The oriental culture has generally been known to bloom in China in regional framework, and established the form of a country in ancient times, and continuously develop as Yu (虞) / Xia (夏) / Yin (殷) [Shang=商] / Zhou (周) in periodical framework. There are several documents to discover the origin along with archaeological and cultural configuration related to prehistory tales or the history of tribal settlement in ancient times. Unfortunately, however, there were few outputs that unveiled the original source (...) in cultural or theoretical angles. Generally, a certain race and a local culture can be a good resource to be considered, the base of ideology, and further, the root of philosophy in a country. It can be found that, in comparison with pre-history legends and archaeological research results, the source of Chinese philosophy is mainly composed of exterior cultures from foreign settlers rather than its own one. In short, it is possible to setup the preposition or hypothesis that the source of Chinese philosophy and thoughts was not from Han (漢) race, but from old Dongyi (東夷) race. Thus, it is necessary to study deeply on that point as a key clue, linking the characteristics of Zhouyi (周易) philosophy' which is the origin of Chinese philosophy to Dongyi culture. As mentioned in the passages above, it was demonstrated that the fundamental issue of Yi philosophy lies in the principle of time operation in Tiantao (天道), and the formulation of Yi philosophy, and through the analysis of fourteen saints in the process of review of Shengtong, (聖統) the stream of old saints by the principle of Lishu (曆數) more than half of saints were from Dongyi family. In addition, the historical fact that the Dongyi tribe had raised the Yin (Shang) culturewhich mainly formed the base of Chinese cultures as a ancient dynasty shows the deep relation between Zhouyi and the Dongyi culture, and further, it seems that the relation was from the tribe's realization of the principle of time operation of Heaven which had been accumulated for a long time as the culture of agricultural settlement, the conceptual characteristics in the Dongyi culture, and it can be found that the cultural characteristics are in connection with Yi philosophy which considers the principle of time operation in Tiantao as the fundamental ground. It also can be detected that they have connection with the original meaning ofseveral concepts in Yixue (易學) and the culture which emphasize the bottom line of the nature of time. This study focused on questioning issues of these findings as a preliminary research in order to prepare for the formal works which will scrutinize the details of circumstances. In brief, the fact that the fundamental issue of Yi philosophy which is the source of Chinese philosophy lies in the nature of time in the operation of Tiantao should be demonstrated, and the matter that the root was from the Dongyi family who had lived in the north-eastern area in the ancient period and had raised the culture which stressed the principle of time operation as the agricultural settlement culture, and moved to the central area of old China should be unveiled through the trace, which, in the future, might be able to enlighten roots of thoughts in Chinese philosophy in the right course, and make them realize that the work process which is being operated in the north-eastern part would be of no use in the after all. (shrink)

1. Naemyŏnjŏk ŭro pyŏng ŭl alk'o innŭn munmyŏngsa ilmannyŏn -- 2. Yangsŏng ŭn pondi taedŭng sangbojŏk kwan'gye -- 3. Sŏng ch'abyŏl ŭi pyŏng ch'iyu nŭn ŏttŏk'e? -- 4. Chagakto e ŭihan kyohwa yobŏpchŏk sŏng p'yŏngdŭng ŭisik kaehyŏk undong -- 5. Chagakto : sunsu Chagakto -- 6. Sunsu ŭi segye, uwŏrham (ttwiŏnam) i hyŏngsŏng toenŭn segye -- 7. Kungmin Chagagwŏn mandŭlgi mit iltae kŏjokchŏk in Chagakto munhwa kyoyuk undong chŏn'gae -- 8. Sangjogye.

It is the aim of this paper to assess Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concept of evidence. In Sect. 1, I will summarize Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concept of evidence. In Sect. 2, I will delineate Husserl’s concept of experience and in Sect. 3, I will try to define the concept of evidence in Husserl. In Sect. 4–6, I will assess Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concepts of evidence and show that Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concept of evidence is out of the (...) mark, since it is based on a total misunderstanding of Husserl’s concepts of evidence. (shrink)

Max Scheler and Mencius both take feeling to be the origin of value and could therefore be considered to be proponents of axiological sentimentalism. Despite the great spatial and temporal distance between them, there are striking similarities between the theories of value they developed. It should be noted, however, that there are also some differences between them that are mainly derived from some difficulties with their theories of value. These difficulties should be removed so that a better theory of value (...) could be developed. It is accordingly the aim of this paper to promote a phenomenological dialogue between Scheler and Mencius that could lead to such a better theory. In Sects. 1, 2, I will first delineate Scheler’s theory of value and feeling, then that of Mencius. In Sect. 3, I will point out some difficulties with the two theories and promote a dialogue between them that would improve each theory. In Sect. 4, I will conclude with some remarks concerning the future task of the phenomenological dialogue between Scheler and Mencius. (shrink)

It is the aim of this paper to sketch the basic idea of the phenomenology of moral drive through a dialogue with Dasan and Fichte. In section 1, I will delineate Fichte’s theory of moral drive; in...

Edmund Husserl published in his lifetime only works which represent a compilation of individual phenomenological analyses or which have the character of an introduction to his phenomenology. It always made him uneasy that he did not publish any systematic work in phenomenology. In his later years, from the beginning of the 1920s, he tried several times to write such a work, but in vain. The masterplan for this work, which his assistant Eugen Fink sketched out in 1930/31 is preserved. According (...) to this plan, the Phänomenologie der Instinkte has attracted very little attention in Husserl studies until now, takes a central and fundamental position in the whole system of his mature transcendental phenomenology. In this book, Nam-In Lee reconstructs the Phänomenologie der Instinkte on the basis of the already published works and, above all, of the unpublished manuscripts of Husserl. Moreover, he draws out the consequences which the Phänomenologie der Instinkte bears for the whole system of phenomenology. Transcendental phenomenology, in its form of a genetic phenomenology of which the Phänomenologie der Instinkte is the concluding part, can, according to him, no longer be considered as one-sided philosophy of consciousness in the traditional sense, as it has often been thought of hitherto. Thus, the author presents a new face of phenomenology; one which has scarcely been noticed in the field of Husserl studies until now. (shrink)

In Speech and Phenomena and other works, Derrida criticizes Husserl’s phenomenology and attempts to pave the way to his deconstructive philosophy. The starting point of his criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology is his assessment of the latter’s phenomenology of language developed in the Logical Investigations. Derrida claims that Husserl’s phenomenology of language in the Logical Investigations and the subsequent works is guided by the premise of the metaphysics of presence. The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, it (...) aims to show that Derrida’s criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology of language is off the mark and, on the other hand, it aims to reveal that the phenomenology of language goes far beyond the scope of the Derridian deconstructive philosophy of language. (shrink)

In this article, the author attempts to explain, the occurrence of Husserl and Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of phenomenology there is a fundamental similarity. I have taken the approach is to analyze the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger's interpretation of the occurrence of the phenomenon of learning among the "place" concept. The author describes the place as a transcendental phenomenology of Husserl's main themes occur, and occur as the body phenomenology of Heidegger's interpretation of the main issues between the two fundamentally (...) identical. As between the two identical, Husserl's transcendental subjectivity as the transcendental place of the load are, in Heidegger's place as a body load there who have basically similar. Furthermore, Husserl and Heidegger on the concept of the world the concept of the transcendental field, as well as Husserl's "consciousness of the world and the occurrence of the construct" and Heidegger's "understanding and interpretation", a fundamentally similar. In this paper, I will attempt to show that there is a fundamental similarity between Husserl's genetic phenomenology and Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. I will do this by analyzing the concept of "genesis" in Husserl's genetic phenomenology and also in Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. I will show that there is a fundamental similarity between the transcendental genesis as the main topic of Husserl's genetic phenomenology and the ontological genesis as the main topic of Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. Due to the similarity between them, there is a fundamental similarity between Husserl's transcendental subjectivity as the bearer of the transcendental genesis and Heidegger's Dasein as the bearer of the ontological genesis. Moreover, there is a fundamental similarity Husserl's concept of the world and Heidegger's concept of the a priori field, between "world consciousness and genetic constitution" in Husserl and "understanding and interpretation "in Heidegger. (shrink)

In this paper, I will examine the possibility of first philosophy from a phenomenological point of view. I will do this by assessing Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In Sect. 1, I will delineate Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In Sect. 2, I will introduce Levinas’s conception of ethics as first philosophy and sketch out his criticism of Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In Sect. 3, I will assess Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s conception and show that from (...) a phenomenological point of view, it is possible to develop first philosophy only in a relative sense and not in an absolute sense. The possibility of first philosophy in a relative sense implies that both Husserl’s and Levinas’s conceptions of first philosophy have some limitations and should be revised, since in a certain way, they are each conceived from an absolute point of view. In Sect. 4, I will show that the conception of first philosophy in a relative sense is a phenomenological one and sketch out some basic features of first philosophy in a relative sense. (shrink)

The life-world is a central topic of Husserl’s phenomenology. He addresses this issue in some of the works published during his lifetime and attempts to analyze the life-world extensively in many of his works and posthumously published research manuscripts. The life-world is one of the topics that have been discussed most extensively in phenomenology. However, there are many misunderstandings of Husserl’s phenomenology of the life-world. One misunderstanding concerns the variety of concepts of the life-world in Husserl and the possibility of (...) developing various fields of the phenomenology of the life-world. It is the aim of this paper to show that Husserl has a pluralistic concept of the life-world, which makes it possible to develop various fields of the phenomenology of the life-world. I will introduce the monistic view and the pluralistic view of the concept of the life-world in Husserl and will clarify what the life-world is, thereby showing that the monistic view of the concept of the life-world in Husserl is not legitimate. However, even though Husserl has a pluralistic concept of the life-world, nowhere does he systematically clarify the various concepts of the life-world. Hence I will sort out and clarify various concepts of the life-world such as the narrower concept and the wider concept, the general concept and the particular concept, the natural concept and the transcendental concept, and the empirical concept and the eidetic concept. Based on the discussion of the various concepts of the life-world in Husserl, I will assess the monistic view and the pluralistic view of Husserl’s concept of the life-world so that we can better understand his various concepts of the life-world. (shrink)

It is the aim of this paper to develop the phenomenology of phronesis through a phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of phronesis by employing different kinds of phenomenological reductions. In section 1, I will show that phenomenological reduction is identical with a change of attitude and that we have to employ different kinds of phenomenological reductions in order to interpret Aristotle’s theory of phronesis phenomenologically. In section 2, employing different kinds of phenomenological reductions, I will attempt to develop the phenomenological (...) psychology of phronesis through a phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of phronesis. In section 3, employing different kinds of intersubjective reductions, I will clarify intersubjective aspects of phronesis. In section 4, adopting these insights, I will try to resolve two of the many difficulties of Aristotle’s theory of phronesis. In section 5, I will conclude with two remarks concerning the future tasks of the phenomenology of phronesis. (shrink)

This paper will deal with the problem of practical intentionality in the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. First, through an analysis of a passage found in Logical Investigations, I will show Husserl''s earlier position with respect to the problem of practical intentionality. I will then go on to critically assess this position and, with reference to some of Husserl''s works written after the 1920''s, prove that every intentionality should be regarded as a practical intentionality. Correspondingly, transcendental phenomenology should also be characterized (...) as a practical philosophy. I make this statement with the following two senses in mind; transcendental phenomenology is a practical philosophy, first, in the sense that it investigates the various forms of practical intentionality and, second, in the sense that transcendental intentionality as the grounding source of transcendental phenomenology is also a kind of practical intentionality. (shrink)

This paper aims to clarify the influence of Husserl’s phenomenology upon Schutz’s phenomenological sociology. In developing his phenomenologicalsociology, even though Schutz was deeply influenced by Weber, he considers that the interpretative sociology developed by the latter has some difficulties. It is Husserl’s phenomenology that enabled him to overcome the difficulties of Weber’s interpretative sociology and to found a phenomenological sociology as an interpretative sociology in a true sense. In section 1, I will deal with the significance and difficulties of Weber’s (...) interpretative sociology. In section 2, I will deal with the influence of Husserl’s phenomenological psychology and furthermore, in section 3, the influence of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology on Schutz’s phenomenological sociology. In section 4, I will mention that there are some motives in Husserl’s later phenomenology that could be useful for the development of the phenomenological sociology. (shrink)

In the past 20 years, the concept of instinct has been discussed in respect to various disciplines such as evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, linguistics, ethics, aesthetics, and phenomenology, etc. However, the meaning of instinct still remains unclarified in many respects. In order to overcome this situation, it is necessary to elucidate the genuine meaning of instinct so that the discussion of instinct in these disciplines can be carried out systematically. The objective of this paper is to establish the genuine concept (...) of instinct on the basis of a phenomenological criticism of A. Gehlen’s theory of instinct-reduction. Moreover, it seeks to show that this concept is the genetic origin of the embodied consciousness. According to Gehlen, instinct is defined as Instinkthandlung. However, this definition of instinct is problematic in the formal logical sense, since the definiendum is already included in the definiens. Moreover, it faces different kinds of serious material problems. Criticizing Gehlen’s theory of instinct systematically, I will show that instinct should be redefined as “the innate living force that urges a species of living being to pursue a certain kind of object,” and I will attempt to clarify this definition of instinct in a more detailed manner by offering 11 points. Thereafter, I will argue that Gehlen’s theory of instinct-reduction has to be replaced by the theory of instinct-enlargement in human beings. Finally, I will point out that the genuine concept of instinct is nothing other than the genetic origin of the embodied consciousness. (shrink)

The aesthetic spirit in Paik Nam June’s video art, TV Buddha, originated in the aesthetics of Zen Buddhism, and the parameters that established Paik’s aesthetic comprised the indigenous Eastern aesthetic idea of dongjing 動靜. Yi 逸 is the paramount aesthetic in Zen Buddhism, suggesting the transcendence of preexisting tracks and conventions. Paik’s behavioral music, to which he was dedicated before pioneering video art in earnest, was related to yi in terms of the complete aspects of forms, themes, and so on, (...) evidently under the influence of avant-garde musical composer John Cage. The Zen Buddhist aesthetic—and Paik’s artistic motto—is to capture the essence of the self and the world through the destruction of stereotypes. Paik’s artistic uniqueness lies in his attempts to combine his traditional culture and spirit—the culture and ideas of Korea and Eastern Asia—with cutting-edge technology. The hallmark of Paik’s video art can be understood as a suggestion of philosophical subjects guided by the interrelation between a graphical presentation on a TV screen and the whole installation setup. The philosophical subject in TV Buddha is Zen Buddhist meditation symbolized in the structure of dongjing. (shrink)

Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample (...) – successfully replicated about 70% of the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate in the field of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research practices going forward. (shrink)

In the past decade, experimental philosophy---the attempt at making progress on philosophical problems using empirical methods---has thrived in a wide range of domains. However, only in recent years has aesthetics succeeded in drawing the attention of experimental philosophers. The present paper constitutes the first survey of these works and of the nascent field of 'experimental philosophy of aesthetics'. We present both recent experimental works by philosophers on topics such as the ontology of aesthetics, aesthetic epistemology, aesthetic concepts, and imagination, as (...) well as research from other disciplines that not only are relevant to philosophy of aesthetics but also open new avenues of research for experimental philosophy of aesthetics. Overall, we conclude that the birth of an experimental philosophy of aesthetics is good news not only for aesthetics but also for experimental philosophy itself, as it contributes to broaden the scope of experimental philosophy. (shrink)

Appendix 1 was incomplete in the initial online publication. The original article has been corrected.

Assume V = L ⊨ ZF + DC + Θ > ω2 + μ is a normal fine measure on.

We say that a computably enumerable (c.e.) degree b is a Lachlan nonsplitting base (LNB), if there is a computably enumerable degree a such that a > b, and for any c.e. degrees w,v ≤ a, if a ≤ w or; v or; b then either a ≤ w or; b or a ≤ v or; b. In this paper we investigate the relationship between bounding and nonbounding of Lachlan nonsplitting bases and the high /low hierarchy. We prove that there (...) is a non-Low2 c.e. degree which bounds no Lachlan nonsplitting base. (shrink)

The relationship between philosophy and science in contemporary times is closer than ever. From the methodology perspective, scientific and philosophical research has a clear sequential relationship. It is highlighted in the following aspects: 1. the methodology of scientific research, including theoretical assumptions and data modeling, parallels with apparent similarities in conceptual analysis and logical deduction in philosophy;2. consistency of analytical argumentation methods in scientific research and philosophical research;3. naturalism is currently a research approach that both scientific and philosophical research adopt. (...) There has been a significant dispute over the relationship between philosophy and science among contemporary philosophers. This dispute focuses on the impact of scientific development on philosophy research. Nowadays, no one would deny the existence of this impact, but there is no consensus on the impact's nature, scope, and role. Wittgenstein's conception of certainty can provide valuable insights to understand the relationship between philosophy and science. In addition, we conclude the pragmatic turn in cognitive science because we misinterpret the cognitive scientists' emphasis on action as a practical claim and interpret the cognitive scientists' views with pragmatism. The theoretical analysis and research suggestions philosophers provide are becoming essential focuses in contemporary artificial intelligence research, including the interpretability of computer technology, the ethical norms of artificial intelligence technology, and the possible conception of human beings in the future. The interdisciplinary study of science and philosophy will achieve more significant development. In sum, understanding the nature of philosophy can be given a new explanation from a future perspective. The future outlook here refers to the starting point from possible world scenarios that can be conceived and traced back to all the facts happening in the present world, thereby giving an appropriate explanation to the real world. (shrink)

Experimental philosophy of art and aesthetics is the application of the methods of experimental philosophy to questions about art and aesthetics. By taking a scientific approach to experiences with art and aesthetic phenomena, it is continuous with the longstanding research program in psychology called empirical aesthetics. However, it is also continuous with traditional research in philosophy of art and aesthetics because it is centered on many of the same timeless questions. Like other branches of experimental philosophy, such as experimental moral (...) philosophy, it involves gathering data using empirical methods and bringing analyses of the data to bear on theorizing on a wide range of topics in philosophy of art and aesthetics: definition of art, ontology of art, aesthetic properties, aesthetic judgments, aesthetic adjectives, morality and aesthetics, and emotion and art. In this entry, we briefly examine the history prior to the current movement’s emergence in the 2010s, extensively survey extant works in this movement on each of the topics, and consider methodological debates regarding this movement. (shrink)