Is aesthetics a product of evolution? Are human aesthetic behaviors in fact evolutionary adaptations? The creation of artistic objects and experiences is an important aesthetic behavior. But so is the perception of aesthetic phenomena qua aesthetic. The question of evolutionary aesthetics is whether humans have evolved the capacity not only to make beautiful things but also to appreciate the aesthetic qualities in things. Are our near-universal love of music and cute baby animals essential to our species’ evolutionary development, (...) which took place over thousands of years? In other words, do aesthetic practice and appreciation help people to survive or reproduce? Do aesthetic behaviors help to propel natural selection? If so, what does that tell us about ourselves as human beings? What does it tell us about art, our other aesthetic practices, and aesthetic experience? (shrink)

Craft Objects, Aesthetic Contexts examines the place of contemporary craft in traditional aesthetics.

Aesthetic experience has been relativized and marginalized by recent social and cultural theory. As less attention has been paid to understanding the nature of aesthetic experience than mapping the distributed social correlates of tastes, its transformative potential and capacity to animate actors’ imaginations and actions goes unexplored. In this paper we draw upon a large number of in-depth interviews with performing arts audiences around Australia to investigate the language and discourse used to describe aesthetic experiences. In particular, we begin with (...) theorizations of the subject-object nexus within object-relations theory to consider the transformative potential of aesthetic experience. Using these literatures, and extending them to others within sociology of the arts and materiality, our focus is on the way aesthetic experience can fuse human subjects with aesthetic objects. We examine how viewers take an aesthetic object into themselves and in turn project themselves into the aesthetic object by various visual and imaginative techniques. Our theoretical and empirical analysis bears out the constructive and productive capacity of aesthetic experience. (shrink)

The article explores the way in which new objects of study, such as dance performance and art–practice, emerge in algorithmic aesthetics. The advent of digital communicative practices shapes new means of formalization of dance performance scripts, which nowadays have various technological solutions, including algorithmic ones. Classical aesthetics is unable to describe the technological modernization of artistic expression. The author offers a general framework of algorithmic aesthetics to study of dance performance and art practice.

This paper raises puzzles concerning our grasp of others’ aesthetic selves. I first articulate a conception of an aesthetic self, understood as an autonomously adopted orientation to objects of aesthetic value, encompassing the embrace of aesthetic reasons and the qualitative appreciative states that follow. This articulation is motivated by the commonplace observation that people’s aesthetic identities are important to them. Given this importance, we might think it salutary to grasp other people’s aesthetic selves, under the general auspices of ‘interpersonal understanding’. (...) Given the conception of aesthetic selves, we might think that empathy is an appropriate way to do so. But, second, I argue that you can’t find out about another’s aesthetic self via empathy. We might instead think that aesthetic conversation is the way to grasp aesthetic selves. However, third, I argue that the aim of finding out about others’ aesthetic selves is at odds with the ostensible aims of aesthetic conversation, which are to do with effacing individuality and creating commonality. So aesthetic selves seem hard to grasp. I finally briefly canvass some ways of solving this problem, without settling on a firm answer, and consider how the thoughts might extend to practical identities more generally. (shrink)

The aesthetic experience, In husserl's language, Brackets or suspends the natural standpoint. Consciousness perceives the work of art not as an object of the factual world, But as a man-Made artifact to be enjoyed just for certain immediately experienced qualities. The work of art is neither a real physical entity nor a real psychical entity, But a purely intentional object, For which the physical object serves as a substratum. The critic must recreate the purely intentional object (...) by completing the schema of the work and by actualizing its merely potential elements. He must experience the ensemble of axiologically neutral qualities, Aesthetic qualities, And aesthetic values as an harmonious whole. A full concretion of the work is the aesthetic object-The object the critic describes and judges. By metaphorical or partly metaphorical language-Never completely adequate-He tries to convey to his readers the experience of its qualities and values. (shrink)

In this paper I will begin by exploring the context in which objectoriented aesthetics arose. I will set object-oriented aesthetics against another focus which I shall call "activity-oriented aesthetics", in which the excellence of an artistic production lies in the artist's activity. This activity is merely expressed in the finished work, even when the work is overwhelmingly admirable. Excellent artistic activity originates and persists in the artist's manner, execution and style. 1 Just as there is a (...) special case of object-oriented aesthetics in which objective beauty is the fundamental aesthetic concept, there is a special case of activity-oriented aesthetics in which artistic beauty/ a property of the artist's activity, becomes the fundamental aesthetic concept. Artistic beauty is beauty that radiates from the activity of an artist. It is visible directly in the activity itself, but it is also visible in the work through and to which it is transmitted. (The combination of activity and work I shall call 'artistic production'.). (shrink)

A fetish is a specific emotionally loaded object, body part, or situation that draws our attention and desire, and sexual fetishism is the sexual arousal that a person experiences when in contact with such a loaded object. Until now, psychology has had trouble understanding the distinctive lust objects and the orchestration of urges in the world of fetishism, so fetishism has therefore fallen into the category of perversions and abnormal behavior. In this study, fetishism is moved to the (...) field of aesthetics, and a new theory is presented: Fetishism is the attraction to certain species-specific key stimuli that are perceived as especially beautiful and exciting. A topic or an object that contains important key stimuli automatically becomes apower object or a fetish.Therefore, we have to look into the innate sensibilities on which our aesthetics are based and into the micro-processes of the aesthetic impulse to understand why something captivates and fascinates us in a fetishist way. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 40.4 (2006) 65-76 MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Identity, Aesthetics, ObjectsGustavo GuerraIn September 1990 UCLA's Wright Art Gallery opened an exhibition entitled Chicano Art: Resistance and Affirmation 1965-1985 (now usually referred to as CARA). While CARA was one of several national events displaying nonmainstream art, it was also distinctive in its politics of self-representation. The artists participating in CARA insisted that they be described (...) as members of a Chicano art movement. With the term Chicano they hoped to step beyond labels preferred by the dominant culture—labels such as Mexican American, Latino, or Hispanic. For these artists, the word Chicano was appealing because it represented a complexity of meanings that they understood as being integral to both their identity and to the art they produced. The word Chicano, as Alicia Gaspar de Alba discusses in Chicano Art Inside/Outside the Master's House,1 embraces multiple meanings and axes of cultural identity; it derives from the Nahuatl pronunciation of Mexicano, often referring to a person of Aztec descent but including, as well, Native American heritage, Mexican roots, and Catholic faith. The CARA artists also embraced the label's association with a politics of liberation, popular protest, and working-class creativity. From the outset, then, the CARA exhibition was more than an art exhibition.By some lights, however, CARA was too much more than an art exhibition. When the organizers realized they needed funds, they applied for a National Endowment of the Humanities (NEH) grant and were initially turned down. While an NEH rejection might mean a number of things, the language of the rejection reports in this case narrows the possibilities down [End Page 65] to an issue that I mean to consider in this article. One rejection report states thatThe panelists understood that Chicano art arose from a variety of political movements and social causes, and therefore the political aspect of this proposal is appropriate to the subject matter.... Even so, the panelists worried that the project makes a political statement, that it is politics masquerading as culture, and that the proposal contains jargon and rhetoric and reads like a manifesto. 2Other reviewers objected to the general language of the report along similar lines. While Chicano artists made a point of representing themselves in complex, multidimensional terms, the NEH found such complexity and multidimensionality perplexing and thus their art not worthy of funding. One referee, for instance, claimed that the terminology used in the proposal was too narrow; he complained that defining Chicano in terms of struggle was too restrictive and excluded other Chicano artists for whom struggle was not a major concern. But later the same reporter objected that some of the concepts in the proposal were not inclusive enough, as they failed to include issues and topics that are central to the Chicano community. Thus the complexity and cluttered characterization that the artists felt was central to their sense of identity was dismissed as either too excessive or as too restrictive. According to the NEH, Chicano artists failed not because of their art (which the referees did describe as "visually compelling") but because of the way in which they chose to identify themselves—because, in other words, of their "rhetoric and jargon." Whatever it was that the NEH found compelling in the Chicano art they found uncompelling in the description of the Chicano artists' lives.After the organizers revised their proposal and reapplied for the grant, they were once again turned down. This second rejection highlights even more clearly the nature of the problem. This second report argues that "[T]here is a disjunction between the organizers' intentions and the exhibition. The proposal does not differentiate clearly between Chicano art and Hispanic art and, in its dependence on self-referential analysis rather than a comparative perspective, the exhibition does not place art in the bigger picture." 3I would like to consider what is at issue when descriptions of identity are said not to work, or when descriptions of art are likewise accused of failure and... (shrink)

The dissertation offers a study of Kant's aesthetic theory as it is developed in the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment", the first half of his Critique of Judgment, which is widely acknowledged to be the founding text of modern philosophical aesthetics. I aim to show that this work elaborates an important and deeply interesting study of the nature and conditions of aesthetic judgment which---despite the recent resurgence of commentary and of secondary literature---has not yet been inherited. I give an account (...) focused on understanding Kant's idea that aesthetic judgment makes a claim to "subjective universality" and "exemplary necessity", the "twofold peculiarity" of aesthetic judgment that Kant himself presents as the main thematic guiding the course of the Critique. I argue for an interpretation of Kant's notion of aesthetic judgment which takes seriously his idea that its demand for the agreement of others takes the form of a presumption, in which the judge offers her judgment as exemplary of a "universal voice", apart from any independently or transcendentally assured authorization. (shrink)

This article explores the role of filmic objects within the romantic relationships featured in Ernst Lubitsch’s silent The Marriage Circle (1924) and the comedy Trouble in Paradise (1932). I argue that these objects reflect a unique engagement with the materiality of film décor, which makes use of the strong presence of objects to portray intimacy as the site of inconclusive meaning. By examining both films together, I demonstrate how the world of inanimate objects brings erotic undertones to the surface while (...) challenging the material conditions of the erotic itself. In order to do so, I examine the ways in which Lubitsch relies on material details not only as functional narrative devices, but as elements that challenge and complicate our interpretations of familiar things. While the underacknowledged use of objects in The Marriage Circle illustrates the logic of displacement that stands at the center of the director’s style, Trouble in Paradise provides a framework for recognizing the critical role of objects in the structure of desire in his films. This article sets up a new reading of tactility and materiality in Lubitsch’s use of mise en scéne and seeks to give objects a prominent role in the analysis of his style. (shrink)

An attempt to show that the judgments of aesthetics are both objective and relative. The sense in which they are objective is established by reference to sartre's account of husserl's theory of intentionality. The key concept here is the non-Ecological nature of consciousness. On this view value predicates refer to the properties of objects. Such properties have certain presuppositions. Drawing on discussions by john laird and j.N. Findlay it is argued that a property is justified when its presuppositions are (...) confirmed. It is also argued that a property is appropriate at one level when its presuppositions are of a certain type and appropriate at a higher level when the type of presupposition can itself be characterized in certain specific ways. These ways are those built into the terms used to express or refer to the property in question. Since such terms are sociocultural objects they are tied to particular times and places. For this reason all aesthetic judgments are relative. This, However, Does not destroy their objectivity. (shrink)

The question with which the paper is concerned is whether beauty must be literally "objective" if there are to be any aesthetic standards. the same issue is discussed in ethics and the conclusion reached that no analogy obtains between the two disciplines. the suggestion is made, in conclusion, that adequate aesthetic standards are possible even though beauty is "subjective.".

In this paper, I suggest an aesthetic model that is consistent with anti-foundational scientific knowledge. How has an aesthetics without foundation to be configured? In contrast to the conventional subject/object model, with idealistic and subjective aesthetics, but also with object-oriented assumptions, I suggest that aesthetics has to be characterized as relational aesthetics in terms of process-oriented perception and that this leads to an _Aesthetics Without Objects_ (AWO) approach. The relational nature of processes means that (...) they do not happen _inter_-, that is, between ontologically delimited and stable entities, but rather they _correspond_ between relations. I will try to show that AWO matches well with the onto-phenomenological-epistemic and relational models proposed by recent theories in different fields of science, especially in the relational interpretation of quantum physics. The field of aesthetics, then, does not indicate perceptual fixed contents—either subjective or objectual properties—rather it emerges from a correspondence occurring in an engaged and situated perceptual movement, an _agencing_ that is prior to any sharp distinction between a perceiver and a perceived. I propose to call _haptic_ this perceptual agencing. In the first section, I describe the reasons according to which the adoption of AWO seems more correct and advisable, both with respect to contemporary scientific models and to the current ecological changes on the planet. In the second section, I portray some characteristics of AWO. In the third section, I argue that AWO calls for haptic perception. In the fourth section, I briefly draw some meta-aesthetics consequences concerning, on the one side, socio-political issues of AWO and, on the other side, the possibility for a theory in an anti-foundational model. I conclude with a proposal: a process-oriented aesthetics approach has to be understood mainly as an _art of thinking_. This means rethinking and re-evaluating the idea of aesthetics as an _artisan thought_. (shrink)

Is the celebrated elegance of Cycladic marble figurines an effect their Early Bronze Age producers intended? Can one adequately appreciate an Assyrian regal statue described by a cuneiform inscription as beautiful? What to make of the apparent aesthetic richness of the traditional cultures of Melanesia, which, however, engage in virtually no recognizable aesthetic discourse? Questions such as these have been formulated and discussed by scholars of remote cultures against the backdrop of a general scepticism about the prospects of escaping the (...) conditioning of one’s own aesthetic culture and attuning to the norms of a remote one. This book makes a radical move: it treats the remote observers’ lack of aesthetic insight not as a hindrance to aesthetic analysis, but as a condition requiring an aesthetic theory that would make room for an aesthetic analysis independent of the model of competent aesthetic judgement or appreciation. -/- Objects of Authority represents a rare effort at bringing together methods and concepts that are often addressed by separate disciplines. It will appeal to scholars and advanced students working on philosophical, art-historical, and anthropological theories of visual art and material culture. (shrink)

미적 감정주의는 미적 가치평가가 감정 반응에 근거한다는 생각이다. 이 글에서 나는 미적 감정주의에 기초하여 미적 감정이 있다고 주장하는 두 관점인 환원주의와 수정주의를 비판적으로 검토한다. 경이 환원주의는 비인지주의 감정 이론을 전제하고 미적 감상이 경이 감정으로 환원된다고 주장한다. 다수 감정 환원주의는 인지주의나 비인지주의를 전제하지 않고 미적 감상이 다수의 감정으로 이루어진 한 부류로 환원된다고 주장한다. 반면 수정주의는 감상 감정인 미적 감정이 별도의 감정적 기능인 완성적 기능을 갖기에 독자적인 감정 유형으로 분류돼야 한다고 주장한다. 그러나 환원주의는 개념 예술 감상을 적절하게 설명하지 못한다는 문제를 가진다. 이에 (...) 더해, 경이 환원주의는 재조정을 통해 미적 경이의 지향적 대상을 구성하는 데 취약하고, 다수 감정 환원주의는 미적 가치평가의 근거가 감정이 아닌 다른 반응이나 태도일 가능성을 간과하는 문제를 가진다. 한편 수정주의는 감정의 완성적 기능과 정감적 평가가 개념적으로 충돌하는 문제를 드러내며, 직접 경험 원칙에서 벗어나는 예술 감상 사례를 설명하지 못한다. 그러므로 나는 환원주의와 수정주의가 모두 성공적이지 않다고 결론 내린다. (shrink)

The first half of this article argues that, like judgments as to whether something smells or tastes good, judgments about works of art ultimately depend on an element of subjective response. However, it shows that, unlike gustatory or olfactory judgments, we can argue meaningfully about our experience of works of art because they have _parts<D>. Because works of art have parts these can be patterned by the imagination, and this patterning can be influenced by what is said to us. The (...) second half considers five conditions that must be met before someone is entitled to assert, 'This is a good poem,' rather than simply, 'I like this poem now.' Finally, the last section considers why a report of an ultimately subjective response is disguised in everyday usage as an objective judgment. (shrink)

People across the world seek out beautiful sounds in nature, such as a babbling brook or a nightingale song, for positive human experiences. However, it is unclear whether this positive aesthetic response is driven by a preference for the perceptual features typical of nature sounds versus a higher‐order association of nature with beauty. To test these hypotheses, participants provided aesthetic judgments for nature and urban soundscapes that varied on ease of recognition. Results demonstrated that the aesthetic preference for nature soundscapes (...) was eliminated for the sounds hardest to recognize, and moreover the relationship between aesthetic ratings and several measured acoustic features significantly changed as a function of recognition. In a follow‐up experiment, requiring participants to classify these difficult‐to‐identify sounds into nature or urban categories resulted in a robust preference for nature sounds and a relationship between aesthetic ratings and our measured acoustic features that was more typical of easy‐to‐identify sounds. This pattern of results was replicated with computer‐generated artificial noises, which acoustically shared properties with the nature and urban soundscapes but by definition did not come from these environments. Taken together, these results support the conclusion that the recognition of a sound as either natural or urban dynamically organizes the relationship between aesthetic preference and perceptual features and that these preferences are not inherent to the acoustic features. Implications for nature's role in cognitive and affective restoration are discussed. (shrink)

It has always been a matter of curiosity what kind of information art, which is far from ordinary and untouchable, provides people. Confronting a person with an art object means looking at the window of a world different from the world of daily routines, with his head stuck out. We can describe this world as magical in a romantic way. This magic arises from the difference in the functioning of perception, interpretation and judgment processes, which the person confronted with (...) an art object has difficulty in explaining to himself from time to time. Because the acquisition of perception in the world of routines and the acquisition of perception from the art object are different in terms of the functioning of mental processes... (shrink)

In order to establish a rational framework within which to discuss aesthetic matters, I attempt to find grounds to support the notion that objectivity in aesthetic evaluation is possible, within the visual arts. I begin by exploring the possibility that the foundations of our aesthetic response are innate, because, if this is the case, it would indicate that aesthetic considerations have a common basis within us all, rather than belonging to a purely personal and subjective realm. In Part One, in (...) search of foundations, I turn to the art of those who are relatively unprogrammed in our artistic conventions, in an attempt to distinguish between innate impulses and conditioned responses. Next, by looking for the motivation behind the aesthetic impulse, and what this can tell me about how the aesthetic is constituted, I consider the possibility that the aesthetic impulse is in some way linked to characteristics which aid survival. This includes studying the nature of perception, including various innate perceptual mechanisms and the part they play in the way our idea of the aesthetic is constituted, and some theories concerned with the psychological aspects involved in creativity, which link the aesthetic impulse with creativity in all fields of enquiry. In Part Two, I study examples of how discussions on aesthetic matters are conducted in our culture, to see whether there is evidence to support the notion of objectivity in aesthetic evaluation. While recognizing that it is common for aesthetic discussions to be conducted in a confused and even unintelligible manner, often using criteria actually irrelevant to aesthetic value (an example of which I provide), I seek out examples of reviews which are conducted in a rational and intelligible manner, based on relevant objective criteria. Also, by analysing the terms we use when discussing an art work, I ascertain whether these terms refer to properties in the actual art work, which we believe exist independently from the spectator, or whether these terms describe how we feel when viewing a work. In other words, I examine whether we have the concepts to support the idea that objectivity in aesthetic evaluation in the visual arts is possible. (shrink)

The purpose here is to give a thorough phenomenological account of the aesthetic experience. The difference between cognitive perception of a real object and the aesthetic experience of an esthetic object is discussed at length. Elements and phases of an esthetic experience are delineated; illustrations of a preliminary emotion of esthetic experience are given, All of which suggest a fundamental change of attitude. From normal perceiving to esthetic perceiving there is a change from categorical structures to qualitative harmony (...) structures, Producing pleasure in the presence of an esthetic object. (staff). (shrink)

The aesthetic theory of Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) revolves around the concept of allure, a nonliteral experience of an object’s displacement from its qualities that draws attention to a deeper reality. But applying allure to aesthetic interpretation is hampered in two ways. First, OOO necessarily moves between the constrained viewpoint of experience and a more global perspective. Yet mixing these “inside” and “outside” views can risk ambiguity. Second, the phenomenological difference between the parts and qualities of an (...) object must be clarified before Harman’s model of wholes and parts can be incorporated into OOO aesthetics. Addressing these two ambiguities will make it possible to further develop OOO’s resources for aesthetic commentary. For instance, one conclusion is that allure itself has two varieties: a tension between the object and its qualities (“allusion”) and a tension between the whole and its parts (“collusion”). These options parallel Harman’s twofold critique of reductionism. Another conclusion is that the literal needs an explanation within the framework of OOO insofar as it is a genuine feature of experience. (shrink)

Heidegger's totally objective view of aesthetic truth, That the meaning of aesthetic experience is revealed only in and through the art-Object, Fails to appreciate the contributions of subjectivity to that meaningfulness. This is shown by pointing out that interpretation of an artwork can be relevant for our aesthetic appreciation and that sometimes subjective factors such as the artist's intentions, And the viewer's personal, Cultural background, Are relevant to interpretation.

The Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature I advance a view of the aesthetic value of nature that Glenn Parsons seeks to contest. Here I attempt to show three things. The first is that his critique of my view of the aesthetic value of a natural thing is malfounded. The second is that his proposed alternative, which is intended to vindicate the claim to objectivity of certain judgements of the aesthetic value of a natural thing, is unconvincing. And the third is that, (...) contrary to what he maintains, I am not committed to the alternative he proposes through an apparent tension in my position, for there is no such tension. (shrink)

This essay traces the steps to social aesthetics. It begins by affirming the central place of sense experience for aesthetics and its refinement in the perceptual acuity of a developed sensibility. This leads to associating aesthetic appreciation with such perceptual experience. Rejecting the identification of disinterestedness with such appreciation, the present paper proposes the full participatory involvement in the experience of appreciation as expressed by the concept of aesthetic engagement. This describes the appreciative situation as an aesthetic field (...) in which the perceptual, creative, focusing, and activating factors are in reciprocal interaction. It characterizes not only appreciation in the arts but occurs as well in appreciating natural, built, and social environments. Aesthetic engagement in social aesthetics is exemplified by the gaze in the experience of four well-known paintings I shall consider. Following these a series of related ideas are developed that lead to the concept of a social aesthetics. Finally, the essay returns to the paintings for an enhanced understanding of social aesthetics. (shrink)

Aesthetic non-naturalism is the view that there are objective aesthetic truths that hold in virtue of sui generis facts. This view is seldom explicitly endorsed in philosophical aesthetics. I argue that many aestheticians should treat it as the view to beat, since (a) their commitments favour aesthetic realism, (b) non-naturalistic forms of aesthetic realism are particularly promising and (c) non-naturalists have reasonable answers to four important objections.

뵈메의 시각으로 서포터즈의 퍼포먼스에 주목해서 프로 축구경기의 미학적 의미를 고찰하고, 이를 통해서 축구 미학은 물론 더 나아가서 스포츠 미학을 새로운 관점에서 접근하는 길을 환기시키는 것이 논문의 목적이다. 이러한 목적에 상응하는 연구의 내용은 다음과 같다. 먼저 ‘분위기’ 및 ‘분위기 머금은 현상’ 개념을 중심으로 뵈메의 ‘지각학으로서의 미학’의 핵심이 검토된다. 이는 축구경기의 미학적 의미를 전통미학의 틀에서 벗어나서 논구할 수 있는 기초를 다지는 것을 의미한다. 다음으로 축구경기에서 만들어지는 분위기, 즉 축구경기의 특정 상황에서 형성되는 경기장 전체의 분위기가 ‘극적인 골’ 사건에 초점을 맞춰 검토된 뒤, 그것이 (...) 어떻게 미학적 대상이 되는가 하는 점이 구명된다. 다시 말해서 극적인 골 직후 조성되는 경기장 분위기가 기본적으로 목적성취 혹은 욕구충족에 기인하는 것임에도 불구하고, 어째서 미학적 사건이라고 할 수 있는가 하는 점, 어째서 욕구충족과 무관한 지각경험의 대상이라 할 수 있는가 하는 점이 해명된다. 아울러 그 사건이 ‘분위기 머금은 현상’으로 표현되고 전달될 때, 그것은 이른바 직관 팬뿐만 아니라 모든 사람에게 미학적 대상이 되는데, 이것이 구체적으로 무엇을 의미하는 것인가 하는 점도 밝혀진다. 마지막으로 ‘축구경기의 미학적 의미’를 새로운 관점에서, 좀 더 정확히 말해서 뵈메의 관점에서 조망하고자 할 경우, 욕구대상으로서의 축구경기가 지각의 대상으로 전환될 때 일반 팬이 감지하게 되는 ‘성과사회의 그물코를 벗어나지 못한 삶에 처해있음’의 의미가 다각도로 논구되는 것이 무엇보다도 필요가 있다는 사실이 언급된다. 이러한 내용을 담고 있는 본 논문은 몇 가지 한계에도 불구하고 전통 미학의 틀에서 벗어나서 스포츠 미학 담론을 새로운 시각에서 새롭게 논의하는 것이 필요하고 또 충분히 가능하다는 사실을 환기시켜주는 데에는 기여할 수 있을 것이다. (shrink)

: In this paper, I lay out a case for why those objects of aesthetic attention which are principally characterized as natural objects should be understood not statically, as existing in merely a three-dimensional fixed state, but as dynamic, as existing in a space-time context, complete with change, movement, and flux. After this, I explain why this is important, how the dynamic nature of natural objects raises a concern for aesthetically evaluating natural objects, and how that concern may be addressed.

Pictorial art and presentness --art and transperceptual space -- In and through space : sculpture, assemblage, and installation art -- Land art : reciprocities of site and formation -- Embodiment and architectural cognition -- The aesthetic space of photography -- Digital objects, aesthetic phenomena.

According to the classical view, beauty is grounded on the universe’s objective harmony, defined by the formula of unity in variety. Thus, nature’s beauty is univocal and independent of subjective judgement. In this paper I argue that, although Leibniz’s view coincides with this formula, his philosophy offers an explanation for subjective dissent in aesthetic judgements about nature. I show that the acceptance of divergences on aesthetic value are the result of a conception of harmony that includes qualitative variety and dissonance.