There’s an argument around from so-called “linguistic theories of vagueness”, plus some relatively uncontroversial considerations, to powerful metaphysical conclusions. David Lewis employs this argument to support the mereological principle of unrestricted composition, and Theodore Sider employs a similar argument not just for unrestricted composition but also for the doctrine of temporal parts. This sort of argument could be generalised, to produce a lot of other less palatable metaphysical conclusions. However, arguments to Lewis’s and Sider’s conclusions on the basis of considerations (...) about vagueness are uncompelling, even if we accept the crucial premises about vagueness. And a good thing too, since the generalised form of the argument would prove far too much. (shrink)

This paper examines the issue of what the self is by reviewing neuropsychological research,which converges on the idea that the self may be more complex and differentiated than previous treatments of the topic have suggested. Although some aspects of self-knowledge such as episodic recollection may be compromised in individuals, other aspects—for instance, semantic trait summaries—appear largely intact. Taken together, these findings support the idea that the self is not a single, unified entity. Rather, it is a set of interrelated, functionally (...) independent systems. Implications for understanding the self in various areas of psychological research—e.g., neuroimaging, autism, amnesia, Alzheimer’s disease, and mirror self-recognition—are discussed in brief. (shrink)

This book argues that the subjective and the objective are crucially dependent on one another and neither is intelligible apart from the other. There is no such thing as a purely external, in-itself world. This book is not intended as a defense of epistemological relativism but as a strong recommendation for modest fallibilism and pluralism.

Communication in law provides a space for alternatives, a Third Space, wherein boundaries between various systems are strongly anchored to a country’s language, history and societal development. Transfers, modifications, and integrations of such systems into other target languages may result in many effects of distortions and appropriations, reformulations and renewals as well as of misinterpretations in communication. Hence, Third Space is a necessary prerequisite for negotiation, transformation and translation from culture A to culture B, since it operates as a multi-stage (...) dynamic where such mechanisms should be analyzed in a fair and equitable manner. (shrink)

The indistinguishability of bosons and fermions has been an essential part of our ideas of quantum mechanics since the 1920s. But what is the mathematical basis for this indistinguishability? An answer was provided in the group representation theory that developed alongside quantum theory and quickly became a major part of its mathematical structure. In the 1930s such a complex and seemingly abstract theory came to be rejected by physicists as the standard functional analysis picture presented by John von Neumann took (...) hold. The purpose of the present account is to show how indistinguishability is explained within representation theory. (shrink)

Let T be a strongly minimal theory with quantifier elimination. We show that the class of existentially closed models of T{“σ is an automorphism”} is an elementary class if and only if T has the definable multiplicity property, as long as T is a finite cover of a strongly minimal theory which does have the definable multiplicity property. We obtain cleaner results working with several automorphisms, and prove: the class of existentially closed models of T{“σi is an automorphism”: (...) i=1,2} is an elementary class if and only if T has the definable multiplicity property. (shrink)

Aristotle attaches particular significance to the homomyny of many of the central concepts in philosophy and science: that is, to the diversity of ways of being that are denoted by a single concept. Shields here investigates and evaluates Aristotle's approach to questions about homonymy, characterizing the metaphysical and semantic commitments necessary to establish the homonymy of a given concept. Then, in a series of case studies, he examines in detail some of Aristotle's principal applications of homonymy--to the body, sameness and (...) and oneness, life, goodness, and being. This first full-length study of a central aspect of Aristotle's thought will interest philosophers working in a number of areas. (shrink)

I. In analytic philosophy, so-called 'univocalism' is the prevailing interpretation of the meaning of terms such as 'being' or 'existence', i.e. the thesis that these terms have only one meaning (see Russell, White, Quine, van Inwagen). But some analytical philosophers, inspired by Aristotle, maintain that 'being' has many senses (Austin, Ryle). II. Aristotle develops an argument in favour of this last thesis, observing that 'being' and 'one' cannot be a single genus, because they are predicated of their differences (Metaph. B (...) 3). III. But 'being' for Aristotle has also a unity, i.e. 'focal meaning', which coincides with substance (Metaph. Γ 2), and substance has not only an ontological priority, but also a logical priority, in respect to the other beings, as was shown by G. E. L. Owen. IV. This 'focal meaning' cannot be identified with primary substance, i.e. with the unmovable mover, as some interpreters pretend, because this latter has only an ontological, not a logical, priority in respect to the world. V. The impossibility of this interpretation results from Aristotle's rejection of an essence and a substance of being (Metaph. B 4), i.e. the rejection of what the Christian philosophers called esse ipsum subsistens. (shrink)

Sexual difference must be recognized in thought and human interactions to enable people to find their real source of jouissance. The Lacanian finding of ‘masculine phallic desire’ and ‘feminine libidinal desire’ in all human beings, irrespective of their biological sex-gender, paved the way for rethinking gender identities. It calls for reforming inter-human relations from the presently predominant utilitarian mode to the one based on love and recognition of the other. Gender is an arbitrary construct to serve the interests of males (...) in finding phallic sexual pleasure, power and recognition in their social life. Assertion of sexual difference and gender multiplicity will enable human beings to find the other human being as their actual desired object, beyond the pleasures offered by wealth, comforts and commodities. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that explaining cognitive behavior can be achieved through what I call hybrid explanatory inferences: inferences that posit mechanisms, but also draw on observed regularities. Moreover, these inferences can be used to achieve unification, in the sense developed by Allen Newel in his work on cognitive architectures. Thus, it seems that explanatory pluralism and unification do not rule out each other in cognitive science, but rather that the former represents a way to achieve the latter.

In this article I introduce a new reading of Jean-Paul Sartre's account of bad faith. The reading contrasts with previous accounts by denying that states of bad faith are exhausted by attitudes towards transcendence and facticity. Instead, I argue that bad faith can involve attitudes to many other aspects of the human being. I also respond to an argument which claims that affirmations of freedom are inconsistent with the motivations behind bad faith. The inconsistency is here resolved by demonstrating how (...) in bad faith we can still affirm a restricted version of freedom which avoids us acknowledging the unpleasant aspects of our full freedom. (shrink)

Philosophers and psychologists are increasingly investigating the conditions under which multiple explanations are better in conjunction than they are individually. This book brings together leading scholars to provide an interdisciplinary and unified discussion of such "conjunctive explanations." The book starts with an introductory chapter expounding the notion of conjunctive explanation and motivating a multifaceted approach to its study. The remaining chapters are divided into three parts. Part I includes chapters on "The Nature of Conjunctive Explanations." Each chapter illustrates distinct ways (...) in which explanatory multiplicity is motivated by a careful study of the nature and concept of explanation. The second part ("Reasoning about Conjunctive Explanations") includes chapters on the epistemology and logic of conjunctive explanations. Here the contributors propose and evaluate various norms for reasoning correctly about and to conjunctive explanations. Part III concerns "The Psychology of Conjunctive Explanations," with contributions discussing conditions under which humans entertain and hold multiple explanations of single explananda simultaneously and the cognitive limitations and capacities for doing so. Conjunctive Explanations will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working on explanation in philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophical logic, and cognitive psychology. (shrink)

Augustine was a convinced proponent of the multiplicity of meanings. He had both theoretical and theological reasons for affirming the phenomenon of polysemy. This article deduces seven themes from Augustine’s exegetical practice and from his discussions of the principles of his exegesis, and employs these as Augustine’s arguments for the multiplicity of meanings. Augustine acknowledges the legitimacy of the many senses of the Word of God. Because scripture is an ambiguous linguistic reality, it constitutes a system of signs (...) and it reuses earlier texts to convey new meanings. Augustine’s theological reasons for the multiplicity of meanings include the beliefs that human authorial intention is complemented by the primary divine intention, that scripture has to be interpreted Christologically, that scripture’s interpretations have to be spiritually useful, and that the texts of scripture are part of the new theological/literary context of the canon. (shrink)

Journal of Mass Media Ethics, Volume 26, Issue 2, Page 176-178, April-June.

With the assumption of inactivation of small traits in bacteriophages “chromosomes” by ultraviolet irradiation the probability of multiplicity reactivation of irradiated phages is calculated. The result appears to be in agreement with the experimental results ofDulbecco.In the mathematical treatment of the problem a distinction is made between ordinary genes, with probability of inactivation negligible relative to the probability of inactivation of the whole phage, and a few vulnerable centers or genes whose probability of inactivation is not negligible. The hypothesis (...) of the existence of vulnerable centers appears necessary in order to explainDulbecco's experimental results.Postulant que de petites sections des „chromosomes” du bactériophage sont inactivés par l'irradiation ultraviolette, on a calculé la probabilité de réactivation par infection multiple des bactériophages traités par les rayons ultraviolets. Les résultats obtenus s'accordent avec les résultats expérimentaux de M.Dulbecco.Dans la tractation mathématique des problèmes une distinction a été faite entre les gènes ordinaires — dont la probabilité d'inactivation prise individuellement peut Être négligée relativement à la probabilité d'inactivation du phage entier — et quelques centres vulnérables ou gènes dont la probabilité d'inactivation ne pourrait Être négligée.L'hypothèse de l'existance des centres vulnérables s'est démontrée nécessaire à l'explication des résultats expérimentaux de M.Dulbecco.Die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Reaktivation durch multiplen Infektionen ist unter Voraussetzung, dass die Ultraviolett-Bestrahlung kleine Teile der Bakteriophagenchromosomen inaktiviert, berechnet. Das Ergebnis entspricht den experimentellen ResultatenDulbecco's.In der mathematischen Behandlung des Problems ist ein Unterschied gemacht worden zwischen gewöhnlichen Genen — wovon jeder eine geringe Wahrscheinlichkeit der Inaktivierung hat, in Bezug auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Inaktivierung der ganzen Bakteriophage — und einige verletzbare Stellen oder Genen, wovon die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Inaktivierung grössenordnungsmÄssig höher liegt. Die Hypothese über die verletzbaren Stellen war notwendig um die experimentellen ResultateDulbecco's zu erklÄren. (shrink)

This article traces the limits of the understanding of beauty as unified multiplicity in Plotinus’ Enneads vi 2 and vi 6. These treatises can be read as insisting on the significance of multiplicity for beauty and as implying a distinction between the illuminated and the unilluminated beauty of Intellect. In treatise vi 7, this distinction is made explicit and a deeper understanding of beauty as the manifestation of the Good in Intellect is introduced.

Laurel Schneider takes the reader on a vivid journey from the origins of "the logic of the One" - only recently dubbed monotheism - through to the modern day, where monotheism has increasingly failed to adequately address spiritual, scientific, and ethical experiences in the changing world. In Part I, Schneider traces a trajectory from the ancient history of monotheism and multiplicity in Greece, Israel, and Africa through the Constantinian valorization of the logic of the One, to medieval and modern (...) challenges to that logic in poetry and science. She pursues an alternative and constructive approach in Part II: a "logic of multiplicity" already resident in Christian traditions in which the complexity of life and the presence of God may be better articulated. Part III takes up the open-ended question of ethics from within that multiplicity, exploring the implications of this radical and realistic new theology for the questions that lie underneath theological construction: questions of belonging and nationalism, of the possibility of love, and of unity. In this groundbreaking work of contemporary theology, Schneider shows that the One is not lost in divine multiplicity, and that in spite of its abstractions, divine multiplicity is realistic and worldly, impossible ultimately to abstract. (shrink)

Modern contract law is characterized by a certain kind of unity and multiplicity. On the one hand, it establishes fundamental principles that apply to all contracts in general. But at the same time, it specifies further principles and rules for particular kinds of contracts or transaction-types that mark out their distinctive features, incidents and effects. Clearly, a viable theory of contract law should be able to provide a suitable account of both aspects. The central critical contention of The Choice (...) Theory of Contracts is that all prior approaches, in particular rights-based theories, have failed to do so. Indeed, Dagan and Heller argue that only a theory that explains the settled rules of contract law as teleologically oriented toward facilitating individuals’ pursuit of their different substantive goods, and thus as primarily power-conferring in this particularly robust sense, can provide the needed account. Such a theory, they believe, would be not only interpretatively accurate with respect to the actual law but also fully acceptable as a liberal view of contract. This Article challenges the core contentions of choice theory, suggesting why it may be unable to meet its own goal of explaining how contract law coherently specifies and integrates the general and specific dimensions of enforceable agreements. The Article looks into basic contract doctrines in order to specify a general conception of the contractual relation that can meet this desideratum and it sketches how, beginning with that conception, contract law unfolds a rich multiplicity of transaction-types. The resulting view is liberal but rights-based rather than teleological, and it proposes an alternative understanding of how the rules of contract law are power-conferring as well as duty-imposing. (shrink)

The solution of the outer multiplicity problem in the tensor product of U(3) irreducible representations (irreps) developed by Biedenharn et al.(1–7) and realized through the well-known Draayer-Akiyama (DA) computer code(8) is extended to the quantum algebra Uq(3). An analytic formula for special stretched Uq(3) Wigner coefficients, $$\left\langle {(\lambda _1 \mu _1 ) H_1 , (\lambda _2 \mu _2 ) \varepsilon _2 \Lambda _2 m_2 \left| { (\lambda _3 \mu _3 ) H_3 } \right.} \right\rangle _{\max }^q$$ is derived (...) using a projection operator method.(9–10) In this expression Hi denotes the highest weight vector of the (λiμi) irrep; the subscript “max” means coefficients corresponding to a unit tensor operator with a maximal characteristic null space; and q is the usual quantum label so the standard U(3) Wigner coefficient, which is required in the DA code, can be obtained in the q→1 limit of the theory. To illustrate the theory, some Uq(3) Wigner coefficients for the tensor product (22)×(22) are calculated. The procedure for evaluating nonhighest weight Wigner Uq(3) coefficients follow the DA prescription. (shrink)

Although intersectional analyses of gender have been widely adopted by feminist theorists in many disciplines, controversy remains over their character, limitations, and implications. I support intersectionality, cautioning against asking too much of it. It provides standards for the uses of methods or frameworks rather than theories of power, oppression, agency, or identity. I want feminist philosophers to incorporate intersectional analyses more fully into our work so that our theories can, in fact, have the pluralistic and inclusive character to which we (...) give lip service. To this end, I advocate an intersectional family resemblance strategy that does not create philosophical problems for feminists. I test my approach against María Lugones's argument in “Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System” (Lugones 2007) to determine, in particular, whether we can successfully resist a move to create multiple genders for women. If we can successfully resist this move, then we can answer the objection that intersectionality fragments women both theoretically and politically. I also argue that my approach avoids Lugones's critique of forms of intersectionality that fall within “the logic of purity.”. (shrink)

Laurel Schneider takes the reader on a vivid journey from the origins of "the logic of the One" - only recently dubbed monotheism - through to the modern day, where monotheism has increasingly failed to adequately address spiritual, scientific, and ethical experiences in the changing world. In Part I, Schneider traces a trajectory from the ancient history of monotheism and multiplicity in Greece, Israel, and Africa through the Constantinian valorization of the logic of the One, to medieval and modern (...) challenges to that logic in poetry and science. She pursues an alternative and constructive approach in Part II: a "logic of multiplicity" already resident in Christian traditions in which the complexity of life and the presence of God may be better articulated. Part III takes up the open-ended question of ethics from within that multiplicity, exploring the implications of this radical and realistic new theology for the questions that lie underneath theological construction: questions of belonging and nationalism, of the possibility of love, and of unity. In this groundbreaking work of contemporary theology, Schneider shows that the One is not lost in divine multiplicity, and that in spite of its abstractions, divine multiplicity is realistic and worldly, impossible ultimately to abstract. (shrink)

Suárez held that the vital faculties of the soul are really distinct from the soul itself and each other and that they cannot causally interact. This means that he needed to account for the connections between the activities of the faculties: they both interfere with and contribute to each other’s activities. Suárez does so by giving the soul a direct causal role in these activities. This role requires the unity of the soul of a living being and Suárez used it (...) to argue against the view that a living being, in particular a human being, has more than one soul. This line of thought displays some affinity with arguments for the simplicity of the soul from the unity of consciousness. One important difference is that Suárez was talking not just about mental activities but about all vital activities. (shrink)

Duhem's and Quine's holistic theses, when properly understood, allow methodologically responsible ways of resolving a conflict between a theoretical system and experience; they only deny the possibility of doing it in an epistemically persuasive way. By developing a "string" model of scientific tests I argue that the pattern of interaction between the elements of a theoretical system arising in response to multiple adverse data can be helpful in locating a "weak spot" in it. Combining this model with anti-holistic arguments of (...) Popper, Greenwood, and Lakatos significantly reinforces their joint power. (shrink)

An anthropogenic pandemic has alerted humankind to the importance of and its estrangement from minor forms of life on the planet. A pandemic of another kind, no less lethal, is seen to have split up humans simultaneously, one that thrived on majoritarian impulses and ethnic supremacy. This paper views both these crises as pathologies of epistemology and communication and accordingly pleads to address them semiotically. By examining the politics of selection and translation of Nazir Mansuri’s Gujarati fiction, this paper seeks (...) to define the contours of a minority text and a minority praxis of translation both of which get marginalised for their political and cultural attitudes amid the sweeping tides of majoritarian, capitalist and consumerist ideologies. It attempts to examine the extent to which Mansuri’s fiction, which operate in an ecosemiosphere, fostering ‘interspecies dialogues and semiotic engagements’ (Maran, 2021) can resist the hegemony of literary technosphere in which symbolic cultural codes and logic of market prevail. Ensconced in the minoritarian understanding of language, literature, culture and worldview, Mansuri’s fiction offers a ray of hope in the age of Anthropocene and its eco-sensitive translation, I argue, is not just a cultural need but a civilisational project and a planetary responsibility. (shrink)

I demonstrate that Deleuze's identification of Aion as an empty form offers a fascinating model of temporality that prioritises variation. First, I suggest that Deleuze's identification of time as an empty form is supported by ancient Greek and Gnostic concepts of the relation of Aion and Chronos. From Plato, through Aristotle, to Plotinus the concept of time undergoes substantive revision, in the sense that temporal measurement becomes removed from the measurement of existent entities. This gradual untethering of time from movement (...) gives rise to the development of the concept of eternity as an ontologically comprehensive mode of time that is devoid of content. It is here, with Deleuze's reading of the Platonic cosmology, that we see the first hints of the suggestion that Aion is involved with ontogenesis. Eternity is characterised as: a temporal ‘all’ that is non-reducible to the determinacy implied by any particular temporally localised existent or temporal series ; that which tends towards a diversity of possible states of affairs. Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects in the long history of Aion is that – in the ancient world – it was used in magical incantations. For the Gnostics and Oracles, Aion was a deity, and a potent one at that. From the Gnostic papyri, we get a vision of Aion as a force which enjoys eternal realisation. I suggest that the papyri conjure an image of Aion as a deity that is liberated from time, in the sense that it enjoys a neutrality with respect to the movements of any particular entity or group of entities – a form, in the most general sense of the term. Then, to clarify this mercurial aspect of an empty form of time, I elaborate on a complex analogy between Aion and Deleuze's concept of an ‘ideal game’ – an analogy that Deleuze specifies through reference to Fitzgerald and Borges. The claim is that Aion is an analogue of an ideal game in the sense that both share essential properties. Both Aion and the ideal game involve the multiplication of chance. Finally, I suggest that the differential aspects of Aion imply that it is pure variability; something which can be illustrated through a differential equation. These yield the suggestion that Aion enjoys realisation as an ontogenetic force. I further claim that ontogenetic forces may enjoy expression as the content of literature and mathematics. In concrete terms, temporality is involved in the creation of existent entities, which may be illustrated as various types of continuous multiplicity. (shrink)

One of the most striking innovations in Aristotle’s philosophical writing is also one of its most characteristic features. That feature is Aristotle’s idea that terms central to philosophy, including ‘cause’ [aition], ‘good’, and even the verb ‘to be’, are, as he likes to put it, “said in many ways.” To be sure, philosophers before Aristotle give some evidence of having recognized the phenomenon of being said in many ways. Plato, in particular, suggests that things in this world that we call (...) “just” are only namesakes of the Just Itself. But, beyond that, homonymy seems to have been, even for Plato, no more than a source of ambiguity for wordplay. Aristotle is apparently the first philosopher to propose a taxonomy of homonymy and to view the identification and analysis of homonymies as a genuinely philosophical project. (shrink)

The concept of multiplicity describes the fluid nature of identity and experience in the wake of postmodernity. Yet the question of how we negotiate and maintain our identities, despite our multiplicities, requires phenomenological clarification. I suggest that recognition of multiplicity needs to be combined with an acknowledgement of continuity, however minimal. I maintain that this continuity is evidenced in our pre-reflective self-awareness, embodiment and habitual activities. Our authorship of life narratives and our ability to deliberate and shape our (...) identities takes place against the background of our lived, prereflective experience. I develop the notion of prereflective self-awareness using the work of Sartre, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. I suggest that prereflective self-awareness, embodiment and habitual activity are themselves shaped by our participation in sociocultural frameworks that give meaning to our lives. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to carve out a political understanding of the Muslim identity. The Muslim identity is shaped within a religious mold. Inseparable from this religious understanding is a political one that is valuable in its own right in order to secure any sustainable possibility of participating politically as Muslims within a democratic liberal democracy, such as the United States. Here I explore not the historical or theological formation of the Muslim identity, rather a metaphysical understanding of (...) it, in order to mobilize politically while avoiding the traps of essentialism. I begin with a brief overview of the early understandings of the term “identity politics” in the United States. Moving beyond interest-based movements I explore María Lugones' particular understanding of the self as multiplicitous. I then offer examples of the Muslim identity within the context of a social movement and individualist claims, in order to draw out the political aspects of the Muslim identity. In the final section I argue that the theological criteria that define “who counts as a Muslim” is a crucial aspect of how many Muslims may understand their identity as Muslims. However, I claim that in order to avoid the traps of marginalization of Muslim minorities, one must understand oneself as a multiplicitous political agent and that, furthermore, such an understanding is not at odds with Islam or one's own understanding of their identity as Muslim. (shrink)

While research has focused on financial and social goals in impact investing, we add to the limited research that focuses on how individuals manage identity multiplicity, defined as three or more role identities. Based on our qualitative study of Christian impact investors, we develop a model of identity multiplicity work, explaining how individuals manage their multiple role identities to reduce identity tensions during the process of impact investing. We find individuals engaged in an interactive, ongoing three-step process of (...) identity multiplicity work: prioritizing one of their salient identities, managing their identity multiplicity interrelationships, and reinforcing their prioritized identity. Investors generally prioritized an identity that was neither financial nor social, but rather religious. We also find this identity work implemented through three novel mechanisms: shadowing, one identity casts a shadow over another thereby enabling the simultaneous pursuit of related goals; distinguishing, all identities are retained and at least a minimum threshold of role expectations are met; and surrendering, partial sacrificing of goals of one identity in favor of another identity based on an individual’s self-reflective importance of the role. Our findings offer new insights to multiple identities, impact investing and business ethics literatures. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a new reading of Simone de Beauvoir’s first major work, L’Invitée ( She Came to Stay ), in order to reveal the text as a vital place of origin for feminist phenomenological philosophy. My reading of L’Invitée departs from most scholarly interpretations of the text in three notable respects: (1) it is inclusive of the “two unpublished chapters” that were excised from the original manuscript at the publisher’s request, (2) it takes seriously Beauvoir’s claim that (...) phenomenological philosophy is often better expressed in novels than essays or treatises, and (3) it views the novel’s main characters, Françoise and Xavière, as one woman who has multiple, contradictory, excessive selves. Thus approached, L’Invitée provides us with a thick description of one woman’s embodied consciousness and thereby shows us with specificity what a consciousness whose underlying structures reflect sexual difference looks like. This consciousness not only experiences itself as being both gendered, categorized, disciplined, and defined and in excess of these genders, categories, disciplines, and definitions at the same time, but also experiences its own self-relation through the presence of multiple selves who are each simultaneously attracted to and negating of the other. As such, the defining features of this consciousness involve experiences that I have respectively labeled “ontological multiplicity” and “auto-jealousy.”. (shrink)

I consider whether there is a plausible conception of personal identity that can accommodate the ‘Multiplicity Thesis’ (MT), the thesis that some ways of creating and deploying multiple distinct online personae can bring about the existence of multiple persons where before there was only one. I argue that an influential Kantian line of thought, according to which a person is a unified locus of rational agency, is well placed to accommodate the thesis. I set out such a line of (...) thought as developed by Carol Rovane, and consider the conditions that would have to be in place for the possibility identified by MT to be realised. Finally I briefly consider the prospects for MT according to neo-Lockean and animalist views of personhood. (shrink)

A prominent argument for the immateriality of the soul is the so-called "Achilles Argument", which relies on the claim that the soul is simple or indivisible. It was not widely used in the Aristotelian tradition, however. But a version of the argument played a crucial role in Suárez’s contention that a human being contains only one unitary soul. On an alternative view that was widespread at the time, living substances may contain several souls, such as a sensitive and a rational (...) soul in the case of human beings. Suárez holds that the powers of the soul are really distinct from each other and from the soul itself. At the same time, the actions of the different powers of the soul influence each other, as when a loud noise distracts me from doing philosophy or when my intellect relies on my imagination for mental images. Suárez argues that this interaction between powers requires that they are all are "rooted" [radicatae] in one single soul. (shrink)

I provide an explicit formulation of empirical adequacy, the central concept of constructive empiricism, and point out a number of problems. Based on one of the inspirations for empirical adequacy, I generalize the notion of a theory to avoid implausible presumptions about the relation of theoretical concepts and observations, and generalize empirical adequacy with the help of approximation sets to allow for lack of knowledge, approximations, and successive gain of knowledge and precision. As a test case, I provide an application (...) of these generalizations to a simple interference phenomenon. (shrink)

First published in 1997, Alain Badiou's _Deleuze: The Clamor of Being_ cast Gilles Deleuze as a secret philosopher of the One. In this work, Clayton Crockett rehabilitates Deleuze's position within contemporary political and philosophical thought, advancing an original reading of the thinker's major works and a constructive conception of his philosophical ontology. Through close readings of Deleuze's _Difference and Repetition_, _Capitalism and Schizophrenia_ (with Felix Guattari), and _Cinema 2_, Crockett argues that Deleuze is anything but the austere, quietistic, and aristocratic (...) intellectual Badiou had portrayed. Instead, Crockett underscores Deleuze's radical aesthetics and innovative scientific, political, and mathematical forms of thought. He also refutes the notion Deleuze retreated from politics toward the end of his life. Using Badiou's critique as a foil, Crockett maintains the profound continuity of Deleuze's work and builds a general interpretation of his more obscure formulations. (shrink)

I explore connections between social divisions and diversity within the self, while striving to differentiate internal diversity and multiplicity. When the person is understood as composite or multiple, she is seen as divided into several distinct agent-like aspects. This view is found in ancient, modern, and postmodern philosophy, psychology, poetry, and lay people's accounts of their experience. I argue for a conception of the self as diverse but not composite or multiple.