Muriel Briançon | : Afin d’éclairer le sens de la religiosité de la philosophie de Lévinas et d’écarter le soupçon d’une soumission de celle-ci à des dogmes ou à des croyances incompatibles avec un principe de laïcité, notre contribution vise à clarifier le sens de son projet général. L’intention lévinassienne, ambitieuse et visionnaire, consiste en l’explicitation philosophique, métaéthique et phénoménologique, de l’idée cartésienne de l’Infini, transcendance non idolâtrique surgissant de la relation humaine. Cette quête philosophique de l’extrême conscience (...) suppose un athéisme ou du moins une mise en question de l’idolâtrie, du sacré et des dogmes. Cette spiritualité laïque universelle réalisée dans un judaïsme repensé conduit à des questions philosophiques essentielles et à un changement paradigmatique. | : To enlighten the sense of the religiosity of the Lévinas’ philosophy and rule out the suspicion of a submission of this one in dogmae or in incompatible faiths with a principle of secularism, our contribution aims at clarifying the sense of its general project. The Lévinas’ intention, ambitious and visionary, consists of the philosophic explicitation, métaéthique and phenomenological, of the Cartesian idea of Infinity, the not idolatrous transcendence appearing from the human relation. This philosophic quest of the extreme consciousness supposes an atheism or at least a questioning of the idolization, the sacred and the dogmae. This universal laic spirituality realized in a rethought Judaism leads to essential philosophic questions and to paradigmatic change. (shrink)

An accessible yet rigorous introduction to the influential French philosopher Gilbert Simondon's philosophy of individuation. Gilbert Simondon, one of the most influential contemporary French philosophers, published only three works: L'individu et sa genèse physico-biologique and L'individuation psychique et collective, both drawn from his doctoral thesis, and Du mode d'existence des objets techniques. It is this last work that brought Simondon into the public eye; as a consequence, he has been considered a “thinker of technics” and cited often in pedagogical reports (...) on teaching technology. Yet Simondon was a philosopher whose ambitions lay in an in-depth renewal of ontology as a process of individuation—that is, how individuals come into being, persist, and transform. In this accessible yet rigorous introduction to Simondon's work, Muriel Combes helps to bridge the gap between Simondon's account of technics and his philosophy of individuation. Some thinkers have found inspiration in Simondon's philosophy of individuation, notably Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Combes's account, first published in French in 1999, is one of the only studies of Simondon to appear in English. Combes breaks new ground, exploring an ethics and politics adequate to Simondon's hypothesis of preindividual being, considering through the lens of transindividual philosophy what form a nonservile relation to technology might take today. Her book is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand Simondon's work. (shrink)

Prendre la décision de déménager en France ou à l’étranger après un divorce ou une séparation, c’est accepter de prendre le risque de voir la résidence de son enfant fixée au domicile de l’autre parent. Les décisions rendues par les juridictions françaises illustrent en effet une idée sous-jacente de sanction à l’encontre du parent qui extrait l’enfant du lieu de résidence habituelle de la famille. Celui qui, en s’éloignant, fait obstacle à la poursuite de la résidence alternée ou à l’exercice (...) du droit de visite et d’hébergement de l’autre parent prend le risque de perdre le bénéfice des droits qui lui ont été conférés sur la résidence de l’enfant. Par une comparaison des décisions rendues en la matière, l’auteure, avocate spécialiste en droit de la famille et du patrimoine, propose d’établir une matrice de réflexion permettant à un parent divorcé ou séparé d’anticiper les questions inhérentes à un projet de déménagement et d’établir les étapes à suivre pour conserver la résidence de son enfant. (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous établissons d’une part que l’usage du concept de capabilité comme une simple « métrique » du développement humain est une vision réductrice de la proposition intellectuelle de Sen. D’autre part, nous montrons qu’il est vain d’attendre de la part de Sen une théorie de la justice en termes de droits à certaines capabilités. Notre démonstration passe par deux types d’arguments : 1) en reprenant l’hypothèse standard et originelle de la capabilité comme ensemble de vecteurs de fonctionnements (...) accessibles ( e.g., Sen 1987), nous mettons en évidence quatre implications théoriques de l’approche de Sen que la perspective du « welfarisme formel » (Fleurbaey 2003 ; D’Aspremont 2011) ne permet pas de saisir ; 2) nous confortons cette lecture en examinant l’hypothèse – sous-explorée jusque là – de la capabilité comme « pouvoir effectif » d’agir dans le sens de résultats que l’on valorise (Sen 2008, 2010). Dans les deux cas, il s’agit de montrer que la capabilité pour Sen est bien autre chose qu’une « métrique » de l’avantage personnel et de confirmer l’idée que Sen n’est pas un théoricien des capabilités tel que l’attendent la plupart des commentateurs (Baujard et Gilardone 2017). De surcroît, la seconde hypothèse amène à intégrer d’emblée la question de l’obligation morale dans le concept de capabilité. Dès lors, la capabilité non seulement n’est pas une métrique de l’avantage personnel, mais elle n’est même plus une représentation de l’avantage personnel. C’est ici qu’apparaît selon nous la véritable révolution conceptuelle de Sen qui, contrairement à ce que Ricœur (2004) avait cru lire, ne se trouve pas dans le couple droit-capabilité, mais dans le couple responsabilité-capabilité. Finalement, il ressort que Sen partage l’idée des tenants d’une économie de la personne (Ballet et al. 2014) selon laquelle une théorie de la justice en termes de droits à certaines capabilités resterait prisonnière d’une vision purement fonctionnelle de la liberté. Surtout, la mise en lumière de ce couple responsabilité-capabilité ouvre des perspectives nouvelles pour appréhender la liberté et la rationalité des personnes, au cœur notamment des questions de justice et de choix collectif. (shrink)

L’auteure présente une thérapie en couple de personnes sourdes. Les spécificités inhérentes à leur langue dont les modalités sont visuelles, où signifiant et signifié sont si proches, génèrent un sentiment d’appartenance groupale à une culture. Comment s’articule la problématique du couple avec les divers modes de communication à l’œuvre, les identités et identifications au sein de ce néo-groupe? Les aspects transférentiels et contretransférentiels serviront de fil rouge dans le déroulement de cette thérapie particulière. Le recours à la métaphore constitue pour (...) le thérapeute un point d’appui vers l’interfantasmatisation. Il contribue à créer une enveloppe, une pensée métaphorique, celle-ci permettant de surmonter les représentations inhibantes qui faisaient obstacle au travail d’élaboration. (shrink)

The potential of memory modification techniques (MMTs) has raised concerns and sparked a debate in neuroethics, particularly in the context of identity and authenticity. This paper addresses the question whether and how MMTs influence authenticity. I proceed by drawing two distinctions within the received views on authenticity. From this, I conclude that an analysis of MMTs based on a dual-basis, process view of authenticity is warranted, which implies that the influence of MMTs on authenticity crucially depends on the specifics of (...) how memory modification would eventually work. Therefore, I continue with a systematic analysis of possible properties of MMTs in which I distinguish between the dimensions of memories and the kinds of experiences that can be modified as well as the properties of the process of memory modification. The impact of MMTs on authenticity is analyzed regarding the possible properties of MMTs and based on a narrative approach to authenticity which fulfills the requirements of a dual-basis, process view of authenticity. Lastly, I explore the potential of MMTs to shift the balance between self-discovery and self-creation within authenticity and thereby alter the concept itself as well as the value of authenticity. (shrink)

The profound changes in personality, mood, and other features of the self that neural interventions can induce can be disconcerting to patients, their families, and caregivers. In the neuroethical debate, these concerns are often addressed in the context of possible threats to the narrative self. In this paper, I argue that it is necessary to consider a dimension of impacts on the narrative self which has so far been neglected: neural interventions can lead to a loss of meaning of actions, (...) feelings, beliefs, and other intentional elements of our self-narratives. To uphold the coherence of the self-narrative, the changes induced by neural interventions need to be accounted for through explanations in intentional or biochemical terms. However, only an explanation including intentional states delivers the content to directly ascribe personal meaning, i.e., subjective value to events. Neural interventions can deprive events of meaning because they may favor a predominantly biochemical account. A loss of meaning is not inherently negative but it can be problematic, particularly if events are affected one was not prepared or willing to have stripped of meaning. The paper further examines what it is about neural interventions that impacts meaning by analyzing different methods. To which degree the pull towards a biochemical view occurs depends on the characteristics of the neural intervention. By comparing Deep Brain Stimulation, Prozac, Ritalin, psychedelics, and psychotherapy, the paper identifies some main factors: the rate of change, the transparency of the causal chain, the involvement of the patient, and the presence of an acute phenomenological experience. (shrink)

An historical review of authorship definitions and publication practices that are embedded in directions to authors and in the codes of ethics in the fields of psychology, sociology, and education illuminates reasonable agreement and consistency across the fields with regard to (a) originality of the work submitted, (b) data sharing, (c) human participants’ protection, and (d) conflict of interest disclosure. However, the role of the professional association in addressing violations of research or publication practices varies among these fields. Psychology and (...) sociology provide active oversight with sanction authority. In education, the association assumes a more limited role: to develop and communicate standards to evoke voluntary compliance. With respect to authorship credit, each association’s standards focus on criteria for inclusion as an author, other than on the author’s ability to defend and willingness to take responsibility for the entire work. Discussions across a broad range of research disciplines beyond the social sciences would likely be beneficial. Whether improved standards will reduce either misattribution or perceptions of inappropriate attribution of credit within social science disciplines will likely depend on how well authorship issues are addressed in responsible conduct of research education (RCR), in research practice, and in each association’s ongoing efforts to influence normative practice by specifying and clarifying best practices. (shrink)

This paper presents a functional genealogy of essentialist authenticity. The essentialist account maintains that authenticity is the result of discovering and realizing one’s ‘true self’. The genealogy shows that essentialist authenticity can serve the function of supporting continuity in one’s individual characteristics. A genealogy of essentialist authenticity is not only methodologically interesting as the first functional genealogy of a contingent concept. It can also deepen the functional understanding of authenticity used in neuroethics, provide a possible explanation for the prevalence of (...) the idea of an essentialist true self and justify the use of the ideal of authenticity. First, essentialist authenticity is defined and explained through the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Second, a general need to have steady characteristics is derived from basic human practices. Third, circumstances that make it more challenging to steady oneself are identified and shown to have become more prevalent in the age of modernity when the ideal of authenticity emerged. Finally, it is shown how essentialist authenticity helps to steady the self. (shrink)

After a brief survey of the speculative sequence « individuation-transduction-transindividuality » which structures Simondon ’s thought, the authors focus their attention on one of its paradoxical limits: the isolation of a writer who devoted his life to thinking in terms of relations. They suggest that the type of action towards which Simondon directed his efforts could not fit with the way he characterized transindividual experiences. By pursuing the path of a speculative thinking incapable of constituting a collective form of transindividuality, (...) Simondon became caught in a logic which he himself described as that of « the act of folly. ». (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Der Islam Jahrgang: 94 Heft: 1 Seiten: 220-233.

Novel technological devices, applications, and algorithms can provide us with a vast amount of personal information about ourselves. Given that we have ethical and practical reasons to pursue self-knowledge, should we use technology to increase our self-knowledge? And which ethical issues arise from the pursuit of technologically sourced self-knowledge? In this paper, I explore these questions in relation to bioinformation technologies (health and activity trackers, DTC genetic testing, and DTC neurotechnologies) and algorithmic profiling used for recommender systems, targeted advertising, and (...) technologically supported decision-making. First, I distinguish between impersonal, critical, and relational self-knowledge. Relational self-knowledge is a so far neglected dimension of self-knowledge which is introduced in this paper. Next, I investigate the contribution of these technologies to the three types of self-knowledge and uncover the connected ethical concerns. Technology can provide a lot of impersonal self-knowledge, but we should focus on the quality of the information which tends to be particularly insufficient for marginalized groups. In terms of critical self-knowledge, the nature of technologically sourced personal information typically impedes critical engagement. The value of relational self-knowledge speaks in favour of transparency of information technology, notably for algorithms that are involved in decision-making about individuals. Moreover, bioinformation technologies and digital profiling shape the concepts and norms that define us. We should ensure they not only serve commercial interests but our identity and self-knowledge interests. (shrink)

Novel and emerging technologies can provide users with new kinds and unprecedented amounts of information about themselves, such as autobiographical information, neurodata, health information, or characteristics inferred from online behavior. Technology providing extensive personal information (PI technology) can impact who we take ourselves to be, how we constitute ourselves, and indeed who we are. This paper analyzes how the external, quantified perspective on us offered by PI technology affects identity based on a narrative identity theory. Disclosing the intimate relationship between (...) PI technology and identity sheds light on a whole new range of ethical issues that have so far not received sufficient attention. Personal information provided by technology is not just information that belongs to individuals but that changes them. (shrink)

Nombreux couples arrivent en thérapie avec une demande d’amélioration de leur communication. Or les mots semblent dangereux, investis d’un pouvoir sur l’autre. Quel danger représente le fait de dire? L’exposition de la situation d’un couple recomposé permet d’évoquer différentes dimensions de la thérapie psychanalytique en couple dont celle du discours. Contradictions et paradoxes mettent en lumière les conflits identitaires d’appartenance constitutifs du lien du couple. L’usage du verbe et ses effets fâcheux montrent combien au nom du discours s’organisent les résistances (...) en groupe. C’est au thérapeute que revient la tâche de rendre possible le passage par le verbe, en travaillant les interactions et projections inconscientes dans l’interrelation, de cette difficulté à dire pour chacun. (shrink)

America is aging. But even more striking than the rise in the proportion of the population over age 65 is the unprecedented number of individuals who are living into their eighties and nineties. While many people remain robust well into advanced age, the dramatic increase in the number of the oldest old has brought with it an epidemic of Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias. Dementia is a highly prevalent condition — currently 5.4 million Americans have Alzheimer’s disease, a number which (...) may rise to 16 million by 2050 if there is no breakthrough in the prevention or treatment of the disease — but it disproportionately affects those over age 85, striking between one-third and one-half of this cohort. Developing a reasonable approach to the medical care of older people with dementia will be essential in the coming decades. (shrink)

Admirador da metafísica de Schopenhauer, Richard Wagner expressou em sua obra, de modo congenial ao filósofo, sua própria visão pessimista de mundo. O presente ensaio busca apontar - na obra O Anel dos Nibelungos - este parentesco e nele as diferenças essenciais que enlaçam de modo poderoso e fascinante os dois autores.

Le livre d’Anne-Claire Rebreyend est tiré d’une thèse préparée sous la direction de Françoise Thébaud et soutenue en septembre 2006, intitulée « pour une histoire de l’intime. Sexualités et sentiments amoureux en France de 1920 à 1975 ». Le titre du livre a été habilement condensé en Intimités amoureuses. La piste suivie dans l’ouvrage est doublement novatrice : une histoire de l’intime, du privé d’individus, hommes et femmes, ordinaires ; une histoire écrite à partir de sources autobiographi...

That the world we seem to experience around us might be nothing but a simulation – perhaps generated by a demon or super-computer – is a perennial theme in science fiction movies. Muriel Leuenberger explores a recent example.

Your phone and its apps know a lot about you. Who you are talking to and spending time with, where you go, what music, games, and movies you like, how you look, which news articles you read, who you find attractive, what you buy with your credit card and how many steps you take. Personal information about individual preferences, characteristics, and actions has turned digital. Nearly everything you might want to know about a person is available or can be inferred (...) from stored 1s and 0s. This information is already being exploited to sell us products, services, or politicians. Online traces allow companies like Google or Facebook to infer your political opinions, consumer preferences, whether you are a thrill-seeker, a pet lover, or a small employer, how probable it is that you will soon become a parent, or even whether you are likely to suffer from depression or insomnia. With the use of artificial intelligence and the further digitalization of human lives, it is no longer unthinkable that AI might come to know you better than you know yourself. Since knowing yourself and improving your life choices is advantageous in many ways, it might seem that an AI that lets you know who you are and what you should do would be great. I want to raise two reasons why it is not. (shrink)