In athletics, coaches and athletes share a unique and important relationship. Recently Jowett and her colleagues (Jowett & Cockerill, 2003; Jowett & Meek, 2000; Jowett & Ntoumanis, 2003, 2004; Jowett & Timson-Katchis, 2005) utilized relationship research (focusing on, for example, marital, familial and workplace relationships) from conjoining fields, and in particular social and cognitive psychology, to develop and test a four-component model (4 C’s) that depicts the most influential relational and emotional components (closeness, commitment, complementarity and co-orientation) of coach-athlete relationships. (...) Proceeding from a review of the literature on human touch communication to examine research on the power of touch to exchange relational and emotional messages (Hertenstein et al., 2006), the present study explores coaches’ and athletes’ collective experiences of communicating via touch, utilizing in-depth interviews with eight college coaches and athletes. A phenomenological approach was used to gather, analyze and interpret the data, drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/1962) philosophical exploration of perception and human experience, which emphasizes the body as a means of communicating with the world. The findings indicate that touch between coaches and athletes increased at major events when emotions and tensions ran high. In addition, touch involved showing appreciation, instructing, comforting and giving attention, and affected perceptions of relationships. The findings also show that touch communication is influenced by societal factors, such as gender, relational stage, and what spectators, parents and other athletes may think. By illustrating how touch is enacted and experienced by a group of college coaches and athletes, the study represents an initial step toward understanding touch communication in the coach-athlete dyad. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 7, Edition 2 September 2007. (shrink)

Collected and edited by Noah Levin -/- Table of Contents: -/- UNIT ONE: INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY ETHICS: TECHNOLOGY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND IMMIGRATION 1 The “Trolley Problem” and Self-Driving Cars: Your Car’s Moral Settings (Noah Levin) 2 What is Ethics and What Makes Something a Problem for Morality? (David Svolba) 3 Letter from the Birmingham City Jail (Martin Luther King, Jr) 4 A Defense of Affirmative Action (Noah Levin) 5 The Moral Issues of Immigration (B.M. Wooldridge) 6 The (...) Ethics of our Digital Selves (Noah Levin) -/- UNIT TWO: TORTURE, DEATH, AND THE “GREATER GOOD” 7 The Ethics of Torture (Martine Berenpas) 8 What Moral Obligations do we have (or not have) to Impoverished Peoples? (B.M. Wooldridge) 9 Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing (Nathan Nobis) 10 An Argument Against Capital Punishment (Noah Levin) 11 Common Arguments about Abortion (Nathan Nobis & Kristina Grob) 12 Better (Philosophical) Arguments about Abortion (Nathan Nobis & Kristina Grob) -/- UNIT THREE: PERSONS, AUTONOMY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND RIGHTS 13 Animal Rights (Eduardo Salazar) 14 John Rawls and the “Veil of Ignorance” (Ben Davies) 15 Environmental Ethics: Climate Change (Jonathan Spelman) 16 Rape, Date Rape, and the “Affirmative Consent” Law in California (Noah Levin) 17 The Ethics of Pornography: Deliberating on a Modern Harm (Eduardo Salazar) 18 The Social Contract (Thomas Hobbes) -/- UNIT FOUR: HAPPINESS 19 Is Pleasure all that Matters? Thoughts on the “Experience Machine” (Prabhpal Singh) 20 Utilitarianism (J.S. Mill) 21 Utilitarianism: Pros and Cons (B.M. Wooldridge) 22 Existentialism, Genetic Engineering, and the Meaning of Life: The Fifths (Noah Levin) 23 The Solitude of the Self (Elizabeth Cady Stanton) 24 Game Theory, the Nash Equilibrium, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Douglas E. Hill) -/- UNIT FIVE: RELIGION, LAW, AND ABSOLUTE MORALITY 25 The Myth of Gyges and The Crito (Plato) 26 God, Morality, and Religion (Kristin Seemuth Whaley) 27 The Categorical Imperative (Immanuel Kant) 28 The Virtues (Aristotle) 29 Beyond Good and Evil (Friedrich Nietzsche) 30 Other Moral Theories: Subjectivism, Relativism, Emotivism, Intuitionism, etc. (Jan F. Jacko). (shrink)

It is common among metaphysicians to talk about objects _having_ persistence conditions or, equivalently, about the persistence conditions _of_ objects. However, as frequent as these statements are, as rare are the attempts to clarify their meaning in a systematic manner. In the present paper, I try to provide such an explanation by considering in detail the question of what it is for an object to have persistence conditions. The central results are the following. _First_: that an object has (in contrast (...) to merely fulfil) certain conditions of Fness means that it lies in the essence of this object that these conditions hold—that is, that it is part of this object’s essence that it is F, if it is F, in virtue of the fulfilment of these very conditions. _Second_: persistence is the staying in existence of an already existing object, which is why an object’s persistence conditions are just that: conditions of the staying in existence of this very object. On the emerging view, the persistence conditions of objects exhibit an interesting parallel to the conditions of satisfaction of intentional states or entities. As the latter, they are imposed upon the world by entities existing in the world, viz. objects. (shrink)

Jeppe von Platz has recently argued that welfare-state capitalism can be justified by a theory of democratic equality, challenging John Rawls’s critique of capitalism. Von Platz develops his argument by introducing a social democratic interpretation of democratic equality as an alternative to Rawls’s justice as fairness. Unlike justice as fairness, in which there is only one possible principle of reciprocity (the difference principle), social democracy includes four possible principles in an eligible set that could be chosen as a principle of (...) reciprocity. However, I argue that von Platz’s conception of reciprocity still fails to justify welfare-state capitalism. Of the four principles of reciprocity in social democracy’s eligible set, one of them, the principle of utility, does not express a notion of reciprocity and thus does not belong. The other three – the principle of equality, the difference principle, and the principle of equity – are not compatible with welfare-state capitalism. Thus, since capitalism cannot satisfy a principle of reciprocity in the (revised) eligible set, it is incompatible with the social democratic interpretation of democratic equality. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Arbeit möchte eine entscheidende Phase im Denken des Deutschen Idealismus beleuchten. Gemäß dem Diktum der Neuzeit, nach dem Wahrheit mit Gewißheit gleichzusetzen ist, kann allein das Ich als das allem Zugrundeliegende in Anspruch genommen werden. Es ist die Transzendentalphilosophie Kants, die zuerst dieser Einsicht rückhaltlos folgt und ein philosophisches System auf dem Boden des Ich zu errichten sucht. Aber Kant hat das volle Wesen des Ich nicht durchklären können. Deshalb erweist sich auch das Herzstück seiner theoretischen Philosophie, die (...) Deduktion der Kategorien, als nicht genugtuend durchgeführt. Erst Fichte gelingt es, das Ich als ursprüngliche, alles umfassende Einheit zu entfalten. Das ermöglicht in eins die Deduktion universaler Kategorien mit systematischer Strenge. Unwiderruflich ist damit die Vollendungsgestalt eines Denkens erreicht, dessen Prinzip das Wesen des Ich ist. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 2, Page 30-31, February 2012.

I argue that, all else being equal, theism is more probable than naturalism on the assumption that human beings are able to arrive at a body of moral knowledge that is largely accurate and complete. I put forth this thesis on grounds that, if naturalism is true, the explanation of the content of our moral intuitions terminates either in biological-evolutionary processes or in social conventions adopted for pragmatic reasons; that, if this is so, our moral intuitions were selected for their (...) utility, not their truth; and that, if our moral intuitions were so selected, they are probably false. I defend the argument against three objections: first, that the argument amounts to a generic skeptical challenge; second, that ethical naturalism explains how our moral intuitions could have been selected for their truth; and third, that there is a pre-established harmony between the utility of moral beliefs and their truth-values. (shrink)

Is language understanding a special case of social cognition? To help evaluate this view, we can formalize it as the rational speech-act theory: Listeners assume that speakers choose their utterances approximately optimally, and listeners interpret an utterance by using Bayesian inference to “invert” this model of the speaker. We apply this framework to model scalar implicature (“some” implies “not all,” and “N” implies “not more than N”). This model predicts an interaction between the speaker's knowledge state and the listener's interpretation. (...) We test these predictions in two experiments and find good fit between model predictions and human judgments. (shrink)

Being the parents of a premature infant can be extremely stressful. Even when parents know that there is a high chance of premature birth, they are often in shock when their infant arrives too earl...

In his Animadversiones on Machiavelli's The Prince (1661), Hermann Conring, one of the most famous of the early modern German professors of politics, further developed the constitutional reading of Machiavelli's The Prince, following in the footsteps of Bodin and the German political theorists of the previous generation such as Arnisaeus, Contzen, and Besold. For Conring, Machiavelli's exaggerated analysis of tyranny and his heavy emphasis on popular liberty offered not so much a realist political science but a dangerous prelude to the (...) monarchomachic theory of popular sovereignty and a fatalistic concession to sin. Conring, a committed Aristotelian with Arminian sympathies, preferred a more empirical constitutional analysis (and a theory of the state) which did not favor any particular faction of the state (i.e. the people over the nobility) as the unique source of stability or instability and which explained the necessity for wickedness as the result of poor constitutional design rather than a realistic view of human nature and fate. (shrink)

This article positions punk rock pedagogy, or the educative dimensions of punk rock subculture, as an exemplar for combatting hate speech. This analysis contrast institutional efforts to protect free speech (which are rooted in free speech absolutism) with the ways by which punks protect one another from bigotry. This paper argues that the punk approach more closely reflects how free speech protections are framed in international human rights law.

The author puts forward and defends a new argument for indirect realism called the argument from pain. The argument is akin to a well-known traditional argument to the same end, the argument from hallucination. Like the latter, it contains one premise stating an analogy between veridical perceptions and certain other states and one premise stating that those states are states of acquaintance with sense-data. The crucial difference is that the states that are said to be analogous to veridical perceptions are (...) pain-states instead of hallucinations. This difference makes the argument from pain immune to the standard objections against the argument from hallucination. (shrink)

I address an objection to inference to the best explanation due to Bas C. van Fraassen, according to which explanatory virtues cannot confirm a theory, since they make the theory more informative and thus less likely to be true given the probability axioms. I try to show that van Fraassen’s argument, once made precise, is deductively invalid, and that even an ampliative version of the argument (i) implies, absurdly, that no theory is confirmed by its fit with empirical data; (ii) (...) fails to account for confirmatory closure under deduction; and (iii) falsely presupposes that a theory and its sub-theories can be competing explanations. (shrink)

Is Moore’s principle of organic unities true? Does it matter whether it is? I argue that it is true and important. I defend the principle of organic unites and the view that intrinsic value can be defeated by presenting examples of the defeat of intrinsic value. I next respond to two objections. The first claims the examples fail since the allegedly defeated parts lack actual intrinsic value—they are “evaluatively inadequate”. The second is that the principle of organic unities lacks “theoretical (...) significance” since there is no precise way to measure intrinsic value. Finally, I illustrate the importance of the principle by considering the Indispensability Argument which claims that if some type of good is an indispensable good, then it is the only good, that pluralism must be false. I argue that appealing to the concept of defeat allows the pluralist to consistently hold both that pluralism is true and that some goods are indispensable for a life or a world to be very good. Since the debate between pluralists and monists in axiology is important and since the concept of defeat provides the pluralist with a reasonable way to reply to the Indispensability Argument, the principle of organic unities is important. (shrink)

This book addresses some basic questions about intrinsic value: What is it? What has it? What justifies our beliefs about it? In the first six chapters the author defends the existence of a plurality of intrinsic goods, the thesis of organic unities, the view that some goods are 'higher' than others, and the view that intrinsic value can be explicated in terms of 'fitting' emotional attitudes. The final three chapters explore the justification of our beliefs about intrinsic value, including coherence (...) theories and the idea that some value beliefs are warranted on the basis of emotional experience. Professor Lemos defends the view that some value beliefs enjoy 'modest' a priori justification. The book is intended primarily for professional philosophers and their graduate students working in ethics, value theory and epistemology. (shrink)

In this 2004 book, Noah Lemos presents a strong defense of the common sense tradition, the view that we may take as data for philosophical inquiry many of the things we ordinarily think we know. He discusses the main features of that tradition as expounded by Thomas Reid, G. E. Moore and Roderick Chisholm. For a long time common sense philosophers have been subject to two main objections: that they fail to give any non-circular argument for the reliability of (...) memory and perception; and that they pick out instances of knowledge without knowing a criterion for knowledge. Lemos defends the appeal to what we ordinarily think we know in both epistemology and ethics and thus rejects the charge that common sense is dogmatic, unphilosophical or question-begging. Written in a clear and engaging style, this book will appeal to students and philosophers in epistemology and ethics. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss whether the view that understanding is the ability to relate the use of an expression to a certain purpose leads to a theory of meaning as use. In particular, I investigate the view that a theory of meaning relies on the assumption that use is related to immanent purposes of language. I inquire whether it is possible to identify those purposes that seem essential for the use of language. Interpreting Wittgenstein, I argue that this idea (...) relies on a misunderstanding between purposes and effects. Single purposes are not to be conceived of as essential for the use of language. However, if we want to speak of an essential purpose of language, I argue, this purpose is to be conceived of as an end in itself. I draw the conclusion that the use of language is an end in itself rather than a means that fulfils essential purposes. (shrink)

This paper explores the editorial influence of Joseph Banks on the Philosophical Transactions—still, at the time of his accession to the Presidency of the Royal Society in 1778, the most prestigious scientific periodical published in English. In particular, it examines how Banks forged, and wielded, personal influence over what went into the Transactions. Nominally, at least, the periodical was under the collective control of the Society's council, with significant statutory safeguards in place to prevent editorship by a presidential clique. Yet (...) this was exactly what Banks was able to speedily create and maintain. In this essay I explore how Banks accomplished this and the pressures it produced, addressing two key questions. First, I examine the social dimension of Banks's management of the Transactions (and what contemporaries thought of it), including particularly the questions of how and to whom access to the periodical was afforded or denied by Banks and his associates; and second, I consider how Banks and the Society dealt with the emerging competitive pressure of new commercial and learned society periodicals. I outline a sphere of scientific sociability partly created by informal processes of communicating, circulating, and evaluating papers developed by Banks and his close associates, and its significance for the Transactions in its engagements with other sites, genres, and conventions of scientific publication. (shrink)

Each title in the highly acclaimed Opposing Viewpoints series explores a specific issue by placing expert opinions in a unique pro/con format; the viewpoints are selected from a wide range of highly respected and often hard-to-find publications.

An earthy smell seeps from the cinderblock room, and a fan in the corner rattles as it circulates the heat. My eyes cross trying to read the square black numbers on the thermometer. I feel achy and tired. I would not be so nervous about the result except that I have been caring for Ebola patients in West Africa.

I defend the view that there are organic unities mainly by presenting examples of organic unities. I also defend the view against two objections. The first objection appeals to the notion of an evaluatively incomplete state of affairs. The second objection holds that the intrinsic value of a state of affairs can be different in different contexts. I argue that neither objection provides a compelling reason for rejecting these examples.

Pastor and influencer Noah Herrin gives you ten simple, powerful choices you can make each day that will lead to life-changing purpose, freedom, and impact. When you shift your relationship with Jesus from duty to delight, you will rest where you once were striving, stand firm in faith, rise in influence, and make an impact that echoes into eternity.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

I argue that classical theism is in tension with a kind of modal recombination principle known as ‘cut-and-paste’. I develop this tension at length, giving two arguments against theism based on cut-and-paste. I then both lay out and respond to various original proposals for reconciling theism with cut-and-paste. I conclude by measuring the cost of having to deny cut-and-paste. I argue that while there is an intuitive cost to this consequence of theism, theists also have plausible ways of addressing various (...) motivations for cut-and-paste. (shrink)

I examine issues in the philosophy of religion at the intersection of what possibilities there are and what a God, as classically conceived in the theistic philosophical tradition, would be able to do. The discussion is centered around arguing for an incompatibility between theism and two principles about possibility and ability, and exploring what theists should say about these incompatibilities. -/- I argue that theism entails that certain kinds and amounts of evil are impossible. This puts theism in conflict with (...) popular principles of modal recombination. However, theists have plausible explanations for the violations of recombination that they posit, and can suitably amend these principles without giving up their usefulness in accounting for what possibilities there are. -/- I also argue that despite the impossibility of these evils, God is able to bring these evils about. This puts theism in conflict with the principle that no one is able to do the impossible. However, theists can give a plausible account of why God is unique in being able to do the impossible, and have distinctive resources to address the arguments in favor of the idea that no one is able to do the impossible. And by denying this principle, theists are able to resolve several otherwise difficult puzzles, including reconciling conflicts between the divine attributes. (shrink)

Nazariyat, Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences, issued twice a year in English and Turkish (Nazariyat İslam Felsefe ve Bilim Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi), is a refereed international journal. It publishes original studies, critical editions of classical texts and book reviews on Islamic philosophy, kalām, theoretical aspects of Sufism and the history of sciences. The goal of Nazariyat is to contribute to the discovery, examination and reinterpretation of the theoretical traditions in the history of Islamic thought, by giving (...) special attention to the post-classical period of it. **ISSN: 2148-8088 E-ISBN: 2547-9415**. (shrink)

This paper presents an alternative conceptual foundation for biological evolution. First the causal and statistical perspectives on evolutionary fitness are analyzed, finding them to implicitly depend on each other, and hence cannot be individually fundamental. It is argued that this is an instance of a relativistic perspective over evolutionary phenomena. New accounts of fitness, the struggle for life, and Natural Selection are developed under this interpretation. This biological relativism is unique in that it draws from General Relativity in physics, unlike (...) previous theories that drew upon statistical mechanics or Newtonian dynamics. A mathematical law of evolutionary change, as well as new theoretical biological concepts to underpin it, are likewise developed. The law and theory are then applied to give examples of how both cornerstones and edge cases can be understood using these new methods. Using General Relativistic Biology provides fresh insight into evolution, all while preserving the core, canonical scientific research program. (shrink)

I distinguish between two theses, DPJ and DGP. DPJ asserts that one’s justification for accepting particular epistemic propositions positively depends on one’s being justified in believing general epistemic principles. DGP claims that one’s justification in believing general epistemic propositions positively depends on one’s being justified in believing particular epistemic propositions. I claim that methodism accepts DPJ and rejects DGP and particularism accepts DGP and rejects DPJ. I argue that we should reject DGP and methodism roughly because these views imply that (...) many of us do not know epistemic propositions that we do know. This point is made by Roderick Chisholm in The Problem of the Criterion and challenged by Robert Amico. I consider Chisholm’s arguments and Amico’s objections. Finally, I argue that even if we reject DPJ and methodism, we need not embrace particularism, since we could reject both DPJ and DGP. (shrink)

This paper takes a historical approach to describing theologian Reinhold Niebuhr’s concept of Christian Realism, and its consequences for political thought in America. In the aftermath of World War I many people in America, especially Protestant clergy, became disillusioned with the idea of political intervention, focussing on domestic rather than international disputes. However, as National Socialism gained a foothold in Germany, culminating in the Second World War, the Protestant theology of Social Gospel Liberalism that gained popularity in the 1920’s would (...) not suffice for explaining the conduct of the Nazi party, nor the political action that America should take towards it. Niebuhr’s Christian Realism, emphasizing the inevitability of sin in individuals and social institutions alike, provided a philosophy that emphasized action towards this political power, influencing American conduct and discourse as the war broke out across the Atlantic at the turn of the decade. (shrink)

Homelessness and its various forms of manifestation are a complex phenomenon. Street homelessness, which is the subject of this study, continues to be a challenge for the South African people and government. Different research studies have been undertaken on street homelessness. Various frameworks have been used in an attempt to understand and respond to street homelessness. Churches continue as key role-players in responses to street homelessness. There is a need, however, for churches to continually evaluate the various approaches to street (...) homelessness, with a view to sharpening those approaches to better understand and respond to the challenge. Churches need frameworks that can help them to theologically understand and adequately respond to street homelessness. Gustafson's framework of moral engagement is explored within the context of street homelessness, with a view to suggest ways and means by which the Methodist Church of Southern Africa could better understand and adequately respond to the problem of street homelessness in South Africa. (shrink)

" In their ground-breaking book, "What the Angel Taught You; Seven Keys to Life Fulfillment," two world-renowned educators collaborate to ask and answer some of ...

The health co-benefits of CO2 mitigation can provide a strong incentive for climate policy through reductions in air pollutant emissions that occur when targeting shared sources. However, reducing air pollutant emissions may also have an important co-harm, as the aerosols they form produce net cooling overall. Nevertheless, aerosol impacts have not been fully incorporated into cost-benefit modeling that estimates how much the world should optimally mitigate. Here we find that when both co-benefits and co-harms are taken fully into account, optimal (...) climate policy results in immediate net benefits globally, overturning previous findings from cost-benefit models that omit these effects. The global health benefits from climate policy could reach trillions of dollars annually, but will importantly depend on the air quality policies that nations adopt independently of climate change. Depending on how society values better health, economically optimal levels of mitigation may be consistent with a target of 2 °C or lower. (shrink)