Discursive knowledge is expressed in a conceptual, specialized language, which offers the standardization and rigor necessary to a rational reasoning. For the non discursive knowledge, language, as a means of communication, is inadequate and insufficient.

This paper points to two little-discussed interrelated features—among sociologists—about the nature of the lifeworld (Lebenswelt): that the experience of transcendence is an essential component of human actions, and that lived experience (Erlebnis) is founded on the non-discursivity of the lifeworld, i.e., the pre-predicative background expectancies from which the discursive arises. I examine the intellectual route of Alfred Schutz who developed his mundane lifeworld theory from appropriating Edmund Husserl’s notions of appresentation and apperception. Harold Garfinkel later extended Schutz’s concept of (...) lifeworld to the empirical investigations of constitutive social orders. By way of conclusion, I warn against a strain of constructionism in sociology, which tends to ignore the two said features of lived experience and inaccurately conceives social realities as essentially the actor’s discursive accomplishments. (shrink)

A. C. Lloyd; XIV—Non-Discursive Thought—An Enigma of Greek Philosophy, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 70, Issue 1, 1 June 1970, Pages 261–274.

An essay on non-discursive forms of knowledge that inhabit art photography. A version of this essay appeared in Gavin Keeney, "Else-where": Essays in Art, Architecture, and Cultural Production 2002-2011 (CSP, 2011), pp. 209-26.

It was Plato who informed the Greek philosophical tradition of how the King of Egypt declared that writing will inevitably “implant forgetfulness in men’s souls; they will cease to exercise memory because they rely on that which is written, calling things to remembrance no longer from within themselves, but by means of external marks”. Plotinus likewise knew how these “wise men of Egypt” therefore chose to inscribe only one image in their temples and thus “manifested the non-discursiveness of the intelligible (...) world”. Sara Rappe reminds us that such passages are not infrequent throughout the history of Neoplatonism, suggesting how Plato and his followers struggled to understand the proper use of the written word, the role of images and symbol, as well as the very possibility of the transmission of truth itself. Focusing on the question: “How is intuitive wisdom communicated, especially within the context of a philosophy that repudiates language but continues to practice speculative metaphysics?”, Rappe has produced a helpful work aimed at examining the Neoplatonic hermeneutic. (shrink)

Neoplatonism is a term used to designate the form of Platonic philosophy that developed in the Roman Empire from the third to the fifth century AD and that based itself on the corpus of Plato's dialogues. Sara Rappe's challenging and innovative study is the first book to analyse Neoplatonic texts themselves using contemporary philosophy of language. It covers the whole tradition of Neoplatonic writing from Plotinus through Proclus to Damascius. Addressing the strain of mysticism in these works from a fresh (...) perspective the author shows how these texts reflect actual meditational practices, methods of concentrating the mind, and other mental disciplines that informed the tradition as a whole. In providing the broadest available survey of Neoplatonic writing the book will appeal to classical philosophers, classicists, as well as students of religious studies. (shrink)

The article is devoted to identifying the potential of using the results of the study of non-discursive social practices to understand the behavioral basis for the possible practical use of social theories. The example of the field of education focuses on the distinction between cognitive, affective and psychomotor dimensions of social communication. Assumptions have been made about the underestimation of the affective, and especially the psychomotor realm, to identify the resource and limits of discursive practices. Classical studies in educational psychology, (...) primarily the works of Benjamin Bloom, David Krathwohl, Anita Harrow and their followers, are involved in philosophical analysis as its object. Educational practices are bodily practices no less than discursive ones. However, it is impossible to reduce these practices to the entering either to the self-sufficient universe of the text or into the self-sufficient universe of the body. The realm of the emotional serves as a link between the bodily and the cognitive, and applying to the emotional experience of values can be the best way to consolidate both bodily and cognitive practices. One of the important conclusions is the recognition not only of the relative autonomy of the cognitive, affective and psychomotor realms in the theoretical aspect, but also the identification of their practical interdependence. The sphere of education appears as a model for observing how a person masters the levels and, parallel and mutually determined, dimensions of the pyramids of the development of personal abilities. Achieving perfection by a person in one dimension is impossible without the simultaneous development of his abilities in the other two. Discourse appears for the person as a situation in which he/she experiences the integral result of the development of his/her abilities in all three dimensions — cognitive, affective and psychomotor. (shrink)

Neoplatonism is a term used to designate the form of Platonic philosophy that developed in the Roman Empire from the third to the fifth century AD and that based itself on the corpus of Plato's dialogues. Sara Rappe's challenging study analyses Neoplatonic texts themselves using contemporary philosophy of language. It covers the whole tradition of Neoplatonic writing from Plotinus through Proclus to Damascius. Addressing the strain of mysticism in these works, the author shows how these texts reflect actual meditational practices, (...) methods of concentrating the mind, and other mental disciplines that informed the tradition as a whole. In providing such a broad survey of Neoplatonic writing, the book will appeal to classical philosophers classicists as well as students of religious studies. (shrink)

It is common for us to see models as exemplars of things that exist. Models, instead, are merely Peircean indexes, in that they only point to their objects, objects which may in themselves not exist. This is to say that these examples may only exist as thoughts that point to other thoughts or even ideas that point to objects that may not exist because they are paradoxical.

The aim of this article is to combine Pettit’s account(s) of freedom, both his work on discursive control and on non-domination, with Pippin’s and Brandom’s reinterpretation of Hegelian rational agency and the role of recognition theory within it. The benefits of combining these two theories lie, as the article hopes to show, in three findings: first, re-examining Hegelian agency in the spirit of Brandom and Pippin in combination with Pettit’s views on freedom shows clearly why and in which way a (...) Hegelian account of rational agency can ground an attractive socio-political account of freedom; second, the reconciling of discursive control and non-domination with Hegelian agency shows how the force and scope of recognition become finally tangible, without either falling into the trap of overburdening the concept, or merely reducing it to the idea of simple respect; third, the arguments from this article also highlight the importance of freedom as non-domination and how this notion is, indeed, as Pettit himself claims, an agency-freedom which aims at successfully securing the social, political, economic and even (some) psychological conditions for free and autonomous agency. (shrink)

Discussions of non-ideal theory as philosophical methodology have recently entered the philosophy of language. In this chapter, the authors take stock of the academic movement that has begun to gather under the banner of ‘non-ideal philosophy of language,’ exploring what it means to idealize discursive phenomena, and how such idealizations impede our inquiry into politically significant speech. In doing so, they aim to draw attention to a certain pernicious ideal that distorts the theorist’s own relationship, qua theorist, to the discursive (...) practices they seek to theorize. This is the methodological ideal of normative neutrality, which ties the rigor of the theorist’s conceptual toolkit to its impartiality in the face of a non-ideal world full of non-neutral speech. The authors make the case that non-ideal philosophers of language ought to reject this ideal, lest they deprive themselves of the resources to register the political significance of their target phenomena. To acknowledge our need for normatively non-neutral methods, the authors argue, is to imagine a philosophy of language that might itself take the shape of discursive resistance against our target phenomena. They conclude by considering how philosophers could do such things with their words. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to combine Pettit’s account(s) of freedom, both his work on discursive control and on non-domination, with Pippin’s and Brandom’s reinterpretation of Hegelian rational agency and the role of recognition theory within it. The benefits of combining these two theories lie, as the article hopes to show, in three findings: first, re-examining Hegelian agency in the spirit of Brandom and Pippin in combination with Pettit’s views on freedom shows clearly why and in which way a (...) Hegelian account of rational agency can ground an attractive socio-political account of freedom; second, the reconciling of discursive control and non-domination with Hegelian agency shows how the force and scope of recognition become finally tangible, without either falling into the trap of overburdening the concept, or merely reducing it to the idea of simple respect; third, the arguments from this article also highlight the importance of freedom as non-domination and how this notion is, indeed, as Pettit himself claims, an agency-freedom which aims at successfully securing the social, political, economic and even (some) psychological conditions for free and autonomous agency. (shrink)

L'interet de Habermas pour lamodernitédont traite son dernier livre, le tourne vers les travaux de Foucault. Celui-ci aurait mis en évidence, dès l'Histoire de la folie, ce qu'il y a de nouveau sous le ciel de la rationalité moderne. Dans plusieurs chapitres consacrés à Foucault, Habermas esquisse une critique qui s'inspire substantiellement des travaux de Fink-Eitel, Fraser, Honegger, Rippel et Münkler, Dreyfus et Rabinow et de Honneth. Cette critique est radicale et prend pour cible la présumée théorie du pouvoir de (...) Foucault, les impasses où conduisent les instructions méthodologiques qu'il entend observer pour reconstruire l'histoire recente des sciences humaines, ainsi que les thèses au sujet du rapport entre les pratiques discursives et les pratiques non discursives, plus exactement les dispositifs de pouvoir dans lesquels les sciences humaines se trouvent intégrées. Bien que Foucault n'ait jamais développé une telle théorie du pouvoir et qu'il dise n'avoir jamais voulu l'élaborer, on doit constater avec Habermas que le thème du pouvoir est pourtant omniprésent, et que le concept de pouvoir doit ëtre considéré comme une notion centrale dans son oeuvre. (shrink)

Moral and political forms of constructivism accord to people strong, “constitutive” forms of discursive standing and so build on, or express, a commitment to discursive respect. The paper explores dimensions of discursive respect, i.e., depth, scope, and purchase; it addresses tenuous interdependencies between them; on this basis, it identifies limitations of the idea of discursive respect and of constructivism. The task of locating discursive respect in the normative space defined by its three dimensions is partly, and importantly, an ethical task (...) that is beyond constructivism. Interdependencies between these dimensions call into question the possibility of a plausible and coherent form of discursive respect that is deep, inclusive in scope, and rich in purchase. This does not mean that we should reject discursive respect, or constructivism, for that matter. But it suggests that the task of reconciling the dimensions of discursive respect may not allow for widely shareable results. This task needs to be addressed on non-constructivist grounds. Accordingly, we have reasons to concede that constitutive forms of discursive standing are less fundamental in the order of justification than weaker, “derivative” forms, and this is so especially if we take constitutive standing to mark an important good. (shrink)

Pippin, Pinkard and Brandom are rightly seen as representatives of a distinct approach in contemporary Hegel scholarship. Still, their interpretations diverge due to different definitions and uses of conceptions of discursive practice. We focus on three ways in which such definitions and uses bear on their interpretations. First, while Lumsden has recently criticized Pinkard and Brandom for ‘discursive bias’ in their accounts of the contestation and upheaval of normative authority in Hegel’s Phenomenology, we note that Pinkard distinguishes between various modes (...) of reason-giving, and we argue that a further qualification of interdependencies between these modes may support his interpretation against such criticism. Second, Pinkard and Pippin have recently criticized Brandom’s conception of discursive score-keeping practice, and Pippin in particular has argued that the latter rests on an individualistic reductionism about content foreign to Hegel. However, we find that the real issue is that the modes of methodological abstraction and idealization assumed for Brandom’s conception of discursive practice leave out of account the historical alteration as well as the institutional embodiment of normative authority as emphasized by Pippin and Pinkard. Third, while Pippin and Pinkard both make Hegel’s notion of modern ethical life bear on a conception of practical rationality, their uses of a conception of discursive practice in such an undertaking betray divergent conceptions of the sociality of rational agents. (shrink)

Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (ME)/Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) is a highly contested illness. This paper analyzes the discursive production of knowledge about, and recognition of ME/CFS. By mobilizing insights from social epistemology and epistemic injustice studies, this paper reveals how actors, through their social-discursive practices, attribute to establishing, sustaining, and disregarding their own and others’ epistemological position. In focusing on the case of the Dutch newspaper reporting about ME/CFS, this paper shows that the debate about this condition predominantly revolves around the ways (...) in which people who make truth claims are represented. In being portrayed as gendered, affectatious, formerly very able, fanatical, or benevolent, people with ME/CFS are constructed as non-/credible. In the debate about what causes ME/CFS, by contrast, the production of non-/credible knowledge focuses more on the content of epistemic positions. Actors in this debate argue that they know the (clear) causes for the illness, something which functions as a discursive strategy to establish and enhance their credibility. This paper contends, however, that since this discursive demarcation of causes is consistently infused with uncertainty – with multi-interpretability, with diffuse explanations, and absence of current knowledge – the credibility of these actors’ epistemic position is undercut rather than established. (shrink)

This paper critically evaluates two aspects of Maxime Lepoutre's important book, Democratic Speech in Divided Times. First, I examine Lepoutre's approach to the shared reasons constraint—the requirement to offer shared reasons within public deliberation—and the place of emotions in public discourse. I argue that he, and indeed all who adopt such a highly inclusivist approach, face a dilemma that pushes him either to apply the shared reasons constraint more widely than he desires or to abandon it completely. I chart a (...) course through this dilemma, but one that involves significant revisions to Lepoutre's position, particularly regarding the need for idealization. Second, I consider Lepoutre's use of the systemic approach to public discourse, which is central to many of his arguments, including his responses to critics of the discursive democratic ideal. Using his arguments regarding angry speech and dogmatic group cognition as illustrative, I highlight the somewhat speculative nature of these systemic arguments, which often rely on conjectures about how the system might operate, how its parts fit together, and how the system as a whole might attenuate seemingly problematic features of its component parts. This limits the ultimate persuasiveness of Lepoutre's responses to skepticism about democratic speech in our divided times. (shrink)

Context: Josef Mitterer has become known for criticizing the main exponents of analytic and constructivist philosophy for their blind adoption of a dualistic epistemology based on an alleged ontological difference between world and words. Judith Butler, who has developed an influential model of (de)constructivist feminism and has been labeled a linguistic constructivist, has been criticized for sustaining exactly what, according to Mitterer, most modern philosophy fails to acknowledge: namely that there is no ontological difference between objective facts beyond language and (...) the discourse about these facts. Problem: In the scholarly discussion on non-dualism, two main questions have been raised: Where does Mitterer’s basic consensus, i.e., the starting-point description, come from? and: What does it mean, to say that further descriptions change their object? Method: Comparative analysis of the core concepts of Mitterer’s and Butler’s work in the context of the history of ideas. Results: Butler’s conception of a performative production of objectivity through discursive and non-discursive iterated practices can be interpreted as an illustration of Mitterer’s claim that descriptions change their object. The problem of where Mitterer’s starting-point descriptions come from can be solved by adopting Butler’s concept of culturally inherited practices. (shrink)

This article presents a typology of discursive discrimination, discrimination carried out through the use of language. It is argued that such a typology should fulfil certain criteria in order to be useful for empirical research. The proposed typology consists of four main concepts: (1) exclusion from discourse; (2) negative other-presentation; (3) objectification; and (4) proposals pointing towards unfavourable non-linguistic treatment. The related concept of othering - the creation of a psychological distance to people understood to belong to groups others than (...) ‘us’ - is also presented. The manner in which the different forms of discursive discrimination and othering can be operationalized is demonstrated through examples from empirical studies of discourses of people categorized as mentally deficient, as deaf, and as immigrants in public debate in Sweden in the past 75 years. (shrink)

Both logic and philosophy of science investigate formal aspects of scientific discourse, i.e. properties of (non-monotonic) consequence operations for discursive logic. In the present paper we handle two of them: paraconsistency and enthymematycity.

After three decades of intensive debate in academic and activist circles, intersectionality has progressively been adopted in public policies. Yet, the challenges of its application are still largely unexplored. This article adopts a discursive approach to study the process of policy implementation of an intersectionality-informed plan in Madrid City Council, Spain. The analysis of materials retrieved through interviews, a focus group, and participant observation enables us to explore how the technical staff interpret intersectionality and links it with other established approaches (...) in equality and antidiscrimination law and policy, namely gender and diversity. We argue that preconceptions and positionality within the institutional structure deeply affect the interpretation of intersectionality and the subsequent action or non-action taken by implementing actors. Our study shows the challenges and opportunities to implement intersectionality in public policies that result from its discursive construction through the frames of gender and diversity. (shrink)

Studies on terrorism with bias towards Boko Haram have mainly been carried out from non-linguistic fields. The few linguistics-related studies that have examined the media reportage of the BH activities, with emphasis on the discourse and linguistic strategies deployed in the representations, have not been sufficient. This study, therefore, identifies the linguistic and discourse strategies deployed by selected newspapers in representing the BH and other social actors. For data, headline and overline stories are purposively sampled from four newspapers, published from (...) 2011 to 2014, from the northern and southern parts of Nigeria. The analysis is guided by a combination of critical discourse analysis and systemic functional linguistics. In all the reports subjected to analysis, 13 representational strategies were identified, while at least 15 tools from Van Leeuwen’s categorisations were used in representing social actors. The newspapers also deployed discourse strategies to manage the voices of social actors, identify and specify the social actors and action, label, condemn BH activities, among others. The mediated reports on BH insurgency orientate Nigerians. (shrink)

The increasing incidence of ‘trafficking’ has added an incontestably disturbing dimension to the contestable nature of a ‘non-trafficked’ UK sex industry. Men who buy sex remain under-researched, though some studies have indicated ambivalence within men's attitudes. This study combines a critical discursive psychology in support of dialogical self theory. Secondary data, from prominent UK media resources, were analysed using Edley's method of combining ‘interpretative repertoires’, ‘ideological dilemmas’ and ‘subject positions’. Contrasting discursive practices indicative of wider ideological conflict were found. Discursive (...) concepts were ‘mapped’ onto Hermans and Hermans-Konopka's ‘I-positions’ to explore how these potentially dilemmatic positions might be understood in terms of identity production. The function of ‘uncertainty’, particularly salient with the increasing complexity of globalisation, was considered a factor in how men's identities might be limited by the current discursive space. A ‘dialogical’ model of self is introduced as a framework for understanding how men who buy sex might take up new, inclusive, positions. A corollary is reflected upon; that researchers, activists and buyers alike, who remain ideologically inflexible, may be sustaining the conditions for coercion through their contribution to the discursive conflict. The synthesis of discursive and dialogical analytical tools is recommended for investigating the production of selves in contested spaces. (shrink)

In recent years, marriage migration as a form of family reunification has become a growing policy concern for migration governance in European member states and is seen as ‘the last loophole’ in EU migration policy in the face of a supposedly large and increasing number of sham marriages through which the non-European spouse is granted a residency permit. Several European nations have therefore legislated legal-administrative measures to battle marriages of convenience by investigating cross-border marriage applications prior to celebrating or recognising (...) the marital union. In this article, I draw on a linguistic ethnographic empirical study of legal-administrative investigations conducted by Belgian municipal authorities to determine whether cross-border marriage applications to their civil registry office are ‘genuine’ or ‘fake’. In particular, I examine how the legal framework and guidelines for investigation are bureaucratically implemented in practice in Belgian civil registry offices with a particular focus on the role of a discursively constructed notion of genuine cross-border love and a bureaucratically acceptable relationship in both policy documents and interviewing practice. (shrink)

Although the role played by narratives and particularly by narratives of personal experience in the construction of identity has been widely investigated, the presence and contribution of such narratives in institutional discourse has received comparatively little attention. Our study focuses on two narratives in university lectures, which show that such narratives are a means of textually constructing not only personal but also professional identities. Analysis reveals that the professors position themselves as experts, exploiting the use of pronouns and other referring (...) expressions in addition to self and other evaluation, in order to distance themselves from non-expert others. In doing so, they make little use of the technical terminology often found in representations of professional selves. In offsetting self-aggrandizement with self-mockery, the professors' narratives display an ideological dilemma typical of the expert in current North American culture, which involves see-sawing between expressions of expertise and equality. (shrink)

Enactivism has influentially argued that the traditional intellectualist ‘act-content’ model of intentionality is insufficient both phenomenologically and naturalistically, and minds are built from world-involving bodily habits – thus, knowledge should be regarded as more of a skilled performance than an informational encoding. Radical enactivists have assumed that this insight must entail non-representationalism concerning at least basic minds. But what if it could be shown that representation is itself a form of skilled performance? I sketch the outline of such an account (...) from the perspective of Peirce’s pragmatist semiotics, which theorises signs as habits of associating specific cues with appropriate acts and schemas of ensuing experience. Within this framework, I argue, a naturalistic account of propositional structure can be constructed which transcends the symbolic – and in some instances even the linguistic – sphere, and offers new insights regarding the Information Processing Challenge, and the Hard Problem of Content. (shrink)

The terms “morality” and “ethical life” refer to the relationship between Kant's universalistic and Hegel's “contextualised” account of morality. In this essay, the problem of universalism and contextualism will be addressed to Apel's and Habermas's positions. I will divide the theme into three main topics: 1) The historical reconstruction of the rational conditions of discourse ethics within Habermas's position: in which sense could this approach lead to a contextualism? 2) The difficulty with establishing a non-contextual justification of the discursive, rational (...) conditions. Habermas's reconstructive approach will be confronted with Apel's “strict reflectional” approach which relies on stronger universalistic presuppositions. 3) This last topic will focus on the main difference between Habermas's and Apel's perspectives. This is connected to the double function of the rational “symmetry and reciprocity” -conditions: they are seen as consensual and simultaneously meta-normative conditions. Their meta-normative character is Apel's main concern, and seen as vital to social criticism. (shrink)

This paper takes the position that interpretations of legal discourse are invariably taken in the context of socio-pragmatic realities to which a particular instance of discourse applies. What makes this process even more complicated is the fact that social realities themselves are often negotiated within the mould of one’s subjective conceptualisations of reality. Institutions and organisations, including people in power, often represent socio-political realities from an ideologically fuelled perspective, engendering many ‘illusory’ categories often a result of contested versions of reality. (...) To substantiate this view, we discuss interpretations of a number of interesting contemporary and controversial laws, including America’s Patriot Act and Hong Kong’s proposed Article 23 of the Basic Law. Both laws can be seen as illustrative of the definitional conflict that abstract concepts such as democracy and human rights are subjected to in their own specific socio-political contexts. While America crowns itself with democracy and Hong Kong struggles to achieve it in effective synthesis with its unique political arrangement, the laws produced by both contrasting political systems are unexpectedly similar, aiming for the moderation of basic rights. The actions of both governments set against their beliefs and discourses, and furthermore set against one another and other media voices, particularly those of non-governmental organisations, political activists, and other socio-political groups, demonstrate contestation of realities, giving rise to ‘discursive illusions’, which seem to be interpreted not so much on the basis of their linguistic construction but more on the basis of socio-pragmatic factors, such as trust, belief, transparency, control and power. (shrink)

Shocks from disasters challenge the normality of everyday life. Emotional and political reactions include anxiety and blame, but these must come together with knowledge through shared discourse to formulate responses, often immediate. The study draws on a phenomenological analysis of personal experience and discursive reactions to fires and the pandemic. It is informed by ethical and social approaches to epistemology and discourse, drawing on sociology of knowledge and studies of rhetoric. From this it is concluded that facts are agreed elements (...) for debate, as in the legal tradition, rather than guarantees of certainty. Knowledge relevant to disaster discourse arises through shared experience and robust communicative institutions, from the local to the scientific, and including the wisdom of First Nations. Disasters are uncanny because they defy everyday know-how. In disrupting the relationship of people to their milieu, they require a new accommodation among and between human and non-human actors. (shrink)

The characterization of thought as a subject reflection about a given object is expressed by an enunciation of predicative order. The introduction of the possibility of a type of thought that it is not constituted in virtue of this presupposition brings a lot of difficulties, which is responsible for why Lloyd treats this theme as an enigma of Greek philosophy, i.e, non-discursive thinking. Plotinus seems to make a distinction between rational and intellectual thought, taking as a starting point the _sui (...) generis_ definition of a thinking that thinks itself. The intriguing nature of this description, i.e, the self-thinking as non-discursive thought, has raised studies with the primary aim to understand how it works this type of thinking. Then to clarify what does it mean to adopt the non-discursive approach. This paper intends to analyze the cited problem in the light of the “non-predicative” of Santos. The hypothesis is that by applying this concept to the discussion it will contribute to increase clarification on the distinction between reason and Intellect. That exercise will be conducted in majority through the reading of V.3 [49] of Plotinus _Enneads_. The nature of the intellectual thought would be non-predicative and the rational would be predicative. (shrink)

By analyzing discursive equalization of the categories of life and death in different spoken and written genres in the 1990s, the author uncovers a number of ideas and strategies around which the discourses guided by this phenomenon are structured. The first part of the paper is aimed at understanding the relation of these categories in Serbian folk culture and possible influences of the latter on recent articulations of the examined phenomenon. In the second part of the paper the central ideas (...) of the phenomenon are identified. These refer to the survival of the nation, "not betraying the ancestors", and ethnic territorialization. From the analysis of different spoken and written genres the conclusion may be derived that the "cancellation of boundaries" between the extremely opposed categories of life and death is made possible by the following discursive strategies: 1. "non-existification", 2. collective individualization, 3. vitalization, 4. mortification, and 5. various combination of the foregoing strategies.. Analizom diskursivnog izjednacavanja kategorija zivota i smrti u razlicitim govornim i pisanim zanrovima devedesetih godina XX veka, autorka iznalazi krug ideja i strategija oko kojih se struktuiraju diskursi usmereni ovim fenomenom. Prvi deo teksta posvecen je razumevanju odnosa ovih kategorija u srpskoj narodnoj kulturi i eventualnim uticajima ove kulture na novije aktualizovanje fenomena koji tematizuje. U drugom delu teksta identifikovane su nosece ideje ovog fenomena, koje se ticu opstanka nacije, "neizneveravanja predaka" i etnicke teritorijalizacije. Iz analize razlicitih govornih i pisanih zanrova proizlazi daje "ukidanje granica" izmedju ekstremno suprotstavljenih kategorija zivota i smrti omoguceno diskursivnim strategijama: 1. "onepostojanja", 2. kolektivne individualizacije, 3. vitalizacije, 4. mortifikacije i 5. razlicitim kombinacijama ovih strategija.. (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous nous concentrons sur le problème du principe premier chez Damascius. La question est celle de savoir dans quelle mesure la discursivité – le fait d’en parler – affecte ce problème et l’accès de notre pensée. Bien que le principe premier se veut indicible, toute tentative de le suggérer ne nous rend qu’une image discursive et donc inadéquate de lui. Toute tentative de raffiner notre perspective sur le principe ne fait que nous en éloigner d’avantage. Quelle est (...) alors la solution de Damascius? Comment peut‑on toujours parler du principe, tout en le reconnaissant indicible? Quel est le rôle du discours dans la saisie du principe? Peut‑il devenir plus qu’une entrave? Nous analysons la manière dont Damascius comprend son propre discours sur le principe et comment il transforme ce discours inévitablement inadéquat, en une manière de produire la conscience du principe. Le principe n’est pas décrit, mais plutôt rendu manifeste par un véritable “travail d’enfantement” de la pensée. Nous analysons les manières de ce travail d’enfantement, afin de montrer comment l’indicible se manifeste à travers lui, sans recevoir une expression concrète, qui risquerait de le transformer en objet de notre pensée. Nous montrerons que le travail d’enfantement n’est pas le signe de l’impossibilité de saisir le principe et d’un indépassable tourment qui accablerait la pensée à cause de cette incapacité. Au contraire, il représente une manière indirecte, non‑descriptive, mais très technique et rigoureuse, dont on peut obtenir la conscience de l’indicible, dans le cadre du discours et par sa médiation. (shrink)

This article approaches the recent work of pre-eminent Indian conceptual artist Vivan Sundaram, Trash (2008), as a supplement to dominant representational practices of, and within, the Indian megacity. Re-purposing tropes that motivate both popular and specialist discourses, Sundaram’s recent ensemble rehearses the discursive construction of the megacity-as-waste, by representing an urban totality through elaborate, ordered arrangements of garbage. Working collaboratively with waste-pickers who are members of the non-governmental organization Chintan: Environmental and Research Action Group in New Delhi, the artist sorts, (...) re-assembles and scales the found-objects of Trash into detailed models of a monumental urban landscape. Through a close reading of its formal aspects, the entry examines Trash’s reflection on logics of planned obsolescence which govern both the work as well as fantasies of economic nationalism premised on dualistic images of the global/mega-city. (shrink)

The Velvet Revolution of Armenia, which took place in 2018, was an important event in the history of Armenia and changed the government peacefully by means of large demonstrations, rallies and marches. This historic event was covered by Armenian news media. Our goal here was to do a Discourse-Historical Analysis of the Armenian Velvet Revolution as covered by two Armenian websites: armenpress.am-the governmental website and 168.am-the non-governmental website. In our analysis we identified how the lexicon related to the Armenian Velvet (...) Revolution was negotiated and legitimized by these media, and which discursive strategies were applied. We concluded that ‘Armenpress’ paid more attention to the government’s speeches, discussions, meetings and tried to impose the opinion of the government upon the people. In contrast, ‘168’ tried to present itself as an independent website with a neutral attitude toward the Velvet Revolution but, in reality, as we can conclude from the negative opinions about the Velvet Revolution in the coverage of ‘168’, it also represented the government’s interests. There was also a discursive struggle over the exact meaning of ‘revolution’ and the sense of ‘velvet’ in politics and the academic field that was to some extent introduced by these media. (shrink)

Problem: The question of the moral and social effects of non-dualism has not yet been clarified to the necessary extent. The relation of truth claims, power and violence has been simplified; critical questions of non-dualist practises have not yet been addressed. Approach: By discussing relevant philosophy and political theory, this paper draws the attention of non-realists towards the issues of power, conflict and discourse rules and asks to rethink the issue of the pragmatic justification of non-realist epistemology. Findings: (1) Constructivists, (...) as well as the non-dualist Josef Mitterer, are critical of the discursive effects of truth claims. Yet, neither constructivism nor non-dualism solve the power issues that are ascribed to realism by constructivists and dualism by Mitterer. Even if participants abstained from truth claims in discourses, many of the power issues would still be prevalent. (2) The question arises of whether a practical difference between non-dualism and dualism exists. (3) There is a tendency in constructivist and non-dualist theory to regard any form of influence on others as illegitimate. This tendency is not sound. Instead, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate power is necessary in non-dualism as well. Implications: Constructivist and non-dualist theory need to scrutinise statements about the moral implications of the respective theories and to emphasise power issues not solely by extrapolating from epistemology, but by acknowledging the social dynamics of discourses and conflicts. Non-dualist social scientists could contribute to the discussion through empirical analyses of the effects of the use and the debunking of truth claims. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 181 On Intuition and Discursive Reasoning in Aristotle. By VICTOR KAL. Philosophia Antiqua, no. 46. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988. Pp. 196. 74 guilders (approx. $37.00). This is a study of Aristotle's logic and psychology of mind which explores a connection between the two. This connection is used, on the one hand, to corroborate the results of the study of the logic and, on the other hand, (...) to elucidate the most controverted text of Aristotle's psychology, De Anima, 3. 5, with its discussion of active mind. Part 1 argues for the dependence of all discursive thinking on non-discursive sources of knowldge, viz., experience and intuition. Part 2, a bridge section, distinguishes logic, epistemology, and psychology: logic studies the forms of reasoning; epistemology studies the connection of reasoning to reality, as Aristotle does notably in Posterior Analytics, 2. 19; and psychology "shows how... cognitive processes... take place from the point of view of physics and First Philosophy " (p. 63). Part 3 investigates the psychology of cognition found in the De Anima and elsewhere and finds in it confirmation of the results of part l. In addition, Kal here offers a new interpretation of what Aristotle means by active mind. In part 1 Kal presents a careful textual study of Aristotle's view of definition, induction, and the syllogism, both dialectical and demonstra· tive, and argues that, as discursve methods, all of them presuppose knowledge already acquired, i.e., first principles that must be known. This raises the question of the origin of such principles, a question which Aristotle addresses and answers in Posterior Analytics, 2. 19. A common interpretation of this difficult chapter holds that first principles are grasped through induction. The text which seems to support this view is found in lines l00b3-5: " Thus it is clear that we necessarily know the first principles by induction; for sensation also produces the universal in this way." Kal argues that this text, when understood according to the indications of its context, does not make induction the source of first principles. Rather, Aristotle's position is that sensation, which gives us the universal, is based on experience (lOOall) and, therefore, an induction, which is also based on experience, also gives the universal (p. 51). Furthermore, Kal finds a much simpler argu· ment against the position that induction is the source of our knowledge of first principles in the beginning of Posterior Analytics, 2. 19, where "Aristotle rejects knowledge based on previous knowledge, and thus induction, as a solution to the problem of the knowledge of the first principles" (p. 52). Induction, then, remains one of the discursive methods, and, as such, depends on a kind of knowledge that is acquired 182 BOOK REVIEWS without being based on previously acquired knowledge. Kai insists that, if knowledge is possible, there must he a non-discursive origin for first principles; and, in his investigation of Aristotle's position, he finds only two such origins-experience and intuition. Sense experience brings the universal to light, although it does not know the universal as such, hut only as an accidental object of sensation. It is intellective intuition (nous) which knows the universal as such (p. 48). Having argued for the primacy of intuition (nous) in part l, Kai turns to the psychology of cognition in part 3. Is the primacy of nous corroborated by Aristotle's understanding of sensation and thinking? Kal finds that it is. From the point of view of logic and epistemology, the non-discursive origin of first principles is an immediate knowledge, a knowledge that does not require a middle term. As Kal puts it, the immediacy of intuition " lies... in the fact that contact is made with the object of knowledge simply, without active intervention of the knower" (p. 59). In receiving the object of knowledge the knower is completely receptive. Similarly, Kal argues, sensation and thinking in the sense of intuitive thought are also completely receptive, and this receptivity confirms the results of part l; cognition when viewed both from the point of view of logic-and epistemology, and from the point of view of psychology reveals the same essential receptivity. Just as Aristotle argues... (shrink)

The Spanish approximators como and como que serve multiple pragmatic functions. They can be employed in similar contexts to express vagueness when speakers experience uncertainty or to hedge and avoid being straightforward. Furthermore, these forms can alternate according to context since they represent two ways of saying the same thing. This study investigated the use of como and como que in two speech events: narratives of personal experience and therapeutic interviews, which were generated by Spanish speakers of several varieties, educational (...) levels, and lengths of residence in the United States. The study was informed by the theoretical frameworks of sociolinguistic and pragmatic variation, and the data were analyzed using quantitative and qualitative approaches. The findings revealed that while como was the preferred form among the speakers of the study they employed como que more often in the therapeutic interviews. Thus, both discourse and the pragmatic functions conditioned the use of these approximators. (shrink)

The article focuses on representing different forms of non-adjunctive inference as sub-Kripkean systems of classical modal logic, where the inference from □A and □B to □A ∧ B fails. In particular we prove a completeness result showing that the modal system that Schotch and Jennings derive from a form of non-adjunctive inference in (Schotch and Jennings, 1980) is a classical system strictly stronger than EMN and weaker than K (following the notation for classical modalities presented in Chellas, 1980). The unified (...) semantical characterization in terms of neighborhoods permits comparisons between different forms of non-adjunctive inference. For example, we show that the non-adjunctive logic proposed in (Schotch and Jennings, 1980) is not adequate in general for representing the logic of high probability operators. An alternative interpretation of the forcing relation of Schotch and Jennings is derived from the proposed unified semantics and utilized in order to propose a more fine-grained measure of epistemic coherence than the one presented in (Schotch and Jennings, 1980). Finally we propose a syntactic translation of the purely implicative part of Jaśkowski's system D₂ into a classical system preserving all the theorems (and non-theorems) explicilty mentioned in (Jaśkowski, 1969). The translation method can be used in order to develop epistemic semantics for a larger class of non-adjunctive (discursive) logics than the ones historically investigated by Jaśkowski. (shrink)

Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) are critical climate policy documents formulated by the Party countries, under the UNFCCC Paris Agreement, to communicate their goals and commitments to reduce national emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change. As an emerging discourse genre, it has attracted increasing attention from discourse analysts. However, few studies have specifically focused on the NDCs of African countries as a whole, leading into the situation in which their positions and voices are largely underrepresented in the current (...) climate negotiation. Using a combined method of positioning theory and critical discourse analysis, this paper aims to explore the African countries’ positioning in the climate change agenda by examining the discursive narratives around three prominent thematic categories in their NDCs, i.e. responsibility, vulnerability and conditionality. It is found that the African countries intend to position themselves as non-villains, victims, and demi-heroes by strategically highlighting their insignificant historical responsibility, exceptional vulnerability, and conditionality of implementation on the external support from the international community. Furthermore, it is argued that the commonality of their self-positioning is conducive to forming a collective identity to resist the hegemonic discourses of inequality and struggle for equity in the current climate negotiation. (shrink)

Robert Brandom defends the intelligibility of the notion of a fully discursive practice that does not include any kind of logical vocabulary. Logical vocabulary, according to his account, should be understood as an optional extra to discursive practice, not as a necessary ingredient. Call this the Layer Cake Picture of the relation of logical to non-logical discursive practices. The aim pursued in this paper is to show, by way of an internal critique, that the Layer Cake Picture is in fact (...) incompatible with the most central claims of Brandom’s philosophy. A way is sketched how to give up the Layer Cake Picture and still hold on to a position that is central to Brandom’s philosophical outlook, namely his expressivism about logic. (shrink)

Research on medical interactions shows how the discursive construction of the clinical case impacts diagnostic reasoning and treatment recommendations. Drawing on an ethnographic study in an intensive care unit, we illustrate how this process is at play in a ward that adopts an extreme, guideline-divergent policy as to the use of antibiotics. The article focuses on how physicians assemble the case as ‘treatable’ or ‘not yet treatable’, and how in doing so they ‘talk into being’ two contrastive policies on antibiotics (...) and position themselves toward the one adopted in the ward. The analysis identifies the discursive resources displayed by physicians to both project an infectious disease diagnosis and resist this treatment-implicative trajectory. We argue that the physicians’ contentious discursive construction of the case has crucial consequences in the way the ward’s extreme policy is jointly accomplished as a highly reflexive process sensitive to the contingencies of any particular case. (shrink)