Background: Lay persons’ judgements of the acceptability of the not uncommon practice of ending the life of a damaged neonate have not been studied. Methods: A convenience sample of 1635 lay people in France rated how acceptable it would be for a physician to end a neonate’s life—by withholding care, withdrawing care, or active euthanasia—in 54 scenarios in which the neonate was diagnosed either with perinatal asphyxia or a genetic abnormality. The scenarios were all combinations of four factors: three levels (...) of maturity or immaturity, three levels of severity of the health problem, three levels of parents’ preference concerning prolonging care and two levels of decision-making (with or without consulting the other caregivers). Analyses: Analyses of variance of the participants’ responses were performed to determine the importance of each factor; the interactions among factors, with methods of ending life and with other patient characteristics; and the differences between asphyxia and genetic abnormality. A cluster analysis was performed to look for groups with different patterns of responses. Results: Lay people assigned most importance to the parents’ request and to the severity of the problem. Except for a small group (12%) always opposed to ending life, they used a simple additive-type rule in integrating the information. Implications: Most of this sample of French lay people are not categorically for or against ending the life of a damaged neonate, but judge its degree of acceptability by adding up those factors that seem most salient to them. (shrink)

BackgroundEuthanasia is performed on occasion, even on newborns, but is highly controversial, and it is prohibited by law and condemned by medical ethics in most countries.AimTo characterise and compare the judgments of lay persons, nurses, and physicians of the acceptability of actively ending the life of a damaged newborn.MethodsConvenience samples of 237 lay persons, 214 nurses, and 76 physicians in the south of France rated the acceptability on a scale of 0–10 of giving a lethal injection in 54 scenarios composed (...) of all combinations of 4 within-subject factors: gestational age of 6,7, or 9 months; 3 levels of severity of either perinatal asphyxia or of genetic disease; attitude of the parents about prolonging care unknown, favourable, or unfavourable; and decision made individually by the physician or collectively by the medical team. Overall ratings were subjected to cluster analysis and each cluster to analysis of variance and graphic representation.ResultsLay persons (mean acceptability rating 4.29) were significantly more favourable to euthanasia than nurses (2.84), p<.005, or physicians (2.12), p<.005. Five clusters were found with different judgment rules, i.e., how the information was integrated. More physicians (30 per cent) than nurses (14 per cent), p<.01, or lay persons (11 percent), p<.01, rated euthanasia as never, under any condition, acceptable. Most, however, asserted that it was increasingly acceptable as the factors combined to favour it, especially when the parents desired to stop treatment. More physicians (45 per cent) and nurses (46 per cent) than lay persons (21 per cent), p<.01, used a complex conjunctive rule (level of parent’s attitude x level of severity of damage x consultation with team or not) rather than a simple additive rule.ConclusionsUnlike lawand medical ethics, most of the lay persons. nurses, and physicians judged the acceptability of euthanasia as a function of the circumstances. Most health professionals combined the factors in a conjunctive (multiplicative), rather than additive, fashion in accordance with legislation for adults in the Netherlands and elsewhere that requires a set of criteria to be fulfilled before it is legitimate to end apatient’s life. (shrink)

The N‐end rule denotes the relationship between the identity of the amino‐terminal residue of a protein and its in vivo half‐life. Since its discovery in 1986, the N‐end rule has generally been described by a defined set of rules for determining whether an amino‐terminal residue is stabilizing or not. However, recent studies are revealing that this N‐end rule (or N‐degron concept) is less straightforward than previously appreciated. For instance, it is unveiled that N‐terminal acetylation (...) of N‐terminal residues may create a degradation signal (Ac‐degron) that promotes the degradation of target proteins. A recent high‐throughput dissection of degrons in yeast proteins amino termini intriguingly suggested that the hydrophobicity of amino‐terminal residues—but not the N‐terminal acetylation status—may be the indispensable feature of amino‐terminal degrons. Herein, these recent advances in N‐terminal acetylation and the complexity of N‐terminal degradation signals in the context of the N‐degron pathway are analyzed. (shrink)

When the Toxic Substances Control Act was passed by the US Congress in 1976, its advocates pointed to new generation of genotoxicity tests as a way to systematically screen chemicals for carcinogenicity. However, in the end, TSCA did not require any new testing of commercial chemicals, including these rapid laboratory screens. In addition, although the Environmental Protection Agency was to make public data about the health effects of industrial chemicals, companies routinely used the agency’s obligation to protect confidential business information (...) to prevent such disclosures. This paper traces the contested history of TSCA and its provisions for testing, from the circulation of the first draft bill in the Nixon administration through the debates over its implementation, which stretched into the Reagan administration. The paucity of publicly available health and environmental data concerning chemicals, I argue, was a by-product of the law and its execution, leading to a situation of institutionalized ignorance, the underside of regulatory knowledge. (shrink)

Religion, as a phenomenon that is as old as humanity, has continued to exist in one way or another wherever humans exist. At the core of religion are the principles of faith consisting of divinity, belief in the afterlife and belief in prophethood. When we look at the History of Religions, in almost all religions, when religion first emerged, there was no need for any institution to maintain religious life in a healthy way, but in later periods, protecting religion against (...) attacks from outside, responding to new demands, 'socialization', which are important tasks in social life. The need for institutional organization has emerged for reasons such as being able to fulfill issues such as 'distributing justice' and 'managing religious rites' in a regular and orderly manner, meeting the need to resolve disputes between people through religious means, increasing its followers and encountering different cultures by spreading over wide geographies. All religions have established some institutions to meet these needs. In today's Turkey, in order to respond to the religious needs of the Muslim community and to ensure continuity in religious services without creating any institutional gaps, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, today known as the Presidency of Religious Affairs, was established within the budget of the Prime Ministry and affiliated to the Prime Ministry, with Law No. 429. The Presidency of Religious Affairs has been fulfilling its duties related to the principles of worship, morality and belief, which are the three basic components of the Islamic religion, in line with the objectives specified in the law, without interruption since the day it was established. In the history of Islamic thought, sects are evaluated in two categories: fiqh-practical and religious-political. Firstly, sects whose religious aspects came to the fore were formed. The beginning of the formation of sects such as Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi and Hanbali, which are called fiqh sects and talk about the rules and principles of worship and how to perform worship, coincides with the second century of Hijri and later periods. It is extremely important that religious officials who provide religious services to people of all ages and strata have a reasonable level of knowledge on theological issues as well as their knowledge of practical/fiqh sects. Religious officials, affiliated with DIB, provide multi-dimensional religious services in many different areas, especially mosques and Quran courses. In Turkish society, the most important source of information about religious issues for a large segment of the population is either the imam hatip or muezzin trustee in the neighborhood mosque, the Quran course instructor in the Quran course, or the preachers they reach through different channels such as 190 alo. In line with the information they receive, their religious perceptions are shaped and they continue their religious lives. In this study, it is aimed to reveal the basic views of religious sects and their knowledge levels of religious officials, who have a very important impact on shaping the religious lives of large masses of people. The study group of the research consists of religious officials working in the religious services class working under the Malatya provincial mufti between September 2020 and February 2021. The sample group of the research consists of 401 religious officials working as preachers, Quran course instructors, imam hatip and muezzin trustees under the Malatya provincial mufti's office. The method used in the research was simple random sampling, where each officer had an equal chance. The main purpose of simple random sampling is; The aim is to obtain more objective data by including each individual in the universe with an equal chance in the sample group. In the study, data was obtained with a two-part survey form prepared by the researcher by paying attention to all necessary stages. Both content analysis and descriptive analysis were used to analyze the data obtained. The data was collected by sending a survey link to the participants via Google form due to force majeure conditions arising from the pandemic. Additionally, official permissions were received from the Presidency of Religious Affairs. The collected data was transferred to the SPSS program and interpreted by subjecting it to various tests and was presented visually through tables. As a result of the study, the findings were interpreted by comparing them with similar and opposing studies, and at the end, some suggestions were given for both researchers and practitioners. At the end of the research, it was understood that the level of knowledge of the religious officials who participated in the research regarding the basic views of the theological sects, even if it was at an acceptable level for some sects, was generally not at the expected level and that they did not have sufficient bookish knowledge. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Citizenship and Culture in Early Modern EuropePeter N. MillerCharlotte Wells, Law and Citizenship in Early Modern France (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), xviii, 198p.Paula Findlen, Possessing Nature: Museums, Collecting, and Scientific Culture in Early Modern Italy (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1994), xviii, 449p.Steven Shapin, The Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, (...) 1994), xxiv, 483p.Anne Goldgar, Impolite Learning: Conduct and Community in the Republic of Letters 1680–1775 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995), xv, 395p.Lawrence Klein, Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness: Moral Discourse and Cultural Politics in Early Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge, U.K., 1994), xiii, 217p.Daniel Gordon, Citizens Without Sovereignty: Equality and Sociability in French Thought, 1670–1789 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), viii, 270p.Dena Goodman, The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994), xiii, 338p.E. J. Hundert, The Enlightenment’s “Fable”: Bernard Mandeville and the Discovery of Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), xii, 284p.The pre-modern political world was broken and remade in the two centuries that separate Montaigne from Jefferson. The long agony of the mixed constitution that began in the civil wars which raged in Iberia, France, the Low Countries, and England and seemed settled by the widespread adoption of the maxims of reason of state, revived at the end of the period, with revolution in Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Geneva, and, more famously, [End Page 725] British North America and France. The problem, classically, turned on the location of sovereignty, or supreme authority, in political systems designed to balance and diffuse rather than concentrate power. When budget deficits and fratricidal culture wars raised the cry of “necessity”—with the knowledge, of course, that necessity knew no law—estates and kings across Europe found themselves at daggers drawn. The claim that the ruler, who naturally was wholly committed to the common good, had therefore the ability to take emergency action was used both by those accustomed to rule and those newly attained to it by force. The pursuit of an “interest” that was identified with the nation’s effectively marginalized discussions of right and law while still serving an essentially constitutional, justificatory role in political debate. But if unchecked authority was necessary in order to meet the challenge of a world characterized by change and chance and thus had to reside somewhere, was there anything that made its exercise by one body more appropriate than another? This was the question that lay behind the late eighteenth-century repudiation of the reason of state “solution” to the problem of the mixed constitution. The answer, which clearly underpinned the establishment in fact of what had first been theorized already a century earlier, was that only consent could legitimate the exercise of sovereignty in time of necessity.1Representation, in one form or another, was the acknowledged solution to the problem formulated by Hobbes: “the name of Tyranny, signifieth nothing more, nor less, than the name of Sovereignty, be it in one, or many men, saving that they that use the former word are understood to be angry with them they call Tyrants.” But representation also acknowledged the reality behind the charged category of “citizenship”: most people in most places could not be said to live the life of the active citizen celebrated in Roman republican literature. Hence Hobbes’s attack on recourse to classical exempla in general, and the Libertas of Lucca in particular. The idea of civis as law-abiding subject was as radical a redrawing of the terms of debate as the identification of human nature with unsociability. Insofar as politics, classically, justified itself as the means for individual self-perfection, the practice of the ancient citizen could be conceived of as the practice of that best life speculated upon by philosophers. For the represented citizen, however, politics necessarily occupied a more subsidiary position. What, then, defined the best life to which he could aspire?There is no simple answer to this question, and the early modern ambivalence has persisted into our own time... (shrink)

What has been learned about logic by means of "uninterpreted" logistic systems can be supplemented by comparing the latter with systems which are more uninterpreted, as well as with others which are less uninterpreted than the well-known logistic systems. By somewhat extending the meaning of 'uninterpreted', I hope to establish certain claims about the nature of logistic systems and also to cast some light on the nature of "logic itself." My procedure involves looking at three major "degrees" of interpretation: first, (...) systems uninterpreted both semantically and syntactically, second, systems uninterpreted semantically but not syntactically, and third, systems uninterpreted neither semantically nor syntactically. We shall be forced to limit ourselves to the truth-functional part of logic in this brief study. What are usually called uninterpreted systems can be seen on a continuum of "degrees" of interpretation, from ordinary reasoning at one extreme to a "thoroughly uninterpreted system" at the other. "Logic itself" apparently lies nearer to the interpreted, deformalized end of the spectrum than to the uninterpreted, formalized end. Logic is not identical with any particular logistic system, but is that which the particular logistic systems aim to formalize or model or capture. I propose that it is that minimum set of logical, rather than syntactical, primitive terms, definitions, and rules which is needed to generate logically, rather than syntactically, the principles of ordinary reasoning as it is used by logicians in their metalinguistic discussions and informal proofs of metatheorems. This minimum set is somewhat larger than the primitive bases of most logistic systems; its truth-functional part is presented in the "Deformalized Logic" at degree twelve. (shrink)

Rational-choice theory is pervasive in legal theorizing. Most law and economics work assumes that human beings make decisions that are rational as to both their ends and means. Decisions are ends-rational if they are directed at goals that satisfy the person's utility function; decisions are means-rational if they adopt methods reasonably connected to achieving those goals. Institutionalist theory assumes that institutions are composed of actors pursuing their own rational ends by rational means and, further, that those institutions themselves can be (...) said to have rational ends pursued by rational means. Most rational-choice theorizing in law is positive: Thinkers are using the theory as a stylized way of describing patterns of behavior or predicting expected behavior. Such theorizing can also be normative: Rationality of ends and means is an aspiration of human and institutional actors, and law can improve upon existing behavior through rules, procedures, and structures. (shrink)

The author raises the old problem--how can the individual fulfill himself within the restrictive structure of the political state? The purpose of this work is to demonstrate that the philosophy of individualism does not lead to a solution, because it considers man as an asocial being. The only logical alternatives for a society based on such a philosophy are anarchy, in which each man serves his own end, or totalitarian rule, in which all individual desires are subjected to the (...) power of the state. The author calls for a society in which man is regarded as naturally social, and in which reason is the corner-stone of order.--K. O'N. (shrink)

The truth of every human being is the end his life with death, and this leads to leaving assets and funds for those after him and can lead to hate between the heirs, it has made a point of Islamic law on all aspects of life, including the subject of the inheritance of the deceased. The main problem is how to get the knowledge of the basics of inheritance. This paper reviews work done in the use of expert system software (...) to calculate inheritance in Islam. A proposed expert system was designed and developed using CLIPS language to calculate the inheritance in Islam. (shrink)

In this original new study, Grant Havers critically interprets Leo Strauss’s political philosophy from a conservative perspective. Most mainstream readers of Strauss have either condemned him from the Left as an extreme right-wing opponent of liberal democracy or celebrated him from the Right as a traditional defender of Western civilization. Rejecting both of these portrayals, Havers shifts the debate beyond the conventional parameters of our age. He persuasively shows that Strauss was neither a man of the Far Right nor a (...) conservative. He was in fact a secular Cold War liberal who taught his followers to uphold Anglo-American democracy as the one true universal regime that does not need a specifically Christian foundation. Strauss firmly rejects the traditional conservative view held by Edmund Burke that Anglo-American democracy needs the leavening influence of Christian morality. Havers maintains that Strauss’s refusal to recognize the role of Christianity in shaping Western civilization, though historically unjustified, is crucial to Strauss and the Straussian portrayal of Anglo-American democracy. In the Straussian view, the Anglo-American ideals of liberty, equality, and constitutional government owe more to the ancient Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle than to the Christian tradition. In the process, Havers argues, Straussians end up rewriting history by falsely idealizing the ancient Greeks as the forerunners of modern liberal democracy, despite the Greek toleration of practices such as slavery and infanticide. Straussians also misrepresent statesmen of the Anglo-American political tradition such as Abraham Lincoln and Sir Winston Churchill as heirs to the ancient Greek tradition of statecraft, despite their indebtedness to Christianity. Havers contends that the most troubling implication of Straussianism is that it provides an ideological rationale for the aggressive spread of democratic values on a global basis while ignoring the preconditions that make these values possible. Concepts such as the rule of law, constitutional government, Christian morality, and the separation of church and state are not easily transplanted beyond the historic confines of Anglo-American civilization, as recent wars to spread democracy in the Middle East and Central Asia have demonstrated. This excellent study will be of interest not only to longtime readers of Strauss but also philosophers, political scientists, historians, religious studies scholars, and theologians. (shrink)

This essay explores ethical foundations for meeting the digital challenge via a case study of the work, life, and virtues of the greatest mathematician and natural scientist of the eighteenth century, Leonhard Euler. By biography and history one can learn of the gifts of human strength, practices, good will, dependence on others, and friendships which made possible Euler’s own astonishing corpus of work and that of many other scientists, mathematicians, engineers, and technologists. Digital technology results from a combination of science (...) (demonstrable knowledge and method), technology, engineering, and art (forms and artifacts of making and expressing), and mathematics (abstract numerical, algebraic, geometrical, formal, and digital concepts, rules, representations, and logics). Joint reflection on the biographical, historical, and natural sources of mathematics and the digital is essential for any humanization or ascesis in response to the perils and promises of digital technology for human thriving. As ethics enable and embody an ethos, so technologies are means and manifestations of a telos. Thus, thought and action for thriving through the digital needs to contemplate and conciliate the ends of humans and of the digital. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 31.4 (2001) 54-82 [Access article in PDF] Seeing With The Body The Digital Image In Postphotography Mark B. N. Hansen In a well-known scene from the 1982 Ridley Scott film Bladerunner, Rick Deckard scans a photograph into a 3-D rendering machine and directs the machine to explore the space condensed in the two-dimensional photograph as if it were three-dimensional [see fig. 1]. Following Deckard's commands to zoom in (...) and to pan right and left within the image space, the machine unpacks the "real" three-dimensional world represented by the two-dimensional photograph [see figs. 2-3]. After catching a glimpse of his target—a fugitive replicant—reflected from a mirror within the space, Deckard instructs the machine to move around behind the object obstructing the two-dimensional photographic view of the replicant and to frame what it sees [see figs. 4-5]. Responding to the print command issued by Deckard, the machine dispenses a photograph of the replicant which is, quite literally, a close-up of an invisible—indeed nonexistent—part of the two-dimensional original [see fig. 6]. And yet, following the fantasy of this scene, this impossible photograph is—or would be—simply the image of one particular data point within the data set comprising this three-dimensional data space. As fascinating as it is puzzling, this scene of an impossible rendering—a rendering of two-dimensional data as a three-dimensional space—can be related to the crisis brought to photography by digitization in two ways. On the one hand, in line with the film's thematic questioning of photography as a reliable index of memory, this scene foregrounds the technical capacity of digital processing to manipulate photographs. In this way, it thematizes the threat posed by digital technologies to traditional indexical notions of photographic realism. On the other hand, in what has turned out to be a far more prophetic vein, the scene presents a radically new understanding of the photographic image as a three-dimensional "virtual" space. Such an understanding presupposes a vastly different material existence of the photographic image: instead of a physical inscription of light on sensitive paper, the photograph has become a data set that can be rendered in various ways and thus viewed from various perspectives.The first position corresponds to the arguments made by William Mitchell in his now classic book, The Reconfigured Eye. In a comprehensive analysis of the techniques and possibilities of digital imaging, Mitchell concentrates on demarcating the traditional photographic image from its digital doppelgänger. While the specter of manipulation has always haunted the photographic image, it remains the exception rather than the rule: "There is no doubt that extensive reworking of photographic images to produce seamless transformations and combinations is technically difficult, time-consuming, and outside the mainstream of photographic practice. When we look at photographs we presume, unless we have some clear indications to the contrary, that they have not been reworked" [Mitchell 7]. To buttress this claim, Mitchell sketches three criteria for evaluating traditional photographic images: (1) does the image follow the conventions of photography and seem internally coherent? (2) does the visual evidence it presents [End Page 54]Stills from Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982), courtesy of Warner Brothers Home Video. Rick Deckard navigates a two-dimensional image as a three-dimensional space." width="72" height="33" />Click for larger viewFigure 1Still from Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982), courtesy of Warner Brothers Home Video. Rick Deckard navigates a two-dimensional image as a three-dimensional space.Stills from Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982), courtesy of Warner Brothers Home Video. Rick Deckard navigates a two-dimensional image as a three-dimensional space." width="72" height="32" />Click for larger viewFigure 2Still from Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982), courtesy of Warner Brothers Home Video. Rick Deckard navigates a two-dimensional image as a three-dimensional space.Stills from Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982), courtesy of Warner Brothers Home Video. Rick Deckard navigates a two-dimensional image as a three-dimensional space." width="72" height="33" />Click... (shrink)

In this new study of Rousseau, Levine presents a Kantian reading of the Social Contract. By attempting to reveal Rousseau’s anticipation of such Kantian themes as moral right and obligation the author’s purpose has been "to produce a Kantian reading of The Social Contract, a reading that emphasizes the many respects in which Rousseau anticipates Kant and motivates his investigations in moral philosophy". This purported similarity has been noted previously by thinkers such as Hegel and Cassirer. The book also develops (...) the theme that the solution to the conflict between moral autonomy and political authority is the main issue in The Social Contract. Because Rousseau apparently "grasped his conflict better than either Hobbes or Locke" he was able to anticipate Marx’s critique of the contractarian tradition. Consequently, Rousseau’s political philosophy underlies the "deep structure" of contemporary mentality, and continues to dominate our own sense of self, society, and being-in-the-world. While the main issues in Kant’s moral philosophy—autonomy/heteronomy, person/thing, rule of reason/heteronomous irrationalism—are present in ovo in Rousseau, the author warns us of crucial differences between the two thinkers, for example, in Kant the notion of our being forced to our own freedom is absent. But both thinkers share the belief that any conception of the state’s function as merely external coercion or coordination is sub-rational. Also, Kant’s conception of moral autonomy located in the de jure kingdom of political ends is anticipated in Rousseau’s attempt to direct society to the norm of the general will as its legitimate political end. In sum, Levine’s book, while drawing from the previous work of Althusser, avoids the usual Marxist concept manipulation, and gives us an interesting addition to Rousseau scholarship.—H.N.T. (shrink)

This article offers a broad-ranging comparison of practical philosophy in the West and in China with a view to enabling not only better mutual understanding between the two sides but also better self-understanding on each side. Contrary to widespread Western conceptions that Chinese practical philosophy may have contributed some important principles in first-order morality but has contributed little in the area of meta-ethics as compared to the West, it is argued here that Chinese practical philosophy did indeed make important contributions (...) in first-order morality, but that in addition it is generally superior to Western practical philosophy in the area of meta-ethics. There are, however, certain exceptions to this rule on both sides. In the end, therefore, a comparison of the two traditions can contribute not only to a better mutual understanding, but also to a better self-understanding and improvement on each side. (shrink)

Background Moral distress is a common challenge among professional nurses when caring for their patients, especially when they need to make rapid decisions. Therefore, leaving moral distress unconsidered may jeopardize patient quality of care, safety, and satisfaction. Aim To estimate moral distress among nurses. Methods This systematic review and meta-analysis conducted systematic search in Scopus, PubMed, ProQuest, ISI Web of Knowledge, and PsycInfo up to end of February 2022. Methodological quality of included studies was assessed using the Newcastle Ottawa checklist. (...) Data from included studies were pooled by meta-analysis with random effect model in STATA software version 14. The selected key measure was mean score of moral distress total score with its’ 95% Confidence Interval was reported. Subgroup analyses and meta-regressions were conducted to identify possible sources of heterogeneity and potentially influencing variables on moral distress. Funnel plots and Begg’s Tests were used to assess publication bias. The Jackknife method was used for sensitivity analysis. Ethical consideration The protocol of this project was registered in the PROSPERO database under decree code of CRD42021267773. Results Eighty-six manuscripts with 19,537 participants from 21 countries were included. The pooled estimated mean score of moral distress was 2.55 on a 0–10 scale [95% Confidence Interval: 2.27–2.84, I2: 98.4%, Tau2:0.94]. Publication bias and small study effect was ruled out. Moral distress significantly decreased in the COVID-19 pandemic versus before. Nurses working in developing countries experienced higher level of moral distress compared to their counterparts in developed countries. Nurses' workplace (e.g., hospital ward) was not linked to severity of moral disturbance. Conclusion The results of the study showed a low level of pooled estimated score for moral distress. Although the score of moral distress was not high, nurses working in developing countries reported higher levels of moral distress than those working in developed countries. Therefore, it is necessary that future studies focus on creating a supportive environment in hospitals and medical centers for nurses to reduce moral distress and improve healthcare. (shrink)

At the end of the verses 44th, 45th, and 47th of the Surat al-Māʾida, it is seen that those who do not judge by what Allah has revealed are described as unbelievers, oppressors, and fāsiqs with the general expression. Especially in verse 44th of the surah, the fact that those who do not judge by Allah's revelations are characterized as misbelievers has been a subject of debate since the early period. Many different opinions have been expressed by the mufassirs about (...) who are included in this scope, who are the addressees of the verse, whether the” kufr” here is blasphemy in the form of denying Allah and leaving the religion, or is it a different type of “kufr”. As it is understood from the information in the sources regarding the asbāb al-nuzūl of these verses were revealed as the Jews destroyed the provisions set by Allah in the Torah, changed them with various ways, and discriminated between people in various ways and applied them. With the relevant verses in Sūrah al-Māʾida, all these injustices, lawlessness, and unfairness were made away and the Jews who committed them were strongly criticized. In this regard, it is seen that some commentators have devoted themselves to the reason for the verdict of the relevant verses and interpreted the characterizations in the verse as infidels, cruel, and fāsiqs as covering only the Jews who committed these acts. However, even if the information about the contents of the relevant verses shows that these verses are about the Jews, this does not mean that the scope of the verse should be limited to them. Because both the universality of the messages of the Qur'an in general and the fact that the address in the verses came in a public way do not allow these provisions to be allocated only to a certain group. In addition, according to the rules of istinbat, the fact that the reason for making a religious provision is specific does not prevent the generalization of it. When considered within the framework of the principles we have explained, it becomes clear that narrowing down the provisions of the verses by allocating them only to a certain group is not a correct approach. In this article, it is aimed to draw attention to the richness of meaning that emerges when the relevant verses are evaluated in terms of the types of indications in the fiqh method. When the verses within our subject are evaluated in terms of the types of indications, it is seen that these verses indicate that the implementation of a provision in force cannot be avoided. In the relevant verses, it's concluded that important principles and rules of law such as the realization of justice, the rule of law, equality before the law, no one's being privileged in the sight of the law, the powers of the head of state are limited, that there is no place for ijtihad where Allah's clear judgment exists. (shrink)

We examined whether the enforcement of phantom rules—frequently broken and rarely enforced codified rules—varies by the race of the rule breaker. First, we analyzed whether race affects when 311 calls, a nonemergency service, end in arrest in New York City. Across 10 years, we found that calls from census blocks of neighborhoods consisting of mostly White individuals were 65% less likely to escalate to arrest than those where White people were the numerical minority. Next, we experimentally manipulated transgressor race (...) and found that participants (N = 393) who were high in social dominance orientation were more likely to route 311 calls to 911 when the transgressor was Black (vs. White). We also explored the subjective experience of phantom rule enforcement; People of color report they are more likely to be punished for violating phantom rules compared to White people. Overall, we find evidence of racism in the enforcement of phantom rules. (shrink)

In recent works, Chomsky has once more endorsed a computational view of rulefollowing, whereby to follow a rule is to operate certain computations on a subject’s mental representations. As is well known, this picture does not conform to what we may call the grammatical conception of rule-following outlined by Wittgenstein, whereby an elucidation of the concept of rule-following is aimed at by isolating grammatical statements regarding the phrase ‘to follow a rule’. As a result, Chomskyan and (...) Wittgensteinian treatments of topics immediately connected with rule-following, namely linguistic competence and understanding, are utterly different from one another. There are two possible stances that computationalists like Chomsky may adopt with regard to the discrepancy between the two aforementioned modes of dealing with rule-following, namely a conciliatory and a non-conciliatory attitude. According to the former attitude, grammatical remarks on and computationallyoriented theories of rule-following investigate one and the same topic although admittedly at different levels, namely a conceptual and an empirical one. According to the latter attitude, grammatical remarks are just a preliminary step in the investigation of rule-following which scientific advancement, presently represented by computationally-oriented theories on this matter, is well entitled to put aside. In what follows, however, I will try to show that both stances are problematic. The conciliatory attitude simply does not work, for it hardly copes with the fact that the concept of rule-following does not supervene, even weakly, on the property of rule-following, namely the property instantiated in the mental/cerebral phenomena that computationally-oriented theories of rule-following study. To take the contrary attitude, on the other hand, is to end up with another disappointing result, namely that the computational treatment of rule-following ultimately deals with something different from that which we wished to gain knowledge of when we began our inquiry into rule-following.. (shrink)

The present joint contribution offers a tentative comprehensive re-interpretation of Pāṇini’s rule A 2.3.46, and shows how that rule teaches the application of the nominative ending without making use of the notion of “subject,” a notion that belongs to other grammatical systems, but not to Pāṇini’s. We discuss the controversial domain of some segments of its wording by attempting to adhere to Pāṇini’s framework and his usus scribendi. In particular, we read the first constituent of the compound prātipadikārtha­ (...) liṅgaparimāṇavacana­ as a genitive depending on a dvandva made up of three constituents, i.e., artha­, liṅga­, and parimāṇavacana­, and we take parimāṇa­ as denoting a quantity that, combining with vacana­, is substantially equivalent to the concept of grammatical number in modern linguistics. We finally show that our reading of A 2.3.46 is able to generate the nominative endings affixed to the subject and predicate of a nominal sentence: as a consequence, nominal sentences might actually not have been neglected by Pāṇini. (shrink)

Jesus of Nazareth, like Socrates, left nothing behind written by himself. Yet, the records of his teaching indicate a rich interest in dialogic pedagogy, reflected in his use of the parable, primarily an oral genre, as a dialogic provocation. Working at the interface of pedagogy, theology and philosophy, this article explores the parable of the Good Samaritan from the perspective of dialogic pedagogy. It employs an analytical approach termed diacognition, developed from the notions of dialogue, position and cognition, to analyse (...) the moves within the parable and the teaching situation in which it is located. The article explores how Jesus engages the dialogue of and around the parable to position and reposition his interlocutor, provoking a re-cognition of what it means to love one’s neighbour. It concludes by reflecting on the implications of this analysis for the relation of meaning to knowing and doing. (shrink)

: Indexes are among the important resources for studies on the Qur'ān. Owing to such works, it is possible to find easily whether a word belong to Qur'ān and in which verses or how it is used. Such works of arts, whose early examples are given by Muslim scientists, later written by orientalists and thus gave its first work of art with the help of a German Orientalist Gustavus Flügel. His accommodation of Qur'ān index blazed a trail in this field (...) and later, it became a resource to those work written by Muslims. Yahya Hilmi Kastamonī who was one of the late Ottoman Era scholar never mentioned from Flügel and his work in his work named Misbāh al-Ihvān. In this article, after introduction of the work of these two authors, two works are compared in terms of obvious mistakes. The aim is to determine whether the work of Kastamonī is original or not. Summary: The scope of this work consists of the comparison of two "index" type of works. It's obvious that indexes are the most essential source in the Qur'ān based researches. The aim of these kinds of works is both to enable researchers to reach verses of the Qur'ān and to show those concepts where and how it is displayed in the Qur'ān. Thus, both effort and time loss will be prevented. Together with knowing that the first Qur'an indexes were prepared by Muslim authors, it's not clear which one is the first. The work called Tertību zībā by Ottoman theologian Muhammed al-Vardarī is considered as one of the first indexes in the field. The author organised this work by putting the very first words of verses of the Qur'ān in an alphabetic order in Turkish so as to reach the intended verse of the Qur’ān easily. The efforts for writing indexes continued later on, by taking his work as an example, the number has extended hastily with writing other works up to now. On the other hand; besides Muslims, we can see that the orientalists has involved in carrying out index preparations. For the first time, Gustavus Flügel wrote a Qur'ān index, originally named as Concordanticae Corani Arabicae, and named as Nücūm al furkān fī atrāf al-Qur'ān in Arabic so that Muslims may benefit from it. It's obvious that Flügel's work which was prepared orienting to find Qur'ānic words has influenced Muslim index authors. After Concordanticae Corani Arabicae written, the number of the works alike in Islamic world has extended vastly. One of such works is the work of art of Kastamonī Yahiya Hilmi's Misbāh al-ihvān li tahharī āyāt al-Qur'ān written in 1322/1906. Although in those works which was written after Flügel's index, the authors credited Flügel and his Concordanticae Corani Arabicae, Kastamonī, being the topic of the article in this work as well, didn't credit him and his index. The situation grasped our attention and caused us to focus on these two works. On this point, Concordanticae Corani Arabicae pioneering in index writing and Misbāh al-ihvān carefully investigated and later compared to one another. In the next step, the aspects that both index have in common and different have been tried to detect. Thus, the originality of Kastamonī's work was questioned. Flügel made undeniable errors on the point of detecting the origin of 39 words while sorting out words of the Qur'ān alphabetically. These errors he made clears outs obviously the authors being incapable of Arabic grammar and not having a grasp of the meaning of the Qur'ānic words. Another failure Flügel made was despite arranging words in a letter order, in some places he didn't pay attention. Besides, the verse of the Qur'ān numbers doesn't fit with those numbers Muslims take as a basis from copy of the Qur'ān we have today. Kastamonī, whose life we don't have any information, made mistakes in detecting 39 origins of the words in the Qur'ān in his index just like Flügel. Besides, the numbers he gave to the verses of Quran and the ones in the copy of the Qur'ān that Muslims use doesn't correspond. Another mistake Kastamonī made in Misbāh is despite putting words in an alphabetic order, he didn't pay attention in some places. Like this, the data received from investigation of both authors compared to one another and eventually some results came across. According to this, it's clearly seen that the error Kastamonī and Flügel made upon detecting the origin of the 39 words are the same. On the other hand, the numbers both author gave to verses of the Qur'ān in their works correspond with one another. Also, Kastamonī repeated the same errors Flügel did in the alphabetical order of the words. As a result of all the comparisons, it's detected that Misbāh al-ihvān is the same of Concordanticae Corani Arabicae. This similarity is not a mere coincidence. As it's understood from the result, Kastamonī plagiarised Flügel's index and wrote it by crediting himself. Continuity and depending on sources is a very important aspect on academic studies. To do that, all academic works must be based on previous efforts. For any reason, if this doesn't happen, works lose their scientific base and became unreliable. As a result, scientific ethic will be neglected and violated and so the field of study will be in harm's way. The major reason that prevents obeying those codes, which creates the orient of academic study, of continuity and reliability is the academic theft called plagiarism. Plagiarism which is defined as showing ones thoughts, works and writings as his/her own without giving proper credit to source in any portion by another author is an enormous ethic problem. The activity of interchanging an author work which was put together with great effort without giving any proper credit is the further step of the plagiarism. It's clearly understood that Kastamonī has fallen the same mistake. At the end of research, it's revealed that Kastamonī didn't compile a work of art. However, he deceived the scientific community by taking the work at issue to himself in his preliminary and disdain the ethical rules in academic studies. As a result, this study aims to raise an awareness upon the necessity of reading the works that resembles one another by comparing right or wrong sides when evaluating those works. if this is done, the originality of works, their relationship, similarities and differences will both be seen clearly and be evaluated wholesomely. (shrink)

We prove that for sufficiently large \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $n$\end{document}, there are tautologies of size \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $O(n)$\end{document} that require proofs containing \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $\Omega( n / \log n )$\end{document} lines in axiomatic systems of propositional logic based on the rules of substitution and detachment.

The “unknown heritage” is the name usually given to a problem type in whose archetype a father leaves to his first son 1 monetary unit and \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\frac{1}{n}}$$\end{document} (n usually being 7 or 10) of what remains, to the second 2 units and \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\frac{1}{n}}$$\end{document} of what remains, and so on. In the end, all sons get the same, and nothing remains. The earliest known (...) occurrence is in Fibonacci’s Liber abbaci, which also contains a number of much more sophisticated versions, together with a partial algebraic solution for one of these and rules for all which do not follow from his algebraic calculation. The next time the problem turns up is in Planudes’s late thirteenth century Calculus according to the Indians, Called the Great. After that the simple problem type turns up regularly in Provençal, Italian and Byzantine sources. It seems never to appear in Arabic or Indian writings, although two Arabic texts (one from c. 1190) contain more regular problems where the number of shares is given; they are clearly derived from the type known from European and Byzantine works, not its source. The sophisticated versions turn up again in Barthélemy de Romans’ Compendy de la praticque des nombres (c. 1467) and, apparently inspired from there, in the appendix to Nicolas Chuquet’s Triparty (1484). Apart from a single trace in Cardano’s Practica arithmetice et mensurandi singularis, the sophisticated versions never surface again, but the simple version spreads for a while to German practical arithmetic and, more persistently, to French polite recreational mathematics. Close examination of the texts shows that Barthélemy cannot have drawn his familiarity with the sophisticated rules from Fibonacci. It also suggests that the simple version is originally either a classical, strictly Greek or Hellenistic, or a medieval Byzantine invention; and that the sophisticated versions must have been developed before Fibonacci within an environment (located in Byzantium, Provence, or possibly in Sicily?) of which all direct traces has been lost, but whose mathematical level must have been quite advanced. (shrink)

The issue of the emergence of formal axiomatic logical systems due to the emergence of logical antinomies in formal axiomatic systems, specifically the issue of developing formal logical axiomatics in the calculus of considerations was investigated in the considered research. At the same time, in order to determine the characteristics of the implementation of the logical-methodological principles and provisions of the deductive reasoning obviously, conceptual-logical foundations of the calculus of considerations was studied and the main propositions of the calculus of (...) considerations and the analysis of the initial logical operations on them were given in the study. The basic laws of logic and the expression of one logical act with another one were also explained in the research work by giving the concepst of proportional form and tautology in the calculus of considerations. At the same time, main properties and the procedure of setting of the formal deductive theory in the calculus of considerations were studied in the article. In order to provide an adequate characterization of the conceptual and methodological bases of the calculus of considerations in the research work, the basic logical laws of the calculus of considerations developed by the German mathematician and thinker P. Hilbert were also given. In addition, the main principles and methodological provisions of the deductive method were investigated, and the rules of deriving new conclusions from the axioms were interpreted. At the end of the reviewed article, the main principles and methods of the formal axiomatic mathematical systems built on a deductive basis, specifically the calculus of considerations, were studied and a logical-methodological analysis of the calculus of considerations was carried out on this basis. In this framework, the syntactic and semantic analysis of formalized language in formal axiomatic logical systems was carried out separately, the constituent parts of those systems, including the construction scheme, were given. (shrink)

Murray N. Rothbard argued that there are many philosophic and non-philosophic arguments that provide a satisfactory basis for individual liberty. Rarely, however, did he discuss the claims of Christianity to be a suitable foundation for individual freedom. By looking at the Christian libertarians of the Old Right, between 1950 and 1971, the article contends that religious values were the most important reason for libertarians pursuing a society composed of free individuals during that period. By examining the journals Faith and Freedom, (...) Christian Economics, and the Freeman, and the positive views of Rev. Carl McIntire, the author explains the philosophy of Christian libertarianism. It is the belief that individual freedom is only the highest political end; the necessary means for God’s Creation to develop unhindered their conscience and the full ‘sacredness of their personality.’ Christian libertarians maintain that individuals cannot be coerced by government to lead a virtuous life. They must instead be persuaded, by a true understanding of the life of Jesus especially, to choose to follow the moral life sanctioned by the Bible. The desire to follow the Golden Rule voluntarily, Christian libertarians explain, is the God-given template that allows a society of individuals to live in freedom. It was this Christian ethic, Christian libertarians insist, couched in terms of the Natural Law, that inspired the founding fathers to establish a system of government where the individual is free to enjoy their ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’ The article concludes by discussing Frank S. Meyer’s ‘fusionist’ attempt to find a uniting theme for traditionalists and libertarians, and suggests that it was the Christian libertarian philosophy in all but name. It also suggests that if America has any valid claim to be ‘Exceptional,’ then it is based on the nation’s traditional defence of individual freedom as a God-given grant. (shrink)

Using mobile health research as an extended example, this article provides an overview of when the Common Rule “applies” to a variety of activities, what might be meant when one says that the Common Rule does or does not “apply,” the extent to which these different meanings of “apply” matter, and, when the Common Rule does apply, how it applies.

I advance a variety of intellectualism about knowing-how that is, paradoxically, suggested by Ryle's positive discussions of that phenomenon. I discuss the roots of the view in Ryle's work, its affinity with John Hyman's () view of factual knowledge, and important points of contrast with Stanley and Williamson's () proposal. Drawing on work by Cath () and Wiggins () I also discuss conditions on knowing practically, in ‘the executive way’, as an alternative to appealing to practical modes of presentation.

The peak-end rule predicts that retrospective evaluations of affective events heavily depend on their most intense and last moment and imply duration neglect. It was originally proposed for negativ...

The Rei(g)n of Rule is a study of rules and their role in language. Rules have dominated the philosophical arena as a fundamental philosophical concept. Little progress, however, has been made in reaching an accepted definition of rules. This fact is not coincidental. The concept of rule is expected to perform various, at times conflicting, tasks. Analyzing key debates and rule related discussions in the philosophy of language I show that typically rules are perceived and defined either (...) as norms or as conventions. As norms, rules perform the evaluative task of distinguishing between correct and incorrect actions. As conventions, rules describe how certain actions are actually undertaken. As normative and conventional requirements do not necessarily coincide, the concept of rule cannot simultaneously accommodate both. The impossibility to consistently define rule has gone unnoticed by philosophers, and it is in this sense that rule has also blocked philosophical attempts to explain language in terms of rules.". (shrink)

Despite the fact that six years have passed since 9/11, the Pentagon's recent decision to try six Guantanamo detainees for capital crimes such as terrorism and support of terrorism made national headlines. William Glaberson, "U.S. Charges 6 With Key Roles in 9/11 Attacks", N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 2008, at A1. In this Debate, Professors Amos N. Guiora, of the University of Utah, and John T. Parry, of Lewis & Clark Law School, attempt to settle the question of what sort of (...) forum is most appropriate to try the thousands of individuals in U.S. custody who are suspected of terrorism. Professor Guiora considers three forum options: treaty-based international terror courts, traditional Article III courts, and a hybrid option he calls domestic terror courts. Ultimately, Professor Guiora argues in favor of domestic terror courts, which he describes as being able to balance the legitimate rights of the individual with the equally legitimate national security rights of the state. He considers this option to be the most practical and expedient policy solution, necessitated by an untenable tension between the understanding that some of the detainees present a genuine threat to American national security, and an awareness that indefinite detention violates constitutional principles and fundamental concepts of morality. Professor Parry agrees that current U.S. policy toward detainees has been misguided, but does not believe that innovations of the sort proposed by Professor Guiora are necessary. Rather, he suggests that policymakers should choose Article III courts rather than hybrid courts for trials of suspected terrorists, with military courts as a fallback option. Professor Parry points to research that shows that the federal government is often able to prosecute suspected terrorists in federal court, and therefore considers alternative proposals to Article III courts to be solution[s] in search of a problem. Professor Parry realizes that trial in federal court will not be possible for every suspected terrorist, and concludes that, [f]or people who pose a risk but whose conduct may not violate federal criminal law, prolonged preventive detention is the best choice. (shrink)

Das Thema dieser Arbeit ist Hegels berühmte und berüchtigte These vom "Ende der Kunst". Der Verfasser bemüht sich insbesondere darum, diese These im Zusammenhang mit ihren Voraussetzungen zu analysieren und einer Kritik zu unterziehen.

Most physicians confront the moral and technical challenges of treating persons who are coming to the natural end of their lives. At the level of the health system, this issue becomes a more pressing area for reform as premature death decreases and more people live a full life span. Well-developed countries and international organizations such as the World Health Organization and the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development have made recommendations for improving healthcare problems in aging societies. Turkey belongs to (...) the WHO and the OECD. This article describes end-of-life healthcare in Turkey, the design of the healthcare system to meet this need, challenges that should be addressed, and solutions that would be appropriate to Turkish culture and resources. (shrink)

Brian Earp and his colleagues argue in this issue’s target article that racial justice requires ending the War on Drugs. In this they are absolutely correct. Indeed, de...

Business ethics can be regarded as a field dealing with corporate _self-regulation_ as it relates to the treatment of stakeholders. However, a concern for corporate stakeholders need not take a corporate-centric perspective, as shown by recent efforts (especially Singer in Bus Ethics Q 25(1):65–92, 2015) to situate corporate conduct within Rawls’ political theory. Although Rawls was largely mute on the subject himself, his theory has implications for business ethics and corporate governance more specifically. Given an understanding of a “Rawlsian society” (...) as a whole—where corporations as associations are a part—this paper addresses how a Rawlsian perspective would safeguard against corporate harms in society. We argue that a Rawlsian society would primarily regulate corporate conduct through exogenous constraints in the form of legislation. To the extent that business ethics is concerned with endogenous constraints in the form of corporate-centric self-regulation regarding _stakeholders_, to adopt a Rawlsian perspective is to assume instead a society-centric perspective and to impose exogenous constraints on corporate conduct in the form of legislation for the benefit of _citizens_. In the context of Rawls’ political liberalism, normative concerns in business are accounted for through legislation and the system of background justice. In a clear departure from Singer (Bus Ethics Q 25(1):65–92, 2015, Bus Ethics J Rev 6(3):11–17, 2018a), we further develop our argument to propose that Rawls' theory can be interpreted as providing a rule for corporate governance. The rule—which is imposed exogenously for the good of society—states: After choosing the corporate constraint mechanism (exogenous vs. endogenous) that best promotes the Liberty Principle, choose the corporate control regime (shareholder vs. stakeholder) that maximizes economic efficiency. (shrink)

Computer simulation (CS) and thought experiments (TE) seem to produce knowledge about the world without intervening in the world. This has called for a comparison between the two methods. However, Chandrasekharan et al. (2013) argue that the nature of contemporary science is too complex for using TEs. They suggest CS as the tool for contemporary sciences and conclude that it will replace TEs. In this paper, by discussing a few TEs from the history of science, I show that the replacement (...) thesis about TE is a failure. The paper is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the arguments of Chandrasekharan et al. (2013) and demonstrates the three distinct aspects of the replacement thesis. The second section examines the argument against TE and shows that they are inadequate to prove the withering of TE from science. The third section discusses Albert Einstein’s Magnet and Conductor TE and demonstrates that replacing such TE with CS yield no advantage. (shrink)

According to familiar accounts, Rousseau held that humans are actuated by two distinct kinds of self love: amour de soi, a benign concern for one's self-preservation and well-being; and amour-propre, a malign concern to stand above other people, delighting in their despite. I argue that although amour-propre can (and often does) assume this malign form, this is not intrinsic to its character. The first and best rank among men that amour-propre directs us to claim for ourselves is that of occupying (...) 'man's estate'. This does not require, indeed it precludes, subjection of others. Amour-propre does not need suppression or circumscription if we are to live good lives; it rather requires direction to its proper end, not a delusive one. (shrink)

It has been hypothesized that psychedelic experiences elicit lasting psychological benefits by altering narrative selfhood, which has yet to be explicitly studied. The present study investigates retrospective reports (n = 418) of changes to narrative self that participants believe resulted from, or were catalysed by, their psychedelic experience(s). Responses to open-ended questions were analysed using inductive and deductive thematic coding and interpreted within agent-centred approaches to development and well-being. Themes include decentred introspection, greater access to self-knowledge, positive shifts in self-evaluation (...) processes, greater psychological and behavioural autonomy, and enhanced connectedness with others and the world. While this explorative qualitative study offers some initial support for the explanation that changes to narrative self are a cornerstone of psychedelics' therapeutic and transformative potential, methodological and recruiting limitations preclude the ability to make objective claims and generalizations. Future scientific research is necessary to further elucidate this hypothesized mechanism. (shrink)

n this paper, I analyse Rahel Jaeggi’s socio-ontological account of forms of life. I show that her framework is a two-sided one, since it involves an understanding of forms of life both as inert bundles of practices and as having a normative structure. Here I argue that this approach is based on an a priori argument which assumes normativity as the condition of intelligibility of social criticism. I show that the intimate tension between these two sides is reflected in the (...) socio-ontological model of the constitution of social phenomena, which on the one side is understood in terms of habituation and materialization, and on the other side in terms of constitution through norms. The second side in the end prevails and leads to some sort of normative essentialism which involves a prescriptive meta-theoretical understanding of normativity combined with a socio-ontological model of constitutive rules. I then analyse two arguments that Jaeggi offers in support of her assumption that normative constitution is the deep structure of social practices. I name these the functional- teleological argument, and the crisis developmental argument, and argue that neither succeeds in proving that practices are not normatively underdetermined. (shrink)

This book frames the development of Llewellyn’s thinking and describes the difference between what rules literally prescribe and what is actually done, with ...