In this chapter I discuss the relation between imaginative perception and moral creativity. I focus on three authors that have explained moral imagination as imaginative perception. Iris Murdoch, Martha Nussbaum, and Cora Diamond have all argued how we use imagination to transform our perspective of moral situations. However, their central examples demonstrate the importance of morally inventive action as well. I argue that this reveals another mode of moral imagination: moral creativity. While a creative process might build on imaginative perception, (...) moral creativity includes inventive responses to moral problems that are not necessarily given by seeing the world in another way. (shrink)

Moral perception is typically understood as moral properties perception, i.e., the perceptual registration of moral properties such as wrongness or dignity. In this article, I defend a view of moral perception as a process that involves imaginative apprehension of reality. It is meant as an adjustment to the dominant view of moral perception as moral properties perception and as an addition to existing Murdochian approaches to moral perception. The view I present here builds on Iris Murdoch’s moral psychology and holds (...) that moral perception is an imaginative exploration of the particularity of concrete objects of moral reality (e.g., persons, situations, and events), rather than a registration of moral properties. I argue that such imaginative apprehension includes direct and reflective uses of imagination and that this process grounds experiential moral knowledge that serves the ultimate role of moral perception: getting a better grip on concrete objects of moral reality. (shrink)

Ratajczyk, Z., Subsystems of true arithmetic and hierarchies of functions, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 64 95–152. The combinatorial method coming from the study of combinatorial sentences independent of PA is developed. Basing on this method we present the detailed analysis of provably recursive functions associated with higher levels of transfinite induction, I, and analyze combinatorial sentences independent of I. Our treatment of combinatorial sentences differs from the one given by McAloon [18] and gives more natural sentences. The (...) same method give also a combinatorial technique with no use of the cut-elimination theorem which is appropriate to study proof-theoretic strength of subsystems of first order arithmetic and some of their expansions. It was used to analyze iterated reflection principle and system of transfinite induction with a satisfaction class. (shrink)

Author: Domaradzki Mikołaj Title: SYMBOL AND ALLEGORY IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL EXEGESIS OF THE STOICS (Symbol i alegoria w filozoficznej egzegezie stoików) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 719-736 Keywords: STOIC EXEGESIS, SYMBOL, ALLEGORY, CHRYSIPPUS, CORNUTUS, HERACLITUS THE ALLEGORIST Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The present paper aims to ascertain whether, and if so, to what extent the modern distinction between the concepts of ‘symbol’ and ‘allegory’ can be (...) applied to Stoic hermeneutical activity. The philosophy of the Stoics invites such a discussion, since the philosophers were the first thinkers in antiquity to actually have used the terms with reference to the process of retrieving the hidden meaning of various literary constructions. Thus, Chrysippus’ interpretation of the myth of Athena’s birth provides the point of departure for our considerations, since it is in the philosopher’s exegesis that we find the very first use of the word ‘symbol’ understood as a theoretical tool for interpreting texts. Subsequently, the article proceeds to discuss the interpretations of the same myth that were presented by Cornutus and Heraclitus who use the words ‘symbol’ and ‘allegory’ interchangeably. While the paper argues that in none of the cases analyzed do we find an understanding of the terms ‘symbol’ or ‘allegory’ that would entirely correspond to modern definitions of the terms, it also stresses that the impossibility of classifying Stoic interpretations as either solely ‘symbolical’ or solely ‘allegorical’ does not diminish the cultural import of Stoic hermeneutical activity. (shrink)

The aim of the present article is to demonstrate that the hermeneutical activity of Lucius Annaeus Cornutus is best characterized as ‘ethnographical’ rather than merely ‘allegorical.’ Without denying the presence of allegorical interpretation in the philosopher’s work, the paper establishes that Cornutus’ etymological interpretations aimed first and foremost to extract the archaic vision of the world that motivated every theogony. Thus, the philosopher regarded conventional mythology and traditional religion as sources of information about the primeval accounts of the cosmos: his (...) analyses of various etymologies discovered not merely the origin of the word in question but, first of all, the origin of the ancient world picture that underlay the particular system of beliefs. As a result of this, interpreting myths was for Cornutus tantamount to gaining profound insights into the mind of primordial man and his world. Key words CORNUTUS, ALLEGORY, MYTH. (shrink)

This article confronts two different evaluations of the narrative identity paradigm in order to examine the possibility of a minimal narrative, practical identity without excessive stress on psychic unity and moral wholeness. It consists of three sections. The first part explains the criticisms of Lippitt and Quinn. Both authors warn of the MacIntyrean narrative model's emphasis on psychic unity and moral wholeness and argue for an ethical thinking that is built around concepts of psychic disunity and moral openness. The second (...) section introduces thoughts of Korsgaard and Frankfurt as having one important intuition in common: both their insights express the idea that our identity conceptions are intimately connected with processes of practical and moral reasoning; the ways in which we see ourselves are significant for the ways in which we act. Their sort-like conclusions are linked to the insights of Kennett and Matthews, who argue with help of empirical research on Dissociative Identity Disorder and psychopathy that we should understand our practical identity conceptions narratively. The third and last section shows how the insights of the first and second sections can be brought together in a truthful vision of moral reasoning and the moral person. It argues for a more realistic perspective on morality without altogether banishing narrative thinking, centred on the concept of moral responsiveness. This results in the affirmation of a basal practical, narrative identity and the acceptance of qualities as improvisation and imagination in moral reasoning. (shrink)

Sophie-Grace Chappell’s recent book Epiphanies is wide-ranging and illuminating, just like its central subject. One basic motif is the ubiquity of value and value expe- rience in the ethical life: we are immersed in a value-laden reality and morality is rooted in this often epiphanic value experience. This results in an emphasis on a broad receptiveness to the surrounding world. One possible pitfall of such an approach could be the reduction of human beings to ethically passive perceivers, waiting for epiphanies (...) to strike them. However, I think such a reading of Epiphanies would be incorrect. Chappell realizes how the ethical life entails more than just passive reception and contemplation; that both the passive and the active parts of the ethical life are important and related. In this article, I aim to avoid the suggested misreading by focussing on one phenomenon that is a good illustration of this interrelation and that is strongly related to epiphanies: creativity. (shrink)

Author: Domaradzki Mikołaj Title: HUMANISTIC INTERPRETATION AND THE PROBLEM OF ANCIENT ALLEGORESIS (Interpretacja humanistyczna a problem starożytnej alegorezy) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.12, number: 2011/1, pages: 361-372 Keywords: ANCIENT ALLEGORESIS, HERMENEUTICS, METRODORUS OF LAMPSACUS, HUMANISTIC INTERPRETATION, JERZY KMITA Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The purpose of the article is to present the phenomenon of allegorical interpretation as one of most important cultural events that has ultimately resulted in the emergence (...) of modern hermeneutics. More specifically, the paper argues that the hermeneutical activity of Metrodorus of Lampsacus embodies the practice that is nowadays commonly referred to as ‘humanistic interpretation’. Having established that the exegesis of Metrodorus can be characterized as a type of humanistic interpretation, the article proceeds to demonstrate that the allegoresis in question was in fact adaptive in its nature. While Metrodorus’ ideas are suggested to have possibly contributed to the philosophical overcoming of the so called syncretic-magical thinking, the allegorical support of the transformation of mythos into logos is analyzed within the framework of Jerzy Kmita’s theory of culture. (shrink)

Le but de cet article est de démontrer que l’étymologie faisait intégralement partie de la théologie stoïcienne. Suivant leur conception panthéiste et hylozoiste du cosmos, les stoïciens utilisaient l’étymologie pour découvir diverses manifestations de Dieu dans l’univers. Ainsi, la thèse principale de cet article est de montrer que, dans le stoïcisme, l’étymologie était moins une étude sur l’histoire des mots que l’étude de la façon dont Dieu se développe et se manifeste à travers divers phénomènes de notre monde. Attendu que (...) pour les stoïciens le fait d’étudier les noms des dieux équivalait à rechercher Dieu, l’étymologie jouait un triple rôle : premièrement, elle était un moyen de rendre un culte à Dieu; deuxièmement, elle était une manière d’interpréter la poésie; et, enfin, elle était un outil de transformation de sa propre existence. Par conséquent, cet article se veut une recherche sur la dimension théologique, allégorique et existentielle de l’étymologie stoïcienne. (shrink)

Problem duša–um–tijelo, drevno je pitanje koje je mučilo mnoge filozofe. Još od Platona i predstoika mnogi su filozofi pokušavali odgovoriti na pitanja odnosa između tih “dijelova”. Ovaj rad je pregled teorije o holonima koju je predložio Arthur Koestler i njezinih implikacija u modernoj kinematografiji, posebno na primjeru anime filma Ghost in the Shell. Postoje mnoga pitanja koja su aktualna i povezana s problemom duha i tijela, a koja proizlaze iz moderne kinematografije i TV emisija, no obično su zanemarena ili previđena. (...) U tim serijama i filmovima nalazimo suvremene ideje o kiborzima i transhumanizmu koje je spomenuti anime film popularizirao. Većina suvremenih serija bliža je transhumanizmu i postmodernizmu, no zbog opsega članka, biti će spomenute samo imenom.Drugi problem koji se nameće u modernoj kinematografiji je individualizam i egocentrizam koji nije usmjeren na transcendentalno ili čak transcendentno. Namjera ovog rada je pokazati da kroz Koestlerove ideje o holonima moramo uzeti u obzir širi pristup transhumanizmu, te da taj pristup ne smije biti fokusiran samo i isključivo na pojedinca. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to reconstruct Aristotle’s distinction between primary substances and their homonyms. It is shown that the Stagirite regards both body parts and artefacts as mere homonyms of primary substances when they are no longer capable of performing their function (ergon) and actualizing their end (telos). In the course of the present discussion, Aristotle’s approach is confronted with his famous doctrine of the four causes, whilst an analysis of the examples given by the Stagirite serves the (...) purpose of determining the ontic status of homonyms. Subsequently, this paper argues that Aristotle’s hylomorphism not only defies the functionalist assumption of the irrelevance of matter but also precludes the possibility of equating artefacts with living organisms. The discussion concludes with an observation that primary substances which are truly (alēthōs) and things which are only homonymously (plēn homōnymōs) require different definitions. (shrink)

We argue that while it is a valuable contribution, Carruthers' model may be too restrictive to elaborate our understanding of the development of mindreading and metacognition, or to enrich our knowledge of individual differences and psychopathology. To illustrate, we describe pertinent examples where there may be a critical interplay between primitive social-cognitive processes and emerging self-attributions.

The aim of the article is to confront normative pre-assumptions of Marx’s and Freud’s emancipatory projects. Considerations on axiological presuppositions of the projects under discussion come to the conclusion that an argument between psychoanalysis and Marxism has its source in the two mutually exclusive systems of values whereas the psychoanalytical critique of Marxism remains the legacy of a conflict dating back to the beginnings of the Enlightenment. The article claims that a confrontation of Freud’s emancipatory project with that of Marx’s (...) means a confrontation of two traditions: according to the first one — pessimistic and referring to Hobbes — man is bad by nature, whereas the other — optimistic and deriving from Locke — man is good by nature. The final conclusion, thus, is a statement that though both Marx and Freud were certain that their emancipatory projects were devoid of not only metaphysical presuppositions, but also metaphysical conclusions, a Freudian critique of Marxism refers to an axiological argument between Locke and Hobbes. Because both in psychoanalysis and Marxism a descriptive order is intricately intertwined with a normative one. The conflict between the two emancipatory projects must remain ilsolluble owing to the antagonistic axiological presuppositions. (shrink)

This paper discusses Aristotle’s account of multivocity as expounded in Topics 1.15. This article argues that an inquiry into how many ways something is said becomes for Aristotle a tool of dialectical examination that he employs throughout his entire philosophical career: investigating the many/multiple ways something is said allows one to recognize the ambiguity of the term in question and, consequently, to construct an adequate definition of its referent. The present study reconstructs the various strategies for detecting ambiguity and discusses (...) its different types. Subsequently, the paper accounts for why Aristotle moves so easily from words and their meanings to things and their essences. Finally, the article presents an analysis of the connection between the many ways something is said and the various categories it is predicated in. The considerations are supported by a new translation of Topics 1.15. (shrink)

[…] Głównym wnioskiem płynącym z niniejszej próby syntetycznego zestawienia wybranych analogii pomiędzy sceptyczną a Nietzscheańską krytyką poznania jest, iż rzeczonych krytyk nie należy traktować jako rozważań jałowych, nieproduktywnych czy wręcz czysto destruktywnych. Podnosząc problem konstruowania świata, obie krytyki zwiększyły bowiem naszą samoświadomość interpretacji. Jeżeli zaś sceptycy i Nietzsche zgadzają się w tym, iż dostępne nam są jedynie perspektywiczne przekłamania rzeczywistości, a nie „prawdziwa rzeczywistość”, to oba projekty łączy gruntowna krytyka naiwnego realizmu. […] pragniemy podkreślić – wbrew wielokrotnie wygłaszanym sądom, podług (...) których sceptycyzm był przejawem upadku greckiej myśli – iż naszym zdaniem sceptycyzm jest jednym z najważniejszych wydarzeń nie tylko w historii filozofii starożytnej, ale w dziejach historii filozofii w ogóle. Jest on bowiem pierwszą na taką skalę przeprowadzoną, systematyczną próbą zakwestionowania wszelkich roszczeń do posiadania prawdy absolutnej. Co sofistyka rozpoczęła, w sceptycyzmie osiągnęło swą akme, a wedle perspektywy proponowanej w niniejszym artykule otwiera się możliwość spojrzenia na sceptyków jako na myślicieli, którzy występując przeciwko absolutnej prawdzie dogmatyków, przygotowali grunt pod myślenie pluralistyczne. (shrink)

The article aims to confront the skeptical critique of cognition with Nietzsche’s refutation of classical epistemology. Irrespective of some striking analogies, it does not purport that skepticism exerted direct impact on Nietzsche’s philosophy. Nevertheless, both critiques reject such a type of philosophy that endeavors to discover the very nature of things and both repudiate the dogmatic dichotomy of the ‘apparent’ and the ‘true’ world that since Plato has become an integral part of nearly every metaphysical project. The ancient skeptics and (...) Nietzsche demonstrate that every cognition is determined by various physiological, social and cultural contexts and, consequently, the Greek thinkers seem to agree with the German philosopher that concepts such as ‘reality’ or ‘world’ are but interpretations conditioned by the very structure of the human sense organs and basic human needs. In the light of the contingent and situational character of our knowledge, the skeptics and Nietzsche dethrone the discourse of science and philosophy by showing not only the genesis of our propositions but also the possibility of opposite, yet equally justified, propositions. Thus, ‘world’ transpires to be a necessary illusion and every attempt at explaining it is relegated to the position of just one of the manifold perspectives attainable. In the final analysis, the article offers a reevaluation of the skeptical project, as it advances a thesis that the ancient and Nietzschean skepticisms show the insurmountable limitations of every cognition, protest against any endeavor to establish an absolute account of reality and, thereby, opt for a continuous striving for new interpretations and perspectives. (shrink)