(2008). Leveraging Higher Education's Role in Social Evolution: A Paradigmatic Strategy. World Futures: Vol. 64, Postformal Thought and Hierarchical Complexity, pp. 536-553.

In this text, a dialogue about the difficult task of seizing the sense of history today is presented. The point of departure is the difficulty of the times to begin and the necessity to rethink the difference between historiography and historicity, and further between events, the event and the advent. The dialogue proposes to revisit the meaning of beginning from out the experience of improvisation and to reflect upon the possibility of developing improvisation as a sense of history.

Avec Hegel, le sens ne se propose plus par le lien religieux d'une communauté et le savoir ne s'ordonne plus à la totalité d'un sens. Depuis Hegel, nous n'avons pas cessé de pénétrer dans cette négativité. Le lire, c'est d'abord penser ceci : le sens n'est jamais donné ni disponible, il s'agit de se rendre disponible pour lui, et cette disponibilité s'appelle liberté.

" C'est pas juste!": combien de fois un enfant ne prononce-t-il pas - tout haut ou en silence - cette exclamation indignée? Combien de fois n'a-t-il pas le sentiment de ne pas avoir la place qui lui revient? Mais un adulte aussi trouve injuste, selon les cas, une contravention, un licenciement, une guerre, la réussite du voisin. Ce qui est juste, pensons-nous, doit l'être pour tous. Or nous pensons aussi qu'il doit y avoir ce qui est juste pour chacun, comme (...) un vêtement bien ajusté, ou comme le droit de faire "juste ce que je veux". Y a-t-il donc deux justices? L'une égale pour tous, l'autre différente pour chacun? Mais chacune ne risque-t-elle pas d'être injuste à sa manière, en s'opposant à l'autre? Qu'est-ce donc qui est juste? Et de qui peut-on dire que "c'est un juste"? (shrink)

Déconstruire le christianisme, c'est demander en quoi et jusqu'où nous tenons à lui. Nullement donc une dénégation, mais l'accomplissement du mouvement de conflit, intérieur au christianisme lui-même, entre intégrité et désintégration. L'A. définit d'abord son concept du christianisme, comme ouverture transcendantale, dimension historique du sens (signification, et passage), et annonce de la fin. Puis il analyse, à la lumière de cette dernière idée, trois thèmes essentiels de la théologie chrétienne: la foi, le péché, le « Dieu-Vivant ». To de-construct Christianity (...) is to ask how, and to what extent, we are attached to it. Hence it is no negation, but the accomplishment of that conflict which takes place within Christianity, between integrity and disintegration. The author first defines his concept of Christianity, as a transcendental openness, historical form of meaningfulness (both as meaning and as leading-way), and foretelling of the end. Then he analyses, in the light of the latter, three essential themes of christian theology: faith, sin, and the « Living-God ». (shrink)

Many argue that sceptical enquiry is incoherent insofar as it requires a detachment from and assessment of the framework judgements that constitute our practice of enquiry. This paper accepts that enquiry is relative to a framework, but argues that the Cartesian sceptical enquiry is consistent with that relativity. Part I presents Marie McGinn's Wittgen‐steinian anti‐sceptical argument, comparing its view of enquiry to Carnap's. Part II clarifies the sense in which Wittgenstein's ‘Moore‐type’ framework judgements could be unquestionable, and argues that McGinn's (...) antisceptical argument fails. Part III shows that the sceptical enquiry finds all our beliefs to lack justification by suspending our normal non‐sceptical framework judgement regarding perception in a way that is consistent with the framework‐relativity of enquiry, and encouraged by normal standards. The paper closes by recommending a view of scepticism as a stimulus for enquiry.1. (shrink)

This article addresses the gap between what works in research and what works in practice. Currently, research in evidence-based education policy and practice focuses on randomized controlled trials. These can support causal ascriptions (“It worked”) but provide little basis for local effectiveness predictions (“It will work here”), which are what matter for practice. We argue that moving from ascription to prediction by way of causal generalization (“It works”) is unrealistic and urge focusing research efforts directly on how to build local (...) effectiveness predictions. We outline various kinds of information that can improve predictions and encourage using methods better equipped for acquiring that information. We compare our proposal with others advocating a better mix of methods, like implementation science, improvement science, and practice-based evidence. (shrink)

My topic is the relation between nonsense and intelligibility, and the contrast between nonsense and falsehood which played a pivotal role in the rise of analytic philosophy . I shall pursue three lines of inquiry. First I shall briefly consider the positive case, namely linguistic understanding . Secondly, I shall consider the negative case—different breakdowns of understanding and connected forms of failure to make sense . Third, I shall criticize three important misconceptions of nonsense and unintelligibility: the austere conception of (...) nonsense propounded by the New Wittgensteinians ; the “no nonsense position” which roundly denies that there are cases of nonsense—Chomsky’s semantic anomalies or Ryle’s category mistakes–that are grammatically well-formed, without even having the potential for being used to make a truth-apt statement ; the individualistic conception of language and of semantic mistakes championed by Davidson . All three positions, I shall argue, ignore or deny combinatorial nonsense, the fact that perfectly meaningful sentence-components can be combined in a way that may be grammatical, yet without resulting in a sentence that is itself “meaningful”, i.e. endowed with linguistic sense. At a more strategic level, the first and the third position deny or ignore that natural languages are communal historical practices that go beyond idiolects and the employments of expressions in specific contexts and that are guided by semantic rules—standards for the meaningful use of words. (shrink)

This article compares situated cognition to contemporary Neo-Aristotelian approaches to the mind. The article distinguishes two components in this paradigm: an Aristotelian essentialism which is alien to situated cognition and a Wittgensteinian “capacity approach” to the mind which is not just congenial to it but provides important conceptual and argumentative resources in defending social cognition against orthodox cognitive science. It focuses on a central tenet of that orthodoxy. According to what I call “encephalocentrism,” cognition is primarily or even exclusively a (...) computational process occurring inside the brain. Neo-Aristotelians accuse this claim of committing a “homuncular” or “mereological fallacy”. The article explains why the label “fallacy” is misleading, reconstructs the argument to the effect that encephalocentric applications of psychological predicates to the brain and its parts amount to a category mistake, and defends this argument against objections by Dennett, Searle, and Figdor. At the same time it criticizes the Neo-Aristotelian denial that the brain is the organ of cognition. It ends by suggesting ways in which the capacity approach and situated cognition might be combined to provide a realistic and ecologically sound picture of cognition as a suite of powers that flesh-and-blood animals exercise within their physical and social environments. (shrink)

In der zeitgenössischen analytischen Philosophe wird oft behauptet, die Erkenntnistheorie sei weniger fundamental als die Ontologie, da sich aus Aussagen über unser Erkenntnisvermögen keine Aussagen über die Wirklichkeit ableiten lassen und die Frage nach der Beschaffenheit der Wirklichkeit der Frage nach ihrer Erkennbarkeit vorausgeht. Dagegen verteidige ich folgende Thesen: eine Form der Erkenntnistheorie—die Auseinandersetzung mit der Skepsis —ist nicht fundamental; eine andere Form—die Auseinandersetzung mit methodologischen Fragen--ist in bestimmter Hinsicht fundamentaler als die Ontologie; man kann sehr wohl ontologische Folgerungen aus (...) überwiegend erkenntnistheoretischen Überlegungen ziehen; was ein Ding ist, läßt sich oft am besten dadurch klären, daß man sich darauf besinnt, daß wir es erkennen und wie wir es erkennen. Dabei stütze ich mich auf das Mooresche Prinzip der vernünftigen Abwägung: auch ohne eine Widerlegung des Skeptikers ist es vernünftig anzunehmen, daß wir Wissen über bestimmte Gegenstandsbereiche besitzen, und aus dieser Annahme lassen sich Schlußfolgerungen über die Beschaffenheit dieser Gegenstandsbereiche ziehen. (shrink)

Few arguments against intentional states in animals have stood the test of time. But one objection by Stich and Davidson has never been rebutted. In my reconstruction it runs: Ascribing beliefs to animals is vacuous, unless something counts as an animal believing one specific “content” rather than another; Nothing counts as an animal believing one specific content rather than another, because of their lack of language; Ergo: Ascribing beliefs to animals is vacuous. Several attempts to block the argument challenge the (...) first premise, notably the appeals to “naked” belief ascriptions and alternative representational formats. This essay defends the first premise and instead challenges the second premise. There are non-linguistic “modes of presentation”; these can be determined by attributing to animals specific needs and capacities—a “ hermeneutic ethology” based on lessons from the debate about radical translation/interpretation in the human case. On that basis we can narrow down content by exclusion. What remains is an “imponderability of the mental” which does not rule out attributions of intentional states to animals. (shrink)

What kind of activity are non-human animals capable of? A venerable tradition insists that lack of language confines them to ‘mere behaviour’. This article engages with this ‘lingualism’ by developing a positive, bottom-up case for the possibility of animal agency. Higher animals cannot just act, they can act intelligently, rationally, intentionally and for reasons. In developing this case I draw on the interplay of behaviour, cognition and conation, the unduly neglected notion of intelligence and its connection to rationality, the need (...) to recognize that reasons are objective conditions, and the difference between the ability to act for reasons and the capacity to reflect on reasons. (shrink)

The most comprehensive survey of Wittgenstein’s thought yet compiled, this volume of fifty newly commissioned essays by leading interpreters of his philosophy is a keynote addition to the Blackwell series on the world’s great philosophers, covering everything from Wittgenstein’s intellectual development to the latest interpretations of his hugely influential ideas. The lucid, engaging commentary also reviews Wittgenstein’s historical legacy and his continued impact on contemporary philosophical debate.

This lucid and accessible dictionary presents technical terms that Wittgenstein introduced into philosophical debate or transformed substantially, and also topics to which he made a substantial contribution. Hans-Johann Glock places Wittgenstein's ideas in their historical context, and indicates their impact on his contemporaries as well as their relevance to current debates. The entries delineate Wittgenstein's lines of argument on particular issues, assessing their strengths and weaknesses, and shed light on fundamental exegetical controversies. The dictionary entries are prefaced by a (...) ‘Sketch of an Intellectual Biography’, which links the basic themes of the early and later philosophy and describes the general development of Wittgenstein's thinking. Extensive textual references, a detailed index and an annotated bibliography will facilitate further study. Authoritative, comprehensive and clear, the volume will be welcomed by anyone with an interest in Wittgenstein – his life, work or influence. Each Blackwell Philosopher Dictionary presents the life and work of an individual philosopher in a scholarly but accessible manner. Entries cover key ideas and thoughts, as well as the main themes of the philosopher's works. A comprehensive biographical sketch is also included. (shrink)

This article discusses the problems which concepts pose for the attribution of thoughts to animals. It locates these problems within a range of other issues concerning animal minds (section 1), and presents a ‘lingualist master argument’ according to which one cannot entertain a thought without possessing its constituent concepts and cannot possess concepts without possessing language (section 2). The first premise is compelling if one accepts the building-block model of concepts as parts of wholes – propositions – and the idea (...) that intentional verbs signify relations between subjects and such propositions. But I shall find fault with both (section 3). This opens the way for recognizing a form of ‘holodoxastic’ thought-ascription which does not presuppose concept-possession on the part of the subject (section 4). Section 5 defends this idea against objections. Section 6 turns to the second premise of the lingualist master argument. I press the idea of judgement into service as a label for conceptual thought that need not be linguistic and argue that the possession of concepts is an ability. Section 7 accepts that concept-possession requires the ability to classify rather than merely to discriminate, but suggests that this need not disqualify animals. In the final section I confirm this verdict by returning to the notion of judgement: classification is the deliberate and considered response to a range of options in a sorting or discrimination task. Notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, the capacity for such a response does not presuppose the linguistic ability to answer questions. Judgement is a feature of a type of problem-solving that we share with some non-linguistic creatures. (shrink)

The ever-increasing dominance of English within analytic philosophy is an aspect of linguistic globalisation. To assess it, I first address fundamental issues in the philosophy of language. Steering a middle course between linguistic universalism and linguistic relativism, I deny that some languages might be philosophically superior to others, notably by capturing the essential categories of reality. On this background I next consider both the pros and cons of the Anglicisation of philosophy. I shall defend the value of English as a (...) lingua franca, while denying both the feasibility and the desirability of English as the sole universal language of philosophy. Finally I turn to the linguistic inequality in contemporary analytic philosophy. While it does not per se amount to an injustice, there is a need to level the playing field. But the remedy does not lie in linguistic academic sectarianism. Instead, what might be called for are piecemeal measures to reduce explicit and implicit biases against analytic philosophers on the geographic fringes, biases that are only partly connected to the predominance of English. (shrink)