Maurice Dobb was the foremost Marxian economist of his generation in Britain. He was noted for his contributions to value theory, the theory of economic planning and the analysis of Soviet economic development. This set will re-issue 7 of his most important works.

In this paper we explore a connection between descriptive set theory and inner model theory. From descriptive set theory, we will take a countable, definable set of reals, A. We will then show that , where is a canonical model from inner model theory. In technical terms, is a “mouse”. Consequently, we say that A is a mouse set. For a concrete example of the type of set A we are working with, let ODnω1 be the set of reals which (...) are ∑n definable over the model Lω1 , from an ordinal parameter. In this paper we will show that for all n 1, ODnω1 is a mouse set. Our work extends some similar results due to D.A. Martin, J.R. Steel, and H. Woodin. Several interesting questions in this area remain open. (shrink)

Performance on the Wason selection task varies with content. This has been taken to demonstrate that there are different cognitive modules for dealing with different conceptual domains. This implication is only legitimate if our underlying cognitive architecture is formal. A non-formal system can explain content-sensitive inference without appeal to independent inferential modules.

In this short essay, I report results from a representative national dataset from the Cooperative Institutional Research Program that shows that significantly more men than women intend to major in philosophy at the high-school and pre-university level. This lends credence to pre-university effects hypotheses of women's underrepresentation in philosophy and successfully replicates a smaller analysis performed by Cheshire Calhoun at Colby College in 2009. I also defend my analysis against an objection that claims that intention to major is not a (...) good predictor of final major selection. Finally, I argue that this new analysis should lead to further investment in university-level diversity programs. (shrink)

In a Society of Peoples as Rawls conceives it, human rights function as “criteria for toleration.” This paper defends the conception of human rights that appears in Rawls’ The Law of Peoples as normatively and theoretically adequate. I claim that human rights function as criteria for determining whether or not a given society or legal system can be tolerated. As such, “human rights” are not themselves basic facts or judgments or ascriptions, but rather the means by which we collectively attempt (...) to secure public criteria for evaluating what can and cannot be tolerated. Human rights are one expression of the fundamental value commitments of Political Liberalism to reasonableness and tolerance. If correct, this account provides good reasons for concluding that Political Liberalism has a normatively adequate conception of global justice. (shrink)

This paper describes how the film “Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner” can be used in the classroom. Drawing on Gilligan’s theory of moral psychology, the paper begins by putting forward a new interpretation of the film. While the central theme of the film is that of miscegenation, another salient topic in the film concerns how to maintain patriarchal privilege in a society that has racial equality. The paper then proceeds to illustrate different ways the film can be used in the (...) classroom, most importantly to illustrate the justice/care distinction. Finally, the pedagogical practice of showing films that support certain ideologies is critically examined. (shrink)

In this short essay, I report results from a representative national dataset from the Cooperative Institutional Research Program that shows that significantly more men than women intend to major in philosophy at the high‐school and pre‐university level. This lends credence to pre‐university effects hypotheses of women's underrepresentation in philosophy and successfully replicates a smaller analysis performed by Cheshire Calhoun at Colby College in 2009. I also defend my analysis against an objection that claims that intention to major is not a (...) good predictor of final major selection. Finally, I argue that this new analysis should lead to further investment in university‐level diversity programs. (shrink)

Provides theories and techniques behind the investigations of intoxication and how subjective experiences relate to addictive potential, which should help ...

An inner model operator is a function M such that given a Turing degree d, M is a countable set of reals, d M, and M has certain closure properties. The notion was introduced by Steel. In the context of AD, we study inner model operators M such that for a.e. d, there is a wellorder of M in L). This is related to the study of mice which are below the minimal inner model with ω Woodin cardinals. As a (...) technical tool, we show that the alternative fine structure theory developed by Mitchell and Steel for mice with Woodin cardinals is equivalent to the traditional fine structure theory developed by Jensen for L. (shrink)

Williams syndrome is a genetic disorder that, because of its unique cognitive profile, has been marshalled as evidence for the modularity of both language and social skills. But emerging evidence suggests the claims of modularity based on WS have been premature. This paper offers an examination of the recent literature on WS. It argues the literature gives little support for mental modularity. Rather than being rigidly modular, the WS brain is an extremely flexible organ that that co-opts available neural resource (...) in a highly dynamic manner to cope in the world. (shrink)

Since social skills are highly significant to the evolutionary success of humans, we should expect these skills to be efficient and reliable. For many Evolutionary Psychologists efficiency entails encapsulation: the only way to get an efficient system is via information encapsulation. But encapsulation reduces reliability in opaque epistemic domains. And the social domain is darkly opaque: people lie and cheat, and deliberately hide their intentions and deceptions. Modest modularity [Currie and Sterelny (2000) Philos Q 50:145–160] attempts to combine efficiency and (...) reliability. Reliability is obtained by placing social skills in un-encapsulated central cognition; efficiency by having the social system sensitive to encapsulated socially tagged cues. In this paper, I argue that this approach fails. I focus on eye-gaze as a plausible example of a socially significant encapsulated cue. I demonstrate contra modest modularity that eye-gaze is subject to influence from central cognition. (shrink)

We identify a particular mouse, [Formula: see text], the minimal ladder mouse, that sits in the mouse order just past [Formula: see text] for all [Formula: see text], and we show that [Formula: see text], the set of reals that are [Formula: see text] in a countable ordinal. Thus [Formula: see text] is a mouse set. This is analogous to the fact that [Formula: see text] where [Formula: see text] is the sharp for the minimal inner model with a Woodin (...) cardinal, and [Formula: see text] is the set of reals that are [Formula: see text] in a countable ordinal. More generally [Formula: see text]. The mouse [Formula: see text] and the set [Formula: see text] compose the next natural pair to consider in this series of results. Thus we are proving the mouse set theorem just past projective. Some of this is not new. [Formula: see text] was known in the 1990s. But [Formula: see text] was open until Woodin found a proof in 2018. The main goal of this paper is to give Woodin’s proof. (shrink)

Journal of Mathematical Logic, Ahead of Print. We identify a particular mouse, [math], the minimal ladder mouse, that sits in the mouse order just past [math] for all [math], and we show that [math], the set of reals that are [math] in a countable ordinal. Thus [math] is a mouse set. This is analogous to the fact that [math] where [math] is the sharp for the minimal inner model with a Woodin cardinal, and [math] is the set of reals that (...) are [math] in a countable ordinal. More generally [math]. The mouse [math] and the set [math] compose the next natural pair to consider in this series of results. Thus we are proving the mouse set theorem just past projective. Some of this is not new. [math] was known in the 1990s. But [math] was open until Woodin found a proof in 2018. The main goal of this paper is to give Woodin’s proof. (shrink)

Beauty has not figured prominently in contemporary notions of human flourishing. This essay seeks to reclaim a notion of beauty that the Church and the academy can find valuable again. The question is engaged here specifically from the perspective of a biblical scholar using a biblical text-the poem in Song 4:1–7 — to focus and source the discussion.

Explains relativity--matter and energy, anti-matter, tachyon, etc.--tracing from discovery to discovery the steps that led to the next development in the field.

Let κ R be the least ordinal κ such that L κ (R) is admissible. Let $A = \{x \in \mathbb{R} \mid (\exists\alpha such that x is ordinal definable in L α (R)}. It is well known that (assuming determinacy) A is the largest countable inductive set of reals. Let T be the theory: ZFC - Replacement + "There exists ω Woodin cardinals which are cofinal in the ordinals." T has consistency strength weaker than that of the theory ZFC + (...) "There exists ω Woodin cardinals", but stronger than that of the theory ZFC + "There exists n Woodin Cardinals", for each n ∈ ω. Let M be the canonical, minimal inner model for the theory T. In this paper we show that A = R ∩ M. Since M is a mouse, we say that A is a mouse set. As an application, we use our characterization of A to give an inner-model-theoretic proof of a theorem of Martin which states that for all n, every Σ * n real is in A. (shrink)

This article identifies an ostracism joke in Menander's Samia (364–6) during a climactic scene in which the Athenian Demeas ejects the titular Chrysis from his house. The joke, uttered by a cook who is reacting to Chrysis’ expulsion, plays on the usage of ὄστρακα—broken pieces of pottery—as ballots in the institution of ostracism. The article proposes that the joke references the final abolition of ostracism during Demetrius of Phalerum's reign and reveals Menander's support for the regime.

THIS paper seeks to elucidate the phenomenon known in psychology as 'the specious present,' by postulating a two-dimensional theory of the extensional aspects of time. On this theory, the usual logical and psychological difficulties, encountered in current accounts of this phenomenon, can be resolved. For, when there are two dimensions of time, the same event may be without extension in one of these dimensions ('transition-time'), while it is nevertheless finitely extended in the other of these dimensions ('phase-time'); so that in (...) a definable sense the phases of a finitely enduring event, though successive in one time-order, yet are contemporary in the other. The epistemological standpoint implicit in the paper is generally similar to the one Bertrand Russell has put forward, in his Physics and Experience (Cambridge, 1946), and his Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (London, 1948) (allowing for the changes which would be required in Russell's theory to take into account a second time dimension). A 'psycho-neural parallelism,' or one-one correspondence, is postulated between features of certain 'experiential events' (namely, those experiential events normally held to be happening to some person's mind, which are describable in the language of psychology); and features of certain 'physical events' (namely, those events described in the language of physics, chemistry and physiology, which are ordinarily conceived as happenings in that same person's body). These physical events are conceived of as being causally connected with events in the physical world outside the experient's body, by means of the concepts of light waves, sound waves, chemical stimuli, and consequential processes in the nervous system (central and peripheral) and sense-organs, in the usual way. In terms of this psycho-neural parallelism the physical correlate of the finite temporal span of the specious, or experiential present, is to be found in certain consequences of the uncertainty principle in quantum physics; according to which there is a finite interval of time necessarily associated with a nearly precise determination of energy levels, and of transitions between them. Some of the physical implications of this theory, applied to processes in the material structure of the human body, are discussed qualitatively. But, for the reasons given in the last section of the paper, a quantitative treatment is not yet possible. The paper is greatly indebted in regard to the physical application of the two-dimensional theory of time, to the discussion of the pentadic group structure in Eddington's Fundamental Theory (Cambridge, 1946 and 1950); and in particular to the treatment there of the phase-variable as the 'time-analogue' in the quantum statistics of stationary states. (shrink)

Clark and Chalmers (1998) have argued that mental states can be extended outside an organism.

The question of truth is bound to the question of the relation between identity and difference. Historically, the bond between truth and the primacy of identity was forged through the conviction that to speak of truth is to speak of being, or what is (the case). Since Parmenides, being becomes intelligible solely in relation to identity, or the One, with difference either being excluded from “what is” altogether, or as in Plato and Aristotle, finding its subordinate “place” within being. After (...) Hegel, whose thought accomplishes this “placing” in an absolute way, philosophy has sought to reverse this priority, while still insisting, necessarily, on thinking and speaking about what is the case, and therefore of truth. This essay raises the question of the coherence of this reversal. Characterizing the past century as the one in which philosophy’s aim was the overcoming of the perennial priority of identity, it attempts to show not only that post-Hegelian thought was at multiple levels divided on this aim, but that what Gillian Rose called the “metaphysics of pure difference” went uniquely awry—both in terms of its consequences and in its failure to maintain a genuinely critical relation to so-called “philosophies of representation.”. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Practical? Moral? The Moral Alternative Punishing Immorality Morality Regardless What About the Children? Getting Tough Moral Arguments for Prohibition Moral Arguments Against Prohibition Proportionality of Punishment.

This book originates from an international research program that is reassessing when and why modern careers emerged. With fifteen essays this volume brings together some of the most important results of this new field of research. Based upon the innovative use of micro-level historical sources, the contributions by economic and social historians reveal the emergence of identifiable career paths in a wide range of occupational settings in Europe and the Americas over the period 1800 to the end of World War (...) II. They highlight the economic and social forces that shaped the creation of both formal and informal career paths and led to their diffusion throughout the workforces of most developed economies by the early 1950s. (shrink)

In response to those who have argued the Internet is amoral at best, and an instrument for immorality at worst, we show that the net can provide a forum for genuine ethical engagement and distinctive forms of wrongdoing. Without deriving the moral value of the Internet from its interface with the non-virtual world and in contrast to presentations of the net as an anarchic utopia or as an unethical or amoral dystopia, we apply a substantive moral test to a selection (...) of online examples and ask can the net accommodate resistance to oppression that is necessary, though not sufficient, for justice? More precisely, we will ask whether Gandhian non-violent action is available to Cyberpunks? (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Wilfrid Sellars’ famous Myth of Jones. I argue the myth provides an ontologically austere account of thoughts and beliefs that makes sense of the full range of our folk psychological abilities. Sellars’ account draws on both Gilbert Ryle and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Ryle provides Sellars with the resources to make thoughts metaphysically respectable and Wittgenstein the resources to make beliefs rationally criticisable. By combining these insights into a single account, Sellars is able to see reasons as (...) causes and, hence, to respect the full range of our folk psychological generalisations. This is achieved by modelling folk psychological practice on theoretical reasoning. But despite frequent misinterpretation, Sellars does not claim that thoughts and beliefs are theoretical concepts. Thus, folk psychological explanation is not theoretical, and hence, it is not replaceable by scientific theory. Hence, scientific concepts will not eliminate folk psychological concepts. Thus, Sellars avoids eliminativism. (shrink)