James procurou superar a cisão da personalidade por meio de uma antropologia da ação em que combinou vários materiais intelectuais que não respeitam fronteiras epistemológicas. Apropriou-se estrategicamente de diferentes fontes culturais e avanços da psicopatologia para pensar a liberação das possibilidades da consciência e da experiência. Entre eles, serão exploradas suas leituras de Giovanni Papini e Pierre Janet para dar conta do modo preciso como essas contribuições intelectuais atuam em sua antropologia da superação.

Directed panspermia is the deliberate seeding of lifeless planets with microbes, in the hopes that, over evolutionary timescales, they will give rise to a complex self-sustaining biosphere on the target planet. Due to the immense distances and timescales involved, human beings are unlikely ever to see the fruits of their labours. Such missions must therefore be justified by appeal to values independent of human wellbeing. In this paper I investigate the values that a directed panspermia mission might promote. Paying special (...) attention to the outcome in which sentient animals evolve, I argue that we have strong reasons to believe the value of a mission would be negative. Research on wild animal suffering has shown that there is a huge amount of suffering among wild animals on Earth. I argue that there are structural features of evolution by natural selection which explain the prevalence of suffering on Earth, and make it predictable that suffering would prevail on the target planet too. Finally, using insights from procreative ethics I argue on non-consequentialist grounds that creators have duties to their sentient creations which cannot be met in directed panspermia missions. (shrink)

We generally accept that medicine’s conceptual and ethical foundations are grounded in recognition of personhood. With patients in vegetative state, however, we’ve understood that the ethical implications of phenomenal consciousness are distinct from those of personhood. This suggests a need to reconsider medicine’s foundations. What is the role for recognition of consciousness (rather than personhood) in grounding the moral value of medicine and the specific demands of clinical ethics? I suggest that, according to holism, the moral value of medicine is (...) secured when conscious states are recognized in everyday medical science. Moreover, consciousness fully motivates traditional principles of clinical ethics if we understand respect for autonomy as respect for the dominion of an experiencer in the private, inescapable realm of bodily experience. When medicine’s foundations are grounded in recognition of consciousness, we understand how patients fully command respect even when they lack capacity to exercise their bodily dominion through decision-making. (shrink)

Classicism in architecture and literature; Turkey; history.

VorbemerkungDer Beantwortung liegt eine allgemeine Stellungnahrae zum Unterricht an der Mittelschule, insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Mathematik bei. Die in Klammern [] gesetzten Ziffern verweisen auf die Punkte 1 bis 6 dieser Stellungnahme.

In chapter 3 of Wild Animal Ethics Johannsen argues for a collective obligation based on beneficence to intervene in nature in order to reduce the suffering of wild animals. In the same chapter he claims that the non-identity problem is merely a “theoretical puzzle” which doesn’t affect our reasons for intervention. In this paper I argue that the non-identity problem affects both the strength and the nature of our reasons to intervene. By intervening in nature on a large scale we (...) change which animals come into existence. In doing so, we enable harmful animals to inflict harms on other animals, and we put other animals in harm’s way. The harms that these animals will inflict and endure are foreseeable. Furthermore, since non-human animals aren’t moral agents, harmful animals cannot be morally responsible for their harmful actions. I argue therefore that by causing animals to exist, knowing that they will inflict and suffer harms, we become morally responsible for those harms. By engaging in identity-affecting actions then we take on secondary moral duties towards the animals we have thereby caused to exist, and these secondary moral duties may be extremely demanding, even more so than the initial costs of intervention. Finally, these duties are duties of justice rather than duties of beneficence, and as such are more stringent than purely beneficence-based moral reasons. Furthermore, this conclusion flows naturally from several plausible principles which Johannsen explicitly endorses. (shrink)

Cameras, microphones, and other sensors continue to proliferate in the world around us. I offer a new metaphor for conceptualizing these technologies: they are _digital wormholes_, transmitting representations of human persons between disparate points in space–time. We frequently cannot tell when they are operational, what kinds of data they are collecting, where the data may reappear in the future, and how the data can be used against us. The wormhole metaphor makes the mysteriousness of digital sensors salient: digital sensors have (...) brought us to a strange place. If humans are to be capable of making sensible decisions while under observation by digital sensors, we must improve the epistemic position of potential sensor subjects. (shrink)

National Action Plans on business and human rights are a growing phenomenon. Since 2011, 42 such plans have been adopted or are in-development worldwide. By comparison, only 39 general human rights action plans were published between 1993 and 2021. In parallel, NAPs have attracted growing scholarly interest. While some studies highlight their potential to advance national compliance with international norms, others criticise NAPs as cosmetic devices that states use to deflect attention from persisting abuses and needed regulation. In response to (...) wider critiques of international human rights norms, and their failure to exact universal state compliance, experimentalist governance theory highlights the dynamic, dialogic and iterative character of human rights implementation as well as the role of stakeholders. In this article, we apply experimentalist governance theory to evaluate the role and character of business and human rights NAPs. Rather than attempting to evaluate NAPs’ ultimate consequences for rights-holders, which appears premature, we focus on NAPs processes. Specifically, we analyse NAPs processes in twenty-five states against five experimentalist governance criteria relating to stakeholder participation; agreement on a broad problem definition; local contextualisation; monitoring and peer review and periodic revision and learning. According to our findings, NAPs on business and human rights in most states demonstrate resemblance to the traits of experimentalist governance. In particular, our analysis points to the emergence of relatively sophisticated and demanding institutional governance mechanisms within NAPs — including the institutionalisation of complex deliberative processes. Nevertheless, our paper also identifies some significant shortcomings in NAPs, related to the lack of inclusion of vulnerable groups and the lack of explicit indicators and targets. (shrink)

I develop a socialist republican conception of economic liberty and show how it can be used to understand the domination of workers. It holds that both paid and unpaid workers can be deprived of economic freedom when they are exposed to an arbitrary power to undermine their access to the economic capabilities needed for civic equality. Measures intended to reduce domination are recommended, including public ownership of productive property, workplace democracy, and robust unconditional basic income and services. Finally, I discuss (...) the implications of this approach for platform capitalism, digital surveillance, the rise of automation, and post-work politics. (shrink)

After nearly fifty years of mea culpas and explanatory additions, the biopsychosocial model is no closer to a life of its own. Bolton and Gillett give it a strong philosophical boost in The Biopsychosocial Model of Health and Disease, but they overlook the model’s deeply inconsistent position on dualism. Moreover, because metaphysical confusion has clinical ramifications in medicine, their solution sidesteps the model’s most pressing clinical faults. But the news is not all bad. We can maintain the merits of holism (...) as we let go of the inchoate bag of platitudes that is the biopsychosocial model. We can accept holism as the metaphysical open door that it is, just a willingness to recognize the reality of human experience, and the sense in which that reality forces medicine to address biological, psychological, and social aspects of health. This allows us to finally characterize Engel’s driving idea in accurate philosophical terms, as acceptance of consciousness in the context of medical science. This will not entirely pin down medicine’s stance on dualism, but it will position it clearly enough to readily improve patient care. (shrink)

Moral theory has generally focused on resolving ethical dilemmas by identifying ethically sound options. Whether the focus is on consequences, duties, principles or virtues, ethical cases are often approached in ways that assume morally sound solutions can be found and followed. Such ‘ideal morality’ assumes that moral goodness is always possible, leaving people confident they have done the right thing. Such an approach becomes inadequate in disaster settings where any good solution is often difficult to see. This paper examines recent (...) work on nonideal moral theory as a useful model for disaster bioethics. This approach views moral dilemmas as situations where no choice is ideal and every option involves some element of unavoidable wrongdoing. Rather than straining for ideal answers, this approach acknowledges that sometimes the lesser of two evils is the best that can be done. Such situations inevitably lead to feelings of regret or guilt, commonly encountered in discussions of disaster bioethics. This paper explores the practical implications of nonideal approaches for disaster responders working in tragic situations. (shrink)

What position on dualism does medicine require? Our understanding of that ques- tion has been dictated by holism, as defined by the biopsychosocial model, since the late twentieth century. Unfortunately, holism was characterized at the start with con- fused definitions of ‘dualism’ and ‘reductionism’, and that problem has led to a deep, unrecognized conceptual split in the medical professions. Some insist that holism is a nonreductionist approach that aligns with some form of dualism, while others insist it’s a reductionist view (...) that sets out to eradicate dualism. It’s important to consider each version. Nonreductive holism is philosophically consistent and clinically unprob- lematic. Reductive holism, however, is conceptually incoherent—yet it is the basis for the common idea that the boundary between medical and mental health disorders must be vague. When we trace that idea through to its implementation in medical practice, we find evidence that it compromises the safety of patient care in the large portion of cases where clinicians grapple with diagnosis at the boundary between psychiatry and medicine. Having established that medicine must embrace some form of nonreduc- tionism, I argue that Chalmers’ naturalistic dualism is a stronger prima facie candidate than the nonreductive alternatives. Regardless of which form of nonreductionism we prefer, some philosophical corrections are needed to give medicine a safe and coherent foundation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 281 g. The Problematics of History. Two types are distinguished: the more general neoidealism, especially the Italian, which will be treated in subsequent volumes; and the more technical examination of historical knowledge by Dilthey, Simmel, Spengler, Windelband, Rickert, M/insterberg, Weber, Troeltsch, Meinecke, and Huizinga. Without exaggerating it, Lamanna points to the strain of "inquietude" and restlessness which shows itself in much of the early twentieth-century philosophizing, especially (...) in its attacks on rationalism, and which serves to foreshadow the greater anxieties that will be portrayed in the second volume of the trilogy. I add only two small observations, not by way of criticism, but merely to supplement the expositions (which seem to me to be excellent) of two men whom I happen to know well. Giuseppe Prezzolini appears with Papini (as he should) as a founder and leader o[ the pragmatist periodical Leonardo. Whereas Papini's adventures in philosophical romance were quite extravagant, Prezzolini's contributions were satirically ironical His L'Arte di persuadere, which to a hasty reader might well appear as a "manuale per i bugiardi" (p. 308), really appears, in view of his subsequent career in La Voce and in his Vita di Macehiavelli as a brilliant Macchiavellian satire. Similarly there is an undercurrent of genial satire in the pragmatisms of James and Schiller. The criticism in Dewey's social philosophy of what he refers to as the bourgeois Utilitarian liberalism and individualism of early nineteenth-century Britain appears in Lamanna 's pages (as in other scholarly European works) as a criticism of "Americanism." Dewey called his political philosophy a "new individualism" which was about the same as the doctrines of European social democrats. It was very democratic in contrast to the liberalism of the early utilitarians. But this early individualistic liberalism is no more American than it is European. Certainly Dewey's democracy is at least as American as the "Americanism" which he criticized. If we must use these terms, we could say that the socalled "Americanization of Europe" coincided with the Europeanization of America. James was politically an individualist and Dewey was a socialist; both were equally American and equally concerned to be cosmopolitan. These terminological problematics are not intended as a criticism of Lamanna's exposition of Dewey's philosophy, which seems to me one of the very best of the many I have read. On p. 245 "Cominger" should be Commager. HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER Claremont, California Aus den A nfiingen der Psychoanalyse. Briefe an Wilhelm Fliess. A bhandlungen und Notizen aus den Jahren 1887-1902. By Sigmund Freud. (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1962. Copyright, Imago Publishing Co., London, 1950.) This selection of the letters, notes and treatises sent to the Berlin physician and biologist Wilhelm Fliess makes fascinating reading today, twenty-five years after Freud's death. Most of this material originates in the years 1893-1901 and therefore covers not only the period of Freud's shift from neurology to psychology but also the period of his most vigorous creativity in psychoanalysis itself, namely the publication together with his predecessor, Josef Breuer, of Studien iiber Hysterie. It is the period of his self-analysis which laid the groundwork for psychoanalytic therapy, the years during which he conceived and published his basic work Interpretation of Dreams. It is also the time when he wrote Sexuality in the Etiology of Neuroses, Ueber den Traum, and Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens. 282 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Included in this volume of papers sent to Fliess is The Draft of a Psychology written in a burst of enthusiasm during three weeks in the autumn of 1895 (pp. 305-384 of the text). This important paper deals not only with emotive life but with the origin of cognitive thought, a topic which went in part into Chapter 7 of the Interpretation of Dreams. In this paper Freud still tries to combine his ideas of the physiology of the brain with his psychological and psychopathological findings. It is therefore a watershed of his intellectual endeavors, although Freud abandoned on the whole the effort to incorporate a theory of cognitive thought into his writings. Some rudiments of the Draft reappeared, however, in Das Ich und das... (shrink)

In this paper I distinguish between illustrative and performative uses of artworks in the teaching and communication of philosophy, drawing examples from the history of art and my own practice. The former are where works are used merely to illustrate and communicate a philosophical idea or argument, the latter are where the artist or teacher philosophizes through the creation of art. I hope to promote future collaboration between philosophers, art historians and artists, with artworks becoming catalysts for artistic-philosophical investigation, thus (...) revitalizing the idea of universities embodying ongoing and open-ended conversations. (shrink)

What is moral philosophy? That is the question with which this important volume grapples. Its starting point is the famous critique made in 1958 by Elizabeth Anscombe, who argued that moral philosophy begins from a mistake: that it is fundamentally wrong about the sort of concept that the word 'moral' represents. Anscombe rejected moral philosophy as it was then (and mostly now still is) practised. She offered instead a blueprint for the task moral philosophers must embrace if they are to (...) speak intelligibly to society about good and bad, right and wrong, duty and obligation. The chapters in this book are inspired by Anscombe's classic text. One of the most powerful voices here, among many authoritative voices, is that of Philippa Foot – Anscombe's lifelong friend – who asserts that 'any account of practical reason evacuated of an understanding of what human beings need to flourish is inadequate and must be rejected.'. (shrink)

Objective: Parental influence during children’s “everyday” pain events is under-explored, compared to clinical or experimental pains. We trialed two digital reporting methods for parents to record the real-world context surrounding their child’s everyday pain events within the family home.Methods: Parents completed a structured e-diary for 14 days, reporting on one pain event experienced by their child each day, and describing child pain responses, parental supervision, parental estimates of pain severity and intensity, and parental catastrophizing, distress, and behavioral responses. During the (...) same 2-week period, a subsample of parent-child pairs completed digital ecological momentary assessments, immediately after any chosen pain event. Children reported their current pain while parents estimated the child’s pain and indicated their own distress.Results: “Everyday” pain events frequently featured minor injuries to the child’s head, hands or knees, and child responses included crying and non-verbal comments. Pain events occurred less frequently when parents had been supervising their child, and supervising parents reported lower levels of worry and anxiety than non-supervising parents. Child sex was significantly associated with parental estimates of pain intensity, with parents of girls giving higher estimates than parents of boys. Child age was significantly associated with both the number of pain events and with parental estimates of pain intensity and child distress: the youngest children experienced the fewest pain events but received higher pain and distress estimates from parents than older children. Hierarchal Linear Modeling revealed that parental estimates of pain severity were significant positive predictors of parental distress and catastrophizing in response to a specific pain event. Furthermore, higher levels of parental catastrophic thinking in response to a specific pain event resulted in increased distress, solicitousness, and coping-promoting behaviors in parents. The EMA data revealed that children reported significantly higher pain intensity than their parents.Conclusion: The electronic pain diary provided a key insight into the nature of “everyday” pain experiences around the family home. Digital daily reporting of how the family copes with “everyday” events represents a viable means to explore a child’s everyday pains without disrupting their home environment. (shrink)

Danielle Macbeth disagrees with the view that there are logical truths in an ontological sense, and argues that we have no adequate epistemological account of our access to such features of reality. In my response I recall some main aspects of my ontological and epistemological formulation of logic as a science, and argue that neither Quine’s considerations against meaning, nor Benacerraf’s considerations against Gödel’s realism, show the untenability of an approach to logical truth in terms of logical propositions that denote (...) logical states of affairs.Danielle MacBeth discorda da tese que há verdades lógicas em um sentido ontológico e argumenta que não há um tratamento adequado de nosso acesso epistêmico à tais aspectos da realidade. Em minha réplica relembro algumas características principais de minha formulação ontológica e epistemológica da lógica como ciência, e argumento que nem as considerações de Quine contra a noção de significado, nem as considerações de Benacerraf contra o realismo de Gödel, mostram a invalidade de uma concepção de verdade lógica em termos de proposições que denotam estados de coisa lógicos. (shrink)

The analysis of historical literature allows to consider profoundly the development of national culture and science of the 18th-first half of the 20th centuries and the formation and change of different historical concepts. With the analysis of historical periods that are highlighted in the research, general trends in the changing of paradigms about Russian historical development were concluded, which were translated to mass historical consciousness from the beginning of the 18th century up to 1917. The periods were closely connected with (...) the specific political, historical and economic changes in Russian Empire and with the dominance of certain textbooks during this time. The books were selected because of a number of factors: their inclusion to the school curriculum, the number of publications, the equal number of textbooks devoted to different historical periods. For the analysis were used 19 textbooks, schoolbooks for different courses of secondary schools and primary schools. All the sources of educational literature were grouped into two concepts - officially-state and the liberal. Each publication was highlighted the dominant concept as a base for the whole textbook. There is also a characteristic of the concepts that are presented chronologically. The analysis represents school history books as an important source for the formation of state policy in the representing of Russian history, and, that is more important, for creation of the concept of the state of Russian history. (shrink)

A new line of self projection magazines that started blooming in Lagos, Nigeria, about the mid-1990s defined itself by filling almost completely every issue with photographs that depict politicians, businesspeople, sports and show business stars enjoying fruits of their extraordinary achievements on festive occasions. The magazine’s cozy coverage of the rich and famous irks a lot of serious cultural and literary critics who believe that this style resembles praise singing too closely. This paper, unlike mainline criticisms of the pictorial magazines, (...) takes praise singing to be a serious subject. Its central proposition is that the Nigerian magazine culture embraced these magazines because they have successfully translated into photography the panegyric tendency that pervades popular, self-projection arts in the underlying Yorùbá cultural environment of southwestern Nigeria. The sub-genre of Yorùbá panegyric that the magazines rework into the photographic medium is oríkì bọ̀rọ̀kìnní, or praise chants of the eminent. The paper analyzes sample issues of Ovation magazine to outline ways of placing contemporary African cultural forms in a long perspective and to propose an example of how inter-mediality operates today in popular cultures. In the concluding section, the essay proposes that a “poetic” understanding of photography, as opposed to “theatricality” and or melancholic substitution, represents the best way to think about the type of festive portraiture practiced in Ovationand its imitators. (shrink)

Even today, apologists for modernist and post-modernist architecture frequently appeal to what, following Sir Karl Popper, I will call historicist arguments. Such arguments have a particular poignancy when they are used to justify the replacement of some familiar part of an ancient city with some intentionally untraditional structure; as, for example, when a familiar nineteenth century block of offices in a prime city site is swept away to make room for something supposedly more fitting to the ‘new millennium’, a ‘twentieth (...) century contribution to monumental architecture’, a building ‘of substantial importance to the present age’. Similarly, those architects or consumers of architecture who fail to conform to whatever stylistic demands the age is held to demand are marginalized in many supposedly serious discussions of architecture, and made to feel out of place and out of time. (shrink)

The paper is devoted to the analysis of Kant’s approach to the ideas of universality and autonomy as the constitutive features of morality. The paper shows that Kant’s findings concerning these ideas were anticipated by the previous history of moral philosophy, mainly by the modern moral philosophers, who focused specifically on the elaboration of the philosophical concept of morality. Kant’s peculiar role was that, firstly, he conceptualized the ideas of universality and autonomy and formulated corresponding principles; secondly, Kant integrated both (...) principles into the concept of moral law and revealed the way by which the formula of universality and the formula of autonomy together with formula of humanity constitute the supreme principle of morality and essentially express the sense of morality itself. Kant believed that the reason for the failure of the previous attempts to explicate the supreme principle of morality was inability to understand that the moral agent is subject not only to universal but at the same time his own legislation. Thirdly, Kant, unlike his predecessors, in his examination of universality didn’t appeal to the human nature or nature of things. Fourthly, he underlined that the principle of universality and the principle of autonomy were not only interconnected but also shaped each other: the determination of will may be identified as a universal principle only if it is given through a moral agent’s rational will. And a moral agent may be identified as autonomous only if in his decisions and actions he is guided by principles that are universalizable. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology” by Urban Kordeš. Upshot: The naturalistic paradigm, which relies on the third-person perspective and the exclusion of the observer, cannot accommodate human experience in its scientific enterprise. I present a critical overview of Kordeš’s proposal to merge the constructivist epistemological framework and empirical phenomenology. I doubt whether constructivism actually requires empirical grounding, but I do see constructivism with instrumentalism as a possible framework in which researchers will be (...) able to make sense of the phenomenal data. (shrink)