This paper argues that the contemporary practice of moral philosophy (particularly in the examples it relies on) and the contemporary practice of legal education both tend to ignore, dismiss or exclude that which is here called 'moral experience.' Moral experience is here defined (non-exhaustively) to be: 1) that which helps us face up to, instead of hide away from, our mortality and fallibility; 2) that which helps us experience radical uncertainty about who we are, (...) where we have been, and where we will be, and about what has happened, is happening and will happen; 3) that which helps us experience the insight that we are not in control of all that which influences us; 4) that which helps us experience the infinite (for us) complexity of others and the world; 5) that which helps us to notice hitherto-invisible (to us) forms of suffering and vulnerability; and 6) that which helps us to widen the scope of, or sometimes change, that which we find valuable and care about. Moral experience is not designed to replace traditions of moral inquiry (such as virtue ethics or utilitarianism), and it is not designed to help us meet the demands of moral life. Rather, it is designed to help us avoid underestimating the demands of moral life. Following a discussion of moral experience in the first part of the paper, the second part turns to offer some activities and resources thanks to which law schools can enable moral experience for both their students and their staff. In doing so, the second part of the paper draws on research undertaken as part of the AHRC Beyond Text in Legal Education project at the School of Law, University of Edinburgh. It also draws on the author's own research as part of a pedagogical project entitled Unnatural Exercises. (shrink)

One solution to the problem of moral knowledge is to claim that we can acquire it a posteriori through moral experience. But what is a moral experience? When we examine the most compelling putative cases, we find features which, I argue, are best explained by the hypothesis that moral experiences are emotions. To preempt an objection, I argue that putative cases of emotionless moral experience can be explained away. Finally, I allay the (...) worry that emotions are an unsuitable basis for moral knowledge. I conclude that those who believe in moral experience should hold that it consists of emotion. (shrink)

Background: Pediatric nursing care involves many significant ethical challenges. Although nurses are broadly recognized as professionals with relevant knowledge about children and families, little is known about how nurses experience ethical concerns in their everyday practice. Objective: The objective of this study was to better understand the moral experiences and related moral distress experiences of nurses working in pediatric settings in Brazil. Design: Interpretative phenomenological study conducted through narrative interviews. Participants and research context: Nine nurses working in (...) three pediatric settings of a teaching hospital in a city of Southern Brazil. Ethical considerations: The study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the research site, and research ethics principles were respected throughout the study. Findings: This investigation illuminated a broader dimension of nurses’ moral distress, which was recognized as moral experience. In advancing our understanding of nurses’ moral experiences, engagement was identified as a central phenomenon that is present in the understandings and actions of nurses within their relationships in their daily practice and lived experiences. Three themes were described with regard to nurses’ relationships and their moral experiences: (a) relationship with the healthcare team; (b) relationship with the family; and (c) relationship with the child. Discussion: The findings of this study are congruent with emerging health literature that demonstrated the focus on moral distress as limiting for bioethical inquiry. Moreover, it is important to better understand and recognize nurses’ relational environment and engagements to advance understandings of the ethical dimensions of pediatric nursing practice. Conclusion: This study provides a better understanding on how engagement affects moral experiences, demonstrating how nurses can experience distress but also satisfaction, gratification, rewarding feelings, and a sense of responsibility for the care they provide. (shrink)

Elements of Moral Experience in Clinical Ethics Training and Practice: Sharing Stories with Strangers is a philosophical and professional memoir of the education, training, and professional development of becoming a clinical ethics consultant. Utilizing a phenomenological and narrative lens, this book offers a fresh and energizing window into the field of healthcare ethics by pairing compelling clinical narratives of what it is like to do clinical ethics consultation with clear reflections and accessible introductions to key philosophical, professional, and (...) humanistic roots for responsible practice. (shrink)

One of the newest research areas in moral philosophy is moral phenomenology: the dedicated study of the experiential dimension of moral mental life. The idea has been to bring phenomenological evidence to bear on some central issues in metaethics and moral psychology, such as cognitivism and noncognitivism about moral judgment, motivational internalism and externalism, and so on. However, moral phenomenology faces certain foundational challenges, pertaining especially to the existence, describability, and importance of its subject (...) matter. This paper addresses these foundational challenges, arguing that moral experiences – in the phenomenal, what-is-like sense of the term – exist, are informatively describable, and are central for the concerns of moral philosophy at large. (shrink)

Theoretical and empirical research in bioethics frequently focuses on ethical dilemmas or problems. This paper draws on anthropological and phenomenological sources to develop an alternative framework for bioethical enquiry that allows examination of a broader range of how the moral is experienced in the everyday lives of individuals and groups. Our account of moral experience is subjective and hermeneutic. We define moral experience as “Encompassing a person's sense that values that he or she deem important (...) are being realised or thwarted in everyday life. This includes a person's interpretations of a lived encounter, or a set of lived encounters, that fall on spectrums of right-wrong, good-bad or just-unjust”. In our conceptualisation, moral experience is not limited to situations that are heavily freighted with ethically-troubling ramifications or are sources of debate and disagreement. Important aspects of moral experience are played out in mundane and everyday settings. Moral experience provides a research framework, the scope of which extends beyond the evaluation of ethical dilemmas, processes of moral justification and decision-making, and moral distress. This broad research focus is consistent with views expressed by commentators within and beyond bioethics who have called for deeper and more sustained attention in bioethics scholarship to a wider set of concerns, experiences and issues that better captures what is ethically at stake for individuals and communities. In this paper we present our conceptualisation of moral experience, articulate its epistemological and ontological foundations and discuss opportunities for empirical bioethics research using this framework. (shrink)

Background Serious ethical problems have been anecdotally identified in the care of children with osteogenesis imperfecta (OI), which may negatively impact their moral experiences, defined as their sense of fulfillment towards personal values and beliefs. Research aims To explore children’s actual and desired participation in discussions, decisions, and actions in an OI hospital setting and their community using art-making to facilitate their self-expression. Research design A focused ethnography was conducted using the moral experiences framework with data from key (...) informant interviews; participant observations, semi-structured interviews, and practice-based research (art-making) with 10 children with OI; and local documents. Participants and research context The study was conducted at a pediatric, orthopedic hospital. Ethical considerations This study was approved by McGill University Institutional Review Board. Findings/results Children expressed desires to participate in their care, but sometimes lacked the necessary resources and encouragement from healthcare providers. Art-making facilitated children’s voice and participation in health-related discussions. Conclusions Healthcare providers are recommended to consider the benefits of art-making and educational resources to reduce discrepancies between children’s actual and desired participation in care and promote positive moral experiences. (shrink)

Background: Legislative changes are resulting in assisted death as an option for people at the end of life. Although nurses’ experiences and perspectives are underrepresented within broader ethical discourses about assisted death, there is a small but significant body of literature examining nurses’ experiences of caring for people who request this option. Aim: To synthesize what has been learned about nurses’ experiences of caring for patients who request assisted death and to highlight what is morally at stake for nurses who (...) undertake this type of care. Design: Qualitative meta-synthesis. Methods: Six databases were searched: CINAHL, Medline, EMBASE, Joanna Briggs Institute, PsycINFO, and Web of Science. The search was completed on 22 October 2014 and updated in February 2016. Of 879 articles identified from the database searches, 16 articles were deemed relevant based on inclusion criteria. Following quality appraisal, 14 studies were retained for analysis and synthesis. Results: The moral experience of the nurse is (1) defined by a profound sense of responsibility, (2) shaped by contextual forces that nurses navigate in everyday end-of-life care practice, and (3) sustained by intra-team moral and emotional support. Discussion: The findings of this synthesis support the view that nurses are moral agents who are deeply invested in the moral integrity of end-of-life care involving assisted death. The findings further demonstrate that to fully appreciate the ethics of assisted death from a nursing standpoint, it is necessary to understand the broader constraints on nurses’ moral agency that operate in everyday end-of-life care. Ethical considerations: Research ethics board approval was not required for this synthesis of previously published literature. Conclusion: In order to understand how to enact ethical practice in the area of assisted death, the moral experiences of nurses should be investigated and foregrounded. (shrink)

Pandemics like COVID-19 confront us with decisions about life and death that come with great uncertainty, factual as well as moral. How should policy makers deal with such uncertainty? We suggest that rather than to deliberate until they have found the right course of action, they better do moral experiments that generate relevant experiences to enable more reliable moral evaluations and rational decisions.

The aim of this study is to explore the relationship between affectivity and moral experience from a phenomenological perspective. I will start by showing how in a phenomenologically oriented account emotions can be conceived as intentional evaluative feelings which play a role in both moral epistemology and the motivation of moral behaviour. I will then move to discuss a particular kind of affect, "existential feelings" (Ratcliffe in Journal of Consciousness Studies 12(8–10), 43–60, 2005, 2008), which has (...) not been considered so far in the discourse on moral and affective experience. Relying on the notion of pre-intentionality through which Ratcliffe characterizes existential feelings (Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53(6), 602–626, 2010) and on some insights into the relationship between affectivity and ethics developed by De Monticelli (2003, 2006), I suggest that key to the role played by existential feelings in moral experience is that they determine the kinds of evaluations that it is possible for us to make and the range of our possibilities of action. I then illustrate and further develop this idea through a phenomenological analysis of some forms of psychopathological experience. More specifically, by considering some experiential features of depression and borderline personality disorder, I claim that, by acquiring an existential character, emotions such as guilt, feelings of isolation, anger and shame can radically alter the structure of the individual evaluative perspective, having a deep impact on both moral judgements and behaviours. (shrink)

In this book, Jeanine Grenberg argues that everything important about Kant's moral philosophy emerges from careful reflection upon the common human moral experience of the conflict between happiness and morality. Through careful readings of both the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, Grenberg shows that Kant, typically thought to be an overly technical moral philosopher, in fact is a vigorous defender of the common person's first-personal encounter with moral demands. Grenberg uncovers a notion of (...) phenomenological experience in Kant's account of the Fact of Reason, develops a new a reading of the Fact, and grants a moral epistemic role for feeling in grounding Kant's a priori morality. The book thus challenges readings which attribute only a motivational role to feeling; and Fichtean readings which violate Kant's commitments to the limits of reason. This study will be valuable to students and scholars engaged in Kant studies. (shrink)

Alison Denham examines the ways in which our engagement with literary art, and metaphorical discourse in particular, informs our moral beliefs. She considers to what extent moral and metaphorical discourses are capable of truth or falsehood, warrant or justification, and how it is that we understand these discourses. This vital new study offers a fresh view of the nature of the moral and the metaphorical, and the relations between art and morality.

It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality, has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory. In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not (...) have the uniformly objective-seeming character it is typically claimed to have. I go on to argue that even if moral experience were to presuppose or display morality as a realm of fact, we would still need a reason for taking that to support theories according to which it is such a realm. I consider what I take to be the four most promising ways of attempting to supply such a reason: inference to the best explanation, epistemic conservatism, the Principle of Credulity, and the method of wide reflective equilibrium. In each case, I argue, the strategy in question does not support a presumption in favor of objectivist moral theories. (shrink)

Voluntary abortions are relatively frequent and their care is complex due to the social stigma that surrounds these losses. This interpretive meta-ethnography of 11 original qualitative articles aims to synthesize the moral experiences of nurses and midwives who cared for women and couples that decided to abort or terminate the pregnancy due to foetal abnormalities. Lines of argument synthesis emerged after reciprocal and refutational translations, together with the metaphor, ‘Going with the flow or swimming against the tide’. Caring in (...) these situations was an ethical dilemma when a conflict existed between their professional duty and their moral principles. In these instances, care was associated with a significant emotional cost. They did not feel sufficiently prepared or with adequate resources, which favoured avoidance behaviours. However, the feeling of professional duty was stronger than their prejudices, and they became engaged in caring. These results could improve knowledge, clinical practice and education, being a (highly) reasonable representation of the phenomenon of interest. (shrink)

In this article, through a comparative analysis of Dewey's and Laozi's relevant accounts, I examine a pragmatic insight concerning moral rules and moral experience to the effect that (i) fixed and formulated moral rules should not be taken as the final absolute moral authority, and (ii) attention needs to be paid to the moral agent's own moral experience that responds to the felt demands in concrete situations. The purpose of this paper is (...) to enhance understanding the crucial points of the pragmatic insight and to look at how, in certain complementary ways, Dewey's and Laozi's distinct approaches could contribute to the pragmatic insight and learn from each other. I endeavour to show several points: (1) The pragmatic insight has its distinct metaphysical foundations in Dewey's and Laozi's accounts, whose combination could enhance each other's visions and overcome each other's limitations; (2) Both Dewey and Laozi reject some sharp dualism to look at the nature of moral experience that responds to the felt demands in concrete situations; in so doing, their distinct focuses on different aspects, or developing stages, of such moral experience could be complementarily coordinated into a whole; (3) Their characterisations of the pragmatic insight are also based upon their distinct but related naturalistic perspectives to human moral foundation; Laozi's approach could provide some constructive insight for and due natural limitations on Dewey's account. (shrink)

While many have suggested that to withdraw medical interventions is ethically equivalent to withholding them, the moral complexity of actually withdrawing life supportive interventions from a patient cannot be ignored. Utilizing interplay between expository and narrative styles, and drawing upon our experiences with patients, families, nurses, and physicians when life supports have been withdrawn, we explore the changeable character of boundaries in end-of-life situations. We consider ways in which boundaries imply differences – for example, between cognition and performance – (...) and how the encounter with boundaries can generate altered meanings important for understanding decisions and actions in these contexts. We conclude that the reliance on mere roles to support the moral weight of withdrawing medical interventions is inadequate. Roles that lead us to such moments are exceeded by the responsibility encountered in such moments. And here, we suggest, is the momentous character of withdrawal: it presents the grave astonishment, the trembling awe, in the not-being-there of the other in death. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In ethics, the use of empirical data has become more and more popular, leading to a distinct form of applied ethics, namely empirical ethics. This ‘empirical turn’ is especially visible in bioethics. There are various ways of combining empirical research and ethical reflection. In this paper we discuss the use of empirical data in a special form of Reflective Equilibrium (RE), namely the Network Model with Third Person Moral Experiences. In this model, the empirical data consist of the (...) moral experiences of people in a practice. Although inclusion of these moral experiences in this specific model of RE can be well defended, their use in the application of the model still raises important questions. What precisely are moral experiences? How to determine relevance of experiences, in other words: should there be a selection of the moral experiences that are eventually used in the RE? How much weight should the empirical data have in the RE? And the key question: can the use of RE by empirical ethicists really produce answers to practical moral questions? In this paper we start to answer the above questions by giving examples taken from our research project on understanding the norm of informed consent in the field of pediatric oncology. We especially emphasize that incorporation of empirical data in a network model can reduce the risk of self‐justification and bias and can increase the credibility of the RE reached. (shrink)

This paper clarifies the nature of moral experience, examines its evidential role in supporting moral judgments, and argues that moral experiences can be among the things having intrinsic value. Moral experience is compared with aesthetic experience and contrasted with its close relative, non-moral experience combined with moral beliefs. The concluding sections explore the case for the organicity of intrinsic value and the kind of role such value can play in grounding (...) moral obligation. (shrink)

A recurrent issue in the vast amount of literature on reasoning models in ethics is the role and nature of moral intuitions. In this paper, we start from the view that people who work and live in a certain moral practice usually possess specific moral wisdom. If we manage to incorporate their moral intuitions in ethical reasoning, we can arrive at judgements and (modest) theories that grasp a moral experience that generally cannot be found (...) outside the practice. Reflective equilibrium (RE) provides a framework for balancing moral intuitions, ethical principles and general theories. Nevertheless, persisting problems associated with the use of intuitions need to be addressed. One is the objection that moral intuitions lack the credibility necessary to guide moral reasoning. Ethicists have tried to solve this problem by formulating criteria to separate the “bad” intuitions from the “good” ones at the beginning of the reasoning process. We call this the credible input-justified outcome strategy. An example is the appeal to the common morality by Beauchamp and Childress. We think this approach is unsuccessful. As an alternative, we outline the good reasoning-justified outcome strategy. It connects to a variant of RE in which intuitions from different sources are incorporated. We argue that the elements of RE have different levels of justificatory power at the start of reasoning. In our strategy, each element can gain or lose justificatory power when it is tested in a reasoning process that meets several criteria. (shrink)

Critical theories often express scepticism towards the idea that social critique should draw on general normative principles, seeing such principles as bound to dominant conceptual frameworks. However, even the models of immanent critique developed in the Frankfurt School tradition seem to privilege principles over particular moral experiences. Discussing the place that particular moral experience has in the models of Honneth, Ferrara and Adorno, the article argues that experience can play an important negative role even for a (...) critical theory that is committed to the necessity of conceptual mediation, as moral experiences can undermine our confidence in the appropriateness of our moral concepts. Building on McDowell’s account of moral perception and Brandom’s interpretation of Hegel’s theory of experience, one can reconstruct Adorno as providing a “radically negativist” approach to immanent critique that takes particular moral experience seriously. (shrink)

In a fascinating paper, where the stakes are a good deal higher than the modesty of its tone might suggest, Edward Harcourt requires us to think again about the ethics of psychoanalysis. We should not allow ourselves to be misled by Harcourt's tendency to downplay the ambitious reach of his argument. Indeed, Lacan demonstrated what is at stake here by drawing attention to the "originality of the Freudian position in ethical matters". Lacan may be relied on, more obviously than anyone (...) else I can think of in the Freudian field, as a counterweight to the assimilation of psychoanalysis to moral philosophy. A stenographer began to transcribe Lacan's seminars starting in 1952 and, reflecting on matters... (shrink)

The author adopts a phenomenalistic method to educe, not the content of universally valid moral judgments, but "the generic characteristics of all moral experience." Interested in describing rather than prescribing the standards of judgment, he finds that the common ground lies in a contextual "fittingness." The possibility of validating moral judgment is maintained by the enunciation of principles of the primacy of facts, of universality, and of ultimacy or obligation.--A. R.

Moral experience comes in many flavors. Some philosophers have argued that there is nothing common to the many forms moral experience can take. In this paper, I argue that close attention to the phenomenology of certain key emotions, combined with a clear distinction between essentially and accidentally moral experiences, suggests that there is a group of (essentially) moral emotions which in fact exhibit significant unity.

Our pains can be more or less intense, our mental imagery can be more or less vivid, our perceptual experiences can be more or less striking. These degrees of intensity of conscious experiences are all manifestations of a phenomenal property I call mental strength. In this article, I argue that mental strength is a domain-general phenomenal magnitude; in other words, it is a phenomenal quantity shared by all conscious experiences that explains their degree of felt intensity. Mental strength has been (...) largely overlooked in favor of mental states’ type, representational contents, domain-specific phenomenology, or processes such as attention. Considering mental strength in our reflections about the mind illuminates debates about the relation of representational contents and phenomenal character, and it also helps address questions about the structure and functions of consciousness. Mental strength provides a unifying construct to model what is shared in the phenomenology of different types of conscious experiences. (shrink)

In this paper, I draw a contrast between two ways of posing the question of moral experience: the episodic and the contemplative. On the first, the episodic outlook, the question of moral experience is the question of specifying the workings of a capacity (or set of capacities) whose exercise may ground claims of moral knowledge. On the contemplative outlook, on the other hand, the question of understanding moral experience is the question of articulating (...) a standpoint: the moral standpoint. On this view, philosophical reflection on moral experience aims to shed light on the human experiences that paradigmatically exemplify and, thus, best reveal the moral standpoint. In the tradition of contemplative accounts, I propose that some of the human experiences that paradigmatically exemplify and reveal the moral standpoint are experiences of “moral growth and change”. Finally, I argue that in “moral growth and change”, one is in view of the world as what is at stake. This leads to a different sense in which moral experience grounds knowledge claims. (shrink)

While the movement to ensure patient’s rights to information and informed consent spreads throughout the world, patient rights of this kind have yet to be introduced in mainland China. Nonetheless, China is no different from other parts of the world in that nurses are expected to shoulder the responsibility of safeguarding patients’ best interests and at the same time to uphold their right to information. This paper expounds on the principle of protectiveness grounded in traditional Chinese medical ethics concerning the (...) practice of informed consent. Nurses in China have a moral obligation to treat patients with sincerity. This notion carries a strong sense of parental protectiveness. As far as information-giving is concerned, nurses in China are ambivalent about the notion of truthfulness. The findings of an empirical study undertaken in seven Chinese cities reveal that nurses in China experience similar difficulties related to the disclosure of information as their counterparts in other parts of the world. A nurse’s narrative, the Chan case, is used to illustrate the typical difficult situation that nurses in China often encounter in looking after vulnerable patients who would like to learn more about their therapeutic regimens. The moral tension embedded in nursing practice is analysed. It is found that most nurses would prefer to tell the truth to patients, but their primary ethical justification is not that of respect for patients’ autonomy or safeguarding patients’ right to self-determination. Rather, it is basically beneficent in nature; that is, they base their decision to reveal the truth on whether or not patients will receive more relevant treatment and better nursing care. (shrink)

This book explains how qualitative awareness-content of human moral experience can have intentional features indicating God's reality and goodness. Chapters offer a range of topics such as Moral Rapport and Inspiration from God, Experiencing God without Philosophy, Justifying Divine Ways, Co-Valuing with God, and Persons as Deciders in Dissonance.

Synthetic biology, as a research field, brings together molecular life scientists, computational biologists, and social scientists to engineer biological systems toward societally desired goals. Given the field’s broad multidisciplinarity and relatively young age, innovative educational methods are required to provide students with the needed background knowledge to push the field forward in the future. The international Genetically Engineered Machine competition is such an example where education and high-level research merge, providing the synthetic biology field with trained students, new ideas, and (...) novel results. In the 2021 edition alone, 343 teams from across the world completed the competition to tackle societal problems with synthetic biology. As Wageningen University & Research celebrates 10 years of participation in iGEM, we share our thoughts and experiences on supervising iGEM teams, which is especially relevant to organizers of current and new teams, and also others interested in the iGEM competition. (shrink)

Our pains can be more or less intense, our mental imagery can be more or less vivid, our perceptual experiences can be more or less striking. These degrees of intensity of conscious experiences are all manifestations of a phenomenal property I call mental strength. In this article, I argue that mental strength is a domain-general phenomenal magnitude; in other words, it is a phenomenal quantity shared by all conscious experiences that explains their degree of felt intensity. Mental strength has been (...) largely overlooked in favor of mental states’ type, representational contents, domain-specific phenomenology, or processes such as attention. Considering mental strength in our reflections about the mind illuminates debates about the relation of representational contents and phenomenal character, and it also helps address questions about the structure and functions of consciousness. Mental strength provides a unifying construct to model what is shared in the phenomenology of different types of conscious experiences. (shrink)

MY programme is as follows: I shall draw a general distinction between morals and moral philosophy in order to show that an ethical theory cannot be neutral and autonomous but must have an empirical foundation. Both ethical naturalists and existentialists agree that an adequate moral theory must be based on anthropological considerations. They however differ on one major issue: ethical naturalists maintain that such a theory must be scientifically grounded, existentialists that it must be grounded on experience (...) phenomenologically described. The weakness of the naturalists’ position becomes apparent when some anthropological notion like the concept of action is clarified, since human behaviour of a morally relevant kind cannot be fully understood from a scientific point of view. (shrink)

The cultural logic contained within Emile Durkheim's work, specifically categories he puts forth in Suicide, creates the ground for Horrible Workers. This book is constructed to allow its readers to study the cases of Max Stirner, Arthur Rimbaud, Robert Johnson, and the Charles Manson Circle independently of one another or in a comparative fashion. Each case demonstrates in what ways particular social experiences lead to what have been perceived as unique forms of cultural expression.

Paul Virilio passed away on the 10th of September 2018. This article surveys his considerable legacy to cultural theory in order to locate a largely dormant contribution to questions of moral respo...