Islamic philosophy - 16th century; Jurjānī, ʻAlī ibn Muḥammad, al- Sayyid al- Sharīf.

The study of the historical path of the development of Christianity from the time of its occurrence and to this day makes it possible to conclude that at all stages of the existence of this religion for her was characterized by the division into separate directions and branches, which led to a struggle between them. The whole history of Christianity is a multitude of divisions, conflicts and heresies. But there is no doubt that the evolutionary process of the development of (...) Christianity is followed by the reverse flow - the desire to unite into a single Christ's church. Representative of this trend was the Roman Catholic Church. In the XI-XIII centuries. it reached the peak of its power and began its unifying activity in the East. (shrink)

Articles on fundamentals of Hinduism, philosophy, and culture.

Contributed seven papers presented at National Seminar on Śrāvakācāra held at Dept. of Jainology, University of Madras in 2005 and two lectures on Muniacara presented on the eve of the Mahāsati Tārābāiswāmi Endowment Lecture 2005.

This book reveals and discusses the foundations of law and justice. Fifteen leading lawyers and philosophers of law, representing thirteen nations and fifteen different philosophical schools examine the value and purpose of law, and the nature and requirements of law and justice. Some of the world's most learned and provocative legal scholars address the ultimate questions of legal and social philosophy from all angles and the broadest possible perspective, with special reference to the work of Mortimer Newlin Stead Sellers, and (...) the republican, liberal, and analytical schools of legal thought. The conclusions reached here are not fully unanimous, congruent or conclusive, but they represent the pinnacle of legal scholarship as it exists today and furnish the necessary basis for any future study of law, justice, or the ultimate requirements of just, effective and legitimate law and society. (shrink)

The title is an allusion to the fact that, traditionally, propositions have served at least two distinct functions in philosophy, even though these functions have not usually been distinguished. Propositions have been invoked as the ‘meanings’ or ‘intensions’ of sentences and as the objects of propositional attitudes. Thus the proposition that Socrates is wise is the meaning of the English sentence, ‘Socrates is wise,’ and is what Charles believes when he believes that Socrates is wise. ‘Means that’ and ‘believes that’ (...) take the same kind of object. I shall argue, first, that there are two quite different functions here and it takes two quite different kinds of proposition to serve these distinct functions. The second thing I want to do is examine the suggestion that we can treat propositions as sets of possible worlds. There is a serious difficulty here, and so I shall want to turn that idea on its side: I shall define possible worlds as sets of G-propositions and then define E-propositions as sets of possible worlds. (shrink)