "What a marvelous praise of modesty it was," Valla wrote, when Pythagoras, asked whether he considered himself wise, replied that he was not "wise," but was rather a "lover of wisdom"—not sophos, but philosophos.2 Valla uses here a humanistic trope, found also in Petrarch's advice to Luigi Marsili, to the effect that Marsili should shape the practice of his life in order to become a "verae sapientiae amator," a "lover of true wisdom."3These citations from Petrarch and Valla alert us to the well-studied fact that, in the view of some humanists, academic "philosophy" had usurped the name "philosophy" and the self-searching meaning behind it. Certain humanists were proposing an alternative notion of what wisdom signified and consequently of what philosophy itself—the "love of wisdom"—represented. It seemed that wisdom needed to be located in a more persuasive way in the world of human beings, history, and language, rather than in one of eternal [End Page 483] suprahuman essences; in short, "philosophy" had to be brought closer to rhetoric and philology.The goal of this paper is to examine this idea in a twofold manner: through the history of terms and concepts as these are refracted by and through the history of institutionalized learning; and through a brief foray into Valla's preface to his great critique of western logic. There has been a lot of challenging and interesting work on this topic in the last few decades. At the same time, there may be cause to wonder whether relatively recent historians have unwittingly become too bogged down in names, failing to see the real conflict. They have tended to assume that the modern, sharp separation of humanistic "disciplines," such as rhetoric and philosophy, existed in the same way and with the same force of conviction in the premodern era. True, there are famous ancient, medieval, and early modern examples of self-defined "philosophers" differentiating themselves from "philologists" and vice versa, most notably Seneca, who—lamenting the professionalization of education in his day—complained in a letter that "what was once philosophy, has become philology" (Ep. 108.23). Yet, the more one investigates this problem, and the more one peers beneath the surface of the seemingly stark divisions between "philosophy" and "philology," the more difficult this strong separation is to maintain.This notion of the possible interpenetrability of "philosophy," and "philology," and "rhetoric" as concepts was probably easier to understand in the Renaissance than it is now. The differences between the Renaissance and our own era lie in institutional context and personal approach, both of which have been, for about six or seven intellectual generations now (but no more than that), supported by a fourfold set of assumptions about what "real" or "professional" philosophy represents: first, that philosophy is primarily about metaphysics and ontology, or rather that there exists a hierarchy in which metaphysics and ontology stand at the top; other things, such as history, language, or rhetoric are "just not philosophy." Second, a retrospectively understood Cartesian split between mind and body is basically true (and that it is legitimate to project that dualistic split back onto thinkers who did not hold the same sort of dualism as axiomatic); and consequently third, that epistemology should be privileged, that is, that knowing and the study of how knowing happens are primarily what philosophy is about. Hence "philosophy" is regulative, a master-discipline that oversees the truth claims of all... (shrink)

La actual etapa en la recepción del Concilio Vaticano II se caracteriza por recuperar la primacía hermenéutica del capítulo II de Lumen Gentium. De este modo se reconoce el carácter vinculante y permanente del sensus fidei fidelium en la construcción del consensus omnium fidelium. El presente artículo ofrece una profundización de esta eclesiología del Pueblo de Dios a la luz de una reconfiguración sinodal. Esto implicará una renovación de la identidad y la vocación de los sujetos eclesiales, y una reforma (...) de la organización y el funcionamiento de las estructuras. En esta nueva etapa se reconoce a la sinodalidad como dimensión constitutiva de la Iglesia. Sin embargo, esto supone diseñar un nuevo modo de proceder eclesial. En este sentido, proponemos que el reto actual debe enfocarse en la construcción de una eclesialidad sinodal que genere un proceso de sinodalización de toda la Iglesia. Se trata de crear la circularidad entre la escucha, el discernimiento, la elaboración y la toma de decisiones en la Iglesia, ya que la eclesiología del Pueblo de Dios nos enseña que en los procesos sinodales se expresa el sensus ecclesiae totius populi y no solo el sensus ecclesiae de la jerarquía. El presente artículo pretende ofrecer el marco hermenéutico para construir una eclesialidad sinodal, lo cual supone, una relectura y profundización de la Eclesiología del Pueblo de Dios, como la presentaremos en este artículo. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Location of the Houses of Cicero and Clodius and the Porticus Catuli on the Palatine Hill in RomeSteven M. CeruttiThe location of cicero’s house on the Palatine hill in Rome is a matter of more than ordinary interest, inasmuch as he locates it for us in relation to a number of other important houses and buildings, and recent archaeological investigations at the southwest corner of the hill can (...) be used to throw fresh light on this question. Cicero’s house almost certainly stood along the higher leg of the Clivus Victoriae, along the northwest side of the hill running from the north corner to the precinct of the Magna Mater. Here it would have overlooked the Forum Romanum, as Cicero says in conspectu prope totius urbis (Dom. 100). 1 On one side it adjoined the Porticus Catuli, which Clodius enlarged by the addition of a part of Cicero’s property, but only a fraction (vix pars aedium mearum decima,Dom. 116), after destroying Cicero’s house during Cicero’s self-imposed exile in 58 B.C. However, since Cicero regarded his as a large and noble house (Dom. 115; cf. Har. Resp. 16, Fam. 6.18.5), that tenth might have been a not inconsiderable parcel. Furthermore, in De Haruspicum Responso (49) Cicero tells us that Clodius announced in public assembly that he wished to build on the Carinae on the Mons Oppius a second porticus quae Palatio responderet. In context he clearly means that Clodius hoped to drive Pompey into exile as he had Cicero, to destroy Pompey’s Domus Rostrata, and to use the land for the construction of a porticus, perhaps in conjunction with the Temple of Tellus that was located nearby, that would match the Porticus Catuli as he had rebuilt it. 2 This has been taken to mean that Cicero’s house on the Palatine faced the Carinae, but that is not necessarily the case, as before the removal of the Velia in the 1930s the view from the Palatine to the Carinae was not uninterrupted, and it is questionable whether any significant [End Page 417] part of the Carinae was in view of the Palatine. 3 But since we cannot bound the Carinae, the question must be left open.On another side Cicero’s house adjoined the house of Q. Seius Postumus, which Cicero seems to have thought architecturally in a class with his own (Dom. 115). Seius’ house, either on the opposite side or in back, adjoined that of P. Clodius Pulcher, for when Clodius wanted to enlarge his house by annexing that of Seius, and Seius was reluctant to part with his house, Clodius threatened to block his light, presumably by the construction of walls that would cover windows that let into open areas such as gardens in his own house. 4 Cicero’s house, when it was later rebuilt, also adjoined that of his brother Quintus, closely enough that Cicero says he and his brother would be contubernales, once his brother’s house was finished, and the adherents of Clodius set fire to the building in progress in November 57 while they were trying to discourage Cicero from rebuilding (Att. 4.3.2; QFr. 2.4.2, 2.5.3). From this it seems almost certain that Cicero must have ceded a slice of his plot to his brother when the time for rebuilding came. Space on the Palatine had long been expensive and difficult to obtain, and at that time Marcus Cicero was worried about his financial condition and complained that the indemnity awarded him by the Senate was woefully inadequate (Att. 4.2.5). One might also imagine that the brothers’ houses adjoined at the rear, facing on different streets, but given the space available between the two legs of the Clivus Victoriae and the Via Nova, that is less likely. 5Clodius’ object in acquiring the houses of Seius and Cicero, although in the case of the latter ostensibly to enlarge the Porticus Catuli and to build a temple of Libertas (Dom. 108), was actually, Cicero asserts, to enlarge his own house and to make it one of the most sumptuous residences in the... (shrink)

The civil war which ended in the victory of Octavian and the suicide of Antony and Cleopatra is one of the most exciting but most obscure periods of Roman history, obscure mainly because the victor succeeded in imposing bis version of affairs upon his countrymen and through them on posterity. That is not to say that his version is necessarily completely false: the danger that threatened Rome was a real one, the national feeling that resulted in the coniuratio totius (...) Italiae of 32 B.C. and that inspired Virgil and Horace later was not an artificial growth, though it was carefully tended. But in kindling the requisite war-feeling and in rousing the necessary enthusiasm both sides had to propagand for themselves, and in ancient times propaganda often became a matter of personal abuse and mud-slinging. In this Octavian's agents were perhaps more successful, though few nowadays would accept the conventional portraits of Antony and Cleopatra as anywhere near the truth. But Antony's propaganda, though not so effective, was not obliterated by Octavian's victory; indeed a great deal of it is still preserved and masquerades as fact in histories of the period, where Octavian's personal character suffers badly. (shrink)

(There are occasional changes to the text. "F" refers to A. Friedberg, Corpus iuris canonici, Leipzig, 1879. "S" refers to Seraphicae legislationis textus originales iussu Rmi Patris Ministri Generalis totius Ordinis Fratrum Minorum in lucem editi (Ad Claras Aquas, 1897).).