The purpose of this chapter is to offer an ethical investigation into whether researchers have a duty to share pre-published bio-medical data with the scientific community. The central questions of the chapter are the following: do researchers have a prima facie duty to share pre-published data? And if so, what stakes and aspects of a concrete situation need to be taken into consideration in order to assess whether and to what extent researchers’ prima facie duty to share data applies? We (...) will argue that based upon their basic duties to benefit society and to promote scientific knowledge, researchers have a prima facie duty to share data. We will also argue that in order to determine whether the prima facie duty applies in practice it is indispensable to take into account the stakes of the persons concerned as well as context dependent aspects. The chapter’s overall goal is to build an analytical and ethical framework that helps to assess with regard to concrete situations whether researchers’ duty to share data applies. To this end we analyse the concept of data sharing and clarify what data sharing might imply in practice. To offer an overview of the different stakeholders’ concerns we will analyse the normative-informational environment in which data producing researchers (to whom the prima facie duty to share data applies) are usually situated. In the last step we focus on the ethically relevant context dependent aspects and illustrate how they affect researchers’ prima facie duty to share data and stakeholders’ potentially conflicting stakes. (shrink)

Essays discuss cognition, perception, art, science, truth, metaphor, education, philosophy, and cognitive psychology.

Knowing and Making 1. Obstacles to Knowing The theory of knowledge to be sketched here rejects both absolutism and nihilism, both unique truth and the ...

When the evidence leaves us with a choice among hypotheses of unequal strength, how is the choice to be made?Caution would counsel us to choose the weakest, the hypothesis that asserts the least, since it is the least likely to fail us later. But the principle of maximum safety quickly reduces to absurdity; for it always dictates the choice of a hypothesis that does not go beyond the evidence at all.

In this manuscript, the author demonstrates how a new idea of the future came into being in eighteenth-century France with the development of modern biological, economic, and social engineering. With the emergence of these practices, the future transformed from something that was largely believed to be predetermined and beyond significant human intervention into something that could be significantly affected through actions in the present. Focusing on the second-half of the century, The author argues that specific mechanisms for constructing the future (...) first arose through the development of practices and instruments aimed at countering degeneration. In their attempts to regenerate a healthy natural state, Enlightenment philosophes created the means to exceed previously recognized limits and create a future that was not merely a recuperation of the past, but was fundamentally different from it. The new active orientation to the future that emerged from these practices was not something that was explicitly articulated during the Enlightenment. Instead this practical orientation must be seen as an implicit understanding of historical temporality. Historical actors often had a tacit knowledge of time--one that they worked with--without necessarily being fully aware of it or articulating it explicitly in their writing. The full articulation of the new idea of the future did not occur until the French Revolution, but the practical understanding of it that developed during the Enlightenment played an important role in making possible the French revolutionaries' unprecedented attempts to remake the world completely anew. (shrink)

WHEN, CONTROVERSIALLY, IT IS MAINTAINED that Aristotle was a functionalist, what is meant by "functionalist" cannot have the sense of "teleological functionalist," for in that sense there can be no doubt that Aristotle was a functionalist. The sense of "functionalism" that is patently being exploited is that which appears in contemporary philosophies of mind with affinities to logical behaviorism but also with some important divergencies and which Paul Churchland describes as the view that "psychological states are functional states in the (...) sense that for any being to have a psychology is for it to instance or embody a certain functional organization among its sensory inputs, internal states, and motor outputs." It is in this philosophical-psychological sense that the title of this paper controversially asks, Was Aristotle a functionalist? and to which I mean to give a negative answer. Thus, unless otherwise stated, it shall henceforth be this sense of the term that occurs in what follows. In order, however, to avoid ambiguity I shall call such functionalism "mind-functionalism.". (shrink)

Israel Scheffler and others have had trouble accepting such drastic theses in my work as that worlds, even old ones, are made by right versions, even new ones, and that two conflicting versions may both be right. But further explication shows how such theses have advantages over the more usual common-sense alternatives.