This book is a defense of Hume's philosophical principles in the Treatise of Human Nature. Nelson shows that Hume's new philosophy was a uniquely original and profound masterpiece in philosophical literature, worthy of serious study and acceptance. It is argued that Dialoguesis a reflective philosophical autobiography of Hume himself.

The essays in this collection in honor of Pierre Bourdieu gather loosely under the rubric of 'cultural production' and around three central themes: the ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On the Authorship oftheAbstract: AReply to John O. Nelson JeffBroome In "The Authorship of the Abstract Revisited," John O. Nelson argues for the once widely held view that Adam Smith was the author of the Abstract.1 Generally speaking, however, this view has not been seriously maintained since the 1938 reprinting of the Abstract by Keynes and Sraffa. There, in their introduction, Keynes and Sraffa argue that Adam (...) Smith was not the author ofthe Abstract, but rather Hume was.2 The central document from which the traditional view derived its authority comes in an early letter of Hume to Hutcheson (hereafter noted as Hl). It is worth quoting the passage in full. Writes Hume to Hutcheson, My Bookseller has sent to Mr. Smith a copy ofmy book, which I hope he has receiv'd, as well as your letter. I have not yet heard what he has done with the Abstract. Perhaps you have. I have got it printed in London; but not in the Works of the Learned; there having been an Article with regard to my Book, somewhat abusive, printed in that Work, before I sent up the Abstract.3 The once widely held view argues that Adam Smith is the Mr. Smith referred toin this passage, and therefore thatAdam Smith is the author of the Abstract. The argument proceeds: Smith at the time of Hl was a pupil of Hutcheson, and it was a habit of Hutcheson to have his promising students write abstracts of standard and contemporary works. It is then assumed that Adam Smith had written the Abstract, that Hutcheson was so impressed with it that he sent a copy to Hume, and that Hume in turn was so impressed that he arranged for its immediate publication, and, as seemingly mentioned in Hl, rewarded Smith with a presentation copy ofthe first two volumes ofhis Treatise. The Keynes and Sraffa thesis argues that the Mr. Smith in Hl cannot be Adam Smith, but rather must be John Smith of Dublin, "at the Philosopher's Head on the Blind Quay" (Abstract, xxiii). Their argument hinges on the conjecture that Hume was interested in an Irish editionofthe Treatise, andtherefore, Hume isaskingHutcheson's assistance in securing John Smith's help in this endeavour (Abstract, Volume XVII Number 2 95 JEFFBROOME xxii). The removal of Adam Smith as the Mr. Smith referred to in Hl consequently seems to explode theAdam Smith authorshiphypothesis. John Nelson first argued fifteen years ago against the Keynes/Sraffa thesis,4 challenging as unlikely the claim that the Mr. Smith in Hl must be John Smith ofDublin, and in the April 1991 issue of Hume Studies he reasserts his position more forcefully, arguing instead that it is impossible that "Mr. Smith" could be John Smith. Since the Mr. Smith of Hl is not John Smith, Nelson goes on to ask "who could he be except the Adam Smith ofthe traditional theory?"5 A closer examination ofeach view, Nelson's and Keynes/Sraffa's, reveals an assumption concerning an Irish publication of the Treatise that precludes any fully coherent resolution of the issue. I shall argue that the proper conclusion tobe drawn from Hl should be that the Mr. Smith is the Dublin publisher John Smith. On this point Keynes and Sraffa are correct; but against their thesis, I shall argue that Hume's purpose in referring toJohn Smith is not to see to his publishing an Irish edition of the Treatise (volumes 1 and 2, and the soon to be published volume 3), but rather to see to his publishing an Irish edition of the Abstract, in the hope that this would help to promote sales of the already publishedvolumes 1 and 2 ofthe Treatise. Thus, Hl should not be taken to decide the authorship ofthe Abstract, as Keynes and Sraffa, as well as John Nelson, argue. If anything, deciding the authorship of the Abstract should be made from Hume's personal copy of the Abstract, annotated in Hume's own hand, which is preserved in the British Museum. We notice in Hl that Hume asks two favours. The first is meant to draw upon Hutcheson's experience in publishing. Hume merely wants to know what... (shrink)

I discuss and defend two arguments against semantic theories which wish to avoid commitment to propositions. The first holds that on the most plausible semantics of a class of natural language sentences, the truth of sentences in that class requires the existence of propositions; and some sentences in that class are true. The second holds that, on the best understanding of the form of a semantic theory, the truth of a semantic theory itself entails the existence of propositions. Much of (...) the discussion engages Davidsonian alternatives to a propositionalist semantic theory. (shrink)

I reply to criticisms from King and Soames and critically examine two aspects of current orthodoxy about propositions: that they are representational and that they are structured. I argue that (especially once one gives up on intrinsically representational propositions) there is no good reason to think that propositions have representational properties, and distinguish a few different senses in which propositions might be structured, expressing some skepticism about the more ambitious ones.

Human-nonhuman chimeric research—research on nonhuman animals who contain human cells—is being used to understand human disease and development and to create potential human treatments such as transplantable organs. A proposed advantage of chimeric models is that they can approximate human biology and therefore allow scientists to learn about and improve human health without risking harms to humans. Among the emerging ethical issues being explored is the question of at what point chimeras are “human enough” to have human rights and thus (...) be owed higher standards of research protection than that currently afforded to nonhuman animals. However, this question and other related questions assume that the ethics of experimenting on nonhuman animals have been settled, which they have not. In this essay, we argue that it is imperative to give adequate attention to familiar questions about nonhuman animal research as well as new questions about chimera research and that failure to do so will result in a distorted understanding of the ethics of chimera research. (shrink)

I defend the view that propositions are a kind of property which is true iff it is instantiated. I discuss how we should think about propositional attitudes on this sort of view, and explain why I favor this sort of view over the more familiar Chisholm/Lewis view that attitudes are self-ascriptions of properties. I conclude by raising, and briefly discussing, two problems for the kind of view of propositions I favor.

While much has been written on Latour’s politics and use of militaristic language, by attending to some of Latour’s lesser known or read writings, his political location within the traditional Left-Right spectrum becomes more discernable, as does the reason for his frequent resort to the language of war. This article does not seek to defend Latour’s politics or rhetoric, but to provide a corrective by incorporating, rather than taking distance from, his use of militaristic language. Doing so reveals an understanding (...) of Latour’s project as having always been—if not traditionally Left—charting a different Leftist approach. (shrink)

During the last third of the 20C, public discourse in the United States has become increasingly acerbic. Parallel to this development there has been an increasing enrollment in College level logic courses, courses that focus on arguments and their appraisal. Could there be a connection? A number of majorphilosophers do not just see arguments as either 100% correct or 100% incorrect. Notable in this regard are Plato, Aquinas and Hume. Their approach to “logic” and that of others is offered as (...) a palliative to the types of logic that we now teach. (shrink)

Kant behauptet, daß wir nur indirekte Pflichten haben können, von Grausamkeiten und Gewalt gegen Tiere abzusehen. Pflichten dieser Art seien direkte Pflichten gegen uns selbst, um unseren moralischen Charakter nicht zu verderben, aber könnten nicht direkte Pflichten gegenüber den Tieren sein, weil Tiere keine rationalen Wesen sind. Diese Sichtweise erscheint unbefriedigend, da die Tiere die Opfer einer solchen Mißhandlung sind, wenn sie stattfindet, und die Vorstellung, daß wir keine direkten Pflichten ihnen gegenüber haben sollen, erscheint merkwürdig. Ich plädiere dafür, daß (...) Kant, durchaus in Übereinstimmung mit seiner allgemeinen Moralphilosophie, hätte ein Konzept von direkten Pflichten gegenüber Tieren entwickeln können. Ein solches Konzept wäre weitaus plausibler und hätte Kant geholfen, mit allfälligen Problemen umzugehen, die sich im Hinblick auf die Behandlung von zurechnungsunfähigen Personen ergeben, die ebenfalls keine rationalen Wesen sind, sondern allenfalls potentiell. Zwar kann Kant durchaus plausibel machen, daß es die von ihm behaupteten indirekten Pflichten im Hinblick auf Tiere gibt, aber nicht, daß unsere Pflichten gegenüber Tieren auf derartige indirekte Pflichten beschränkt sind. Kant claimed that we could only have indirect duties to abstain from cruelty and violence to animals; such duties were directly duties to ourselves not to degrade our moral character, but could not be direct duties to animals because animals are not rational beings. This view seems unsatisfactory because animals are the victims of such mistreatment when it occurs, and the idea that we have no direct obligations to them seems odd. I urge that Kant, consistent with his general moral philosophy, could have developed a view of DIRECT duties to animals. Such a view would have been more plausible and would also have helped him deal with lurking problems concerning the treatment of incompetent humans, some of whom are also not rational beings, even potentially. Kant can plausibly claim that there are such indirect duties to animals, but not that our duties to them are limited to such indirect duties. (shrink)

This innovative book proposes that what we think of as “moral conscience” is essentially the exercise of reflective judgment on the goods and ends arising in interpersonal relations, and that such judgment constitutes a form of taste. Through an historical survey Mitchell shows that the constant pendant to taste was an educational and cultural ideal, namely, that of the gentleman, whether he was an ancient Greek citizen-soldier, Roman magistrate, Confucian scholar-bureaucrat, Renaissance courtier, or Victorian grandee. Mitchell argues that it was (...) neither an ethical doctrine nor methodology that provided the high cultures with moral and political leadership, but rather an elite social order. While the gentry in the traditional sense no longer exists, it nevertheless made significant historical contributions, and insofar as we are concerned to understand the present state of human affairs, we need to grasp the nature and import of said contributions. (shrink)

This book provides a unique introduction to the study of relationships between gender and biology, a core part of the feminist science research tradition which emerged nearly half a century ago. Lynn Hankinson Nelson presents an accessible and balanced discussion of research questions, background assumptions, methods, and hypotheses about biology and gender with which feminist scientists and science scholars critically and constructively engage. Writing from the perspective of contemporary philosophy of science, she examines the evidence for and ethical implications (...) of biological hypotheses about gender, and discusses relevant philosophical issues including understandings of scientific objectivity, the nature of scientific reasoning, and relationships between biological research and the scientific and social contexts in which it is pursued. Clear and comprehensive, this volume addresses the engagements of feminist scientists and science scholars with a range of disciplines, including developmental and evolutionary biology, medicine, neurobiology, and primatology. (shrink)

Keith Dromm has argued that the makers of historical films have a moral duty to be accurate in their depictions of the past due to the principle that it is wrong to lie. In this essay, I contend that contractarianism provides a more comprehensive basis upon which to ground such an obligation. While Dromm’s treatment takes into consideration key historical facts, such as names and dates, it fails to properly account for the role played by causal interpretation in historical understanding. (...) I argue that his recommended guidelines for filmmakers should be supplemented by an additional one that urges them to respect the conventional scholarly explanation of the circumstances which led to the events that they have chosen to depict. (shrink)

One of the greatest challenges in teaching an introductory philosophy course is convincing students that there are, indeed, reliable standards for the evaluation of arguments. Too often introductory students criticize an argument simply by contesting the truth of one of its claims. And far too often, the only claim in an argument that meets serious objections is its conclusion. For many students, the idea that an argument displays a structure which can be evaluated on its own terms is not very (...) difficult to grasp. Unfortunately, the idea is grasped only in an abstract way, with insufficient appreciation of how structural problems manifest themselves in concrete arguments, and without the vocabulary for formulating structural criticisms. But this paper is not simply about teaching logic, it is about pedagogy. Our task is to instill in the student the habit of clear thinking. When we send our students out into the world, we have to ensure that they are prepared for it. (shrink)

El artículo examina la presencia de Friedrich Nietzsche a finales del siglo XX en Colombia, especialmente el periodo 1990-2010, a partir de varios presupuestos de la Historia social de la filosofía (HSF) y del enfoque genealógico planteado por el filósofo alemán. Para dar cuenta del anterior objetivo se establecen tres momentos. En el primer apartado I. Nietzsche y la Historia social de la filosofía, se analizan varios presupuestos de la HSF a partir de los cuales se señalan aspectos característicos del (...) periodo 1990-2010. En el segundo apartado II. Edgar Garavito y la filosofía del transcurso, se destaca el trabajo del filósofo colombiano Edgar Garavito, en especial su obra La transcursividad. Crítica de la identidad psicológica como un vector fundamental de la clave interpretativa “postestructuralista” de Nietzsche. Finalmente, en el tercer apartado III. Otros devenires de Nietzsche, se destacan algunos trabajos de Jaime Toro y Víctor Florián, filósofos colombianos que han hecho tanto lecturas como usos otros del pensador alemán. (shrink)

El problema del diálogo entre interlocutores con distintas expresionesculturales es una de las difi cultades más notables que afrontan las actualessociedades democráticas. En el presente artículo se aborda dicho problemaen clave de los aportes fi losófi cos de Hans Georg Gadamer y Charles Taylor.Se plantea como pregunta central: ¿qué actitudes ameritan promover losinterlocutores con tradiciones culturales incompatibles para la construcciónde unidad política democrática y pluricultural? Se acoge como principiode argumentación la idea de que diálogo abierto y reconocimiento mutuoson dos actitudes (...) ineludibles de cualquier intento sano por construir unidadpolítica democrática y pluricultural. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se afirma que el lenguaje determinado por el seguimiento de reglas, por la intencionalidad de los estados mentales y por las expresiones con contenidos, tiene una preeminencia frente al planteamiento funcional ofrecido por la versión cognitiva en lo relacionado con el estudio de los procesos mentales. 1) Se reconstruye el modo como Searle entiende el lenguaje y la manera como están entrelazados sus rasgos constitutivos con el problema de los estados mentales. 2) Se muestra la característica (...) principal de cada uno de los rasgos del lenguaje. 3) Se concluye que los contenidos de la acción mental intencionada están siempre determinados por la infinita capacidad individual y por la generosa multiplicidad de perspectivas generales sobre el mundo, en lo referente con la continua creación y representación de los hechos institucionales determinados por el lenguaje. (shrink)

Should I break my promise? -- Should I tell people his secret? -- Can I cancel my plans with my friend? -- Why won't he trust me with his toy? -- Why didn't they believe me? -- Is it okay if I keep Maddie's shirt? -- Is it honest to stuff everything under Mary's bed? -- Should I tell my teacher the truth? -- Should I look at his paper and copy him? -- Activity.

En el año 2020, Pedro J. Chamizo Domínguez publicó dos estudios, el uno en inglés, el otro en castellano, enfocados en el problema de traducir el sustantivo inglés «actuality» a múltiples idiomas europeos. Arguía que, por resultado de algún cambio semántico en su evolución, dos lenguas-- por ejemplo, el inglés y el castellano-- comparten por lo menos uno de los sentidos de su significante, diferenciándose con respecto a los demás sentidos, y que esta diferencia de sentido, (presente en todas las (...) lenguas romances y en alemán), dificulta la traducción. El trabajo presente ofrece una prueba concreta y significativa de la tesis de Chamizo, siguiendo su ejemplo al analizar la voz inglesa «actuality». Solo que ofrecemos el ejemplo de su empleo en la versión inglesa hecha por nosotros en 2003 del curso de metafísica de Xavier Zubiri, Estructura dinámica de la realidad (1968). Aquí mostraremos que Zubiri obliga al traductor a emplear la palabra «actuality» como monosémico, significando «ser real o completo», «ejecutivo», con el fin de traducir la palabra castellana «actualidad», por razones sugeridas por Chamizo. Pero, además, en Zubiri esta traducción obedece a tres propósitos concretos que, merced a Chamizo, esclarece su metafísica: [1.] el de distinguir la «realidad» del «ser», doctrina fundamental del tratado zubiriano Sobre la esencia, en el cual se basan las teorías del curso del 68; [2.] el de definir el concepto de «estructura», y [3.] el de conceptuar el «tiempo» y su relación con el «ser», frente a Ser y Tiempo de Heidegger. (shrink)

Implicit bias is one of the most successful cases in recent memory of an academic concept being translated into practice. Its use in the National Science Foundation ADVANCE program—which seeks to promote gender equality in STEM careers through institutional transformation—has raised fundamental questions about organizational change. How do advocates translate theories into practice? What makes some concepts more tractable than others? What happens to theories through this translation process? We explore these questions using the ADVANCE program as a case study. (...) Using an inductive, theory-building approach and combination of computational and qualitative methods, we investigate how the concept of implicit bias was translated into practice through the ADVANCE program and identify five key features that made implicit bias useful as a change framework in the academic STEM setting. We find that the concept of implicit bias works programmatically because it is demonstrable, relatable, versatile, actionable, and impartial. While enabling the concept’s diffusion, these characteristics also limit its scope. We reflect on implications for gender theories of organizational change and for practitioners. (shrink)