This paper documents the beginning of a conversation about what it means to be Mäori within a larger, mainstream research project. This larger project was conceived by a team of researchers that included a Mäori principal investigator, and funding was gained from a funding agency that has established criteria for Mäori responsiveness. The Mäori component of the project was, however, not initially conceived of as separate from the non-Mäori component. Discussions about this were initiated approximately one year into the project (...) in response to Mäori team members' desires to undertake Kaupapa Mäori research. This effectively means that the Mäori team colects and analyses the Mäori research data prior to re-engaging with the full research team. While there is a level of uncertainty about how this process will play itself out, there is a commitment to continue a constructive conversation within the team and to journey together in good faith and trust. (shrink)

This paper examines perspectives on student disaffection in education at the levels of culture and policy. It considers the balance between punitive/exclusionary and therapeutic/restorative positions. The paper engages with concepts of retributive punishment (Murray, 2004a; 2004b), social welfare ideologies (Esping-Andersen, 1990) and discourses of social exclusion (Levitas, 1998). The conclusion is that policy choices are made about how disaffected, at risk young people are to be provided for, and these policy choices are not contained simply within an education policy (...) and practice setting. The policy responses emerge from national and local government decision-making. They correlate with national indicators of punitiveness in the criminal justice system and the scale of inequalities tolerated. Policies resonate with deep-seated cultural positions which are linked to the willingness to pay -- for prevention or for punishment -- and with the propensity to allocate blame either to individuals and families or to societal failures. Opportunities for intervention at points in the reinforcing cycle of punitiveness are indicated. (shrink)

This entry traces the historical development of the Square of Opposition, a collection of logical relationships traditionally embodied in a square diagram. This body of doctrine provided a foundation for work in logic for over two millenia. For most of this history, logicians assumed that negative particular propositions ("Some S is not P") are vacuously true if their subjects are empty. This validates the logical laws embodied in the diagram, and preserves the doctrine against modern criticisms. Certain additional principles ("contraposition" (...) and "obversion") were sometimes adopted along with the Square, and they genuinely yielded inconsistency. By the nineteenth century an inconsistent set of doctrines was widely adopted. Strawson's 1952 attempt to rehabilitate the Square does not apply to the traditional doctrine; it does salvage the nineteenth century version but at the cost of yielding inferences that lead from truth to falsity when strung together. (shrink)

In his two recent books on ontology, Universals: an Opinionated Introduction, and A World of States of Affairs, David Armstrong gives a new argument against nominalism. That argument seems, on the face of it, to be similar to another argument that he used much earlier against Rylean behaviourism: the Truthmaker Argument, stemming from a certain plausible premise, the Truthmaker Principle. Other authors have traced the history of the truthmaker principle, its appearance in the work of Aristotle [10], Bradley [16], and (...) even Husserl [15]. But that is not my task — in this paper I argue that Armstrong’s new argument is not logically analogous to the old, and, in particular, that it is quite possible to be a thoroughgoing nominalist, and hold a truthmaker principle. (shrink)

The best known and most widely discussed aspect of Kurt Gödel's philosophy of mathematics is undoubtedly his robust realism or platonism about mathematical objects and mathematical knowledge. This has scandalized many philosophers but probably has done so less in recent years than earlier. Bertrand Russell's report in his autobiography of one or more encounters with Gödel is well known:Gödel turned out to be an unadulterated Platonist, and apparently believed that an eternal “not” was laid up in heaven, where virtuous logicians (...) might hope to meet it hereafter.On this Gödel commented:Concerning my “unadulterated” Platonism, it is no more unadulterated than Russell's own in 1921 when in the Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy … he said, “Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology, though with its more abstract and general features.” At that time evidently Russell had met the “not” even in this world, but later on under the infuence of Wittgenstein he chose to overlook it.One of the tasks I shall undertake here is to say something about what Gödel's platonism is and why he held it.A feature of Gödel's view is the manner in which he connects it with a strong conception of mathematical intuition, strong in the sense that it appears to be a basic epistemological factor in knowledge of highly abstract mathematics, in particular higher set theory. Other defenders of intuition in the foundations of mathematics, such as Brouwer and the traditional intuitionists, have a much more modest conception of what mathematical intuition will accomplish. (shrink)

The introduction discusses the influence of two kinds of philosophy to film theory. It describes and clarifies the characteristic methods and strategies of analytic philosophy and film theory, and continental philosophy and film theory. It is concerned with the description of methods, debates, and principles of analytic philosophy with reference to the contributions of philosophy to film theory. It informs and provides indication of issues, methods, and doctrines. It examines, criticizes, and defends the use of exponents of analytic and continental (...) philosophy. All throughout the introduction, it is noted that analytic philosophy is conceived as a pedantic, conservative discipline by scholars of film, media, and culture while continental philosophy is seen as having more imaginative richness and being more focused on moral and ideological issues. However, the aim of analysing film theory is not to stop the pursuit of any specific doctrine but to improve the rigor with its pursuit. (shrink)

Beginning with a focus on the ethical foundations of caregiving in health and expanding towards problems of ethics and justice implicated in a range of issues, this book develops and expands the notion of care itself and its connection to practice. Organised around the themes of culture as a restraint on caregiving in different social contexts and situations, innovative methods in healthcare, and the way in which culture works to position care as part of a rhetorical approach to dependency, responsibility, (...) and justice, The Ethics of Carepresents case studies examining institutional responses to end-of-life issues, the notion of informed consent, biomedicine, indigenous rights and postcolonialism in care and theoretical approaches to the concept of care. Offering discussions from a variety of disciplinary approaches, including sociology, communication, and social theory, as well as hermeneutics, phenomenology, and deconstruction, this book will appeal to scholars across the social sciences with interests in healthcare, medicine, justice and the question of how we think about care as a notion and social form, and how this is related to practice. (shrink)

Scientific cognitivism is the idea that nature must be aesthetically appreciated in light of scientific information about it. I defend Carlson's traditional formulation of scientific cognitivism from some recent criticisms. However, I also argue that if we employ this formulation it is difficult to uphold two claims that Carlson makes about scientific cognitivism: (i) it is the correct analysis of the notion of appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature, and (ii) it justifies the idea that nature, seen aright, is always beautiful (...) (that is, positive aesthetics about nature). I attempt to find a revised formulation of scientific cognitivism that can support both of these claims. I argue that to do this we must rethink the notion of positive aesthetics and its place in our theorizing about the appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature. Specifically, I propose that positive aesthetics be made ‘internal’ to the theory of appropriate aesthetic appreciation, in the sense that this theory determines the correct scientific categories for appreciating a natural object, in part, in virtue of a ‘beauty-making’ criterion. I argue that this sort of formulation of scientific cognitivism can support both of Carlson's claims and does not compromise the objectivist scruples that motivate the view. (shrink)

The distinction between organic and inorganic nature receives little attention in contemporary nature aesthetics. Traditionally, however, this distinction was considered to have important aesthetic ramifications. Nick Zangwill has recently suggested that aesthetic differences between organic and inorganic nature arise because natural functions are present only in organic nature (for example, in the parts of organisms). I argue for a different explanation: though inorganic nature too has natural functions, these are metaphysically distinct from those characteristic of organic nature. I defend the (...) claim that this difference in functions is aesthetically significant, and use it to justify a common intuition about the thesis of positive aesthetics for nature. (shrink)

Tristan Haze claims we have made two mistakes in replying to his two attempted counter-examples to Tracking Theories of Knowledge. Here we respond to his two recent claims that we have made mistakes in our reply. We deny both of his claims.

This paper considers how to put together two popular ideas in the philosophy of time: detenserism and perdurantism (the view that objects persist through time by having temporal parts. On the most obvious way of doing this, certain problems arise. I argue that to deal with these problems we need a tool that is unfamiliar to most detensers and perdurantists - the distinction between sortal and non-sortal predicates.

This monograph analyzes the moral reasoning behind people's proposed consequences for wrongdoers and compares group modes of moral decision making.

The essential nature of legislative power is to make the laws; that of executive power is to execute those law. The difference between the two is both substantial and significant; it is the difference between the rule of arbitrary power and the rule of law. This paper will seek to trace the genesis of an independent judicial power, in both theory and practice, through an examination of sections of The Constitutions of Clarendon, The Assize of Clarendon, Hobbes’ Leviathan, Locke’s Second (...) Treatise, Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws, as well as The Federalist Papers. Moreover, it will seek to establish its executive nature and to explain why it is so often (at least presently) misunderstood to be akin to the legislative power. (shrink)

"Presents an account of the ways scientists and others have perceived life and living processes from the times of the early Greek philosophers to the twentieth century ... The book follows out several major themes in the history of biological thought. How is it possible to harmonise atomism and organism? What has happened to the concept of the soul which played so important a part in early biologies? To what extent does our technology influence our understanding of the living process? (...) These and other questions are seen as instances of a major movement in the history of biological thought: a movement from an Aristotelian to a Cartesian vision of the nature of life"--From publisher description. (shrink)

In 1772, Kant outlined the new problem of his critical period in terms of four possible “ways” of understanding the agreement of knowledge with its object. This study expands Kant’s terse descriptions of these ways, examining why he rejected them. Apart from clarifying the historical context in which Kant saw his own achievement (the Fifth Way), the chief benefits of exploring the historical background of Way Two, in particular, are that it (1) explains the puzzling intuitus originarius/intellectus archetypus dichotomy, and (...) (2) casts doubt on the received idea that Kant broke with the traditional theocentric model of cognition. (shrink)

The first sustained exploration of Simondon's work to be published in English. This collection of essays, including one by Simondon himself, outlines the central tenets of Simondon's thought, the implication of his thought for numerous disciplines and his relationship to other thinkers such as Heidegger, Deleuze and Canguilhem.Complete with a contextualising introduction and a glossary of technical terms, it offers an entry point to this important thinker and will appeal to people working in philosophy, philosophy of science, media studies, social (...) theory and political philosophy.Gilbert Simondon's work has recently come to prominence in America and around the Anglophone world, having been of great importance in France for many years. (shrink)

In “Beat the (Backward) Clock,” we argued that John Williams and Neil Sinhababu’s Backward Clock Case fails to be a counterexample to Robert Nozick’s or Fred Dretske’s Theories of Knowledge. Williams’ reply to our paper, “There’s Nothing to Beat a Backward Clock: A Rejoinder to Adams, Barker and Clarke,” is a further attempt to defend their counterexample against a range of objections. In this paper, we argue that, despite the number and length of footnotes, Williams is still wrong.

Mike Murray's excellent new book attacks the narrow high stakes accountability and marketized vision which has distorted our education system and offers a radical optimistic vision of how we can emerge from the current impasse.

Genetic testing can be used to determine if unexplained fractures in children could have resulted from a predisposition to bone fractures, e.g., osteogenesis imperfecta. However, uncertainty is introduced if a variant of unknown significance is identified. Proper interpretation of VUS in these situations is critical because of its influence on clinical care and in court rulings. This study sought to understand how VUS are interpreted and used by practitioners when there is a differential diagnosis including both osteogenesis imperfecta and non-accidental (...) injury.A 15-question survey was emailed to physicians who requested analysis of two genes, COL1A1 and COL1A2, from the University of Washington from 2005-2013 for patient cases involving suspicion of child abuse.Among the 89 participants, responses differed about when genetic testing should be ordered for osteogenesis imperfecta, who should be consulted about utilization of VUS test results, follow-up procedures, and who should receive the VUS results.There are no clear guidelines for how to interpret and follow up on VUS. In the legal setting, misinterpreted VUS could lead to unintended consequences and deleterious ramifications for family members. The need for better practice guidelines to help promote more equitable handling of these sensitive legal cases is clear. (shrink)

This book presents Bertram Murray's philosophy of science, unpublished papers, and rebuttals to critics of these papers. Subjects include clutch size, population dynamics, life history tables, and mating systems.

Robyn Eckersley claims erroneously that I believe humanity is currently equipped to take over the “helm” of natural evolution. In addition, she provides a misleading treatment of my discussion of the relationship of first nature and second nature. I argue that her positivistic methodology is inappropriate in dealing with my processual approach and that her Manichaean contrast between biocentrism and anthropocentrism virtually excludes any human intervention in the natural world. With regard to Warwick Fox’s treatment of my writings, I argue (...) that he deals with my views on society’s relationship to nature in a simplistic, narrowly deterministic, and ahistorical manner. I fault both of my deep ecology critics for little or no knowledge of my writings. I conclude with an outline of a dialectical naturalism that treats nature as an evolutionary process-not simply as a scenic view-and places human and sodal evolution in a graded relationship with natural evolution. I emphasize that society and humanity can no longer be separated from natural evolution and that the kind of society we achieve will either foster the development of first nature or damage the planet beyond repair. (shrink)