The degreed view is an influential account in the debate on quantum value indefiniteness, linking the gradedness of quantum properties to quantum indeterminacy. This paper challenges the connection between degrees and indeterminacy by presenting an example of a graded quantum property that does not entail metaphysical indeterminacy. Through an investigation of two graded approaches to location in quantum mechanics, the paper argues that while the first account, degreed instantiation of exact location, is indeterminate, the second account, degreed quantum location, is (...) not. This indicates that indeterminacy and degrees are not inherently linked, offering a novel perspective on quantum ontology. The paper advocates adopting a graded view of quantum properties without indeterminacy, potentially leading to a paradigm shift in understanding quantum phenomena. (shrink)

Classical work on Hindu cosmology by Huccaṇṇa, 16th century Kannada author.

Hicri I ve II. asırlarda meydana gelen bir takım olaylar, Müslümanların düşünce dünyalarına da bazı tartışmaları beraberinde getirmiştir. Tartışmalı ortamın gerektirdiği sahih bir inanç sisteminin ortaya konulması, akâid türü metinlerin yazılmasına sebep olmuştur. Mâtürîdî ekolünde, Ebû Hanife (ö. 150/767)’nin Fıkhu’l-ekber’i ile başlatılan bu tür metinler içerisinde Hakîm es-Semerkandî (ö. 324/953)’nin es-Sevâdü’l-a‘zam’ı da önemli bir yer tutmaktadır. Bu metnin ayırt edici özelliği ise akâid eseri olmasına rağmen içerisinde birçok fıkhî meseleler barındırmasıdır. Genelde akâid metinlerinde özelde de es-Sevâdü’l-a‘zam isimli eserde fıkhî meselelerin (...) yer almasının muhtemel sebeplerini incelemeye yönelik olan bu çalışmada; Akâid ve fıkıh arasındaki sağlam ilişki, müellifin hanefi-matürîdî geleneğine bağlılığı, muhalif fırkaların görüşlerine tepkisel bir söylem ve dönemin güncel sorunlarına cevap bulma gayesi üzerinde durulacaktır. (shrink)

Essays on religious psychology and mysticism.

Mongolian traditional teaching of reasoning.

Theories on World origin and Human Nature.

The aim of this paper is to give a characterisation of religion and the Religious Spirit, basing itself on the Platonic assumption that there are Forms, salient jewels of simplicity and affinity, to be dug out from the soil of vague experience and cut clear from the confusedly shifting patterns of usage, which will give us conceptual mastery over the changeable detail in a given sector. It will further be Platonic in that it will not seek to discount the deep (...) gulfs between the species into which religion qua genus divides itself, i.e. its theistic, polytheistic and atheistic subvarieties, taking it to be of the essence of a true genus to extend itself over mutually exclusive species, only being what it is by including in its sense the alternatives which are thus mutually exclusive. And my treatment will be Platonic, thirdly, in that it will endeavour to delimit the Religious Spirit by, on the one hand, setting it over against what it excludes, all purely this-world talk and life which is quite irreligious, and by, on the other hand, opposing it to forms of talk and life which fall short of it in various ways or which deviate from it variously, thereby likewise contributing to our understanding of what it is. The practice of Plato, which could study the deviations from his ideal city in order to confirm his notion of its structure and excellence, and which also paired every ideal pattern with its opposite— piety with impiety, justice with self-interested tyranny, etc.—is plainly one to be followed: Plato, as we know from a citation from his contemporary Hermodorus in one of the Aristotelian commentators, always set beside the ‘in itself’ of the pure Form the deviant and the wholly negative which were nonetheless part of its sense. Religion will therefore stand before us as a target that it is possible to fall short of or miss altogether as well as to hit squarely, and we shall try by a series of glancing darts to end by hitting it squarely. (shrink)

I consider two possible sources of vagueness. The first is indeterminacy about which intension is expressed by a word. The second is indeterminacy about which referent (extension) is determined by an intension. Focusing on a Fregean account of intensions, I argue that whichever account is right will matter to whether vagueness turns out to be a representational phenomenon (as opposed to being “in the world”). In addition, it will also matter to whether supervaluationism is a viable semantic framework. Based on (...) these considerations, I end by developing an argument against supervaluational semantics that depends, instead, on anti-Fregean (Millian) assumptions. (shrink)