According to Aristotelian logic, in categorical logic, there are three kinds of judgements (qaḍīyya): affirmative, negative, and metathetic (ma‘dūla). Khūnajī, a famous Muslim logician in the 13th century, introduces a different judgement (or statement) entitled “affirmative judgement with the negative predicate” (mūjiba al-sāliba al-maḥmūl; henceforth, ANP judgement). Although in the Arabic language, formally, ANP judgement is similar to definite negative (sāliba muḥaṣṣala) and also metathetic judgements, the way of its construction is different from both of them and its truth (...) conditions are different from metathetic ones. From a modern logic viewpoint, ANP may indicate equality judgement; however, attributing it to Muslim logicians is questionable, although some of their wordings may implicitly show it. According to Ḥāʾirī, an Iranian contemporary philosopher and logician, the new judgement is supposed to solve some problems, especially logical explanation of the division of modalities into necessity, impossibility, and contingency (imkān khāṣṣ). However, Ṭabāṭabāʾī, another Iranian contemporary philosopher, disagrees with Ḥāʾirī and regards ANP judgement the same as an affirmative metathetic one. In this paper, while examining Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s and Ḥāʾirī’s reasons, by using some insights into modern logic, I will try to strengthen Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s views, although it may be confronted with some questions or deficiencies. (shrink)

The introduction of Greek philosophy into the Muslim world left an indelible mark on Islamic intellectual history. Philosophical discourse became a constant element in even traditionalist Islamic sciences. However, Aristotelian metaphysics gave rise to doctrines about God and the universe that were found highly objectionable by a number of Muslim theologians, among whom the fourteenth-century scholar Ibn Taymiyya stood foremost. Ibn Taymiyya, one of the greatest and most prolific thinkers in medieval Islam, held Greek logic responsible for the (...) `heretical' metaphysical conclusions reached by Islamic philosophers, theologians, mystics, and others. He therefore set out to refute philosophical logic, a task which culminated in one of the most devastating attacks ever levelled against the logical system upheld by the early Greeks, the later commentators, and their Muslim followers. His argument is grounded in an empirical approach that in many respects prefigures the philosophies of the British empiricists. Professor Hallaq's translation, with a substantial introduction and extensive notes, makes this important work available to a wider audience for the first time. (shrink)

The contributions in this volume examine these questions on the basis of key texts, thus shedding new light on the problematic relationship between logic and theology.

How did the reception of Aristotelian logic in the Arabic and Latin Middle Ages shape the development of theology? And how did theological issues influence the debates about logic and theories of argumentation? The contributions in this volume examine these questions on the basis of key texts, thus shedding new light on the problematic relationship between logic and theology.

According to a rule of traditional logic concerning the relation between general (or universal) concepts, if a given concept is more general than a second one, then the opposition (or contradictory) of the first concept is more specific than the opposition (or contradictory) of the second one. Kātibī, one of the Muslim logicians in the 13th century, has raised a question against this rule and, by giving some counterexamples, claims that it results in contradiction. Some Muslim (...) class='Hi'>logicians have replied to Kātibī, and in this paper I have examined their replies. Also, by using rules of modern logic, we may easily show that either Kātibī's argumentation is fallacious or it does not result in contradiction; however, it seems that if modern logic rules had been represented to Muslim logicians, some of those rules would have been rejected by them. (shrink)

The separation of Avicenna between Essence and Existence influenced logic and Arab and Muslim logicians in the Middle Ages among them Ibn al-Nafīs (1208-1288). Under this influence he contributed to the development of logic and especially the theory of the universal term. By means of the consequences of this analysis:-It has become possible to make a distinction between abstract concepts and formal concepts independent of any sensible reality, and hence the questioning of Aristotelian categories, that is to say (...) the ability to conceive for Ibn al-Nafīs like Avicenna, subjects and predicates which are not necessarily words expressing or belonging to one of the Aristotelian categories.-The analysis of the universal proposition as a conditional proposition, which made easier the distinction between absolute proposition which has no existential implication, and the other which differ from the first by an affirmation of explicit existence. (shrink)

Since the time Plato wanted to banish poetry from his ideal state by accusing Homer of “imitation”, the tension between poetry and philosophy has made itself evident. Our study aims to rethink this highly controversial relationship and to question the relationship between logic, which is the basis of the intellectual sciences, directly connected to logos, and poetry, which is seen as closer to sensation and to “mythos”. This questioning about the possibility of logical thinking through poetics will be realized through (...) language, logic and poetics. In this context, our discussion ground will be the reception of Aristotle’s Poetics, which is accepted as the first work of philosophy of art, in Islamic philosophy, specifically in Avicenna. While commenting on Aristotle, muslim logicians and Avicenna included poetry in logic by placing Poetics in the Organon. This very inclusion invites us to think about the logical status of poetry for Avicenna. In this context, the question we will pursue with Avicenna will be essentially: What is the logical status of poetry and what is the possibility of poetic syllogism? According to Avicenna, poetry is related to the “possibles”, and in this respect, it allows to consider being and non-being together. While poetry addresses imagination, the fact that the imagination is between the sensation and the intellect, makes poetry’s position of “mediator” valuable. In order to show what this position means, we will try to discuss the relationship between poetry and logic through a number of basic themes of the Avicennian philosophy, such as powers of the soul, the relationship between sensation-imagination-intellect, the distinction of essence-existence, the importance of imitation, and types of syllogism. Finally, we will discuss, through particular examples, the place given to the poetry, and examine the possibilities of poetry and the relationship between the poetic and the logical, in terms of the aforementioned theory of poetry. (shrink)

This book examines the medieval tradition of Aristotelian logic from two perspectives.

Arabic contributions to medicine, mathematics, astronomy, and other fields have been extensively studied, yet Arabic logic has never been systematically investigated. In this book, Nicholas Rescher sheds new light on the major philosophical contribution of Arab logicians. He provides a historical account of the evolution of Arabic logic, from its inception in the early ninth century through the sixteenth century, when these tenets gained wide acceptance. The book also includes a bio-bibliography of 170 Arabic logicians, and a discussion (...) of the place of each within the overall scheme of developments. (shrink)

Following Avicenna, many Muslim philosophers and logicians have identified ‘intellectual universal’ (kullī ʿaqlī) with the very mental concept dependent on mind. Apart from the controversies about Platonic Forms, they argue that they cannot be the very universals in logic. Accordingly, Mullā Ṣadrā’s commentators have interpreted his view on intellectual universal in the Avicennian framework. In this interpretation, Mullā Ṣadrā has embraced Avicenna’s explanation about mind-dependent universal concepts; however, he has modified some details of the issue as per his (...) theory of the primacy of existence and Plato’s theory of Forms. Having explained Sabzawārī and Ṭabāṭabāʼī’s interpretation of Mullā Ṣadrā’s view in his article, the author goes to propose a different interpretation according to which intellectual universals are identical with Platonic Forms, rather than the mind-dependent universal concepts. This Platonic interpretation is supported by three sets of evidences from Mullā Ṣadrā’s own texts. It also shows how Mullā Ṣadrā has answered Avicenna’s objection about the use of Platonic universal in logic. (shrink)

There is a common understanding among logicians today that nonmonotonic types of reasoning, such as defeasible or presumptive, can clearly warrant a rational acceptance of its conclusion. Recognition of the significance and legitimacy of these forms of arguments, which were considered for long as fallacious, is believed to be very recent and many logicians tended to reject any discussions around it within the tradition of logic after Aristotle. In contrast, Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), since medieval age, has recognised the (...) validity and importance of non-deductive forms of reasoning, analysed the structures of such arguments and demonstrated how the conventionally understood fallacies are not essentially fallacies. Qiyās – generally represents analogical reasoning – is taken here as a case of defeasible reasoning in Islamic argumentation. This paper will show through works of two emblematic medieval Muslim jurist-logicians, al-Juwainī and al-Ghazzālī, that understanding the legitimacy and the structure of non-deductive forms of arguments is at the core of Islamic legal theories (usūl al-fiqh), and that they recognised its legitimacy and proposed a dialectical method (jadal) of approaching it. Les logiciens comprennent généralement que les types de raisonnement non monotones peuvent justifier l’acceptation rationnelle des conclusions. L’importance et la légitimité de ces formes d’arguments, qui ont longtemps été considérées comme fallacieuses, ont été controversées parmi les logiciens de la tradition logique aristotélicienne. En revanche, la jurisprudence islamique (fiqh) a depuis longtemps reconnu l’importance des formes de raisonnement non déductives et a démontré que les sophismes conventionnellement compris ne sont pas essentiellement des sophismes. Le qiyās – qui représente généralement le raisonnement analogique – est un exemple de raisonnement réfutable dans l’argumentation islamique. Je montre à travers les travaux de deux juristes-logiciens musulmans médiévaux emblématiques, al-Juwainī et al-Ghazzālī, que la compréhension de la légitimité des formes d’arguments non déductives est au cœur des théories juridiques islamiques (usūl al-fiqh), qui ont proposé une méthode d’approche dialectique (jadal). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Possible Worlds in the Tahâfut al-tahâfut:Averroes on Plenitude and PossibilityTaneli Kukkonen1.It has become customary to credit John Duns Scotus with having first systematically laid out the basis for treating the modal terms as referring to synchronic alternative states of affairs. This has been viewed as constituting a genuine shift in modal paradigms, as no former model had included the idea of genuine synchronic alternative possibilities. Historians of modal logic (...) and contemporary logicians alike have found it interesting that certain key features of Duns Scotus's theory and subsequent late medieval work markedly resemble the so-called possible worlds semantics approach of modern modal theory.1Duns Scotus' innovations were not completely without precedent. Several key elements in Scotus' theory were foreshadowed by twelfth-century developments. Perhaps somewhat amusingly, one of the most important forerunners to the Latin discussion was one in whose context the expression "possible worlds" would have made sense in a very special way.2 This is the medieval Arabic debate on the eternity of the world and its modal status. In this paper I propose to take stock of the positions the Arabs reached, and to do so by way of [End Page 329] consulting one of the documents central to the debate, the Tahâfut al-tahâfut or the "Incoherence of the Incoherence," by Abû al-Walîd Ibn Rushd (the Latin "Averroes," 1126-1198). In the first part I examine Averroes' exposition of the received Aristotelian tradition; in the second I assess the revisions to modal theory suggested by al-Ghazâlî (1058-1111), in the latter's comprehensive critique of philosophical doctrine. Though the two inquiries are obviously complementary, they can be accomplished independently of each other.It will be seen that Averroes' and his formidable adversary's views on the interpretation of the modal concepts differ quite fundamentally. What makes the ensuing debate, often fraught with misunderstandings and misrepresentation, so engaging is that both parties, in spite of their differences, refer to a common Aristotelian backdrop in questions of terminology and mode of argumentation. Both Averroes and al-Ghazâlî are well-placed to present a considered and balanced account of what they take to be crucial in the issues involved. It is on account of this that the complex interplay between the old and the new comes to the fore with exceptional force and clarity in the Tahâfut debates.2.The Tahâfut al-tahâfut, first published in 1180, is a philosophical rejoinder to an attack on philosophy, Abû Hâmid al-Ghazâlî's Tahâfut al-falâsifa or "The Incoherence of the Philosophers" (1095). In that celebrated work al-Ghazâlî had claimed to expose certain philosophical doctrines as not only contrary to orthodox Muslim belief, but also internally incoherent.3 Averroes' reply in turn was written in order "to show the different degrees of assent and conviction attained by the assertions in The Incoherence of the Philosophers, and to prove that the greater part has not reached the degree of evidence and of truth."4 The work is thus of a doubly dialectical nature. Whereas al-Ghazâlî tries to show the philosophers' reasoning to be defective, Averroes has to show both that al-Ghazâlî is likewise lacking in intellectual rigor and that philosophy, properly understood, is innocent of the charges leveled at it. If the Islamic philosophers (al-Fârâbî and, above all, Avicenna) have in fact erred, this is only to the extent that they have misrepresented correct Aristotelian doctrine. [End Page 330]Averroes' presentation is appropriately delicate considering the complexity of the task at hand. Averroes quotes al-Ghazâlî exclusively in full, lengthy passages, with the result of incorporating almost all of the Tahâfut al-falâsifa in his own work. In so doing he gives us an adequate and comparably fair representation of al-Ghazâlî's views. Averroes then goes on to discuss what al-Ghazâlî says both in the philosophers' name and in his own, and points out their respective deviations from Aristotelian doctrine. The text thus comes laid out in three successive layers, with Averroes' own... (shrink)

ABSTRACT Although there are myriad sources on utopia and utopian studies, in none of them is there reference to the Iranian utopia The Virtuous City, written by Abu Nasr Farabi, Iranian philosopher, logician, and musician and founder of Islamic philosophy. His ideas are homogeneous with those of Greek philosophers, especially Plato and Aristotle, but a comparison of the dominant ideology of the book with Islamic, especially Shiite, teachings shows that Farabi presents a Shiite utopia. The Virtuous City consists of six (...) sections and nineteen chapters on subjects such as cosmology, man and his physical and spiritual nature, and the structure of human society. However, the greater part of the book is dedicated to “an ‘academic’ description of the structure of human society as it ought to be.” Like many utopias that reflect the unsatisfactory conditions of the status quo, The Virtuous City is viewed as a protest against the Abbasid caliphate. Farabi questions the legitimacy of the Abbasid caliphs who in the name of Islam had made an un-Islamic society. Considering the historical background of The Virtuous City, subversion mostly appears when Farabi presents twelve qualifications for an imam that contrast with the caliphs of the Muslim society. (shrink)

Nicholas Rescher. Schools.” An English translation of these sections of the text is given in Appendix A below. No matter how difficult or boring this material proved for the Muslim schoolmaster, it is of the greatest relevance for our interests.

From past to present, women's access to social life and their preoccupation with science has been a problematic issue in all societies. Hz. Mohammad gave importance to the woman, who was worthless in the period of ignorance, in a way that it is not possible to come across her husband in the rest of the world, and gave them access to social life, mosques and scientific assemblies. However, since the period of the Companions, women's access to mosques and scientific assemblies (...) was increasingly restricted due to the dominant character of the Arab society and the poor understanding of the Prophet's message by some segments. Since the third century Hijri, the acceptance of women as the cause of strife, the society's view of women, the responsibilities placed on women in the family have further restricted women's access to knowledge and education in fiqh. The effect of Jewish literature, Greek philosophers, and logicians' view of women on Muslim scholars has reinforced this situation. Although women did not fall behind in learning fiqh thanks to their individual efforts and the men who were involved in fiqh in their families, they remained in the background in writing books and scientific studies. Throughout the Hanafi history, Asma bint Esad b. Furât, Kasani's wife Fatima bint Mohammad and İbn al-Saati Muzaffar al-Din Ahmad b. Ali's daughter Fatima al-Saati stands out. (shrink)

Dâwûd al-Qarisî (Dâvûd al-Karsî) was a versatile and prolific 18th century Ottoman scholar who studied in İstanbul and Egypt and then taught for long years in various centers of learning like Egypt, Cyprus, Karaman, and İstanbul. He held high esteem for Mehmed Efendi of Birgi (Imâm Birgivî/Birgili, d.1573), out of respect for whom, towards the end of his life, Karsî, like Birgivî, occupied himself with teaching in the town of Birgi, where he died in 1756 and was buried next to (...) Birgivî. Better known for his following works on Arabic language and rhetoric and on the prophetic traditions (hadith): Sharḥu uṣûli’l-ḥadîth li’l-Birgivî; Sharḥu’l-Ḳaṣîdati’n-nûniyya (two commentaries, in Arabic and Turkish); Şarḥu’l-Emsileti’l-mukhtalifa fi’ṣ-ṣarf (two commentaries, in Arabic and Turkish); Sharḥu’l-Binâʾ; Sharḥu’l-ʿAvâmil; and Sharḥu İzhâri’l-asrâr, Karsî has actually composed textbooks in quite different fields. Hence the hundreds of manuscript copies of his works in world libraries. Many of his works were also recurrently printed in the Ottoman period. One of the neglected aspects of Karsî is his identity as a logician. Although he authored ambitious and potent works in the field of logic, this aspect of him has not been subject to modern studies. Even his bibliography has not been established so far (with scattered manuscript copies of his works and incomplete catalogue entries). This article primarily and in a long research based on manuscript copies and bibliographic sources, identifies twelve works on logic that Karsî has authored. We have clarified the works that are frequently mistaken for each other, and, especially, have definitively established his authorship of a voluminous commentary on al-Kâtibî’s al-Shamsiyya, of which commentary a second manuscript copy has been identified and described together with the other copy. Next is handled his most famous work of logic, the Sharhu Îsâghûcî, which constitutes an important and assertive ring in the tradition of commentaries on Îsâghûcî. We describe in detail the nine manuscript copies of this work that have been identified in various libraries. The critical text of Karsî’s Sharhu Îsâghûcî, whose composition was finished on 5 March 1745, has been prepared based on the following four manuscripts: (1) MS Kayseri Raşid Efendi Kütüphanesi, No. 857, ff.1v-3v, dated 1746, that is, only one year after the composition of the work; (2) MS Bursa İnebey Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Genel, No.794B, ff.96v-114v, dated 1755; (3) MS Millet Kütüphanesi, Ali Emiri Efendi Arapça, No. 1752, ff.48v-58r, dated 1760; (4) MS Beyazıt Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Beyazıt, No. 3129, ff.41v-55v, dated 8 March 1772. While preparing the critical text, we have applied the Center for Islamic Studies (İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi, İSAM)’s method of optional text choice. The critical text is preceded by a content analysis. Karsî is well aware of the preceding tradition of commentary on Îsâghûcî, and has composed his own commentary as a ‘simile’ or alternative to the commentary by Mollâ Fanârî which was famous and current in his own day. Karsî’s statement “the commentary in one day and one night” is a reference to Mollâ Fanârî who had stated that he started writing his commentary in the morning and finished it by the evening. Karsî, who spent long years in the Egyptian scholarly and cultural basin, adopted the religious-sciences-centered ‘instrumentalist’ understanding of logic that was dominant in the Egypt-Maghrib region. Therefore, no matter how famous they were, he criticized those theoretical, long, and detailed works of logic which mingled with philosophy; and defended and favored authoring functional and cogent logic texts that were beneficial, in terms of religious sciences, to the seekers of knowledge and the scholars. Therefore, in a manner not frequently encountered in other texts of its kind, he refers to the writings and views of Muhammad b. Yûsuf al-Sanûsî (d.1490), the great representative of this logical school in the Egyptian-Maghrib region. Where there is divergence between the views of the ‘earlier scholars’ (mutaqaddimûn) like Ibn Sînâ and his followers and the ‘later scholars’ (muta’akhkhirûn), i.e., post-Fakhr al-dîn al-Râzî logicians, Karsî is careful to distance himself from partisanship, preferring sometimes the views of the earliers, other times those of the laters. For instance, on the eight conditions proposed for the realization of contradiction, he finds truth to be with al-Fârâbî, who proposed “unity in the predicative attribution” as the single condition for the realization of contradiction. Similarly, on the subject matter of Logic, he tried to reconcile the mutaqaddimûn’s notion of ‘second intelligibles’ with the muta’akhkhirûn’s notion of ‘apprehensional and declarational knowledge,’ suggesting that not much difference exists between the two, on the grounds that both notions are limited to the aspect of ‘known things that lead to the knowledge of unknown things.’ Karsî asserts that established and commonly used metaphors have, according to the verifying scholars, signification by correspondence (dalâlat al-mutâbaqah), adding also that it should not be ignored that such metaphors may change from society to society and from time to time. Karsî also endorses the earlier scholars’ position concerning the impossibility of quiddity (mâhiyya) being composed of two co-extensive parts, and emphasizes that credit should not be given to later scholars’ position who see it possible. According to the verifying scholars (muhaqqîqûn), it is possible to make definition (hadd) by mentioning only difference (fasl), in which case it becomes an imperfect definition (hadd nâqis). He is of the opinion that the definition of the proposition (qadiyya) in al-Taftâzânî’s Tahdhîb is clearer and more complete: “a proposition is an expression that bears the possibility of being true or false”. He states that in the division of proposition according to quantity what is taken into consideration is the subject (mawdû‘) in categorical propositions, and the temporal aspect of the antecedent (muqaddam) in hypothetical propositions. As for the unquantified, indefinite proposition (qadiyya muhmalah), Karsî assumes that if it is not about the problems of the sciences, then it is virtually/potentially a particular proposition (qadiyya juz’iyyah); but if it is about the problems of the sciences, then it is virtually/potentially a universal proposition (qadiyya kulliyyah). This being the general rule about the ambiguous (muhmal) propositions, he nevertheless contends that, because its subject (mawdû‘) is negated, it is preferable to consider a negative ambiguous (sâliba muhmalah) proposition like “human (insân) is not standing” to be a virtually/potentially universal negative (sâliba kulliyyâh) proposition. He states that a disjunctive hypothetical proposition (shartiyya al-munfasila) that is composed of more than two parts/units is only seemingly so, and that in reality it cannot be composed of more than two units. Syllogism (qiyâs), according to Karsî, is the ultimate purpose (al-maqsad al-aqsâ) and the most valuable subject-matter of the science of Logic. For him, the entire range of topics that are handled before this one are only prolegomena to it. This approach of Karsî clearly reveals how much the ‘demonstration (burhân)-centered’ approach of the founding figures of the Muslim tradition of logic like al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ has changed. al-Abharî, in his Îsâghûjî makes no mention of ‘conversion by contradiction’ (‘aks al-naqîd). Therefore, Karsî, too, in his commentary, does not touch upon the issue. However, in his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd Karsî does handle the conversion by contradiction and its rules. Following the method of Îsâghûjî, in his commentary Karsî shortly touches on the four figures (shakl) of conjuctive syllogism (qiyâs iqtirânî) and their conditions, after which he passes to the first figure (shakl), which is considered ‘the balance of the sciences’ (mi‘yâr al-‘ulûm), explaining the four moods (darb) of it. In his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd, however, Karsî handles all the four figures (shakl) with all their related moods (darb), where he speaks of fife moods (darb) of the fourth figure (shakl). The topic of ‘modal propositions’ (al-muwajjahât) and of ‘modal syllogism’ (al-mukhtalitât), both of which do not take place in the Îsâghûjî, are not mentioned by Karsî as well, either in his commentary on Îsâghûjî or in his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd. Karsî proposes that the certainties (yaqîniyyât), of which demonstration (burhân) is made, have seven, not six, divisions. After mentioning (1) axioms/first principles (awwaliyyât), (2) observata/sensuals (mushâhadât), (3) experta/empiricals (mujarrabât), (4) acumenalia (hadthiyyât), (5) testata (mutawâtirât), and (6) instictives (fitriyyât), that is, all the ‘propositions accompanied by their demonstrations,’ Karsî states that these six divisions, which do not need research and reflection (nazar), are called badîhiyyât (self-evidents), and constitute the foundations (usûl) of certainties (yaqîniyyât). As the seventh division he mentions (7) the nazariyyât (theoreticals), which are known via the badîhiyyât, end up in them, and therefore convey certainty (yaqîn). For Karsî, the nazariyyât/theoreticals, which constitute the seventh division of yaqîniyyât/certainties, are too numerous, and constitute the branches (far‘) of yaqîniyyât. Every time the concept of ‘Mughâlata’ (sophistry) comes forth in the traditional sections on the five arts usually appended to logic works, Karsî often gives examples from what he sees as extreme sûfî sayings, lamenting that these expressions are so widespread and held in esteem. He sometimes criticizes these expressions. However, it is observed that he does not reject tasawwuf in toto, but excludes from his criticism the mystical views and approaches of the truth-abiding (ahl al-haqq), shârî‘â-observant (mutasharri‘) leading sufis who have reached to the highest level of karâmah. (shrink)

Generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) is a subset of artificial intelligence (AI) that can generate content such as texts, images, videos, sounds, etc. While GenAI tools have been utilized in various contexts, their utilization in the academic context is still a controversial topic. Scholars observed that many universities have banned GenAI due to the potential for unethical usage. In this opinion article, we promote the utilization of GenAI tools as feedback agents to alleviate challenges in conventional feedback provision. Feedback is a (...) valuable learning source, especially in writing instructions. However, conventional feedback provision is challenging due to the increase in teacher’s workload and social irritation issues in peer feedback. Utilized ethically, GenAI tools can alleviate these challenges. A few critical considerations are briefly presented. (shrink)

The contemporary Qur’anic studies have been marked by amazing development. Various methods and approaches to understand the Qur’an are offered by the scholars. One of the prominent figures in this field is Nashr Hamid Abu Zayd. Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (1943–2010 M) is a highly controversial contemporary thinker. He is an Egyptian scholar who is accused of being apostate, because of his theory of qur’anic hermeneutic (the textual of Qur’an). This is reflected in his stances towards contemporary religious discourse and (...) the approach to reading religious texts, especially the Quran, which requires reading according to a hermeneutic mechanism. His books ‘Naqd al-Khitab al-Dini (Criticism of Religious Discourse)’ and ‘Al-Takfir fi Zaman al-Takfir (Thinking in the Time of Atonement)’ caused a great uproar in the early nineties of the last century. Abu Zayd was accused of criticising atheists because of their stances on the text. Therefore, this study aimed to discuss Abu Zayd’s position on contemporary religious discourse and his new approach to reading religious texts, and also aims to discuss why Abu Zayd’s theory has been string up Islamic world and ending by his expulsive from his native country. To deal with this problem, this article discusses Abd Zayd’s biography and some cultural framework of his people. The methodology of Qur’anic hermeneutic is the least his. Having examined the topic, the author finds that Abu Zayd believes that modem literary theory and criticism denote the way to understand and interpret the Qur’an ‘objectively’. The contribution of this research is discussing Abu Zayd’s contemporary religious discourse and his new approach to reading religious texts. Contribution: The contribution of this research is discussing Abu Zayd’s contemporary religious discourse and his new approach to reading religious texts. (shrink)

On religious life in Islam; conduct of life for Muslims and on Islamic ethics.

The need for religious moderation in North Sumatra province arises as a result of burning worship [Vihara and Klenteng], exploding bombs and stabbing attempts at churches during worship. This study examines the effect of Islamic education, depression and religiosity on religious moderation in students at state Islamic universities. This study used a cross-sectional design in North Sumatra province with 1125 Muslim students over a period from February 2023 to May 2023. This study used a closed questionnaire involving Islamic education, (...) depression, religiosity and religious moderation using linear regression with 95% CI using JASP version 19. With regard to the notions of depression, religious ideology, religious experiences and religious studies, this research demonstrates that students who have received education in Muslim schools affect religious moderation in students of state Islamic universities. Religious moderation among Islamic students will be improved by providing increased information on religious studies that contain religious moderation.Contribution: This article will provide new information about religious moderation carried out by Muslim students in Islamic universities that are often associated with intolerance, terrorism, fanaticism and religion-based violence. (shrink)

I. Avicennan studies -- II. Ghazālian studies -- III. Other studies.

Islamic Perspectives on the Principles of Biomedical Ethics presents results from a pioneering seminar in 2013 between Muslim religious scholars, biomedical scientists, and Western bioethicists at the research Center for Islamic Legislation & Ethics, Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies. By examining principle-based bioethics, the contributors to this volume addressed a number of key issues related to the future of the field. Discussion is based around the role of religion in bioethical reasoning, specifically from an Islamic perspective. Also considered is (...) a presentation of the concept of universal principles for bioethics, with a response looking at the possibility (or not) of involving religion. Finally, there is in-depth analysis of how far specific disciplines within the Islamic tradition -- such as the higher objectives of Sharia (maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah) and legal maxims (qawā'id fiqhīyah) -- can enrich principle-based bioethics. (shrink)

Background Effective healthcare delivery in today's diverse society necessitates healthcare providers' adeptness in navigating cultural and religious nuances in patient care. However, the integration of cultural competence training into medical education remains inadequate, particularly concerning the care of Muslim patients. In response, we introduce a novel educational intervention aimed at enhancing intercultural proficiency among medical students, emphasizing care for Muslim patients. Methods The intervention comprised interactive seminars and simulated patient sessions. With a bespoke and the Cross-Cultural Competence of (...) Healthcare Professionals (CCCHP-27) questionnaire the pre- and post-course intercultural competencies of n = 31 medical students of the Medical Faculty of Jena University were assessed. Additionally, there was a control group consisting of 34 students. Statistical analyses including descriptive statistics, paired samples t-tests, Wilcoxon tests, correlation analysis, Mann–Whitney U-tests, and multiple regression analysis were employed for data analysis. Results Results of the bespoke questionnaire reveal significant improvements in intercultural knowledge (median pre 1.0 (0.6 – 1.6), median post 2.2 (2.4-2.8), p < 0.001) and in knowledge regarding Muslim patients (median pre 1.0 (0.5 – 1.5), median post 2.5 (2-3), p < 0.001) following the course. Regarding the CCCHP-27, students demonstrated a significant improvement in their skills, with pre-assessment score of 4.10 (± 0.47) and post-assessment score of 4.38 (± 0.40), p = 0.001. Female participants and those with limited prior experience demonstrated greater gains (p = 0.005 and p = 0.053). Notably, the incorporation of a session with a simulated patient garnered favorable feedback, affirming the efficacy of practical application in consolidating learning outcomes. Discussion Our study emphasizes the importance of integrating intercultural competencies training into medical education and our findings underscore the efficacy of targeted educational interventions in enhancing intercultural competencies among medical students. For the assessment of intercultural competence, our bespoke questionnaire serves as a valuable addition to the German healthcare system. Conclusion Implementation of similar interventions into medical curricula nationwide is imperative to address the needs of diverse patient populations effectively. (shrink)