This article seeks to provide a new reading of the work of Celestin Freinet and his use of the printing press. Specifically, this article aligns Freinet’s approach to teaching and learning with a counter-reformation in pedagogical thought-an approach that places him both within and outside of the ‘progressive’ turn in education that began to emerge at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. Freinet’s pedagogical experiment in rural France during mid-twentieth century demonstrated the way that student (...) freedom, uninhibited by overarching ideological pre-emption, and unbound from the progressive imperatives typical of reform education in either its Marxist or liberal variants, can be utilized as a way to inspire pedagogical techniques founded on alternative social, political, and anthropological postulates. Specifically, the authors demonstrate how Freinet’s use of the press helps us to think about the following: 1) a different relationship to technology and the role it could play in the conception of the common within the classroom; 2) the creation of an existential good as opposed to the private good discovered through the amassing of property and the advancement of the related notion of progress; 3) and a reaffirmation of the possibility of a genuine workers education. (shrink)

We consider the efficacy of various forms of reinforcement learning with punishment in evolving linguistic conventions in the context of Lewis-Skyrms signalling games. We show that the learning strategy of reinforcement with iterative punishment is highly effective at evolving optimal conventions in even complex signalling games. It is also robust and can be easily extended to a self-tuning variety of reinforcement learning. We briefly discuss some of the virtues of reinforcement with iterative punishment and how it may be related to (...) learning in nature. (shrink)

Higginbotham (1986) observed that quantified conditionals have a stronger meaning than might be expected, as attested by the apparent equivalence of examples like No student will pass if he goofs off and Every student will fail if he goofs off. Higginbotham's observation follows straightforwardly given the validity of conditional excluded middle (CEM; as observed by von Fintel & Iatridou 2002), and as such could be taken as evidence thereof (e.g. Williams forthcoming). However, the empirical status of CEM has been disputed, (...) and it is invalid under many prominent theories of conditionals—notably Lewis (1973) for counterfactuals, also Kratzer (1979, 1991). More acutely, Higginbotham's observation holds even for quantified counterparts of conditionals that appear not to obey CEM (Higginbotham 2003), and the standard way of explaining (away) such apparent counterexamples to the principle, à la Stalnaker (1981), does not directly yield an account of our apparent truth-conditional intuitions about the quantified counterparts (Leslie 2009). This article provides an explanation for the latter intuitions within Stalnaker's framework, the upshot being that CEM does remain a viable explanation, in principle, for Higginbotham's observation. (shrink)

This paper focuses on tacit versus explicit uses of plural performance metrics as a primary methodological characteristic. This characteristic usefully distinguishes two schools of normative analysis and their approaches to normative interpretations of bounded rationality. Both schools of thought make normative claims about bounded rationality by comparing the performance of decision procedures using more than one performance metric. The consistency school makes tacit reference to performance metrics outside its primary axiomatic framework, but lexicographically promotes internal axiomatic consistency as the primary, (...) and in most cases sufficient, normative outcome with which to undertake welfare comparisons. The consistency school's axiomatization program, in both neoclassical and behavioral forms, pre-commits to welfare interpretations that follow a hierarchy of rationalities based on the stringency of restrictions that different axiomatizations impose on choice data. In contrast, the ecological rational.. (shrink)

Jonathan Schaffer (2010) has summoned a new sort of demon – which he calls the debasing demon – that apparently threatens all of our purported knowledge. We show that any debasing skeptical argument must attack the justification condition and can do so only if a plausible thesis about justification is false.

There is an apparent problem in identifying a basis for equality. This problem vanishes if what I call the ‘intuited response’ is successful. According to this response, there is no further explanation of the significance of the feature in virtue of which an individual matters, beyond the bare fact that it is the feature in virtue of which an individual matters. I argue against this claim, and conclude that if the problem of identifying a basis for equality is to be (...) resolved, it is necessary to defend a substantive account of the independent significance of some feature. (shrink)

The ArgumentOver the years national styles have been invoked or denigrated in the writing of the history of science. This paper is an attempt to give the concept of national style a degree of precision and clarity enabling scholars to understand when and how it may be invoked and when and how its use would be dubious or even forbidden. The example of the United States of America is used because the history of the sciences in the United States was (...) often written loosely in terms supposedly conducive to national style analyses. We first discuss the problem of commonalities, factors widely present within all countries in the Western tradition, which, by definition, cannot be exclusive national attributes. Here the problem is to somehow determine whether the supposed national style attribute is a case of a significantly different degree of intensity than some presumed norm in the Western tradition.The principal thesis advanced is that pre-existing historiographic assumptions largely determine whether or not a scholar finds or does not find a national style. This is discussed in terms of some examples for the U.S. case. More particularly, a number of examples are discussed from the three principal genres or schools in current writing in the history of science: the knowledge-centered; the doing-science; and the context-oriented. Based on the analysis of the examples, an attempt is made to sketch an approach to a more rigorous use of the concept of national style. (shrink)

While philosophers tend to consider a single type of causal history, biologists distinguish between two kinds of causal history: evolutionary history and developmental history. This essay studies the peculiarity of development as a criterion for the individuation of biological traits and its relation to form, function, and evolution. By focusing on examples involving serial homologies and genetic reprogramming, we argue that morphology (form) and function, even when supplemented with evolutionary history, are sometimes insufficient to individuate traits. Developmental mechanisms bring in (...) a novel aspect to the business of classification—identity of process-type—according to which entities are type-identical across individuals and natural kinds in virtue of the fact that they form and develop through similar processes. These considerations bear important metaphysical implications and have potential applications in several areas of philosophy. (shrink)

This essay presents a model-theoretic account of dispositional properties, according to which dispositions are not ordinary properties of real entities; dispositions capture the behavior of abstract, idealized models. This account has several payoffs. First, it saves the simple conditional analysis of dispositions. Second, it preserves the general connection between dispositions and regularities, despite the fact that some dispositions are not grounded in actual regularities. Finally, it brings together the analysis and the explanation of dispositions under a unified framework.

Translation of several chapters of L. Nathan Oaklander's contribution to Time, Change and Freedom: An Introduction to Metaphysics (New York and London: Routledge, 2008.

Many solutions of the Goodman paradox have been proposed but so far no agreement has been reached about which is the correct solution. However, I will not contribute here to the discussion with a new solution. Rather, I will argue that a solution has been in front of us for more than two hundred years because a careful reading of Hume's account of inductive inferences shows that, contrary to Goodman's opinion, it embodies a correct solution of the paradox. Moreover, the (...) account even includes a correct answer to Mill's question of why in some cases a single instance is sufficient for a complete induction, since Hume gives a well-supported explanation of this reliability phenomenon. The discussion also suggests that Bayesian theory by itself cannot explain this phenomenon. Finally, we will see that Hume's explanation of the reliability phenomenon is surprisingly similar to the explanation given lately by a number of naturalistic philosophers in their discussion of the Goodman paradox. (shrink)

Emotions play an important role in both sport and games, from the pride and joy of victory, the misery and shame of defeat, and the anger and anxiety felt along the way. This volume brings together experts in the philosophy of sport and games and experts in the philosophy of emotion to investigate this important area of research. The book discusses the role of the emotions for both participants and spectators of sports and games, including detailed discussions of suffering, shame, (...) anger, anxiety, misery and hatred. It also investigates the issues of collective emotions in relation to sport such as the shared joy of a football crowd when their team scores a goal. In addition, this volume examines the role of pretence and make believe in emotional reactions to sport. In so doing, it makes important contributions both to the philosophy of sport and to the philosophy of emotions, which will be of interest to researchers and students in both fields. (shrink)

From the mid-thirties onwards, Martin Heidegger occasionally speculated about the future possibility of artificially producing human beings. What is at stake in biotechnology, Heidegger claims, is the imminent possibility of the destruction of the human essence. It is unclear, however, how Heidegger can substantiate such a claim given that he consistently denounced attempts to define human Dasein as a living being to which a higher capacity such as reason or language is added. This paper will argue that, in this sense, (...) Heidegger took the radical challenge of biotechnology both too seriously and not seriously enough. Too seriously, because it is unclear why he would fear the annihilation of Dasein’s essence if he is convinced that this essence is not related to man’s biological equipment in the first place. Not seriously enough, because Heidegger at the same time remained convinced that even the most intrusive interventions in the human body will not be able to disrupt Dasein’s ontological essence. (shrink)

Ian Carter has recently argued in a series of articles that a certain form of respect, called ‘opacity respect’, gives a moral grounding to people’s equality. This type of respect involves abstaini...

A novel class of proton‐ATPase has been identified in the vacuolar system of eukaryotic cells. The properties of these enzymes and their relation to other proton‐ATPases is discussed.

This chapter is an edited transcription of an author-meets-critics session at the Truth 20|20 Conference, on Douglas Edwards’ award-winning book, The Metaphysics of Truth (2018, Oxford University Press). The Metaphysics of Truth tackles fundamental questions about the role of truth in connections between language and the world. Edwards proposes a pluralist account, according to which sentences in different domains get to be true in different ways. Kellen’s questions center around how to locate Edwards’s pluralist account given certain distinctions between varieties (...) of truth pluralism, and on how to determine what domains certain sentences belong to, especially mixed compounds. Taylor’s comments critically investigate Edwards’ critiques of deflationism, particularly to do with what the deflationist can say about whether truth counts as a ‘sparse’ or ‘abundant’ property, and whether deflationists are able to explain important differences between sparse properties such as being magnetic, and abundant properties, which deflationists will likely think include being true. Lynch provides several questions about the metaphysics of Edwards’s account, including the nature of the determination relation, and the nature of the property of truth itself, and whether Edwards’s account of that property manages to distinguish itself from something a truth minimalist would be happy with. (shrink)

This book is the first to explore the varied ways in which invented languages can be used to teach languages and linguistics in university courses. Renowned scholars and junior researchers show how using invented languages can appeal to a wider range of students, and can help those students to develop the fundamental skills of linguistic analysis.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:98 COMMENTS ON TWEYMAN AND DAVIS Tweyman contends that in Parts X and XI of the Dialogues Philo sets aside his Pyrrhonian or skeptical approach to theology, which consists in falsifying or casting doubt on the hypotheses of Cleanthes, and instead argues for a thesis of his own, viz. what we might call the "indifference thesis" that the original source of all things is morally indifferent. Davis counters with (...) an alternative interpretation of these two Parts of the Dialogues, arguing that Philo's approach to Cleanthes' arguments is consistent throughout the Dialogues and that Philo's aim is always the same, viz., to show that if cleanthes remains true to his principles and accepts their logical consequences, it is Cleanthes who is the Pyrrhonian and Philo who is the moderate skeptic. My position is that neither Tweyman nor Davis have given a proper analysis of Parts X and XI. I would agree with Davis that Tweyman' s position does seem to have an initial implausibility to it for at least two reasons. First of all, in Part II Philo commits himself to the "mystical incomprehensibility thesis" that the attributes of God are perfect but incomprehensible; and the mystical incomprehensibility thesis is incompatible with the indifference thesis. It cannot be the case both that God has perfect but incomprehensible attributes and that we also know he is morally indifferent. Moreover, the mystical incomprehensi2 bility thesis is reiterated in Part VI and more importantly, in Part X: "None but we mystics, as you were pleased to call us, can account for this strange mixture of phenomena, by deriving it from attributes, infinitely perfect, but incomprehensible" 99 (D 199). Since Philo appears to stick to the mystical incomprehensibility thesis, Tweyman has a problem explaining how Philo can hold one position on the attributes of God in Part X (the mystical incomprehensibility thesis) and then supposedly reverse himself in Part XI to argue for another (the indifference thesis). Second, Tweyman' s position seems to contradict the strategic position outlined by Philo in Part II: "You seem not to apprehend, replied Philo, that I argue with Cleanthes in his own way; and by showing him the dangerous consequences of his tenets, hope at last to reduce him to our opinion." (D 145) The strategy is to show Cleanthes that any position but that of the mystics has dangerous, i.e., skeptical or theologically unwelcome consequences, and so should be abandoned. Philo's strategy is not to defend his own position, but rather to reveal the weaknesses in Cleanthes' position. Thus far I would agree that Davis' interpretation is more consistent with both Philo's strategic position and with his mystical incomprehensibility thesis. Yet Davis does not directly take up the important point about Parts X and XI which Tweyman raises: that Philo changes his way of arguing in Parts X and XI from that which he had been employing previously in the first eight sections, i.e., that he changes from a Pyrrhonian to a non-Pyrrhonian way of arguing. This is how Tweyman puts it: In the first eight sections, Philo argues against Cleanthes' hypothesis by advancing his own hypotheses. His effort to advance hypotheses must be assessed in light of the fact that (by his own admission) all such hypotheses are based on insufficient 100 data, and, therefore, none is, strictly speaking, acceptable. Their use is not to establish truths about the nature of God, but to establish the conclusion which we find at the end of Part VIII that 'a total suspense of judgment is here our only reasonable resource.' The design of the world is compatible with, and could have arisen from, an indefinite number of designing principles. On the other hand, we have seen that in dealing with Cleanthes' hypotheses in Parts X and XI we are able to proceed more scientifically, and, in this manner, eliminate all but one of the hypotheses which can be introduced to explain the design of the world. (Tweyman 84-85) Now Tweyman does seem to have a point here. It is true that Philo takes his arguments in Parts X and XI to have a conclusiveness which he did not attribute to his... (shrink)

There is a common distinction between two aspects of history: history as the object dealt with and history as the way of dealing with the object. Within the “objective” aspect of history one may distinguish between the attempt to define the object as man and the attempt to define it as process. Within the “subjective” aspect there is the prevailing tendency to put forward the nature of the onceptual method as one employing individual concepts.

This essay is a discussion and critical analysis of Nick Zangwill's theory of art. Zangwill's theory makes aesthetic intention (or "aesthetic insight") central to the status of art in various articles and in his book, Aesthetic Creation (OUP, 2007). The present essay focuses on the analysis found in his book and in particular whether Zangwill's theory adequately addresses the nature of avant-garde works of art. In the end, I argue that Zangwill's theory is both too narrow and too broad to (...) fully succeed as an account of the full sweep of artistic endeavors. (shrink)

‘Probability dynamics’ (PD) is a second-order probabilistic theory in which probability distribution d X = (P(X 1), . . . , P(X m )) on partition U m X of sample space Ω is weighted by ‘credence’ (c) ranging from −∞ to +∞. c is the relative degree of certainty of d X in ‘α-evidence’ α X =[c; d X ] on U m X . It is shown that higher-order probabilities cannot provide a theory of PD. PD applies to (...) both subjectivist and frequentist theories. ‘Straight PD’ (SPD) produces associative and commutative mergers of evidence, in which evidences of positive credence are mutually reinforcing. ‘Offsetting PD’ (OPD) sets off conflicting evidences against each other. Subjectivist PD is a quantified second-order logic of action. Frequentist PD relates to descriptions of physical states of affairs. Acceptance of evidence α 1 X = [c 1; d 1 X ] at t 1 updates α 0 X = [c 0; d 0 X ] at t 0 into SPD-merger or OPD-merger . Given ‘co-evidence’ at t 0 < t 1, ‘indirect’ PD accepts evidence at t 1 and produces support for update α 10 X = [c10;d 10 X α 0 X such that in SPD and in OPD. For binary X and Y, with α 0 X = [c 0; P 0(X)] at t 0 (short-hand for ) and the accepted evidence, the support is ; ; where ρ0(X, Y) is the correlation coefficient of X and Y, and update α 10 X of α 0 X is with ‘accord’ λ = 1 in SPD and in OPD. As , tends toward update P 1(Y) of P 0(Y), but P 10(X) does not converge toward ‘ ’ of ‘probability kinematics’. Therefore PD is not compatible with probability kinematics. A process of ‘normalization’ interprets ‘β-evidence’ [[c 1; q 1]& . . . &[c m ; q m ]; U m X ]] with [c j ; q j ] on and m ≥ 3, as an α-evidence on {X 1, . . . , X m }. It is shown that SPD- and OPD-updates can be derived from updated cumulative functions. Time-biased updates are discussed. A PD-based theory of confirmation (PDCT) is presented. (shrink)

No detailed description available for "Prince William B.".