This project will track and explain the development of the Doctrine of Divine Immutability from early mythological and scriptural source material that seems to indicate that divine entities are changeable into metaphysical systems that demand a perfectly consistent deity. The Doctrine of Divine Immutability is a philosophical and theological postulate that has long been a staple of systematic metaphysics and theology, but its function in robust and fully formed systems is different than its function when it is first generated in (...) Ancient Greece and Judah. Methodologically mostly primary sources are studied and compared with interpretive help from relevant secondary sources. Once the generation and evolution of this doctrine is understood, a more holistic understanding of the relationship between religion and philosophy will be evident. Additionally a more robust understanding of Middle Platonism and 1st and 2nd century Christianity and their relationship to Roman Stoicism will be achieved. Of particular importance to contemporary scholarship this work will allow us to understand the doctrine in its context and will shield us from anachronistic readings of the arguments that are bound to cause fundamental errors in scholarship. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to show that agency-based accounts of moral status are more plausible than many have previously thought. I do this by developing a novel account of moral status that takes agency, understood as the capacity for intentional action, to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the possession of moral status. This account also suggests that the capacities required for sentience entail the possession of agency, and the capacities required for agency, entail the possession of sentience. (...) Thus on this account sentient beings possess agency and agents possess sentience. If this is correct, it will show that an Agency Account of moral status can offer a plausible defence of the moral status of all sentient beings, something that previous Agency Accounts have not succeeded in doing. What is more, this account could establish that all sentient animals are not just moral status holders per se, but that they are owed pro tanto obligations regarding continued existence and liberty, similar in kind, though not always in strength, to those owed to humans. (shrink)

Neuroeconomics illustrates our deepening descent into the details of individual cognition. This descent is guided by the implicit assumption that “individual human” is the important “agent” of neoclassical economics. I argue here that this assumption is neither obviously correct, nor of primary importance to human economies. In particular I suggest that the main genius of the human species lies with its ability to distribute cognition across individuals, and to incrementally accumulate physical and social cognitive artifacts that largely obviate the innate (...) biological limitations of individuals. If this is largely why our economies grow, then we should be much more interested in distributed cognition in human groups, and correspondingly less interested in individual cognition. We should also be much more interested in the cultural accumulation of cognitive artefacts: computational devices and media, social structures and economic institutions. (shrink)

The prevalent views of animal liberty among animal advocates suggest that liberty is merely instrumentally valuable and invasive paternalism is justified. In contrast to this popular view, I argue that liberty is intrinsically good for animals. I suggest that animal well-being is best accommodated by an Objective List Theory and that liberty is an irreducible component of animal well-being. As such, I argue that it is good for animals to possess liberty even if possessing liberty does not contribute towards their (...) subjective well-being, and even in some cases where it has a negative effect upon their subjective well-being. To establish this view I argue that if animals are agents, as I assume they are, then like humans they must be able to determine the course of their own lives (to some extent). Further, having the opportunity to self-determine one’s life just is the very same thing as liberty, and having the opportunity to determine the course of one’s life is intrinsically good. Thus liberty has intrinsic value for humans and animals. So, in addition to the instrumental harms of having one’s liberty restricted, I claim that restricting animals’ liberty in principle harms them because it undermines their capacity for self-determination and fails to acknowledge their authority as agents to make their own choices. (shrink)

Volume 30, Issue 3, September 2024, Page 248-250.

Like many recent works in legal theory, especially those focusing on the apparently conflicting schools of legal positivism and natural law, Waluchow’s Inclusive Legal Positivism begins by admitting a degree of perplexity about the field; indeed, he suggests that the field has fallen into “chaos”. Disturbingly, those working within legal theory appear most uncertain about what the tasks of their field are. Legal philosophers often seem to suspect strongly that at least their colleagues in the field are confused about those (...) tasks. As a result, many recent books in legal theory are in large part exercises in legal metatheory, devoting many pages to attempts to define the purposes and goals of the field. Waluchow follows this trend and begins by expressing a desire to clarify the issues that separate those trying to give an account of the nature of law. His ultimate goal is to defend a version of legal positivism, inclusive legal positivism, that he thinks is at least implicit in H. L. A. Hart’s work. (shrink)

This article investigates the ways in which discourses and experiences of health and healing have shaped the development of contemporary dance in France. It confronts the problem of how to situate contemporary dance in relation to other dance genres and suggests Robert Desjarlais’ concept of the ‘aesthetic of experience’ as a helpful framework for understanding the ways in which technique and virtuosity operate differently in contemporary dance than in other dance forms. The article is ethnographic and historical and attempts to (...) create a dialogue between dance studies and medical anthropology. The ethnographic and historical material has three parts. First, I offer an analysis of the cultural idiom of illness as blocageand argue that contemporary dancers in Aix-en-Provence experience their work as a form of healing or dÈblocage. Next, I show how two historical and political events in France led to the promotion of dance as a means of social reform: (1) the Situationist art movement of the 1960s and its idea of ‘awakening’ society through public art; and (2) the renovation of the French Ministry of Culture in 1982 and its subsequent promotion of contemporary dance in state-funded community outreach projects in the 1980s. Finally, drawing on rich narratives from fieldwork interviews, I define awareness, expression and presence as the primary technical elements of contemporary dance in Aix-en-Provence, France, in 2002, and explain their relationship to the notion of ‘dance as l'intervention’ that has grown out of the historical context of contemporary dance in France. (shrink)

It is generally accepted that ought-statements can be used to justify other ought-statements. In more familiar language: we can justify our acts, motives, and character by various standards, principles, or criteria; and we can justify those standards by more ultimate standards. But how can we justify our most ultimate standards, if we have any? This act is wrong, I conclude, because it would be the telling of a lie to one who trusts me; and the telling of such a lie (...) is wrong, I may argue, because such lies normally disrupt communication and confidence; and such disruption is wrong, the utilitarian may argue, because it causes distress or pain for the people involved, without compensatory satisfaction or pleasure. Why then, we may ask the utilitarian, is it wrong to cause uncompensated pain? Principles may be justified by higher principles, but if we have a highest principle, then simply by virtue of being highest it cannot be justified in that way. So the is-ought question becomes the more specific question, how can we decide whether to accept anybody's proposal of an ethical first principle? To use J. S. Mill's phrase, what "considerations... capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold its assent" can be given for such a principle? (shrink)

Journal Name: Cognitive Linguistics Issue: Ahead of print.

Integrating personality, behavioral, and cognitive theories of change, the author examines the operations, measurement, and evolution of behavioral and ethical standards that distinguish capitalism from other ideologies.

Global migration raises important ethical issues. One of the most significant is the question of whether liberal democratic societies have strong moral obligations to admit immigrants. Historically, most philosophers have argued that liberal states are morally free to restrict immigration at their discretion, with few exceptions. Recently, however, liberal egalitarians have begun to challenge this conventional view in two lines of argument. The first contends that immigration restrictions are inconsistent with basic liberal egalitarian values, including freedom and moral equality. The (...) second maintains that affluent, liberal democratic societies are morally obligated to admit immigrants as a partial response to global injustices, such as poverty and human rights violations. This article surveys the main philosophical arguments for these positions on immigration and discusses the critical responses to these arguments. (shrink)

The emerging discipline of educational neuroscience stands at a crossroads between those who see great promise in integrating neuroscience and education and those who see the disciplinary divide as insurmountable. However, such tension is at least partly due to the hitherto predominance of philosophy and theory over the establishment of concrete mechanisms and agents of change. If educational neuroscience is to move forward and emerge as a distinct discipline in its own right, the traditional boundaries and methods must be bridged, (...) and an infrastructure must be in place that allows for collaborative and productive exchange. In the present paper, we argue that school psychologists have the potential to fulfill this need and represent important agents of change in establishing better connections between research and practice. More specifically, we use theNational Association of School Psychologists (NASP) (2020)Domains of Practice to highlight several areas where school psychology can actively support forging connections between neuroscience and educational practice. School psychologists represent untapped potential in their knowledge, skillset, and placement to serve a vital role in building the bridge between neuroscience and education. (shrink)

In Justice for People on the Move, Gillian Brock develops a promising, original account of migration justice. In her view, states have a robust (though conditional) right to self-determination, which includes a reasonably strong right to regulate migration. However, in order for these rights to be justified, three legitimacy requirements must be met. Most obviously, states must respect the human rights of their own citizens and the international state system itself must be legitimate. This latter condition also requires states to (...) do their part in sustaining a justified state system, which includes helping to alleviate “legitimacy gaps,” including significant human rights violations in other states. Brock uses this framework to address several pressing migration-related policy issues, including Muslim bans, the deportation of unauthorized migrants, temporary labor migration, and refugee protection. However, one topic is notably absent from her analysis: climate-related displacement. Some theorists insist that climate change migrants should not be considered refugees because they do not fit the standard definition of a refugee. In particular, climate migrants were displaced by droughts, floods, storms, or sea level rise rather than by war or persecution, and many are able to remain in their homes at present but will be forced to relocate at some point in the future. This paper explores the implications of Brock’s theory of migration justice for climate migration. I suggest that although her approach to refugee protection may initially appear to exclude climate migrants, her understanding of right to self-determination yields strong obligations to assist them. I take this to be a strength of her framework, which makes an important, albeit indirect, contribution to current debates on climate change migration. (shrink)

Entrevista com o geógrafo brasileiro Milton Santos, onde ele faz uma profunda reflexão sobre o Brasil e o mundo atual, abordando criticamente temas como a globalização, a ideologização da vida social, a geografia como disciplina crítica e o papel do intelectual nos dias atuais.

This paper raises two objections to the freedom of movement argument from the perspective of nonideal philosophy: the argument cannot provide a means for establishing admissions priorities when all prospective immigrants cannot be admitted and it ignores alternative grounds for moral claims to admission in the context of histories of injustice. I develop an alternative admissions-guiding principle that assigns strong moral claims to admission to certain prospective immigrants based on a global extension of the no-harm principle. It claims that a (...) society must admit prospective immigrants if admission is necessary either to prevent that society from harming those immigrants or to compensate immigrants whom it has already harmed. States must fulfill these duties before they may legitimately use immigrant admissions policy in service of other national goals, including the advancement of economic interests. (shrink)

Central to the social membership model of animal rights is the claim that relations with nonhuman animals should be reorganized such that domesticated animals are recognized as members of our shared societies. Though some elements of the membership model remain contested, the core of the membership model is that domesticated animals have a claim on, and a direct entitlement to, the benefits of cooperative relations. For many political theorists, however, distributive justice considerations apply only to a certain kind of cooperative (...) relationship. The community of justice recipients is thought to be limited by what Brian Berkey calls the Contribution/Capacity Basis of Entitlement. Accordingly, justice considerations apply to a scheme of cooperation and a conception of justice “entail[s] direct entitlements only for those who are contributors, or, alternatively, those who at least possess the capacities that are necessary to be capable of contributing to such a scheme”. This thesis – referred to as ‘contributionism’ – has typically been utilized to exclude nonhuman animals from justice considerations. The paper argues that contributionism is not fundamentally at odds with justice for domesticated animals, and conversely that contributionism remains a useful conceptual tool for explaining resource sharing with these nonhuman animals. (shrink)

Analyzes the varied discourse on values and ethics. Addresses the need for self-scrutiny and explores leadership, the professoriate, and campus culture. Also examines academic integrity, freedom of speech, and the conflict between individual rights and the needs of the academic community.

The author of Ejaculate Responsibly, Gabrielle Blair, does not find the current discussion around abortion satisfactory: too much emphasis is put on the woman’s role in a pregnancy, when it is the...

All of us, including scientists, make judgments about what is true or false, probable or improbable. And in the process, we frequently appeal to concepts such as evidential support or explanation. Bayesian philosophers of science have given illuminating formal accounts of these concepts. This paper aims to follow in their footsteps, providing a novel formal account of various additional concepts: the likelihood-prior trade-off, successful accommodation of evidence, ad hocness, and, finally, consilience—sometimes also called “unification”. Using these accounts, I also provide (...) a new Bayesian analysis of how someone such as Charles Darwin hypothetically could have reasoned in favor of evolution over special creationism. Lastly, I explore how these accounts relate to other topics and accounts in philosophy, and I chart out some areas for further research. (shrink)

Some animal defenders are committed to complete abstinence from animal products. However the strongest arguments for adopting veganism only seem to require that one avoid using animal products, where use or procurement of these products will harm sentient animals. As such, there is seemingly a gap between our intuition and our argument. In this article I attempt to defend the more comprehensive claim that we have a moral reason to avoid using animal products, regardless of the method of procurement. I (...) argue that animal bodies give rise to properties which grant sentient animals’ moral status and in light of this, animal bodies possess final value in themselves. This final value gives us a moral reason not to commodify animal bodies, which means we have a defeasible reason to abstain from using animal products in almost all circumstances. (shrink)

It is seemingly bad for animals to have their desires modified in at least some cases, for instance where brainwashing or neurological manipulation takes place. In humans, many argue that such modification interferes with our positive liberty or undermines our autonomy but this explanation is inapplicable in the case of animals as they lack the capacity for autonomy in the relevant sense. As such, the standard view has been that, despite any intuitions to the contrary, the modification of animals’ desires (...) is not harmful (at least not in itself). In this article, I offer a different perspective on this issue, laying the foundations of a novel argument in defence of the view that animals _can_ be harmed by desire modification directly. I suggest that the modification of an animal’s desires (under certain circumstances) is harmful for that animal because it undermines their agency. (shrink)

The principle of indifference has fallen from grace in contemporary philosophy, yet some papers have recently sought to vindicate its plausibility. This paper follows suit. In it, I articulate a version of the principle and provide what appears to be a novel argument in favour of it. The argument relies on a thought experiment where, intuitively, an agent’s confidence in any particular outcome being true should decrease with the addition of outcomes to the relevant space of possible outcomes. Put simply: (...) the greater the number of outcomes, the weaker your confidence should be in any one of those outcomes. The argument holds that this intuition favours the principle of indifference. I point out that, in contrast, the intuition is also incompatible with a major alternative to the principle which prescribes imprecise credences: the so-called wide interval view. Consequently, the argument may also be seen as an argument against the wide interval view. (shrink)

This study provides a unified framework within which to view the development of pre-Socratic thought. It points out three aspects of Xenophanes' scepticism, and shows how Heraclitus responded to each. Key issues concerning psyche and logos are summarized and an attempt is made to settle certain long-standing debates concerning them.

There is not, of course, a one-to-one relation between policy conclusions and the conclusions of positive economics; if there were, there would be no ...

The antibiotic streptomycin was discovered soon after penicillin was introduced into medicine. Selman Waksman, who was awarded the Nobel Prize for the discovery, has since generally been credited as streptomycin's sole discoverer. However, one of Waksman's graduate students, Albert Schatz, was legally recognized as streptomycin's co-discoverer and received a share of the royalties from the drug. The aim of this essay is to discuss the streptomycin story, largely using previously unquoted archival material, and in particular to provide further evidence for (...) the important role which Schatz played in the discovery. (shrink)