This third volume of Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science contains papers which are based upon Colloquia from 1964 to 1966. In most cases, they have been substantially modified subsequent to presentation and discussion. Once again we publish work which goes beyond technical analysis of scientific theories and explanations in order to include philo sophical reflections upon the history of science and also upon the still problematic interactions between metaphysics and science. The philo sophical history of scientific ideas has (...) increasingly been recognized as part of the philosophy of science, and likewise the cultural context of the genesis of such ideas. There is no school or attitude to be taken as de fining the scope or criteria of our Colloquium, and so we seek to under stand both analytic and historical aspects of science. This volume, as the previous two, constitutes a substantial part of our final report to the U. S. National Science Foundation, which has continued its support of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science by a grant to Boston University. That report will be concluded by a subse quent volume of these Studies. It is a pleasure to record our thanks to the Foundation for its confidence and funds. We dedicate this book to the memory of Norwood Russell Hanson. During this academic year of 1966-67, this beloved and distinguished American philosopher participated in our Colloquium, and he did so before. (shrink)

In this 1958 book, Professor Hanson turns to an equally important but comparatively neglected subject, the philosophical aspects of research and discovery.

We have been discussing some of the fundamental features of the classical calculus of probability. The equiprobability of rival events was seen to be a major assumption of the calculus. Moreover, it is an assumption which the pure mathematician need not bother to justify. He need only present his formal system as follows.

Originally published in 1963, The Concept of the Positron forms a detailed analysis of quantum theory. Whilst it is not as well known as Professor Hanson's previous book, Patterns of Discovery, the text has many interesting aspects. In many ways it goes further than Hanson's earlier work in approaching the problems of theory competition and the rationality of science, topics that have since become central to the philosophy of science. It is also notable for a rigorous and forthright defence of (...) the Copenhagen Interpretation. Taken together, the ideas presented in this book constitute a first-rate achievement in the history and philosophy of science. This paperback reissue comes with a new preface from Matthew Lund, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Rowan University. (shrink)

This highly readable book is aimed at anyone with an interest in the food they eat. In conversational tone, and avoiding academic jargon, it provides an honest and objective account of the consequences of food consumption choices and policies, through the lens of economics.

Norwood Russell Hanson was one of the most important philosophers of science of the post-war period. Hanson brought Wittgensteinian ordinary language philosophy to bear on the concepts of science, and his treatments of observation, discovery, and the theory-ladenness of scientific facts remain central to the philosophy of science. Additionally, Hanson was one of philosophy's great personalities, and his sense of humor and charm come through fully in the pages of Perception and Discovery. Perception and Discovery, originally published in 1969, (...) is Hanson's posthumous textbook in philosophy of science. The book focuses on the indispensable role philosophy plays in scientific thinking. Perception and Discovery features Hanson's most complete and mature account of theory-laden observation, a discussion of conceptual and logical boundaries, and a detailed treatment of the epistemological features of scientific research and scientific reasoning. This book is of interest to scholars of philosophy of science, particularly those concerned with Hanson's thought and the development of the discipline in the middle of the 20th century. However, even fifty years after Hanson's early death, Perception and Discovery still has a great deal to offer all readers interested in science. (shrink)

1 A PICTURE THEORY OF THEORY-MEANING Perplexities concerning Scientific Theories persist because the usual 'singled valued' philosophical analyses cannot do ...

The conceptual excitement of science often seems geared only to work in contemporary physics. Thus, philosophers regularly discuss current cosmology, relativity, or the foundations of microphysics. In these areas one's philosophy is stretched and strained far beyond what our ancestors might have anticipated. Historians of science have also focused attention on past events by remarking their analogies and similarities with perplexities in physics today. But there are statements, hypotheses and theories of the past which are rewarding in themselves, without having (...) to be referred to the agonies which now confound quantum theory and cosmology. Specifically, the First Law of Motion--the "Law of Inertia"--this has everything a logician of science could look for. Understanding the complexities and perplexities of this fundamental mechanical statement is in itself to gain insight into what theoretical physics in general really is. With this in view a study of the law is undertaken. (shrink)

History of science and philosophy of science are not logically related: to claim that they are would be either to underestimate or to misunderstand the genetic fallacy. But one risk of inferring that there is no connection at all between the two is the risk that philosophers of science may not know what they are talking about. The philosopher of science who does not know intimately the history of the scientific problem with which he is exercised may be discussing no (...) genuine state of affairs. On the other hand, The historian and philosopher of science are both concerned with the structure of scientific ideas, And these concerns are fused into one when the scientific "argumentation" of the past is the issue. (staff). (shrink)

I. In some celebrated passages, the Physics conveys to us that.

That I shall never meet myself coming towards me is clearly true. It will never happen. But, Weiss notwithstanding, there is a real need to bother with a demonstration. For that he can say of the assertion above, that it is both absurd and material and that its denial is material and certain, significant and indubitable, this makes at least one of his readers feel unsure of the grounds for his claim. In one philosophical tradition Weiss would appear to have (...) mixed the logical levels of his predicates. And while the error may turn out to reside in that philosophical tradition and not in Weiss's argument, nothing less than a demonstration one way or the other will settle the matter. If what he says is true, then a demonstration of his point should offer no difficulties. But, it might be argued that if Weiss's claim is a material one, then it cannot be logically certain. If, on the other hand, it is indubitable, then it cannot be material. (shrink)

What I eat is your business -- The pesticide controversy -- The chemical fertilizer controversy -- The carbon footprint controversy -- The GMO controversy -- The farm subsidy controversy -- The local food controversy -- Controversies about livestock -- Parting thoughts.

Volume 24, Issue 7-8, November - December 2019, Page 874-876.

The God of biblical revelation is present everywhere in the Gospel according to Matthew, but often in a self-effacing way, receding behind Jesus, Emmanuel, God-with-us. God's presence is veiled by divine passives, hidden behind the reverent circumlocution “heavens.” God's supreme designation is Father. This gospel usually speaks on a horizontal plane of everyday life, where the Transcendent awaits us at every turn as the horizon.

Within the past decade there has grown an acute and highly articulate group of critics of the orthodox interpretation of quantum theory,--the so-called "Copenhagen Interpretation." The writings of people like Bopp, Janossy, and particularly Bohm and Feyerabend, must be taken very seriously indeed. The future of some important discussions in the philosophy and the logic of science rests with these individuals. But they have, in their own writings, occasionally matched the inelegancies of Bohr and Heisenberg with as many inelegancies of (...) their own. The present paper is meant to present a quintet of considerations which may possibly lead to a reassessment of the issues between Bohr, Heisenberg, and their critics, especially Bohm and Feyerabend. (shrink)