This book is a defense of Hume's philosophical principles in the Treatise of Human Nature. Nelson shows that Hume's new philosophy was a uniquely original and profound masterpiece in philosophical literature, worthy of serious study and acceptance. It is argued that Dialoguesis a reflective philosophical autobiography of Hume himself.

The essays in this collection in honor of Pierre Bourdieu gather loosely under the rubric of 'cultural production' and around three central themes: the ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On the Authorship oftheAbstract: AReply to John O. Nelson JeffBroome In "The Authorship of the Abstract Revisited," John O. Nelson argues for the once widely held view that Adam Smith was the author of the Abstract.1 Generally speaking, however, this view has not been seriously maintained since the 1938 reprinting of the Abstract by Keynes and Sraffa. There, in their introduction, Keynes and Sraffa argue that Adam (...) Smith was not the author ofthe Abstract, but rather Hume was.2 The central document from which the traditional view derived its authority comes in an early letter of Hume to Hutcheson (hereafter noted as Hl). It is worth quoting the passage in full. Writes Hume to Hutcheson, My Bookseller has sent to Mr. Smith a copy ofmy book, which I hope he has receiv'd, as well as your letter. I have not yet heard what he has done with the Abstract. Perhaps you have. I have got it printed in London; but not in the Works of the Learned; there having been an Article with regard to my Book, somewhat abusive, printed in that Work, before I sent up the Abstract.3 The once widely held view argues that Adam Smith is the Mr. Smith referred toin this passage, and therefore thatAdam Smith is the author of the Abstract. The argument proceeds: Smith at the time of Hl was a pupil of Hutcheson, and it was a habit of Hutcheson to have his promising students write abstracts of standard and contemporary works. It is then assumed that Adam Smith had written the Abstract, that Hutcheson was so impressed with it that he sent a copy to Hume, and that Hume in turn was so impressed that he arranged for its immediate publication, and, as seemingly mentioned in Hl, rewarded Smith with a presentation copy ofthe first two volumes ofhis Treatise. The Keynes and Sraffa thesis argues that the Mr. Smith in Hl cannot be Adam Smith, but rather must be John Smith of Dublin, "at the Philosopher's Head on the Blind Quay" (Abstract, xxiii). Their argument hinges on the conjecture that Hume was interested in an Irish editionofthe Treatise, andtherefore, Hume isaskingHutcheson's assistance in securing John Smith's help in this endeavour (Abstract, Volume XVII Number 2 95 JEFFBROOME xxii). The removal of Adam Smith as the Mr. Smith referred to in Hl consequently seems to explode theAdam Smith authorshiphypothesis. John Nelson first argued fifteen years ago against the Keynes/Sraffa thesis,4 challenging as unlikely the claim that the Mr. Smith in Hl must be John Smith ofDublin, and in the April 1991 issue of Hume Studies he reasserts his position more forcefully, arguing instead that it is impossible that "Mr. Smith" could be John Smith. Since the Mr. Smith of Hl is not John Smith, Nelson goes on to ask "who could he be except the Adam Smith ofthe traditional theory?"5 A closer examination ofeach view, Nelson's and Keynes/Sraffa's, reveals an assumption concerning an Irish publication of the Treatise that precludes any fully coherent resolution of the issue. I shall argue that the proper conclusion tobe drawn from Hl should be that the Mr. Smith is the Dublin publisher John Smith. On this point Keynes and Sraffa are correct; but against their thesis, I shall argue that Hume's purpose in referring toJohn Smith is not to see to his publishing an Irish edition of the Treatise (volumes 1 and 2, and the soon to be published volume 3), but rather to see to his publishing an Irish edition of the Abstract, in the hope that this would help to promote sales of the already publishedvolumes 1 and 2 ofthe Treatise. Thus, Hl should not be taken to decide the authorship ofthe Abstract, as Keynes and Sraffa, as well as John Nelson, argue. If anything, deciding the authorship of the Abstract should be made from Hume's personal copy of the Abstract, annotated in Hume's own hand, which is preserved in the British Museum. We notice in Hl that Hume asks two favours. The first is meant to draw upon Hutcheson's experience in publishing. Hume merely wants to know what... (shrink)

During the last third of the 20C, public discourse in the United States has become increasingly acerbic. Parallel to this development there has been an increasing enrollment in College level logic courses, courses that focus on arguments and their appraisal. Could there be a connection? A number of majorphilosophers do not just see arguments as either 100% correct or 100% incorrect. Notable in this regard are Plato, Aquinas and Hume. Their approach to “logic” and that of others is offered as (...) a palliative to the types of logic that we now teach. (shrink)

Kant behauptet, daß wir nur indirekte Pflichten haben können, von Grausamkeiten und Gewalt gegen Tiere abzusehen. Pflichten dieser Art seien direkte Pflichten gegen uns selbst, um unseren moralischen Charakter nicht zu verderben, aber könnten nicht direkte Pflichten gegenüber den Tieren sein, weil Tiere keine rationalen Wesen sind. Diese Sichtweise erscheint unbefriedigend, da die Tiere die Opfer einer solchen Mißhandlung sind, wenn sie stattfindet, und die Vorstellung, daß wir keine direkten Pflichten ihnen gegenüber haben sollen, erscheint merkwürdig. Ich plädiere dafür, daß (...) Kant, durchaus in Übereinstimmung mit seiner allgemeinen Moralphilosophie, hätte ein Konzept von direkten Pflichten gegenüber Tieren entwickeln können. Ein solches Konzept wäre weitaus plausibler und hätte Kant geholfen, mit allfälligen Problemen umzugehen, die sich im Hinblick auf die Behandlung von zurechnungsunfähigen Personen ergeben, die ebenfalls keine rationalen Wesen sind, sondern allenfalls potentiell. Zwar kann Kant durchaus plausibel machen, daß es die von ihm behaupteten indirekten Pflichten im Hinblick auf Tiere gibt, aber nicht, daß unsere Pflichten gegenüber Tieren auf derartige indirekte Pflichten beschränkt sind. Kant claimed that we could only have indirect duties to abstain from cruelty and violence to animals; such duties were directly duties to ourselves not to degrade our moral character, but could not be direct duties to animals because animals are not rational beings. This view seems unsatisfactory because animals are the victims of such mistreatment when it occurs, and the idea that we have no direct obligations to them seems odd. I urge that Kant, consistent with his general moral philosophy, could have developed a view of DIRECT duties to animals. Such a view would have been more plausible and would also have helped him deal with lurking problems concerning the treatment of incompetent humans, some of whom are also not rational beings, even potentially. Kant can plausibly claim that there are such indirect duties to animals, but not that our duties to them are limited to such indirect duties. (shrink)

What did Heidegger learn and fail to learn from Laozi and Zhuangzi? This book reconstructs Heidegger's philosophy through its engagement with Daoist and Asian philosophy and offers a Daoist transformation of Heidegger on things, nothingness, and freedom. PDF includes the introduction, bibliography, and index.

Those giving birth within modern maternity systems are recognised as facing a number of barriers to person-centred care. In this paper, I argue that in order to best facilitate the conditions for positive change, work needs to be done to provide a more granular articulation of the specific barriers. I then offer a nuanced and contextually aware articulation of one key component of the overall failure to ensure person-centred care: medical authority and the expectation of conformity. Articulating these barriers with (...) increased specificity is valuable, as it creates a stronger foundation from which to challenge existing problems which serve to constrain the autonomy of birthing individuals. The analysis offered in this paper also underscores the need for change at an institutional, rather than individual, level. (shrink)

This paper argues that it is prudentially wise to defer to groups about how they are essentially constituted and defined. After a few words situating the paper in my greater research project (§1), I articulate the kind of deference I have in mind (§2). Then I offer two conditional arguments on why it is epistemically desirable to let other people tell you how they ought to be identified (§3). The first argument is that people are owed lexical sovereignty because denying (...) it is absurd; the second is that modest skeptics ought to agree with it on the basis of some relatively anodyne and plausible epistemic considerations. (shrink)

This book provides a unique introduction to the study of relationships between gender and biology, a core part of the feminist science research tradition which emerged nearly half a century ago. Lynn Hankinson Nelson presents an accessible and balanced discussion of research questions, background assumptions, methods, and hypotheses about biology and gender with which feminist scientists and science scholars critically and constructively engage. Writing from the perspective of contemporary philosophy of science, she examines the evidence for and ethical implications (...) of biological hypotheses about gender, and discusses relevant philosophical issues including understandings of scientific objectivity, the nature of scientific reasoning, and relationships between biological research and the scientific and social contexts in which it is pursued. Clear and comprehensive, this volume addresses the engagements of feminist scientists and science scholars with a range of disciplines, including developmental and evolutionary biology, medicine, neurobiology, and primatology. (shrink)

One of the greatest challenges in teaching an introductory philosophy course is convincing students that there are, indeed, reliable standards for the evaluation of arguments. Too often introductory students criticize an argument simply by contesting the truth of one of its claims. And far too often, the only claim in an argument that meets serious objections is its conclusion. For many students, the idea that an argument displays a structure which can be evaluated on its own terms is not very (...) difficult to grasp. Unfortunately, the idea is grasped only in an abstract way, with insufficient appreciation of how structural problems manifest themselves in concrete arguments, and without the vocabulary for formulating structural criticisms. But this paper is not simply about teaching logic, it is about pedagogy. Our task is to instill in the student the habit of clear thinking. When we send our students out into the world, we have to ensure that they are prepared for it. (shrink)

This contribution unfolds an existential-ontological response to the question of sexual difference in the context of Heidegger’s formally indicative concept of “Dasein.” The question of Dasein’s “neutrality” concerns how formal indication formalizes, empties, and neutralizes the givenness of factical human existence. Ostensibly “given” biological and anthropological facts, such as sexual difference, are interpreted from an emptied and neutralized perspective that appears abstract and fictional to Heidegger’s critics. How, then, is the “neutrality” of formalizing emptying related to the “facticity” of in (...) each case factically existing as a sexual and gendered being? The answer lies in Heidegger’s elucidation of the existential-ontological structure of Dasein: Dasein is always relationally instituted in its factical entangled life through “being-with.” The sexual difference of human existence is not merely biologically or anthropologically given, but disclosed and enacted according to one’s relations with others, the environment, and oneself. The formally indicating concept “Dasein” indicates, accordingly, the concrete diversity and plurality of individuated sexual and gendered ways of being. (shrink)

I define ethical intuitionism as the view that it is appropriate to appeal to inferentially unsupported moral beliefs in the course of moral reasoning. I mention four common objections to this view, including the view that all such appeals to intuitionism collapse into “subjectivism”, i.e., that they make truth in ethical theory depend on what people believe. I defend intuitionism from versions of this criticism expressed by R.M. Hare and Peter Singer.