How is it that we think and refer in the first-person way? For most philosophers in the analytic tradition, the problem is essentially this: how two apparently conflicting kinds of properties can be reconciled and united as properties of the same entity. What is special about the first person has to be reconciled with what is ordinary about it. The range of responses reduces to four basic options. The orthodox view is optimistic: there really is a way of reconciling these (...) apparently contradictory properties as contained within the same thing. The heretical views are pessimistic and content to be so: there is no such way, and that is because there is simply nothing to reconcile – because there is really nothing special about what is in question; or there is really nothing ordinary about it; or there is really nothing …. (shrink)

We define in precise terms the basic properties that an ‘ideal propositional paraconsistent logic’ is expected to have, and investigate the relations between them. This leads to a precise characterization of ideal propositional paraconsistent logics. We show that every three-valued paraconsistent logic which is contained in classical logic, and has a proper implication connective, is ideal. Then we show that for every n > 2 there exists an extensive family of ideal n -valued logics, each one of which is not (...) equivalent to any k -valued logic with k < n. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Gegenwart und Zukunft der Philosophie in Deutschland" verfügbar.

Moral principles or the rules of conduct are based in the society. If the purpose of ethics in research is to take into consideration the needs and the rights of the experimental subject, his social milieu must then largely determine the ethical considerations of a projected study. The inability to comprehend such rights may often be due to ignorance, disease and his societal values. Blood letting, biopsy and post-mortem examinations may so conflict with local beliefs that so called 'consent' to (...) these is much more than a surrender of the rights of the individual. It is difficult to conform with the highest principles of ethics in research in any uniform society. It is more so when the many variables are further complicated by cultural demands and social taboos. The best custodians of ethical standards must relate intimately with the norms of the local population. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nature as Guide: Wittgenstein and the Renewal of Moral Theology by David Goodill, O.PCajetan Cuddy and O.P.Nature as Guide: Wittgenstein and the Renewal of Moral Theology. By David Goodill, O.P. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2022. Pp. xiii-319. $75.00. (hardcover). ISBN: 978-0-8132-3445-8.Nature as Guide is an intriguing reevaluation of the philosophical legacy of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the light of Thomistic moral theology after the Second (...) Vatican Council. Goodill helpfully lays out his fundamental argument in the book’s introduction: Wittgenstein can help the philosopher to reconcile the “modern dichotomy between nature and reason,” and the theologian to reevaluate “the associated oppositions typical of modern thought, such as that between moral agency and natural agency or between grace and nature” (2). The author is overt in his appreciation for Fergus Kerr’s 1997 monograph Theology after Wittgenstein. Nonetheless, Nature as Guide is unique insofar as it focuses on specifically moral theological issues in a moment of theological “renewal”—one in which we can recognize “the restoration of metaphysics to the center of theological debate” (12).The first four chapters of Nature as Guide consider Wittgenstein in relation to themes associated with classical philosophy. Goodill’s “objective in the first part of the book is to construct a dialogue between Wittgenstein and the metaphysical tradition which illuminates both conversation partners” (38). This initial part of the book culminates in an account of human nature that serves as the foundation for the moral theological inquiry that follows in the second part (the fifth through the eighth chapters).In the first chapter (“What Lies Hidden: Wittgenstein, Metaphysics, and Moral Theology”), Goodill introduces Wittgenstein’s “philosophical practice”—specifically his “insistence on grounding philosophical enquiry in everyday thinking” that effectively “connects him to the [metaphysical] tradition that begins with Plato and Aristotle” (16). Goodill is perceptive and nuanced in his analysis of Wittgenstein’s texts. He recognizes that “it would be wrong to treat [Wittgenstein] as an unproblematic inheritor of this tradition” (37). Nonetheless, he wants his readers to appreciate the careful balance between theory and praxis maintained in Wittgenstein’s thought vis-à-vis the priorities of classical philosophy. To this end, he examines G. E. M. Anscombe’s account of how Wittgenstein helped her to overcome the “trap” of phenomenalism.In the second chapter (“Nature, Logic, and Grammar”), Goodill attends to the progress of key tenets in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. He identifies as “the guiding theme” of this narrative “the development of Wittgenstein’s understanding of the relationship between the meaning and the application of linguistic expressions” (40–41). Specifically, he suggests that Wittgenstein’s “mistake” in the Tractatus (51) can be reduced a fundamental point: the erroneous presupposition that there is “one general notion of clarity which is required in all contexts. It was precisely this requirement which Wittgenstein came later to reject in the Investigations” (52). Indeed, between the Tractatus [End Page 703] and the Investigations Wittgenstein abandoned his efforts to establish a “forced unity” of language through “the general form of the proposition”—turning, instead, to “our actual linguistic practices” (85). The whole of human life, thus, “provides the unity of our grammar” (ibid.). Nonetheless, Goodill also points out that Wittgenstein does not reject “the central insight” of the Tractatus, namely, “that meaning is internal to our forms of representation” (59). This immanence remains throughout the Tractatus and the Investigations.The third chapter (“Grammar, Teleology, and Understanding”), summarizes objections to Goodill’s proposal that Wittgenstein can be read in continuity with the metaphysical tradition. William Charlton “argues that in the absence of a teleological conception of nature Wittgenstein’s account of language collapses into pragmatism” (88-89). Rush Rhee “accuses Wittgenstein of being misled by his analogy between language and games to neglect the basis of our linguistic practices in the human search for universal understanding” (89). In brief, both “Charlton and Rhee argue that a much richer conception of our natural human capacities and reactions is required than that provided by Wittgenstein”—and they do so in a complementary way (103). Although Goodill does not believe that their objections stand above... (shrink)

Purpose. Objectives of the study are as follows: to remove the reduction of women to a metaphysical subject, to the "castrated Other" through the correlation of postmodern strategies and gender medicine; to institutionalize gender medicine as knowledge and practical activities that improve the quality and span of life of women based on the methodological application of deconstruction, complementarity, differance, "double writing", X-subject treatment and biomedical innovations; the perspective of gender medicine development is the implementation of the concept of "sovereign writing" (...) of postmodern in individual treatment of a person. Theoretical basis. Shock value of the title means farewell to metaphysics in the complex of its derived concepts. The author criticizes the abstract, reduced, marginalized, deviant subject of classical metaphysics and its continuation in psychoanalysis, explores the correlation of postmodern philosophy strategies and biomedical innovations. The allusion to the masterpiece of world cinematography Pasolini’s "Ciao maschio" corresponds to the rhizomatic stylistics of the postmodern. Originality. After feminist transgressions, gender constructivism postmodern philosophy demonstrates a new subject and a new methodology, which formed gender medicine. Differance, distinction, complementarity, X-subject of treatment, chiasmatic movement, "double writing", "sovereign writing" organically turned over and reconstructed modern medicine in gender, biochemical, and hormonal innovative variations. Conclusions. 1. Based on the philosophy and biomedical innovations, a new direction has grown – gender medicine, which has removed the reduction of women to a metaphysical subject, "castrated Other", which has improved the quality of women’s health and span of life. 2. Gender medicine in organic combination with the strategies of deconstruction, complementarity, differance, distinction as hormonal distinction, "double writing" as a "dual protocol" of treatment for the same diseases of men and women, the treatment of X-subject turned out to be "new wisdom", which improves the quality of health and span of life in everyday practice. 3. The prospect of the gender medicine’s development is in the implementation of the "sovereign writing" as an individual treatment of a specific person. (shrink)

The essays in this volume explore current work in central areas of philosophy, work unified by attention to salient questions of human action and human agency. They ask what it is for humans to act knowledgeably, to use language, to be friends, to act heroically, to be mortally fortunate, and to produce as well as to appreciate art. The volume is dedicated to J. O. Urmson, in recognition of his inspirational contributions to these areas. All the essays but one have (...) been specially written for this volume. (shrink)

Rather surprisingly, T.H.Green's ideas on women and the family are as neglected today as they were immediately after his death in 1882, when his thought was first interpreted for a wider public by his colleagues and friends.1 Silence on such matters in the 1880s is not remarkable. It is odd, however, that it persists today, despite recent intense concern with the history of women and the family, including their place in political thought, and despite reviving philosophical interest in the British (...) Idealists and readiness to credit them with a significant impact on politics, education and social work. It has often been remarked that Green's political ideas have much in common superficially with those of John Stuart Mill, since their values and precepts are very similar, although the substructure of their thought is utterly different. Nevertheless it has altogether escaped notice that this is equally true of their ideas on women, marriage and family relationships. Today Mill's fabled feminism easily appears limited and imperceptive, and the priority he gave to the parliamentary vote strangely simplistic. Did Green show any greater realism and understanding? Did he practise as well as preach real equality between men and women, in private as well as public life? In short, what precisely was Green's position on 'the woman question'�? (shrink)

The formulae advanced by Popper to calculate the degree of corroboration C of a scientific hypothesis are unsatisfactory in that the probability values required in the computation are often not available. An attempt is made to define a quantitative measure B* in the place of C in which only countable empirical values would be used. This condition is fulfilled in two basic formulae and eq. ), which could be applied to calculate the degree of corroboration. When m successful falsifications of (...) the hypothesis h appear after a sequence of n unsuccessful ones, the pragmatic degree of corroboration B* results from the difference between B and the analogue value of the falsification F* and eq. ). In the event that the hypothesis can be "rescued" through a correction, increased experimental effort must be made with the revision. This would be taken into account through the correction equation ). When the hypothesis cannot be corrected, however, it can no longer exceed the value of 1-F*, even after numerous verification experiments. In the process of deciding whether a hypothesis is "adequately" verified or falsified, a lower threshold ${\rm B}_{{\rm u}}$ und Bₒ must be selected. These values have to be chosen on an intuitive subjective basis. The same applies to the strength of unsuccessful falsifications . This evaluation is expressed by a multiplicative constant a̱ ) or an additive constant kₐ in eq. . Despite the subjectivity of the values a̱, kₐ necessary for the calculation of B*, and of the values ${\rm B}_{{\rm u}}$ , Bₒ for the decision to discontiue the examination of the hypothesis, I feel that amongst the scientists within a particular field of research, a consensus for these values should be possible. Through a quantitative determination of B* the procedure for testing a hypothesis, considered to be a closed loop process, becomes clearer. To estimate the values of B* could not only have an influence upon the decisions of the respective researchers or research groups examining a hypothesis, but also be of assistance in decisions regarding research grants when financial resources are limited. (shrink)

When The Sound of One Hand Clapping came out in Japan in 1916 it caused a scandal. Zen was a secretive practice, its wisdom relayed from master to novice in strictest privacy. That a handbook existed recording not only the riddling koans that are central to Zen teaching but also detailing the answers to them seemed to mark Zen as rote, not revelatory. For all that, The Sound of One Hand Clapping opens the door to Zen like no other book. (...) Including koans that go back to the master who first brought the koanteaching method from Japan to China in the eighteenth century, this book offers, in the words of the translator, editor, and Zen initiate Yoel Hoffmann, "the clearest, most detailed, and most correct picture of Zen" that can be found. What we have here is an extraordinary introduction to Zen thought as lived thought, a treasury of problems, paradoxes, and performance that will appeal to artists, writers, and philosophers as well as Buddhists and students of religion. (shrink)

Since Alasdair MacIntyre’s landmark book After Virtue, there has been renewed interest in the role of the virtues in the moral life and attention paid to reappropriating the Aristotelian notion of "practice." Recent reappropriations of the virtues and virtue theory in medical ethics have contributed to conceiving more adequately the nature of good medicine. I wish to explore some of these insights and the special relevance the notion of practice has in an account of good medicine. Yet, I also want (...) to suggest that much remains to be done. This renewed attention to the virtues needs to be supplemented by a similar reappropriation and transposition of the notion of nature in order to navigate successfully the Dardanelles of an ahistorical essentialism and the Bosphorus of a historical relativism. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the work of Russian philosopher and cultural researcher Helen Petrovsky. The focus of the article is her original way of working, which consists in expanding the possibilities of philosophical analysis through reference to the practice of contemporary arts. Where art reveals its technique, Helen Petrovsky sees an opportunity to find a mechanism corresponding to this method in the sphere of thinking, a version of the Kantian Witz. The example of Helen Petrovsky's analysis of painting and (...) photography shows that her attention is focused on signs-affects, stains, traces, imprints of the external (nature or society), which are in conflict with human abilities of perception and understanding. Here the side of the image that remains outside the representation manifests itself. Turning to Lacoue-Labarthe's mimetology and Mondzain's interpretation of the icon allows us to see more clearly the Russian scholar's original way of working. Her critical gaze reanimates the "logic of the tragic" (Lacoue-Labarthe) as the culturally displaced basis of cognition (Oedipus' line) and judgment (Antigone's line). The collective affectivity and modern technologies with which Helen Petrovsky works allow us today to see Greek tragedy not so much as a cultural value, but as an alternative practice of thinking immanent to the problems of contemporary society. (shrink)

Recently various gedankenexperiments have been formulated which argue that the assumption that “elements of reality” are Lorentz invariant cannot be reconciled with standard quantum mechanics. Two of these gedankenexperiments were subsequently analyzed using the notion of pre- and postselected quantum systems, and it was claimed that elements of reality can be made Lorentz invariant if the “product rule” of standard quantum mechanics is abandoned. In this paper we show that the apparent violations of the product rule in these gedankenexperiments are (...) not as significant as they appeared to be in the previous analysis. We conclude that the problems with Lorentz invariance which arise in these gedankenexperiments are essentially unrelated to the product rule violations. (shrink)