The problem of missingness in observational data is ubiquitous. When the confounders are missing at random, multiple imputation is commonly used; however, the method requires congeniality conditions for valid inferences, which may not be satisfied when estimating average causal treatment effects. Alternatively, fractional imputation, proposed by Kim 2011, has been implemented to handling missing values in regression context. In this article, we develop fractional imputation methods for estimating the average treatment effects with confounders missing at random. We show that the (...) fractional imputation estimator of the average treatment effect is asymptotically normal, which permits a consistent variance estimate. Via simulation study, we compare fractional imputation’s accuracy and precision with that of multiple imputation. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) has become nearly ubiquitous in modern society, from components of mobile applications to medical support systems, and everything in between. In societally impactful systems imbued with AI, there has been increasing concern related to opaque AI, that is, artificial intelligence where it is unclear how or why certain decisions are reached. This has led to a recent boom in research on “explainable AI” (XAI), or approaches to making AI more explainable and understandable to human users. In the (...) military domain, numerous bodies have argued that autonomous and AI-enabled weapon systems ought not incorporate unexplainable AI, with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United States Department of Defense both explicitly including explainability as a relevant factor in the development and use of such systems. In this article, I present a cautiously critical assessment of this view, arguing that explainability will be irrelevant for many current and near-future autonomous systems in the military (which do not incorporate any AI), that it will be trivially incorporated into most military systems which do possess AI (as these generally possess simpler AI systems), and that for those systems with genuinely opaque AI, explainability will prove to be of more limited value than one might imagine. In particular, I argue that explainability, while indeed a virtue in design, is a virtue aimed primarily at designers and troubleshooters of AI-enabled systems, but is far less relevant for users and handlers actually deploying these systems. I further argue that human–machine teaming is a far more important element of responsibly using AI for military purposes, adding that explainability may undermine efforts to improve human–machine teamings by creating aprima faciesense that the AI, due to its explainability, may be utilized with little (or less) potential for mistakes. I conclude by clarifying that the arguments are not against XAI in the military, but are instead intended as a caution against over-inflating the value of XAI in this domain, or ignoring the limitations and potential pitfalls of this approach. (shrink)

This paper concerns the semantics of coordinated if-clauses, as in (1)-(2). It is argued that the meanings of such sentences are explained straightforwardly on theories of conditionals that tie their non- monotonic behaviour to the if-clause itself (e.g. Schlenker 2004, but not theories that tie it to a (covert) modal operator (e.g. Kratzer 1981; 1991). Coordinated if-clauses are revealing of the fine-grained compositional semantics of conditionals.

To counter the imbalance in vaccine distribution during the COVID-19 pandemic, Albertsen and more recently Germaniet alhave suggested a new system of taxation coined as ‘VaxTax’ that would force higher-income countries to fund the access of low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs) to new vaccines in times of pandemic. I will argue that this idea faces numerous challenges of ethical, sociopolitical and economical nature that may hinder any effort to solve the numerous health challenges that LMICs face. I argue that while (...) it is an interesting idea, it is neither sufficient nor will it ever be easily implemented because of socioeconomic or practical reasons. (shrink)

There is a diversity of ‘ethical practices’ within medicine as an institutionalised profession as well as a need for ethical specialists both in practice as well as in institutionalised roles. This Brief offers a social perspective on medical ethics education. It discusses a range of concepts relevant to educational theory and thus provides a basic illumination of the subject. Recent research in the sociology of medical education and the social theory of Pierre Bourdieu are covered. In the end, the themes (...) of Bourdieuan Social Theory, socio-cultural apprenticeships and the ‘characterological turn’ in medical education are draw together the context of medical ethics education. ​. (shrink)

Humans, unlike other animals, are equipped with a powerful brain that permits conscious awareness and reflection. A growing trend in psychological science has questioned the benefits of consciousness, however. Testing a hypothesis advanced by [Lieberman, M. D., Gaunt, R., Gilbert, D. T., & Trope, Y. . Reflection and reflexion: A social cognitive neuroscience approach to attributional inference. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 34, 199–249], four studies suggested that the conscious, reflective processing system is vital for logical reasoning. Substantial decrements in (...) logical reasoning were found when a cognitive load manipulation preoccupied conscious processing, while hampering the nonconscious system with consciously suppressed thoughts failed to impair reasoning . Nonconscious activation of the idea of logical reasoning increased the activation of logic-relevant concepts, but failed to improve logical reasoning performance unless the logical conclusions were largely intuitive and thus not reliant on logical reasoning . Meanwhile, stimulating the conscious goal of reasoning well led to improvements in reasoning performance . These findings offer evidence that logical reasoning is aided by the conscious, reflective processing system. (shrink)

This article presents and discusses one of the most prominent inferential strategies currently employed in cognitive neuropsychology, namely, reverse inference. Simply put, this is the practice of inferring, in the context of experimental tasks, the engagement of cognitive processes from locations or patterns of neural activation. This technique is notoriously controversial because, critics argue, it presupposes the problematic assumption that neural areas are functionally selective. We proceed as follows. We begin by introducing the basic structure of traditional “location-based” reverse inference (...) and discuss the influential lack of selectivity objection. Next, we rehearse various ways of responding to this challenge and provide some reasons for cautious optimism. The second part of the essay presents a more recent development: “pattern-decoding reverse inference”. This inferential strategy, we maintain, provides an even more convincing response to the lack of selectivity charge. Due to this and other methodological advantages, it is now a prominent component in the toolbox of cognitive neuropsychology. Finally, we conclude by drawing some implications for philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Bricks and boxes -- Between Scylla and Charybdis -- Lessons from the history of science -- Placeholders -- Black-boxing 101 -- History of science 'black-boxing style' -- Diet mechanistic philosophy -- Emergence reframed -- The fuel of scientific progress -- Sailing through the strait.

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has developed and progressively refined an argument against moral intuitionism—the view on which some moral beliefs enjoy non-inferential justification. He has stated his argument in a few different forms, but the basic idea is straightforward. To start with, Sinnott-Armstrong highlights facts relevant to the truth of moral beliefs: such beliefs are sometimes biased, influenced by various irrelevant factors, and often subject to disagreement. Given these facts, Sinnott-Armstrong infers that many moral beliefs are false. What then shall we think (...) of our own moral beliefs? Either we have reason to think some of our moral beliefs are reliably formed or we have no such reason. If the latter, our moral beliefs are unjustified. If we have reason to think some moral beliefs are reliably formed, then those beliefs are not non-inferentially justified, because then we’ll have reason to accept something—namely, that they are reliably formed—that entails or supports those beliefs. But then, either way, our moral beliefs are not non-inferentially justified, and so moral intuitionism is false. This paper takes issue with Sinnott-Armstrong’s interesting and widely discussed argument, which we here call the Empirical Defeat Argument (EDA). According to us, the EDA does not defeat moral intuitionism. In section 1, we will set out the argument, briefly reviewing the rationale Sinnott-Armstrong offers for the premises. Then, in section 2, we identify a critical but dubious epistemological assumption concerning the nature of defeat that undergirds the argument. Finally, in section 3, we will defend our challenge to the EDA by answering two objections. (shrink)

In this discussion I shall argue that some fairly widely held views about human habits are mistaken. These misconceptions are important because of the pervasiveness of the habitual in human behavior and because it is the concept of habit that has served as the prototype of various conceptions of conditioned response which are used in psychological explanation. One major task of this analysis is to show that accounts in which actions are explained by reference to rules are not incompatible with (...) accounts in which the same behavior is seen as the product of habit. (shrink)

Carl Cohen's arguments against animal rights are shown to be unsound. His strategy entails that animals have rights, that humans do not, the negations of those conclusions, and other false and inconsistent implications. His main premise seems to imply that one can fail all tests and assignments in a class and yet easily pass if one's peers are passing and that one can become a convicted criminal merely by setting foot in a prison. However, since his moral principles imply that (...) nearly all exploitive uses of animals are wrong anyway, foes of animal rights are advised to seek philosophical consolations elsewhere. I note that some other philosopher's arguments are subject to similar objections. (shrink)

In this candid autobiographical essay, Nathan Salmon recounts and assesses the impact of various philosophers and events on his philosophical development.

I’ll raise a problem for Retributivism, the view that legal punishment is justified on the basis of desert. I’ll focus primarily on Mitchell Berman’s recent defense of the view. He gives one of the most sophisticated and careful statements of it. And his argument is representative, so the problem I’ll raise for it will apply to other versions of Retributivism. His insights about justification also help to make the problem particularly obvious. I’ll also show how the problem extends to non-retributive (...) justifications of punishment. I’ll argue that Berman’s argument makes a questionable assumption about the standard of justification that justifications of punishment must meet to be successful. If we think about what it takes to justify punishment and reflect on the intuitions that retributivists appeal to, it turns out that the intuitions aren’t obviously up to the task. (shrink)

Richard Rorty does have something ‘to say to [Black Americans]’ and to their racially conscious nonblack allies in the sense that his understanding of liberalism, his prophecies about the future and his urgent appeals to the American Left all paint a picture of a white middle class fully prepared to make life increasingly miserable for Black Americans unless it is ‘protected from catastrophe’. Rorty hopes that this group will undergo a moral transformation that enables it to see past its narrow (...) group interests, but doubts that it will. He, nevertheless, prescribes a politics of hope and appeasement as a hedge against both despair and backsliding. In so doing, he fails to appreciate the availability and the suitability of an alternative ‘racial realist’ (and tragicomic) posture vis-à-vis American liberalism inspired by thinkers like Ralph Ellison, James Baldwin and Derrick Bell. This alternative enables racially conscious Americans to respond to the intransigence of (certain) white Americans with cunning rather than by escaping into fantasies of a ‘dream country’ unmarked by the damage caused by racism and its long-lingering effects. I uncover and explore this alternative through Rorty’s warnings regarding the white middle class, a somewhat surprising consistency between Rorty’s brand of class politics and Bell’s understanding of ‘racial fortuity’, and, finally, through a development of Bell’s ‘racial realist’ posture combined with Baldwin’s ‘uses of the blues’ resulting in a ‘hard-eyed’ tragicomic sensibility sufficient to effectively pair continued struggle with creative consolation and resilience. (shrink)

In this essay, I examine Philip Clayton’s efforts to construct a philosophical theology that fits the current scientific view of organism. Clayton capitalizes on an evolutionary outlook, which sees organism as an emergent entity composed of lower organic unities, and which, at the highest level of organic development (brain), yields an emergent, non-physical phenomenon (mind). Presuming a bilateral relationship between mind and body, Clayton argues for a picture of God-world relations where world is analogous to body and God is analogous (...) to emergent mind. Contrary to Clayton, I argue that panentheism does not naturally accommodate the current scientific picture of organic development, and as an alternative, I submit St. Augustine of Hippo’s theistic modifications to Plotinian NeoPlatonism. My goal is to demonstrate that Augustine’s metaphysic offers a strong foundation for the construction of a theologically robust and scientifically satisfying philosophy of organism. (shrink)

This paper explores the category of films known as “twist films” in relation to distinctions between different modes of epistemic access to works. With reference to the case of Robert Enrico’s short film, La rivière du hibou, the philosophical significance of different sorts of twist films is explored. Twists are also discussed in relation to emotive responses, with special attention to the paradox of suspense.

The UK’s 2014 Immigration Act aimed to create a ‘Hostile Environment’ for migrants to the UK. One aspect of this was the restriction of access to secondary care for overseas visitors to the UK, although it remains the case that everybody living in the UK has the legal right to access primary care. In this paper, we argue that the effects of this policy extend beyond secondary care, including preventing eligible people from registering with a General Practice, although as an (...) unintended consequence. This problem arises from misinterpretation of policy wording, misleading GP websites and gatekeeping behaviour from front-line staff, even though there are no grounds in the current guidelines or law to support this. Free access to primary healthcare among refugees and asylum seekers living in deprived populations is particularly important in protecting patient health, given the burden of ill-health in this population and the multiple barriers to accessing early intervention they face. The medical profession has a duty to communicate their rights to this patient group—their legal entitlement to access free healthcare, and the vital importance of doing so. (shrink)

This essay is an attempt to restore Hume’s account of personal identity to its place in the treatise and to show that it becomes far more plausible in that setting. In this chapter Hume undertakes the tasks of showing how the mistaken idea of a substantial self arises and providing a model for re-thinking the question and eliminating the mistake. It is argued that Hume does not end up dealing with a false question (as some have claimed), and that this (...) theory of mental identity survives the criticisms of its author. (shrink)

Virtue Rediscovered: Deontology, Consequentialism, and Virtue Ethics in the Contemporary Moral Landscape explores the nature and position of virtue ethics within the contemporary moral landscape and in so doing develops a more complicated framework for ethical theorizing.

This essay presents a model-theoretic account of dispositional properties, according to which dispositions are not ordinary properties of real entities; dispositions capture the behavior of abstract, idealized models. This account has several payoffs. First, it saves the simple conditional analysis of dispositions. Second, it preserves the general connection between dispositions and regularities, despite the fact that some dispositions are not grounded in actual regularities. Finally, it brings together the analysis and the explanation of dispositions under a unified framework.

Clark and Fischer's dismissal of extant human–robot interaction research approaches limits opportunities to understand major variables shaping people's engagement with social robots. Instead, this endeavour categorically requires multidisciplinary approaches. We refute the assumption that people cannot (correctly or incorrectly) represent robots as autonomous social agents. This contradicts available empirical evidence, and will become increasingly tenuous as robot automation improves.

In “The Tensed or Tensless Existence of Nature” Alexsander Jokic attempts to defend a new version A. N. Prior’s “Thank Goodness It’sOver” argument against my response to it. Jokic argues that we can give a non-circular account of ceasing to exist that will vindicate the new reading, but I argue that his account to rescue Prior’s argument against my criticism fails.

The topic is time travel of the sort depicted in H. G. Wells’ classic novel, The Time Machine—Wellsian time travel. The range of proper applicability of the concept of Wellsian time travel is investigated. The results of this investigation are applied to provide a new argument against the metaphysical possibility of time travel in absolute time. Alternatively, the argument is against the possibility of Wellsian time travel relative to a single temporal frame of reference. The argument leaves open the prospect (...) that an object nontrivially moves relative to one temporal reference frame from one time to another relative to another temporal reference frame. The argument does not turn on closed timelike curves or “causal loops” of any kind. It does however invoke the prospect of backward causation—a consequence of backward time travel in conjunction with common sense—but it invokes this possibility only in the weak sense of mere logical consistency. (shrink)

This article argues that two words in line 8.612 of the Aeneid, promissa and perfecta, have been transposed since the poem's composition, and that the restoration of their correct order yields a preferable sense. This corruption would have happened at an early stage in the poem's transmission, but there is some reason to believe that Servius’ comment on the verse reflects its original state.

Over the past century, six studies – the most recent data from 2000 – and one review have comprehensively examined the content of medical oaths and oath-taking practices, all focusing on North Amer...

Examines transcendentalism as a distinct rhetorical genre concerned primarily and self-consciously with questions of power.

Cinema, like art more generally, is both an artistic genre and a politico-economic institution. On the one hand there is film, a medium which disseminates moving images via the projection of light through celluloid onto a screen. Individual films or "movies," in turn, are discrete aesthetic objects that are distinguished and analyzed vis-à-vis their form and content. On the other hand there is the film industry-the elaborate network of artistic, technical, and economic apparatuses which plan, produce, market, and display films (...) to audiences. Since its inception, both the aesthetic and political aspects of cinema have been subject to various forms of theoretical analysis which have been subject to critique in turn. In this paper I offer a brief survey of these analyses and critiques followed by a sketch of an alternative approach to film theory. Drawing upon the ideas of Foucault and Deleuze, this "anarchist" film theory seeks to present a viable critical methodology while at the same time elucidating the liberatory potential of film. (shrink)

In this brief commentary, we offer thoughts on Thomas Kelly’s Bias: A Philosophical Study. We focus on the book’s relevance to the study of cognitive biases, including Kelly’s discussion of naïve realism (in the psychologists’ sense). While we are largely enthusiastic about Kelly’s theorizing, we also provide some pushback against his notion of emergent biases. We hope that psychologists will engage with Kelly’s work and might consider how some philosophical refinements could improve the empirical study of biases.

In the Republic, Socrates argues that morality (justice) is valuable both for itself and for what comes from it. In contemporary moral theory, this view is not widely accepted. However, contemporary empirical research in psychology reveals that what we experience is also what we come to expect. It follows from this that if we act in an immoral fashion, we will expect the same from others. The more often we act immorally, the more suspicion will be ingrained within us. Suspicion (...) quickly pervades our minds, corrodes our relationships, and increases our levels of stress, thereby dramatically decreasing our quality of life. Moral action, on the other hand, has the ability to strengthen our faith in others and create strong human relationships. Therefore,morality should be classified as having the highest type of value, just as Socrates contends.Moral behavior allows for healthy relations between persons (intrinsic value) and the wellbeing of the individual (extrinsic value). (shrink)