It has been suggested that many philosophical theses—physicalism, normative naturalism, phenomenalism, and so on—should be understood in terms of ground. Against this, Ted Sider (2011) has argued that ground is ill-suited for this purpose. Here I develop Sider’s objection and offer a response. In doing so I develop a view about the role of ground in philosophy, and about the content of these distinctively philosophical theses.

This paper argues that ground is irreducibly plural: a group of facts can be grounded together, as a collective, even though no member of the group has a ground on its own. This kind of plural grounding is applied to the metaphysics of individuals and quantities, yielding a “structuralist” view in each case. Some more general implications of plural grounding are also discussed.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason states that everything has an explanation. But different notions of explanation yield different versions of this principle. Here a version is formulated in terms of the notion of a “grounding” explanation. Its consequences are then explored, with particular emphasis on the fact that it implies necessitarianism, the view that every truth is necessarily true. Finally, the principle is defended from a number of objections, including objections to necessitarianism. The result is a defense of a “rationalist” (...) metaphysics, one that constitutes an alternative to the contemporary dogmas that some aspects of the world are “metaphysically brute” and that the world could in so many ways have been different. (shrink)

In Human Well-Being and the Natural Environment, Partha Dasgupta explores ways to measure the quality of life. In developing quality-of-life indices, he pays particular attention to the natural environment, illustrating how it can be incorporated, more generally, into economic reasoning in a seamless manner. Professor Dasgupta puts the theory that he develops to use in extended commentaries on the economics of population, poverty traps, global warming, structural adjustment programmes, and free trade, particularly in relation to poor countries. The (...) result is a treatise that goes beyond quality-of-life measures and offers a comprehensive account of the newly emergent subject of ecological economics. (shrink)

Symmetries in physics are a guide to reality. That much is well known. But what is less well known is why symmetry is a guide to reality. What justifies inferences that draw conclusions about reality from premises about symmetries? I argue that answering this question reveals that symmetry is an epistemic notion twice over. First, these inferences must proceed via epistemic lemmas: premises about symmetries in the first instance justify epistemic lemmas about our powers of detection, and only from those (...) epistemic lemmas can we draw conclusions about reality. Second, in order to justify those epistemic lemmas, the notion of symmetry must be defined partly in epistemic terms. 1 Symmetry-to-Reality Reasoning1.1 A rough introduction to symmetry1.2 The symmetry-to-reality inference1.3 Two questions1.4 Two answers1.5 Preliminary clarifications2 Against Redundancy2.1 Redundancy2.2 Is absolute velocity redundant?2.3 Some redundancies3 Against Objectivity4 From Symmetry to Detection4.1 The epistemic approach4.2 The Occamist norm4.3 From symmetry to detection5 The Meaning of ‘Symmetry’5.1 A framework5.2 Formal definitions5.3 Ontic definitions6 Epistemic Definitions6.1 Taking observation seriously6.2 How things look6.3 Observation sentences6.4 Observational equivalence7 Symmetry as an Epistemic Notion 7.1 Observational equivalence and metaphysics7.2 The Occamist norm revisted7.3 Consequences8 Conclusion. (shrink)

Sometimes, ignorance is inexpressible. Lewis recognized this when he argued, in “Ramseyan Humility,” that we cannot know which property occupies which causal role. This peculiar state of ignorance arises in a number of other domains too, including ignorance about our position in space and the identities of individuals. In these cases, one does not know something, and yet one cannot give voice to one's ignorance in a certain way. But what does the ignorance in these cases consist in? This essay (...) argues that many standard models of ignorance cannot account for the phenomenon of inexpressible ignorance. It then develops an alternative model that does better, on which the ignorance consists in a failure to identify something by way of its nature or essence. (shrink)

Substantivalism is the view that space exists in addition to any material bodies situated within it. Relationalism is the opposing view that there is no such thing as space; there are just material bodies, spatially related to one another. This paper assesses this issue in the context of classical physics. It starts by describing the bucket argument for substantivalism. It then turns to anti-substantivalist arguments, including Leibniz's classic arguments and their contemporary reincarnation under the guise of ‘symmetry’. It argues that (...) these anti-substantivalist arguments are stronger than is often acknowledged. (shrink)

Neural devices have the capacity to enable users to regain abilities lost due to disease or injury – for instance, a deep brain stimulator (DBS) that allows a person with Parkinson’s disease to regain the ability to fluently perform movements or a Brain Computer Interface (BCI) that enables a person with spinal cord injury to control a robotic arm. While users recognize and appreciate the technologies’ capacity to maintain or restore their capabilities, the neuroethics literature is replete with examples of (...) concerns expressed about agentive capacities: A perceived lack of control over the movement of a robotic arm might result in an altered sense of feeling responsible for that movement. Clinicians or researchers being able to record and access detailed information of a person’s brain might raise privacy concerns. A disconnect between previous, current, and future understandings of the self might result in a sense of alienation. The ability to receive and interpret sensory feedback might change whether someone trusts the implanted device or themselves. Inquiries into the nature of these concerns and how to mitigate them has produced scholarship that often emphasizes one issue – responsibility, privacy, authenticity, or trust – selectively. However, we believe that examining these ethical dimensions separately fails to capture a key aspect of the experience of living with a neural device. In exploring their interrelations, we argue that their mutual significance for neuroethical research can be adequately captured if they are described under a unified heading of agency. On these grounds, we propose an “Agency Map” which brings together the diverse neuroethical dimensions and their interrelations into a comprehensive framework. With this, we offer a theoretically-grounded approach to understanding how these various dimensions are interwoven in an individual’s experience of agency. (shrink)

Much recent metaphysics is built around notions such as naturalness, fundamentality, grounding, dependence, essence, and others besides. In this article I raise a problem for this kind of metaphysics, the “problem of missing value.” I survey a number of possible solutions to the problem and find them all wanting. This suggests a return to a kind of Goodmanian view that the world is a structureless mess onto which we project our own categorizations, not something with categories already built in.

During the past three decades, two terms, “postmodernism” and “globalization” have entered not only academic discourse, but everyday discussions outside the groves of academia. This book contains essays assembled with a conviction that both postmodernism and globalization have the potential to be valuable tools for social analysts, this despite the uncertainties and ambiguities that persist. The editors and the contributors make no claim to have found a solution that would overcome the uncertainties and ambiguities. Rather, it is assumed that at (...) some level both the concepts will remain contested. All the essays are expressions of efforts to employ one or both of the concepts in terms of empirically grounded topics. They also add further precision or clarity to the concepts themselves in order to enhance their utility in making sense of the dynamics of social change. (shrink)

In this benchmark five-volume study, originally published between 1922 and 1955, Surendranath Dasgupta examines the principal schools of thought that define Indian philosophy. A unifying force greater than art, literature, religion, or science, Professor Dasgupta describes philosophy as the most important achievement of Indian thought, arguing that an understanding of its history is necessary to appreciate the significance and potentialities of India's complex culture.

We naturally think of the material world as being populated by a large number of individuals . These are things, such as my laptop and the particles that compose it, that we describe as being propertied and related in various ways when we describe the material world around us. In this paper I argue that, fundamentally speaking at least, there are no such things as material individuals. I then propose and defend an individual-less view of the material world I call (...) “generalism”. (shrink)

This article looks at the contribution made by Ambalavaner Sivanandan to black politics and organising in Britain. It reviews some of his most important writings and analyses their significance and influence on black activism and race studies. Specifically, the article looks at the ways in which class and race intersected in his work and his critical stance towards political elites and advocacy for radical politics.

One important concern regarding implantable Brain Computer Interfaces is the fear that the intervention will negatively change a patient’s sense of identity or agency. In particular, there is concern that the user will be psychologically worse-off following treatment despite postoperative functional improvements. Clinical observations from similar implantable brain technologies, such as deep brain stimulation, show a small but significant proportion of patients report feelings of strangeness or difficulty adjusting to a new concept of themselves characterized by a maladaptive je ne (...) sais quoi despite clear motor improvement. Despite the growing number of cases in the DBS literature, there is currently no accepted or standardized tool in neuroethics specifically designed to capture the phenomenological postoperative experience of patients implanted with DBS or BCI devices. Given potential risks of postoperative maladaptation, it is important for the field of neuroethics to develop a qualitative instrument that can serve as a shared method for capturing postoperative variations in patient experience of identity and agency. The goal of this article is to introduce an instrument we have developed for this purpose and call for further neuroethical efforts to assess the phenomenology of implantable brain device use. (shrink)

Assuming that progress in science means effectiveness at problem-solving, this paper discusses how a progressive scienti?c tradition can be created by a peripheral scienti?c community. A mechanism of peripheral scienti?c growth is proposed, and it is illustrated with an Indian case study. The conclusion of the paper is that scienti?c collaboration between metropolitan and peripheral research communities is frequently characterized by a persistent inequality of intellectual authority due to inequalityin their epistemic transactions.

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 7, Page 30-31, July 2012.

Genomics research is regularly appropriated in social and political contexts to publicly legitimize unjust and malicious political views, policies, and actions. In recent years, there have been high‐profile cases of mass shooters, public intellectuals, and political insiders using genomics findings to convince audiences that deadly force and coercive policies against racial minorities are warranted. To create a just genomics, geneticists must consider what makes their research so attractive and adaptable for the legitimization of unjust ends and what they can do (...) to counter such appropriations. We offer insights and recommendations drawing from our research into the many ways online white nationalist and far‐right political movements mobilize genetics research to promote their racist, sexist, antisemitic, and homophobic views. First, geneticists should identify and change routine research practices that feed eugenic thinking. Second, geneticists should adopt creative extra‐scholarly communication efforts to counter the use of their field's research that occurs in nonscholarly spaces. Third, we identify permissive epistemological and professional practices within the genetics field that have enabled such unjust appropriations to thrive, and we recommend strategies for institutional reform. (shrink)

Originally published in 1969, this book gives the text of the Readership Lectures which the author delivered at the University of Patna. He sets out the various strands of idealistic thought in India which stemmed from the Upanishads and later from Buddhism, explaining in what sense these theories can be called 'idealism', bringing out the significant contributions of each of the principal Upanishads and comparing Buddhist idealism with that of Sankara and some of his followers.

Discusses policy change in the midst of markets and non‐market institutions. Accounting prices are particularly difficult to estimate in non‐market institutions because of an absence of market prices to serve as guide. Moreover, changes in public policy frequently affect the macro‐economy. Involving as they do large changes to an economy, their evaluation requires more complex estimation procedures. Accounting prices don’t suffice. By means of three examples, I offer a sketch of how social cost–benefit analysis is useful for identifying what the (...) evaluator ought to try to measure and why. The first example is a miniature, involving communal management of irrigation systems in Nepal; the latter two are altogethergrander, illustrating some of the environmental implications for poor countries of structural adjustment programmes and trade liberalization. (shrink)

Studies a comprehensive, but operational, notion of current well‐being, and develop ways of measuring it. In order to find a usable measure of current well‐being, I appeal to an overarching idea of citizenship, with its three constituent spheres: the civil, the political, and the socio‐economic. The classification is useful for identifying the constituents of well‐being. The idea of citizenship is useful also in that it directs us to study the kinds of institutions that are best suited to protect and promote (...) human interests. Political scientists have shown that democracy is neither necessary nor sufficient for civic co‐operation and the benefits that come with it. (shrink)

Reasons for seeking an index of social well‐being are identified in this chapter. Four are given prominence: to compare well‐being across countries ; to compare well‐being across time and generations for the same country ; to check if well‐being is sustainable; and to derive a criterion for judging if a policy is worth undertaking. There is no a priori reason why the same index would be appropriate for the four sets of exercises.

As part of an article symposium on their “Narrow Identities”, Partha Dasgupta and Sanjeev Goyal respond to commentaries by Jean-Paul Carvalho, John B. Davis, Peter Finke, and Miriam Teschl.