During the early Cambrian period metazoan life forms diverged at an accelerated rate to occupy multiple ecological niches on earth. A variety of explanations have been proposed to address this major evolutionary phenomenon termed the “Cambrian explosion.” While most hypotheses address environmental, developmental, and ecological factors that facilitated evolutionary innovations, the biological basis for accelerated emergence of species diversity in the Cambrian period remains largely conjectural. Herein, we posit that morphogenesis by self‐organization enables the uncoupling of genomic mutational landscape from (...) phenotypic diversification. Evidence is provided for a two‐tiered interpretation of genomic changes in metazoan animals wherein mutations not only impact upon function of individual cells, but also alter the self‐organization outcome during developmental morphogenesis. We provide evidence that the morphological impacts of mutations on self‐organization could remain repressed if associated with an unmet negative energetic cost. We posit that accelerated morphological diversification in transition to the Cambrian period has occurred by emergence of dormant (i.e., reserved) morphological novelties whose molecular underpinnings were seeded in the Precambrian period. (shrink)

Abstract The typical explanation of an event or process which attracts the label ‘conspiracy theory’ is an explanation that conflicts with the account advanced by the relevant epistemic authorities. I argue that both for the layperson and for the intellectual, it is almost never rational to accept such a conspiracy theory. Knowledge is not merely shallowly social, in the manner recognized by social epistemology, it is also constitutively social: many kinds of knowledge only become accessible thanks to the agent's embedding (...) in an environment that includes other epistemic agents. Moreover, advances in knowledge typically require ongoing immersion in this social environment. But the intellectual who embraces a conspiracy theory risks cutting herself off from this environment, and therefore epistemically disabling herself. Embracing a conspiracy theory therefore places at risk the ability to engage in genuine enquiry, including the enquiry needed properly to evaluate the conspiracy theory. (shrink)

Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics University of Melbourne, Parkville, 3010, Australia and.

The extended mind thesis is the claim that mental states extend beyond the skulls of the agents whose states they are. This seemingly obscure and bizarre claim has far-reaching implications for neuroethics, I argue. In the first half of this article, I sketch the extended mind thesis and defend it against criticisms. In the second half, I turn to its neuroethical implications. I argue that the extended mind thesis entails the falsity of the claim that interventions into the brain are (...) especially problematic just because they are internal interventions, but that many objections to such interventions rely, at least in part, on this claim. Further, I argue that the thesis alters the focus of neuroethics, away from the question of whether we ought to allow interventions into the mind, and toward the question of which interventions we ought to allow and under what conditions. The extended mind thesis dramatically expands the scope of neuroethics: because interventions into the environment of agents can count as interventions into their minds, decisions concerning such interventions become questions for neuroethics. (shrink)

What is posthumanism and why does it matter? This book offers an introduction to the ways in which humanism's belief in the natural supremacy of the Family of Man has been called into question at different moments and from different theoretical positions. What is the relationship between posthumanism and technology? Can posthumanism have a politics—postcolonial or feminist? Are postmodernism and poststructuralism posthumanist? What happens when critical theory meets Hollywood cinema? What links posthumanism to science fiction. Posthumanism addresses these and other (...) questions in an attempt to come to terms with one of the most pressing issues facing contemporary society. (shrink)

The self-deceived are usually held to be moral responsible for their state. I argue that this attribution of responsibility makes sense only against the background of the traditional conception of self-deception, a conception that is now widely rejected. In its place, a new conception of self-deception has been articulated, which requires neither intentional action by self-deceived agents, nor that they possess contradictory beliefs. This new conception has neither need nor place for attributions of moral responsibility to the self-deceived in paradigmatic (...) cases. Accordingly, we should take the final step toward abandoning the traditional conception, and drop the automatic attribution of responsibility. Self-deception is simply a kind of mistake, and has no more necessary connection to culpability than have other intellectual errors. (shrink)

The presentist view of time is psychologically appealing. I argue that, ironically, contingent facts about the temporal properties of consciousness are very difficult to square with presentism unless some form of mind/body dualism is embraced.

Abstract : Libet’s famous experiments, showing that apparently we become aware of our intention to act only after we have unconsciously formed it, have widely been taken to show that there is no such thing as free will. If we are not conscious of the formation of our intentions, many people think, we do not exercise the right kind of control over them. I argue that the claim this view presupposes, that only consciously initiated actions could be free, places a (...) condition upon freedom of action which it is in principle impossible to fulfil, for reasons that are conceptual and not merely contingent. Exercising this kind of control would require that we control our control system, which would simply cause the same problem to arise at a higher-level or initiate an infinite regress of controllings. If the unconscious initiation of actions, as well as the takings of decisions, is incompatible with control over them, then free will is impossible on conceptual grounds. Thus, Libet’s experiments do not constitute a separate, empirical, challenge to our freedom. (shrink)

To the extent that indeterminacy intervenes between our reasons for action and our decisions, intentions and actions, our freedom seems to be reduced, not enhanced. Free will becomes nothing more than the power to choose irrationally. In recognition of this problem, some recent libertarians have suggested that free will is paradigmatically manifested only in actions for which we have reasons for both or all the alternatives. In these circumstances, however we choose, we choose rationally. Against this kind of account, most (...) fully developed by Robert Kane, critics have pressed the demand for contrastive explanations. Kane has responded by arguing that the demand does not need to be met: responsibility for an action does not require that there be a contrastive explanation of that action. However, this response proves too much: it implies that agents are responsible not only for the actions they choose, but also for the counterfactual actions which were equally available to them. (shrink)

Theories of self-deception divide into those that hold that the state is characterized by some kind of synchronic tension or conflict between propositional attitudes and those that deny this. Proponents of the latter like Al Mele claim that their theories are more parsimonious, because they do not require us to postulate any psychological mechanisms beyond those which have been independently verified. But if we can show that there are real cases of motivated believing which are characterized by conflicting propositional attitudes, (...) however, the parsimony argument against incongruent mental state accounts is undermined. I argue that anosognosia presents us with a real-life example of motivated belief together with (sub)-doxastic conflict. (shrink)

Moral discourse is propositionally clothed, that is, it exhibits those features – such as the ability of its sentences to intelligibly embed in conditionals and other unasserted contexts – that have been taken by some philosophers to be constitutive of discourses that express propositions. If there is nothing more to a mental state being a belief than it being characteristically expressed by sentences that are propositionally clothed then the version of expressivism which accepts that moral discourse is propositionally clothed (‘quasi-realism’) (...) is self-refuting. Fortunately for quasi-realists, this view of belief, which I label ‘minimalism’, is false. I present three arguments against it and dismiss two possible defences (the first drawn from the work of Wright, the second given by Harcourt). The conclusion is that the issue between expressivists and their opponents cannot be settled by the mere fact that moral discourse wears propositional clothing. (shrink)

Proponents of evolutionary psychology take the existence of humanuniversals to constitute decisive evidence in favor of their view. Ifthe same social norms are found in culture after culture, we have goodreason to believe that they are innate, they argue. In this paper Ipropose an alternative explanation for the existence of humanuniversals, which does not depend on them being the product of inbuiltpsychological adaptations. Following the work of Brian Skyrms, I suggestthat if a particular convention possesses even a very small advantageover (...) competitors, whatever the reason for that advantage, we shouldexpect it to become the norm almost everywhere. Tiny advantages aretranslated into very large basins of attraction, in the language of gametheory. If this is so, universal norms are not evidence for innatepsychological adaptations at all. Having shown that the existence ofuniversals is consistent with the so-called Standard Social ScienceModel, I turn to a consideration of the evidence, to show that thisstyle of explanation is preferable to the evolutionary explanation, atleast with regard to patterns of gender inequality. (shrink)

It is widely held that there is an important distinction between the notion of consciousness as it is applied to creatures and, on the other hand, the notion of consciousness as it applies to mental states. McBride has recently argued in this journal that whilst there may be a grammatical distinction between state consciousness and creature consciousness, there is no parallel ontological distinction. It is argued here that whilst state consciousness and creature consciousness are indeed related, they are distinct properties. (...) Conscious creatures can have, at one time, both conscious and unconscious mental states. This raises the question of what distinguishes the conscious from unconscious mental states of a subject: a question about what state consciousness consists in. Whilst the state/creature distinction may not be of use in explaining every aspect of a subject's consciousness, it does provide a key part of the explanandum for theories of consciousness and mind. The state/creature consciousness distinction is a real one and should not be dropped from our psychological taxonomy. (shrink)

I argue that Frank Jackson's knowledge argument cannot succeed in showing that qualia are epiphenomenal. The reason for this is that there is, given the structure of the argument, an irreconcilable tension between his support for the claim that qualia are non-physical and his conclusion that they are epiphenomenal. The source of the tension is that his argument for the non-physical character of qualia is plausible only on the assumption that they have causal efficacy, while his argument for the epiphenomenal (...) character of qualia is plausible only on the assumption that they are non-physical. Since these two arguments cannot be combined coherently, the most Jackson's argument can establish is that qualia are non-physical. (shrink)

This article is a response to recent attempts by liberals to defend faith-based schools against the criticism that they are both socially divisive and prejudicial to the individual autonomy of their pupils. Geoffrey Short (2002) and Johan De Jong and Ger Snik (2002) divide faith-based schooling into moderate and strong versions and then go on to argue for a moderate version of faith schooling that is compatible with liberal educational aims in culturally diverse societies. Against this view I will argue (...) that it is the qualities of the strong version of faith schooling that appeals to many traditional religious communities and any liberal defence of faith schooling must take account of this. The article concludes by examining the part that faith schools might play in the achievement of a range of diverse, and often incompatible, human goods—community belonging, social cohesion and individual autonomy. (shrink)

How might Roland Barthes’ posthumously published account of the Neutral invite us to rethink the very activity of cultural analysis? How did Barthes the cultural critic change when, towards the end of his career, he described and desired Neutral Life? Cultural criticism has often taken Barthes’ early semiological work as a guide, but this essay examines how we might need to reorient ourselves as critics, shift our stance, learn to look and live differently in the light of Barthes’ later focus (...) on the Neutral. (shrink)

I propose a new form of epiphenomenalism, 'explanatory epiphenomenalism', the view that the identification of A's mental properties does not provide a causal explanation of A's behaviour. I arrive at this view by showing that although anomalous monism does not entail type epiphenomenalism (despite what many of Davidson's critics have suggested), it does (when coupled with some additional claims) lead to the conclusion that the identification of A's reasons does not causally explain A's behaviour. I then formalize this view and (...) show that it is an attractive position, because it captures the insights of existing forms of epiphenomenalism without their onerous metaphysical commitments. (shrink)

Many incompatibilists, including most prominently Peter Van Inwagen, have argued that deliberation presupposes a belief in libertarian freedom. They therefore suggest that deliberating determinists must have inconsistent beliefs: the belief they profess in determinism, as well as the belief, manifested in their deliberation, that determinism is false. In response, compatibilists have advanced alternative construals of the belief in freedom presupposed by deliberation, as well as cases designed to show that determinists can deliberate without inconsistency. I argue that the compatibilist case (...) requires a convincing demonstration not merely that belief in determinism is consistent with deliberation, but also that such a belief does not place great psychological strain on agents, and that cases so far advanced have not succeeded in showing this. I then present a case designed to show that agents can accept determinism and deliberate, without inconsistent beliefs and without psychological strain. (shrink)

Gareth Evans has argued influentially against vague identities. David Lewis and Theodore Sider have argued against vague parthood. Much of the distaste among philosophers for metaphysical vagueness is sourced in these arguments. I argue that even if the considerations adduced by Evans, Lewis and Sider are conclusive, metaphysical boundary vagueness remains possible.

_Libertarian restrictivists hold that agents are rarely directly free. However, they seek to reconcile their views_ _with common intuitions by arguing that moral responsibility, or indirect freedom (depending on the version of_ _restrictivism) is much more common than direct freedom. I argue that restrictivists must give up either the_ _claim that agents are rarely free, or the claim that indirect freedom or responsibility is much more common_ _than direct freedom. Focusing on Kane’s version of restrictivism, I show that the view (...) holds people responsible_ _for actions when (merely) compatibilist conditions are met. Since this is unacceptable by libertarian lights,_ _they must either accept that compatibilist conditions on moral responsibility are sufficient, or make their_ _restrictivism more extreme than it already is._. (shrink)

A syllabic acrostic (de-ca-te, “tenth”) has recently been discovered by Leah Kronenberg at Eclogue 4.9–11. The aim of the present article is to adduce further evidence for the intentionality of this acrostic. The article begins by pointing to corroborative clues in the text encompassed by the acrostic itself. Attention is then drawn to the overlooked deni‑acrostic in the previous Eclogue (3.55–58). This acrostical deni, for whose intentionality arguments are likewise adduced, evidently serves to corroborate acrostical decate. This deni‑acrostic is itself (...) confirmed shortly afterwards by decem (Ecl. 3.71), which is in turn an imitation of Theocritus (Id. 3.10). This Theocritean text, which contains the word δέκα in ‘line ten’, provides further corroboration of the decate-acrostic, which is likewise centred around ‘line ten’. In particular it is argued that this passage of Theocritus has inspired the noun which decate can be shown to qualify. (shrink)

The opening of the fourth session of The Neutral — the course given by Roland Barthes at the Collège de France in 1977–8 — is marked by a dramatic spillage of ink. Rather than take this as an incidental, trivial moment, I read it as one of the many ‘ink blots’ that colour the work of Barthes. Tracing his ‘almost obsessive relation to writing instruments’ and the material act of inscription, this essay relates the ‘ink blots’ to the development of (...) a ‘non-arrogant’, non-expressive, non-idealistic theory of language in The Neutral and other texts by Barthes. (shrink)

Frankfurt-style cases are widely taken to show that agents do not need alternative possibilities to be morally responsible for their actions. Many philosophers take these cases to constitute a powerful argument for compatibilism: if we do not need alternative possibilities for moral responsibility, it is hard to see what the attraction of indeterminism might be. I defend the claim that even though Frankfurt-style cases establish that agents can be responsible for their actions despite lacking alternatives, agents can only be responsible (...) if they possess certain powers, and possession of these powers is - arguably - incompatible with determinism. Because this is the case, Frankfurt-style cases fail to advance the debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism. (shrink)

It is, as Dana Nelkin (2004) says, a rare point of agreement among participants in the free will debate that rational deliberation presupposes a belief in freedom. Of course, the precise content of that belief – and, indeed, the nature of deliberation – is controversial, with some philosophers claiming that deliberation commits us to a belief in libertarian free will (Taylor 1966; Ginet 1966), and others claiming that, on the contrary, deliberation presupposes nothing more than an epistemic openness that is (...) entirely compatible with determinism (Dennett 1984; Kapitan 1986). Since, however, the claim that deliberation presupposes freedom is accepted by all sides in the free will debate, it ought to be possible to frame a minimal version that is neutral between compatibilism and incompatibilism, and which therefore can be accepted by everyone. Peter van Inwagen has advanced the best-known such claim: ‘all philosophers who have thought about deliberation agree on one point: one cannot deliberate about whether to perform a certain act unless one believes it is possible for one to perform it’ (van Inwagen 1983: 154). It is the purpose of this paper to argue that van Inwagen, and the many philosophers who have followed him in this regard, is wrong. (shrink)

Philosophers who advocate the possibility of spectrum inversion often conclude that the qualitative content of experiential states pose a serious problem for functionalism. I argue that in order for the inversion hypothesis to support this conclusion one needs to show that it generalizes to all species of qualia. By examining features of touch, taste, and olfactory sensations, I show there is good reason to resist this generalization, in which case appeals to the possibility of spectral inversion are considerably less effective (...) than they may initially appear. (shrink)

Thomas Huxley is often identified as the originator of the doctrineknown as ``epiphenomenalism,'' but there appears to be littleappreciation for the details of Huxley's theory. In particular,conflicting interpretations show that there is uncertainty about twoaspects of his position: whether mental states are completelywithout causal powers or simply have no influence on the behavior theyare typically taken to explain, and whether conscious epiphenomena arethemselves physical states of the brain or immaterial items. I clarifythese issues and show that Huxley's brand of epiphenomenalism (...) is in factdifferent from the forms usually attributed to him. (shrink)

In the letter which initiated his correspondence with Paulinus of Nola Jerome deplores the propensity of the inexpert to pontificate on scripture. Three kinds of incompetence are denounced. The second takes the following form: ‘alii discunt – pro pudor!–a feminis, quod viros doceant’. As in the other two denunciations, Jerome has chosen to express himself in general terms; scholars have nonetheless assumed that here a specific individual is meant. Nautin argued that with these words Jerome was attacking Rufinus, who is (...) here represented as being intellectually dependent on his patroness Melania. More recently Testard has maintained that Jerome's criticism is in fact directed against Ambrose. However Nautin's view that Rufinus is the target has now been re-affirmed by Rebenich. The purpose of the present note is to draw attention to a piece of evidence which has hitherto been overlooked; it would seem to indicate that the object of Jerome's attack cannot be Rufinus. (shrink)

Archetypal psychology suggests the possibility of a leadership archetype representing the unconscious preferences of human beings as a species about the appropriate relationships between leaders and followers. Mythological analysis compared God’s leadership in the Abraham myth with modern visionary, ethical and situational leadership to find similarities reflecting continuities in human thinking about leadership over as long as 3600 years. God’s leadership behavior is very modern except that God is generally more relationship oriented. The leadership archetype that emerges is of a (...) leader that develops his/her follower by reliably maintaining a vision, behaving according to firm ethical values even when it weakens the leader’s authority, accepting suffering when the follower is unreliable, and always forgiving even when the follower behaves with hubris in an attempt to overthrow the leader. If God’s leadership principles were mandatory in management, many dysfunctional leaders would be disqualified and many of the negative consequences of poor leadership might be averted. (shrink)

Background Most studies on medical reasoning focus on contemporary allopathic practitioners. Here, the significance of diagnostic sense in Nizāmī ‘Arūzī’s Four Discourses (Chahār Maqāle), an influential text that circulated widely throughout the Islamic world, is explored. Methods After a brief introduction, key passages are translated on how doctors should cultivate analytical skills. Results Nizāmī ‘Arūzī cites three sources of diagnostic authority: (1) education in the texts of medical experts, (2) formal logic and (3) belief in the power of God. Conclusions (...) ‘Arūzī’s methods, though rooted in a religious faith that may seem foreign to contemporary doctors and educators, has much to recommend regarding its clarity of approach, its high ethical standards and expectations of doctors, and its commitment to best practices for the patient. Crosscultural studies of medical education and professionalism can offer valuable insights by demonstrating how doctors across history and geography have grappled with the common concerns of diagnosis and treatment. (shrink)

I document the historically unprecedented challenges and opportunities attending the prospect of devising ecumenical ethics endorsed by both Catholics and Protestants. First, I offer several reasons for attending to the connection between ecumenism and ethics. This topic has received insufficient attention from scholars of ethics, especially given the importance and challenge of reaching a common moral witness. Second, I review previous comparisons of Catholic and Protestant approaches in ethics. Such work transitions over the twentieth century from dismissive to appreciative. Third, (...) I show how one of the key methodological differentiators softens in recent decades as there emerges an increasing consensus on the moral sources of scripture, natural law, and history. I conclude by emphasizing the humility required for progress in the pursuit of any ecumenical ethics. The route to a common moral witness that manifests the divinely given unity of the church is continual conversion through corporate dialogue on a global scale. (shrink)

The identity theory, advocated as a solution to the mind-body problem by materialists such as Feigl and Smart, has been criticized for implying the existence of irreducible properties. After summarizing the relevant theses of materialism, I consider several versions of the irreducible properties objection, and argue that they are all unsuccessful.

Time passes; sometimes swiftly, sometimes interminably, but always it passes. We see the world change as events emerge from the shroud of the future, clandestinely slinking into the past almost immediately as though they are reluctant to meet our gaze: children are born, old friends and relatives die, governments once full of youthful enthusiasm wane. If the Earth were sentient, it might feel itself being torn apart as tectonic plates diverge, and chuckle as it outlived species upon species of transient (...) parasites. How could anyone possibly deny that time passes? (shrink)

Peter Unger's 'problem of the many' has elicited many responses over the past quarter of a century. Here I present a new problem of the many. This new problem, I claim, is resistant to the solutions cunently on offer for Unger's problem.

Putnam raises two objections against the token-identity theory in his _Dewey Lectures. (1) Token-physicalism invokes a mysterious or _sui generis concept of identity between mental and physical event tokens; (2) The theory suffers from explanatory failure because it cannot individuate mental events using physical criteria. I argue that the first claim is false, since Davidson adopts the same criterion of identity Quine employs for ordinary objects which invokes a concept of identity we understand clearly enough. I then show that Putnam's (...) second complaint is an extravagant demand that needs not be answered and is at odds with his own direct realism. (shrink)

The division between “erklaren” and “verstehen” is not as sharp as the conventional wisdom maintains, for all understanding, including the understanding of people, consists in the connecting, ordering and appraising of things encountered, believed or known. The understanding of people is a distinctive kind of cognitive understanding which has a practical side, involving the emotions. The education of the emotions, needed for us to understand ourselves and others, can be achieved both by the observation of real life and importantly by (...) the study of realistic fiction and of biography. (shrink)